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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 This thesis addresses Guy Debord's theory of spectacle through its primary 
philosophical and theoretical influences. Through doing so it highlights the importance 
of his largely overlooked concerns with time and history, and interprets the theory on 
that basis. The theory of spectacle is shown to be not simply a critique of the mass 
media, as is often assumed, but rather an account of a relationship with history; or more 
specifically, an alienated relation to the construction of history. This approach thus 
offers a means of addressing Debord’s Hegelian Marxism. The thesis connects the latter 
to Debord’s interests in strategy, chance and play by way of its existential elements, and 
uses these themes to investigate his own and the Situationist International’s (S.I.) 
concerns with praxis, political action and organisation.  
 Addressing Debord and the S.I.’s work in this way also highlights the 
shortcomings of the theory of spectacle. The theory is based upon the separation of an 
acting subject from his or her own actions, and in viewing capitalist society under this 
rubric it tends towards replacing Marx's presentation of capital as an antagonistic social 
relation with an abstract opposition between an alienated consciousness and a 
homogenised world. Yet whilst the theory itself may be problematic, the conceptions of 
time, history and subjectivity that inform it may be of greater interest. Drawing attention 
to Debord's claims that theories should be understood as strategic interventions, and also 
to the S.I.'s calls for their own supersession, the thesis uses its observations on the 
nature of Debord's Hegelian Marxism to cast the theory of spectacle as a particular 
moment within a broader notion of historical agency. It thus contends that Debord's 
work can be seen to imply a model of collective political will, and offers initial 
suggestions as to how that interpretation might be developed.  
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Preface 
 
 
 In 1979, seven years after the Situationist International's (S.I.) dissolution, Guy 
Debord claimed that “the S.I. is like radioactivity: one speaks little of it, but one detects 
traces of it almost everywhere, and it lasts a long time.”1 Today however one might 
counter that the group and its practices are in fact spoken of a great deal, and perhaps to 
the detriment of their corruptive aspirations. The S.I.’s anti-art stance has been 
canonised into the pantheon of art history, 'psychogeography' and détournement have 
become tropes of popular culture, and Situationist material is now a staple of both the 
bookshop and the lecture hall. This popularity has led to a level of official acceptance 
that may once have seemed surprising: in 1966 the judge presiding over the closure of 
Strasbourg University's student union declared that Situationist ideas were “eminently 
noxious”, and held that their “diffusion in both student circles and among the general 
public” constituted a genuine “threat”;2 today, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
actively supports the dissemination of Situationist texts as a means of promoting French 
culture overseas,3 and the French State has recently gone so far as to purchase Debord’s 
archives for the nation. This acquisition, which prevented the collection’s sale and 
relocation to Yale University, prompted Sarkozy’s minister of culture to describe 
Debord as a “great French intellectual”,4 and led the President of the National Library 
of France to deem his work a “national treasure”.5 The disparity between the group’s 
past notoriety and their contemporary endorsement is thus sharp, and perhaps rai
questions pertaining to their theoretical legacy: it may, for example, lead the 
uncharitable to ask whether this material was ever quite as 'noxious' as was once 
supposed; conversely, one might also be led to consider whether the predominant 
interpretations of Debord and the S.I.’s oeuvre have omitted the latter’s purportedly 
‘radioactive’ elements.
ses 
                                                
6  
 This thesis will attempt to offer responses to such questions by focussing on 
Debord’s theory of ‘spectacle’, which is perhaps the most prominent and celebrated 
aspect of the Situationist corpus. My contention will be that its critique of capital's 
 
1 Debord 1979  
2 Quoted in Dark Star 2001, p.9 
3    The most recent English translation of The Real Split in the International was “supported by the 
French Ministry for Foreign Affairs” and the Institut Français du Royaume Uni (S.I. 2003, p.v).  
4 Gallix 2009 
5 Rousell 2009 
6 See Clark and Nicholson-Smith 2004 for a related critique of the S.I.’s incorporation into the canon of 
art history.  
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appearances is itself rooted within those appearances,7 and that this has perhaps 
facilitated its reduction – as predicted by its own author in 1967 – to the status of “just 
another empty formula of sociologico-political rhetoric”.8 However, I'll also show that a 
close and critical analysis of the theory can yield a set of ideas and themes that remain 
largely overlooked within the existing literature. Not only do these ideas serve to 
illuminate Debord’s work as a whole: in addition, I’ll suggest that they may be of 
greater contemporary interest than the theory of spectacle itself.  
 In this latter respect, and in keeping with the essentially Hegelian content of my 
subject matter, I've tried to adopt the maxim that “the refutation” should “properly 
consist in the further development of the principle”.9 To that end, and as far as is 
possible, the thesis will take Debord and the S.I. on their own terms: their work will be 
read through the philosophical and theoretical influences that inform it, and through 
indicating these lines of development and influence I’ll attempt to provide a detailed 
reading able to identify the theory’s shortcomings and contradictions. I will not 
therefore be taking the S.I.'s work as a discrete, given corpus that can be measured 
against more recent theories of deconstruction, assemblage, event, etc. (although 
connections to contemporary debates will be signalled where relevant); instead, I’ll try 
to show the ways in which aspects of this material might be seen to point beyond their 
own extant formulations.  
 The primary elements of Debord's oeuvre that I'll attempt to draw out in this 
respect are his Hegelian Marxist views on praxis, and I'll place particular emphasis on 
the connections between the latter and his interests in temporality and strategic agency. 
Admittedly, Debord's interest in strategy has received greater acknowledgement since 
the re-release of his Game of War (2006; 2007 in English), but I would argue that this 
interest remains largely unexplored. I would also suggest that this is due to a broader 
failure to address the primarily Hegelian notions of time, subjectivity and history that 
structure Debord’s work. These latter concerns have little to no place within what seems 
at times to be the popular understanding of the theory of spectacle, which is frequently 
depicted as a simple diatribe about society's saturation with visual media. It’s thus 
pertinent to recall that in The Society of the Spectacle itself (1967) Debord describes the 
“mass media” as the spectacle's “most stultifyingly superficial manifestation”,10 and 
 
7 My claims are close to those of Dauvé here, according to whom Debord “made a study of the 
profound, through and by means of the superficial appearance” (Dauvé 1979). 
8    Debord 1995, p.143; 2006, p.852 
9 Hegel 1977, p.13 
10 Debord 1995, p.19; 2006, p.772 
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states that the spectacle “cannot be understood as a product of the technology of the 
mass dissemination of images.”11 In contrast to such readings, this thesis will stress the 
sense in which the spectacle should be understood – and I quote again from The Society 
of the Spectacle – as a “paralysed history”: as an “abandonment of any history founded 
in historical time”, and as “a false consciousness of time.”12 Rather than a simple 
complaint as to the functional import of the media and mass entertainment within 
modern capitalism, Debord's theory is a description of a society that has become 
separated from its own historical agency. This thesis will attempt to explore the nature 
and implications of that notion of agency.  
 My interpretation of Debord’s theory will be set out in the thesis' general 
introduction, which also offers initial commentary on some of the existing literature on 
the subject (further remarks in this regard will be included in later sections of the 
thesis). My aim in the introduction is to demonstrate that addressing Debord's oeuvre 
through its concerns with time and history illuminates a number of connections between 
some of the more seemingly disparate elements of his work. I’ll also show that the links 
that can thus be inferred between his concerns with temporality and strategy may afford 
insight into his Hegelian Marxism. In making that case – and by way of a brief 
overview of the theory of spectacle's primary problems – I'll present an initial argument 
as to the comparative merits of Debord's views on historical action vis a vis those of the 
theory of spectacle itself. The grounds and implications of that claim will then be 
developed throughout the thesis as a whole.  
 The rest of the thesis is composed of three sections, each of which is bracketed 
by an introduction and a conclusion. Part one attempts to clarify the temporal 
dimensions of Situationist subjectivity, setting out the ideas that inform the theory of 
spectacle; part two offers a detailed account and critique of the latter; part three then 
indicates the ways in which the material identified in part one might be developed in the 
light of the problems set out in part two. The thesis' movement through these three 
sections is also broadly chronological. Part one makes its claims by addressing the S.I.'s 
avant-garde beginnings in the late 1950's; part two is centred around Debord and the 
S.I.'s work in the 1960's, with a particular focus on 1967's The Society of the Spectacle; 
part three addresses the interests in time and strategy that come to the fore in Debord’s 
later years, and discusses 1988's Comments on the Society of the Spectacle.  
 The movement between the three parts of the thesis is also a route towards 
 
11 Debord 1995, pp.12-3; 2006, p.767 
12 Debord 1995, p.114; 2006, p.834 
9 
addressing the nature, implications and potential relevance of the historical subjectivity 
implied by Debord's Hegelian Marxism, and each part of the thesis thus takes up a 
different aspect of the latter. The issue of historical closure is considered in part one; 
totality and alienation are addressed in part two; praxis is discussed in part three. In 
order to facilitate this and to link the diverse sources and arguments involved each of 
the three parts of the thesis employs a theme that corresponds to the issues under 
consideration. Tragedy serves as a motif for dialectical resolution in part one; Hegel's 
interest in the unification of universality and particularity provides a means of 
discussing alienation in part two; historical agency and self-determination provide ways 
of addressing the relation between freedom and the 'circularity' of Hegelian logic in part 
three. The content of the three parts of the thesis can be sketched as follows. 
 Part one addresses the Hegelian and existential aspects of Debord's views on 
time via the S.I.'s desire to unite art and life through the construction of 'situations': a 
unification that was to give rise to an inherently 'open' future of subjective self-
determination. In considering the influences that inform this, part one also addresses the 
ways in which the famed 'restlessness' of Hegelian negativity was presented by Debord 
and others as undermining the completion and coherence of the Hegelian system itself. 
Tragedy is used as a means of linking these ideas: for tragic art, insofar as it presents 
negative disruption within a stable, coherent whole, provides a useful motif for both the 
spectacle's historical arrest and for the Hegelian system's own alleged neutralisation of 
negative change. This first part of the thesis will also look at the ways in which Hegel's 
connections between time, consciousness and negativity were highlighted by French 
Hegelianism and echoed in Sartrean existentialism, and will pay particular attention to 
the manner in which these aspects of Hegel’s work were presented as standing opposed 
to his system's purportedly final closure; a view that can also be found in aspects of 
Surrealism's own critical appropriation of Hegel. I'll show that Debord's account is 
informed by these influences, and that it describes a historical negative able to 
undermine a society that he presents in similar terms to Kojève's (deeply idiosyncratic) 
reading of the end of history. That analogue between the spectacle and the end of history 
does however come with an important qualification. Although it might be assumed to 
imply an endorsement of the perpetual deferral of final dialectical resolution, I will 
suggest – whilst making reference to the constantly receding historical goal posited by 
Lefebvre (the unreachable 'total man'), and to Sartre's presentation of the individual as a 
10 
                                                
perpetually 'de-totalised' totality (the for-itself's impossible “desire to be God”)13 – that 
any such deferral can also be seen to be 'tragic' in a sense. Such a continual deferral is, 
on my reading, closer to Debord's views on spectatorship than it is to the resolution of 
alienation and separation that he posits beyond the spectacle’s historical impasse. I'll 
thus suggest that Debord is in fact far closer to what I take to be Hegel's own position 
than he gives one to realise. Hegel's ‘absolute’ is not a state of static arrest but rather a 
perpetual self-determinate process, and given that the concept of spectacle rests upon 
the denial of identity between the subject and its actions I'll suggest that Debord's views 
on the relation between Hegel and Marx serve to cast Hegelian resolution not as the end 
of history, but rather as an intellectual representation (a Vorstellung) of what Marx 
referred to as the end of pre-history.14 Hegel's unification of the ideal and the material 
would then constitute a “mystified”,15 static depiction of self-determinate praxis, as 
would the spectacle's own “non-inverted”16 manifestation of Hegelian philosophy. This 
is not a position that Debord states explicitly, but I'll show that it can be inferred from 
textual evidence. It will also form the basis for some of the proposals set out in part 
three. 
 Part two will then consider the theory of spectacle itself in greater detail, paying 
particular attention to its Marxist components, and will address its notion of alienation 
via Hegel's attempt to unite the universal and the particular. Having contended in part 
one that the Hegelian absolute becomes a figure for praxis, I'll look here at the manner 
in which both Marx's comments on capital and Debord's views on the spectacle indicate 
a disjuncture between the particular and the universal, thus implying a more 'authentic' 
form of collectivity. Both capital and spectacle are at times presented as 'false', alienated 
forms of interrelation that maintain the isolation of the particular elements that they 
mediate (e.g. for Debord the spectacle is a “unity ... of generalised separation”;17 for 
Marx capital is a “social relation”18 in which “men are ... related in a purely atomistic 
 
13 Sartre 2003, p.587 
14 “This social formation [i.e. capitalism] brings, therefore, the pre-history of human society to a close” 
(Marx 2000 p.426). See also volume three of Capital, where capitalism is described as “that epoch of 
human history that directly precedes the conscious reconstruction of human society” (Marx 1976, 
p.182). 
15 Cf. Marx 1976, p.103 
16 “[T]he contemplation of the movement of the economy in the dominant thought of present day society 
is indeed a non-inverted legacy of the undialectical part of the Hegelian attempt to create a circular 
system” Debord 1995, p.51, translation altered; 2006, p.795, emphasis in the original). I will suggest 
that this implies there to be a dialectical aspect to Hegelian 'circularity', and that this might be 
'inverted'. 
17 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.767 
18 Marx 1976, p.932 
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way”).19 Through a detailed critique of the concept of spectacle – in which I'll discuss 
the manner in which Debord's theory employs Marxist concepts and categories whilst 
undermining their connection to the classical primacy of labour – I'll contend that 
Debord's account effaces the particular differences of capitalism's antagonistic social 
relations by subsuming them under the equally abstract universality of the alienated, 
occidental spectator.   
 Having taken the Hegelian absolute as an image of praxis in part one, and having 
shown the degree to which the unity associated with it might be linked to forms of 
association in part two, part three will then consider its self-founding and self-
determinate movement in relation to Debord's association of strategic and dialectical 
thought. I'll also show how Debord's Comments on The Society of the Spectacle can be 
understood in the light of the arguments presented in part one, and I'll present an 
interpretation of that book that highlights the importance of its remarks on the 
connection between historical and strategic thought. This will be shown to offer a 
response to the supposedly hyperreal morass that the Comments is often said to have 
described. However, having argued in part two that the theory of spectacle is flawed, I'll 
show that the model of historical agency that one can draw from it not only solves some 
of the theory’s apparent problems, but may also be of interest in its own right. In this 
regard the closing sections of the thesis will offer indications as to the manner in which 
this material might be developed. 
 To sum up, the thesis will contend that:   
 
1) The theory of spectacle should be understood through Debord's concerns with time 
and history. 
2) The theory is inadequate as a critique of the operation of capital.  
3) The ideas that found the theory may be of more interest today than the theory itself.  
 
 In demonstrating the first two claims, and in making a case for the latter, the 
thesis will make the following contributions to the existing corpus of work on Debord 
and the S.I.:  
 
• The thesis will build on the extant literature on the subject by addressing the 
philosophical dimensions, influences and implications of Debord's work.  
 
19 Marx 1976, p.187 
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• It will rectify some of the more prevalent misconceptions of Debord's concepts of 
spectacle, image and representation.  
• The thesis will build upon and develop the extant commentary on Debord's Hegelian 
Marxism. 
• It will also go some way towards indicating the inadequacy of the concept of spectacle 
as an account of the operation of capital. 
• An attempt will be made to present a theoretical reading of Debord's interest in 
strategy. 
• A notion of collective political agency will be inferred from Debord's work that may 
afford a means of reconsidering and re-evaluating the ‘historicist' aspects of Hegelian 
Marxism.20   
• Suggestions will be presented for further research in this area, amongst which will be 
the proposal that the notion of agency that one can draw from this material may imply a 
form of ethics.21  
 
 
20 As we'll see in part two, Chris Arthur offers a useful distinction between a 'systematic' and a 
'historicist' approach to Hegelian Marxism. The former, prevalent today, reads Marx's Capital in the 
light of Hegel's Logic; the latter is concerned with the connections between Hegelian and Marxist 
notions of history and agency, and has fallen into disfavour as a result of its connections to Soviet 
'diamat'. Debord's work falls squarely into this second category, but remains at the same time 
resolutely anti-hierarchical and anti-dogmatic. 
21 I’ll propose in the conclusion to the thesis that one can draw links between aspects of Debord's work 
and Sartre's attempt to develop an ethics able to cast “the final goal of humanity as the freedom of all” 
(Anderson 1993, p.59). 
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Time and Subjectivity  
 
 The 125th thesis of The Society of the Spectacle, which opens the book's chapter 
on 'Time and History', begins with the following claim: “Man – that 'negative being who 
is to the extent that he abolishes being' – is one [identique] with time”. The quoted 
phrase (“l'être négatif qui est uniquement de la mesure ou il supprime l'être”) stems 
from Hyppolite’s translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit,1 and it provides us with an 
apposite starting point for a number of reasons. Firstly, its description of a negative, 
transitive and temporal subjectivity will be pursued throughout the thesis. Secondly, it 
illustrates the affinity between Debord's Hegelianism and aspects of existentialism: his 
work's occasionally fraught interrelation of those two schools of thought will be 
introduced below and developed throughout the thesis. Thirdly however, and most 
importantly for our present purposes, Debord's statement provides a means of 
addressing one of the most prevalent misconceptions about his work: namely, the 
contention that it posits a pure, a priori human essence that lies buried beneath the 
spectacle. Addressing this error here will serve to introduce a number of attendant 
themes.  
 For Vincent Kaufmann, Debord “postulates a golden age, a humanity originally 
transparent to itself”.2 There is however no such fixed human essence within Debord's 
work (a point also made by Jappe):3 instead, on the reading that I'll present here, the 
human subject within Debord and the S.I.'s account is a changing, malleable being, 
engaged in a dialectical relationship with an objective world; an entity that creates and 
shapes itself through negating and changing the contexts in which it is located, and 
which is thus 'one' (or rather identique) with time. It would seem that like Marx, Debord 
presents human subjectivity as historically contextual, and this means that there can be 
no a priori human identity: only an open capacity for free self-determination. 
Consequently, the supersession of the society of the spectacle cannot involve the 
restitution of a buried realm of authenticity. Rather, it was to inaugurate a new form of 
                                                 
1 The line can be found on p.236 of the Hyppolite translation. Thanks are due to John McHale for this 
reference.  
2 Kaufmann 2006, p.222 
3 Jappe1999, p.131  
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subjectivity in which the latter's negative, temporal movement might be self-consciously 
directed rather than abdicated to alienated forms of social power. This, for Debord, was 
to be an inherently historical form of subjectivity: a qualification that might be clarified 
by noting that history, in his essentially Hegelian view, was by no means solely a 
catalogue of events or the study of the past, but rather something to be self-consciously 
and pro-actively made. I'll argue throughout the thesis that communism, for the S.I., was 
not to be a static economic formula or a discrete social system, but rather an ongoing 
historical process, and as we'll also see, Debord is far closer to Marx's early texts in this 
regard than he is to the latter's mature work. I would thus suggest that the line quoted 
above, which describes the negative and temporal qualities of subjective self-
determination, might usefully be placed in relation to Marx and Engels' early claim in 
The German Ideology that “communism” is “the real movement that abolishes [aufhebt] 
the present state of things”:4 for time, in Debord's account, constitutes the medium in 
which a perpetual and collective project of change and self-determination was to be 
established. Thus rather than allowing the recovery of Kaufmann's lost, Arcadian past, 
post-spectacular society was to provide conditions in which the transitive, temporal 
nature of the human subject would flourish.  
 As is perhaps already evident from these initial comments, The Society of the 
Spectacle is at root a book about history, or rather the creation thereof. However, and as 
I signalled in the preface above, this has been largely obscured by the prevalence of 
academic works that fixate on the theory of spectacle's links to the mass media, and 
which pursue its possible relevance to visual cultural concerns. The import of time and 
history to the theory can however be illustrated here by way of reference to Debord's 
own statements about The Society of the Spectacle, and by drawing attention to its three 
seldom-discussed chapters on time and history. In a letter containing advice and 
instruction on an Italian translation of his book, Debord states that its fourth chapter 
('The Proletariat as Subject and Representation'), which  describes the rise and fall of 
the workers' movement in terms of a drive towards the self-conscious creation of 
history, holds “the principal place” in the whole work; in the same letter, the fifth 
chapter ('Time and History') is said to present “historical time” as the “milieu and goal 
of the proletarian revolution”, whilst the sixth ('Spectacular Time') is referred to as 
describing “a society that refuses history”.5  
 The importance of history to the book can be developed by referring once again 
 
4 Marx 2000, p.187 
5 Debord 2004a, p.79  
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to the human subject's identity with time. In Debord's view, different forms of 
temporality are engendered by different modes of production, and the alienation 
produced by the latter can be understood in terms of the former. The Society of the 
Spectacle contends that during the course of human history the technical power to shape 
that history has grown, as has the divorce of that power from any direct, conscious 
control on the part of its producers; a trajectory that has culminated in the “separation 
perfected [achevée]”6 of spectacular society. The spectacle is thus cast as an historical 
juncture at which the ability to consciously shape and direct history has become greater 
than ever before, but at which individuals have become separated from that capacity. 
From such a perspective, concerns pertaining to commodification, subsumption and 
simulation need not be taken as symptoms of the loss of an originary realm of 
authenticity, but rather as demonstrations of a new-found technical capacity to shape 
and consciously control the world of human experience: for the latter is increasingly the 
product of human agency, however alienated the latter may be. The task at hand for 
Debord and the S.I. was thus that of returning that capacity for self-determination to the 
human agents from which it stems. The revolutionary desire to make that change was 
said to have been generalised throughout society by capital's increasing domination of 
life, whilst the technological and automative possibilities provided by capitalism's 
technical developments were said to have afforded the abolition of wage labour 
altogether.7 The end of the spectacle would thus allow individuals to engage in the “free 
consumption of [their] own time”. 8  
 The latter point can be qualified by noting that the S.I.'s positions in this regard 
were responses to the apparent absence of a 19th century proletariat, which for some 
commentators had been eradicated by the relatively new-found wealth of commodity 
capitalism. This alleged absence was treated with no small amount of irony: “Where on 
earth can it be?”, asked Vaneigem of the proletariat in 1967; “has it been put in a 
museum? ...We hear from some quarters that...it has disappeared forever beneath an 
avalanche of sound systems, T.V.'s, small cars and planned communities”.9 Yet for 
Debord and the S.I., this apparent wealth had given rise to a “new poverty” and a “new 
proletariat”: 10 a 'higher' form of poverty, and one that made explicit the true, implicit 
nature of that of the past. The deprivation of the means of subsistence entails the 
 
6 Debord 1995, p.11; 2006, p.766 
7 See Jorn in S.I. 2006, pp.55-8; 1997 pp.22-5. See also Debord 2002, p.40; 1998 p.1616 
8 Debord 2003a, p.15; 2006 p.472.   
9 Vaneigem 1994, p.68 
10 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.309 
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deprivation of the power to freely shape one's existence; thus, whilst commodity society 
was tending to remedy the former problematic, through doing so it was also tending to 
reveal and generalise the latter. The proletariat – now considered as “all people who 
have no possibility of altering the social space-time that society allots to them”11 – was 
not disappearing at all, but rather growing: for the expansion of capitalist wealth was 
also that of a desire for a 'real' wealth of self-directed time and experience (the S.I. can 
thus be seen to echo some of Marx's contentions in the Grundrisse12 prior to its French 
translation).13 Thus for Debord, “history itself is the spectre haunting modern 
society”.14  
 As the S.I. developed, the avant-garde artistic and cultural concerns that 
characterised their early years came to be replaced by more explicitly theoretical and 
political positions. Nonetheless, their early concerns and interest in the construction of 
situations bear direct relation to these themes, for the constructed situation was intende
as an experimental anticipation of the conscious control over lived experience offere
by post-revolutionary society. The situation would later evolve into a more general 
concern with historical self-determination, but it originated as an attempt to unify art 
and life through the 'realisation' of the former as lived praxis; an actualisation that was
deliberately modelled upon Marx's Young Hegelian concerns with the 'realisation' of 
philosophy. Echoing the Theses on Feuerbach, the S.I. held that where Sartre and the 
existentialists had “only interpreted situations”, the S.I. would “transform them”;15 an
where spectacular society constituted an historical arrest, or rather a separation from 
one's own history, the “Situationist attitude” would consist in “going with the flow of 
time.”16 The revolutionary unification of art and life would thus inaugurate a new
a re sophisticated form of historical agency. 
 Debord and the S.I.'s concern with the construction of situations and self-
constitutive action owes an obvious debt to the legacy and intellectual ambience of 
French existentialism, as indeed does Debord's concern with temporality. Th
deny that his interest in time was perhaps more directly inflected by French 
 
11 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.141 
12 “For real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals. The measure of wealth is then 
not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time” (Marx 1973, p.708).  
13 The Grundrisse appeared in France in two volumes in 1967 and 1968. Marx's comments on time as 
wealth appear towards its end, so would presumably have become available after The Society of the 
Spectacle's publication. Debord did not read German (“my ignorance of German surpasses credulity 
[as I was] unaware [as a youth] that...I would become an internationalist and dialectician” (Debord 
1986b)). 
14 Debord 1995, p.141; 2006, p.851 
15 S.I. 2006 p.178; 1997, p.388 
16   S.I. 2006, p.42; Debord 2006, p.327 
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Hegelianism's focus on Hegel's association of consciousness, time and dialectics
I'll discuss at length in chapter one; nor is it to deny that related notions of self-
determination and self-constitution can also be discerned in the more obvious influen
of Hegel,17 Marx,18 Lukács19 and Lefebvre.20 Rather, it is to suggest that the Frenc
milieu of the 1950's and 60's furthered an emphasis on those aspects of Hegel and 
Hegelian Marxism, and that as a result Debord effectively came to found the existenti
view that “one is what one does”21 (Heidegger) not upon phenomenology, but rather 
upon a model of dialectical interaction between subject and object. This brings us back 
to his claim that the subject is both 'negative' and 'one with time', which I quoted above: 
for as that subject abolishes what exists by creating itself and its world anew through its 
own actions, and insofar as it comes to know itself through that process, both the subject 
and its world – qua their continual differentiation – are cast as inherently historical. Th
brings us to the sense in which a denial of self-determination – brought about through 
the restriction of such options and the imposition of set, predetermined experiences – 
would constitute not only a denial of the self, but also a separation of that self from it
own lived time. It also leads us to Debord's Hegelian association of history and self-
consciousness: for if one is and knows oneself through what one does, then abdicating
autonomy over one's actions not only involves a divorce from one's own history, but 
also an absence of self-consciousness. Thus, just as Hegel wrote that “the slave knows 
not his essence ... and not to know himself is not to think himself,”22 Debord held th
“the more [the spectator] contemplates ... his own unthin
understands his own existence and his own desires.”23  
 Whilst this owes a great deal to Marx's early discussions of alienated labour, it 
also exhibits the influence of Lukács' History and Class Consciousness (an influence 
                                                 
“An individual17  cannot know what he is until he has made himself a reality through action” (Hegel 
18 149); 
r 
nd 
.  
20 
 life consists of a sort of constellation of actions and powers (capacities)” 
83 
 p.23; 2006, p.774 
1977, p.240). 
For the young Marx, “Objective man ... [is] the outcome of man's own labour” (Marx 1988, p.
“As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their 
production” (Marx 2000, p.177; quoted in S.I. 2003, p.81; Debord 2006, p.1134). Against those who 
would argue for an 'Althusserian break', similar points can be found in Marx’s 'mature' work: “Labou
is ... a process between man and nature ... Through this movement he acts upon external nature a
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature” (Marx 1976, p.283)
19 “To posit oneself, to produce and reproduce oneself – that is reality” (Lukács 1971, p.15). 
“An individual can imagine himself to be a nebula (a cloud) of virtualities (possibilities). ... The 
processes of his practical
(Lefebvre 2008, p.112). 
21 Heidegger 1962, p.2
22 Hegel 2005, p.xlii 
23 Debord 1995,
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troduced here may serve to illuminate further aspects of Debord's work. 
mage and Representation
stressed by Jappe,24 and  one that can perhaps be demonstrated by noting the number of 
quotations that Debord seems to have lifted from Lukács' text).25 According to L
the alienation of the subject from his or her own activity entails an increasingly 
“contemplative”26 attitude towards the latter: an attitude that had, as a result of the 
domination of society by the commodity form, begun to spread beyond the factory 
walls. Debord adopts and expands this position, claiming that all social activity now 
takes place in accordance with the demands of the economy, and he contends that the 
dialectical relation of mutual constitution between self and world has as a result been 
subverted: the consequence is a passive subject acted upon by an alien world, albeit a 
world com
a .  
 My initial claims here can thus be summarised by two contentions: firstly, tha
time and history are central to Debord's work; secondly, that the theory of spectac
cannot be understood without them. I'll now argue that to view the spectacle as a 
diatribe about the mass media, or solely in terms of the literally visual aspects of 
modern capitalism, is to gain a very limited and superficial view of the full ambitions 
and scope of Debord's thought. Having done so I'll then offer some preliminary 
on the theory's shortcomings, before outlining the manner in which the them
in
 
I  
 
 
 
trends 
    
 
 I hope that the broad overview of the theory that I’ve presented here has served
to illustrate the degree to which a reductively literal interpretation of Debord's visual
terminology fails to address the true scope and nature of his work. Nonetheless, the 
Hegelian ideas that render this otherwise misleading terminology intelligible are largely
absent from much of the existing literature on Debord, perhaps as a result of the 
that coloured his work's academic appropriation. Initially brought to an English 
                                             
Jappe 1999 
Debord seems to take an important line from Capital (Debord 1995, p.12, 2006, p.767; Lukács 1971, 
p.49); a quotation from The Poverty of Philosophy (Debord 1995, p.110; 2006, p.831; Lukács, 1971, 
p.89); another from Hegel's 'Differenzschrift' (Debord 1995 p.130; 2006
24 
25 
 p.843; Lukács 1971, p.139; 
tion is also noted by Jappe 1999, p.21). As discussed in chapter six, the ninth thesis 
26 
this latter appropria
of The Society of the Spectacle, an oblique reference to Hegel's Phenomenology, may also stem from 
Lukács (Debord 1995, p.14; 2006, p.769; Lukács 1971, pp.xlvi-xlvii).   
Lukács 1971, p.89 
19 
 by a 
ster. 
as that 
st 
 
e 
 
nd have 
ttemp
                                                
audience through the radical groups of the 1960's,27 the S.I. came to be adopted
more cultural and artistic milieu from the late 70's onwards. The exhibition of 
Situationist work in the late 1980's28 laid the basis for the art-historical and visual 
cultural readings that would later proliferate,29 and which fostered the assumption that 
Debord's 'images' and 'representations' could be read in a simplistically visual regi
This lent the theory to its adoption by proponents of media studies, which in turn 
facilitated its connection to 'postmodern' notions of 'simulacra' and 'hyperreality'.30 
When coupled to the decidedly unfashionable status of Hegelian philosophy over the 
last few decades, these trends can be seen to have led to the denigration of the ide
make Debord's theory fully comprehensible. In fact, Jappe's Guy Debord, which 
addresses Debord's Hegelian Marxism, remains the sole major work to treat the latter in 
detail. This thesis is undoubtedly indebted to Jappe’s text, and given the latter’s intere
in Debord’s Hegelianism it’s significant to note that Debord himself described it in a 
letter as “the best-informed book about me”.31 Yet whilst Jappe brings this dimension of
Debord's theory to the fore, he does so largely in terms of the influence of Lukács; and 
whilst he certainly recognises Debord's interests in time and strategy, he does not pursu
the manner in which they cohere, or how they might relate to his Hegelianism.32 Since
the publication of Jappe's book writers on Debord have at least been obliged to make 
reference to the latte’s Hegelianism;33 others have addressed it more explicitly, a
a ted greater detail.34 The topic does however remain largely unexplored.  
 As a result, Debord's own observation that “one cannot fully comprehend The 
 
27 The Castoriadis-influenced Solidarity group, who remained critical of the S.I.’s departure from labour 
issues, were important in this respect. They were however by no means alone: Rebel Worker, having 
 
 in its second issue; the editors and others would go on to form the S.I.'s 
28 
oston ICA's in 1988-9 (see Black 1994 
holson Smith 2004).  
nd Kellner 2000 and Plant 1992. 
33 
34 
 
sewitz, and presents positions on Debord’s use of Hegel that are close to my own in some 
expressed Situationist sentiments (such as recommending Lautréamont and Blake as “precursors of
the theory and practice of total revolution” (King Mob 2000, p.8)), evolved into Heatwave, which 
featured Situationist material
short-lived English section. 
The exhibition "On the Passage of a Few People Through a Rather Brief Moment in Time" toured 
between the Centre Georges Pompidou and the London and B
for commentary; see also Clark and Nic
29 e.g. Beller 2006, Crary 2001, Jay 1994 
30 See for example Best a
31 Debord 2008, p.453 
32  See the discussion in the introduction to the third part of this thesis.  
One might think here of the flurry of Debord biographies that appeared around the millennium: 
Hussey, for example, acknowledges that the theory's “first influence was Hegel” (Hussey 2002, 
p.216), and Bracken writes that “Hegel is ... central to Debord's thought” (Bracken 1997, p.83). 
Moinet (1977) explicitly connects the spectacle to Hegelian philosophy; Turner (1996) provides an 
extremely useful and admirably concise overview of Debord’s links to Korsch, Lukács and the young
Marx; Grass (2000) also comments on the connection to Korsch, identifies a further correspondence 
with Clau
respects. 
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Society of the Spectacle without Marx, and especially Hegel”35 continues to ring true.
Kaufmann for example, who admits somewhat disarmingly that “the enthusiasm shown 
... for Debord the theoretician36 often leaves me ... sceptical”,37 informs us on a page 
that contains no less than nine rhetorical questions (“Do we know exactly what 
means by spectacle? Can we know?”, etc.),38 that Debord's most famous work is “an 
enigma”.39 Yet by far the most prevalent error – as widespread as its following 
formulation is crude – is encapsulated by a frustrated Jean-Pierre Voyer: he “u
to bed late, hoping to find an idea in Guy Debord's book”; he came to the conclusion
that “there are none”; he thus contends that “when Debord pompously writes 
'e hing that was directly lived has withdrawn into a representation', the prick i
simply saying that we see posters of naked women pushing brands of cigarettes.”40  
 Traces of this simplistic reading can be discerned throughout much of the 
existing literature. Beller for example is close to the mark when he tells us that the 
theory “is merely a reformulation in visual terms of Lukács analysis of commodity 
reification”,41 but he conflates 'visual terms' with visual phenomena;42 and just as Belle
only half-grasps the spectacle's connection to the commodity, so too does Hussey fall 
short of its connection to alienation: he correctly notes that Debord is doing something
“rather more nuanced” than “simply attack[ing] the obvious visual manifestation
modern society”, but he believes this to be describing the ways in which tho
unite, as in ideology, “the fragmented aspects of modern life”.43 Dauvé is more 
successful, yet he too tends to identify the spectacle with fads, fashion and 
entertainment: “as capital tends to ... parcelize everything so as to recompose it with t
help of market relations,” he writes, “it also makes of representation a specialized sec
of production”; as a result, “wage-workers are ... stripped of the means of producing 
 
36   
ebord's statement does however make it clear that 
ion of theory from practice. 
6, p.73 
42 
o 
s that “the visual” for Debord is “the paramount field of capital exploitation” 
217 
35 Debord 2004a, p.454 
Kaufmann is no doubt drawing on Debord’s claim “The petty people of the present age seem to 
believe that I have approached things by way of theory, that I am a builder of theory” (Debord 2003, 
p.147, 150; 2006, p.1350, 1353-4). The context of D
his target is the separat
37 Kaufmann 2006, p.xi  
38 Kaufmann 2006, p.73  
39 Kaufmann 200
40 Voyer 1998 
41 Beller 2006, p.241 
This pertains to Beller's use of the notion of an 'attention economy', within which things accrue value 
via the attention paid to them. Beller makes extensive use of The Society of the Spectacle in relation t
this model: he contend
(Beller 2006, p.278). 
43 Hussey 2002, p.
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their ideas, which are produced by a specialized sector”.44 The spectacle, for Dauvé, 
would seem to be primarily associated with the marketing and ideology that supports
the current economic system. 
 On my reading, Debord's visual terminology is best clarified by way of referenc
to its largely overlooked45 roots in Hegel's notion of Vorstellung (often translated as
'picture thought' in English, and significantly as 'representation' in French): conceptu
representations that remain separate from their object, as do the rigid categories of the 
'Understanding' (the latter, incidentally, forms the paradigm for Lukács' critique of 
bourgeois society's separation from history).46 Insofar as Vorstellungen are separate 
from their referent, they fall short of the identity in difference grasped and actualised b
the Begriff, or 'Concept': the motive force of Hegelian logic, and for Hegel the “life 
pulse”47 of being itself (an explanatory discussion of Hegel's dialectical logic will be 
presented in the conclusion to part one). Thought that merely represents its object, in 
this sense, fails to identify its own true nature within that which it took to be other to
itself: e.g. religion, for Hegel, is a 'picture-thought' of the 'Absolute': it simply depicts 
the latter, as opposed to directly communing with it (a communion actualised through 
Hegelian speculative philosophy).48 Self-separation is of course a primary Hegelian 
theme, and can be found in all aspects of Hegel's work. I would however argue
formulation in terms of representative detachment is particularly important for Deb
(a formulation that is particularly evident in the Phenomenology, the central text in 2
Century French Hegelianism), and that it feeds into his account by way of the 
inflections given to it by Feuerbach, Marx and Lukács. For example, Feuerbach – 
whose The Essence of Christianity provides the epigraph to the first chapter of The 
Society of the Spectacle – presents religion in these same terms: “Man,” he claims, first 
sees his [own] nature as if out of himself, before he finds it in himself”;49 thus to find 
with human powers and capacities. “God,” for Feuerbach, is thus no more than “the
rror of man”.50 This view was echoed by Bakunin,51 the early52 and late Marx,53 and 
                                             
44 Dauvé 1979 
45 Bracken (1997, pp.82-3) mentions the phrase 'picture-thinking' when signalling the influence of 
he does not analyse the concept or establish its connection to alienation, praxis 
(Lukács 1971, pp.110-49). 
48 
49 
Hegel's aesthetics, but 
or spectacle.  
46 See in particular the second section of Lukács' famous 'Reification' essay, which is entitled 'The 
Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought' 
47 Hegel 1969, p.37 
Hegel 1977, p.453; see also p.479 
Feuerbach 1989, p.13 
50 Feuerbach 1989, p.63  
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is directly evident in Debord's spectacle: the latter is composed of separated social 
power, yet it presents itself as the very unity between that power and its producers that it 
itself denies. The spectacle's representations also involve a notion of reflection54 and 
speculum55 in this regard, yet being the “material reconstruction of the religious 
illusion”56 the spectacle is not just a body of ideology, but also real, concrete social 
practice: hence the increasingly common tendency to link Debord's spectacle to the 
Marxist notion of 'real abstraction'. It is life itself, in other words, that becomes 'image', 
because its determination by alienated economic power means that it becomes separated 
from those that live it.  
 This does not mean that Debord's spectacle excludes what Debord refers to as 
“stultifyingly superficial”57 and literally visual manifestations: rather, the latter are 
subsumed within a broader notion of alienation and separation. Like Lukács, Debord 
sought to understand society under the general rubric of a concept able to capture it as a 
totality: a concept able to grasp the essential, common, structuring nature of each 
determination within the social whole. For the Lukács of History and Class 
Consciousness (1923) this central concept was of course the commodity,58 but for 
Debord a new concept was required, able to express the changes wrought by the 
commodity's increasing domination of society. Hence 'spectacle': a concept that unites, 
as Debord himself states, “a wide range of apparently disparate phenomena”.59 It 
expresses the purportedly completed 'perfection' of alienation, the need to overcome a 
dead art's separation from its living observers, but also captures (and here we come to 
the media and visual aspects of the theory) the sense in which the separation of subject 
and object had reached such an extreme that it had been made manifest within a society 
saturated with literally visual imagery: marketing, adverts and entertainment that 
                                                                                                                                              
 “Man, who has found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought 
a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere appearance of himself, the non-man...and 
must seek his true reality” (Marx 1975, p.243-4, emphases in the original) 
53 “Thus at the level of material production...we find the same situation that we find in religion at the 
51 See Bakunin's God and the State, which argues that “God being everything, the real world and man 
are nothing” (Bakunin 1970, p.24) 
52
ideological level, namely the inversion of subject into object and vice versa” (Marx 1976, p.990, 
emphases in the original). 
54 “The spectacle is “the faithful [fidèle] reflection of the production of things, and a distorting [infidèle] 
objectification of the producers.” (Debord 1995, p.16; 2006, p.769) 
55 “In French, 'spectacle' has the merit of being linked to the Latin speculum and thus to mirror, to the 
inverted image, to the concept of speculation, etc.” (Debord 1980) 
56 Debord 1995, pp.17-8; 2006, pp.770-1 
57 Debord 1995, p.19; 2006, p.772 
58 “The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence when it becomes the universal 
category of society as a whole”. (Lukács 1971, p.86) Debord quotes this very same passage as the 
epigraph to the second chapter of The Society of the Spectacle.  
59 Debord 1995, p.14; 2006, p.768 
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 of historical development. 
presented all possible satisfactions and desires as accessible only within the bounds s
by the present order of things. Hence, the spectacle is “a negation of life that has 
become visible”;60 hence also Debord's contention that the cinema offered “the bes
representation of an epoch”61 (see also Lefebvre: “someone sitting in front of a cin
screen offers an example and a common model of [modern] passivity”).62 Lukács' 
'contemplative attitude', in other words, had truly come to define modern society.  
 My argument is thus not that media-centric readings of spectacle are wrong per 
se, but rather that their more limited perspective renders it difficult to see the conn
between these 'superficial' phenomena and the theory's broader themes. As Debord put it 
in his correspondence: “behind the phenomenal appearances of the spectacle (for 
example, television, advertising, the discourse of the State, etc.), that is to say, particular 
mendacious forms, one can find the general reality of the spectacle itself (as a moment 
in the mode of production).”63 I'll discuss this further in a m
o
that the spectacle arises from a long line
 
The Need for an Intellectual History 
 
 One could perhaps contend that the best way to address Debord's theory woul
be to look not at its conceptual roots, as I'm attempting here, but rather at the inception 
of the spectacle itself; one might then perhaps be able to understand it by defining it 
through the events, dates and phenomena that mark its historical arrival.  In my vie
attempting to understand the spectacle through such phenomena would tend to 
the former to the latter, and would cast the spectacle as a discrete, neatly bracke
phenomenon. This would entail a failure to identify the broader historical and 
teleological dimensions of the theory, and thus the themes of time, history and 
d 
w, 
reduce 
ted 
ubject
that “a striking feature of [The Society of the Spectacle] was the absence of any kind of 
64
s ivity that I'm emphasising here: for if one focuses solely on the spectacle’s 
completed form, one loses sight of the trends and tendencies from which it arose.  
 Jonathan Crary, in his essay 'Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory', contends 
                                                 
60 Debord 1995, p.14, translation altered; 2006, p.768 
 p.32 
r a broader discussion of this approach. 
61 S.I. 1997, p 8  
62 Lefebvre 2008a
63 Debord 1973  
64 See Kinkle 2010 fo
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as...always been spectacular”.71 In fact, in a letter of 1971, Debord writes as follows:   
o age de crâne: 
terally, 72
le if 
historical genealogy of the spectacle.”65 Arguing that the “critical or practical efficacy”
of Debord's theory depends “on how one periodizes it”,66 Crary sets out to rectify this
perceived lack, taking as his clue Debord's claim in the Comments that by 1967 – the 
year in which The Society of the Spectacle was published – the spectacle had “barely 
forty years behind it”.67 Crary thus contends, quite reasonably, that “1927, or roughly 
the late 1920's”68 must mark the threshold of the spectacular era. He then proceeds to 
link its emergence to the development of television and sound in the cinema, and whilst 
he includes the rise of totalitarianism in his list of historical phenomena, his essay treats 
the latter in relation to media and propaganda (it should however be noted that h
a  a reductive, media-centric reading of Debord's spectacle elsewhere).69   
 Debord does indeed indicate that the spectacle's full emergence took pla
around this time. He (and Vaneigem)70 viewed this period as one in which the 
culmination of an existing tendency towards art's negation of representation c
with a further tendency towards the clear, self-conscious expression of mass 
revolutionary action; yet he also held that these years saw the loss of that potential 
the rise of both the commodity and the Party (the latter being seen as an alienated 
representation of the proletariat’s political will and agency). However, to say that th
spectacle emerges in its fully developed form in the 1920's is rather different from 
claiming that it begins in the 1920's: for to opt for the latter is to miss the sense i
the spectacle arises from an existing historical and economic tendency, thereby 
overlooking Debord's claims that its roots lie in religion, and that “all separated power 
h
 
[The spectacle] has its basis in Greek thought; it increased towards the Renaissance (with capitalist 
thought); and still more in the 18th century, when one opened museum collections to the public; it 
peared under its completed form around 1914-1920 (with the brain washing [b urrap
li 'skull stuffing'] of the war and the collapse of the workers' movement ).   
 
 Debord thus has a much broader and more general trend in mind than any neatly 
bracketed set of 20th Century phenomena, and this only becomes fully comprehensib
                                                 
65 Crary 2002, p.456 
66 Crary 2002, p.456 
67 Debord 2002, p.3; 2006, p.1595 
68 Crary 2002, p.457 
69 Crary has warned against the “facile meanings” implied by The Society of the Spectacle's title, stating 
that the spectacle does more than merely describe “the effects of mass media and its visual imagery” 
(Crary 2001, p.73).  
70 Vaneigem 1994, p.146 
71 Debord 1995, p.20, translation altered; 2006, p.772 
72 Letter to Juvenal Quillet, 14th December 1971 
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te set of technologies. However, despite their subtleties, Debord's 
onceptions of image, representation and spectacle are by no means without their 
one attends to his theory's essentially Hegelian basis. Without this approach, which 
requires addressing this material through its intellectual history, one is liable to
sight of the sense in which the core of the spectacle is separated social power, and 
just a discre
c
problems.  
 
Spectacle and Capital 
 
 I'll argue in the second part of this thesis that Debord's theory offers lit
purchase on the actual operation of capital, and that it is instead largely given over to
the latter's subjective effects. The theory stresses the subjective alienation of 
consciousness over the objective alienation of activity, and in theorising society as
totality united under the rubric of contemplation it subsumes the specificity and 
diversity of objective activity under the ubiquity of alienated consciousness, thus 
casting production, circulation, work, leisure etc. as effectively homogeneous. In sho
Debord's theory attempts to understand social production on the basis of consumptio
remaining within the “sphere of circulation” without entering “t
tle 
 
 a 
rt, 
n, 
he hidden abode of 
rey 
a 
 
 
ed 
the 'otherness' of the external world and action to the subjective alienation engendered 
                                                
production”;73 as a result (and as noted in the preface, I'm close to Dauvé here), its 
critique of appearances is itself founded in part on appearance. 
 These problems can be introduced by enquiring as to whether Debord fell p
to the idealism that Lukács later attributed to his History and Class Consciousness; 
text that constitutes, as noted above, one of The Society of the Spectacle's primary 
influences. “Man,” Lukács claimed there, “must become conscious of himself as a 
social being, as simultaneously the subject and object of the socio-historical process.”74
This entailed that “society becomes the reality for man,”75 and that “nature” became a 
“social category.”76 However, in his long and self-effacing preface to the book's 1967 
edition, Lukács wrote that its presentation of nature as a social construct had led him to
efface the independence of the real, objective world, together with that of the objective 
activity conducted upon it. History and Class Consciousness, he claimed, had equat
 
73 Marx 1976, p.279 
74 Lukács 1971, p.19 
75 Lukács 1971, p.19 
76 In other words, “whatever is held to be natural at any given stage of social development” is “socially 
conditioned” (Lukács 1971, p.234) 
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by capital: to use Marx's terms from the 1844 Manuscripts – the reading
Lukács adds, led him to recognise his own overly subjective errors77 – 
Vergegenständlichung (objectification) had been blurred with Entfremdung78 (subjec
estrangement), in that the former was viewed in terms of the latter.79 Consequently, 
according to the Lukács of 1967, “labour, the mediator of the metabolic interaction 
between society and nature, is missing [from History and Class Consciousness]”,80 and
as a result his critique had fallen back into the “idealistic contemplation”81 of capital's 
subjective effects: his presentation of “the proletariat seen as the identical subject-obje
of history” was thus “an attempt 
above every possible reality”.82 
 Debord avoids this problem by way of his concern with time, but he fails to 
so in an entirely satisfactory manner. “Time”, he writes, is “a necessary alienation, 
being “the medium in which the subject realises himself while losing himself, becom
other in order to become truly himself [pour devenir la vérité de lui-même]”.83 The 
object with which this subject was to unite was thus its own externalised actions, not 
nature per se, and a degree of 'necessary' otherness was thus retained within the unity
subject and object (this point will become important later, when we come to look at 
Hegelian identity in difference). However, Debord's theory does not entirely escape the
charge of subjectivism: for although it presents capital as the result of alienated so
a , it offers little purchase on the social relations from which capital arises.  
 The theory of spectacle blurs different forms of social activity because the 
extension of reification and rationalisation throughout society had given rise to a world
in which “time” (to borrow Lukács' phrasing) “sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing 
nature”, and is thereby “transformed into abstract, exactly measurable”84 space; and ju
 
77 “In the process of reading the Marx manuscript [the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844] all the idealist prejudices of History and Class Consciousness were swept to one side” (Lukács 
1971, p.xxxvi). 
78 Marx's Entäusserung is also frequently translated as alienation, although 'externalisation' perhaps 
serves to distinguish it from the more subjective dimensions of Entfremdung. Chris Arthur discusses 
this difficulty in the appendix to his Dialectics of Labour (1986), noting that Entfremdung is perhaps 
best for interpersonal relations and Entäusserung for the alienation of property. Following Bernstein 
(1999, p.45), and indeed Lukács himself (1971, p.xxiv), I will opt for Vergegenständlichung as a 
marker for the objective actualisation of subjective action and capacity. 
79 Lukács 1971, p.xxiv See also Clark (1991) for useful comments on this issue. Significantly, given his 
personal link to Debord (discussed in chapter one), Hyppolite also makes much of the distinction 
between subjective and objective alienation in his Studies on Marx and Hegel of 1955. 
80 Lukács 1971, p.xvii 
81 Lukács 1971, p.xviii 
82 Lukács 1971, p.xxiii 
83 Debord 1995, pp.115-6; 2006, p.835 
84 Lukács 1971, p.90 
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as this time had become abstract and generalised across social experience, so too had 
Debord's proletariat: a 'class' that exceeded the bounds of traditional Marxist analysis, 
being formed, as we saw above, of “the vast mass of workers who have lost all power 
over the use of their own lives”,85 and of all those deprived of the possibility of shaping
their own 'social space-time', “regardless of variations in their degrees of affluence”.86 
Debord's effectively existential notion of poverty was therefore linked to the nature of
'spectacular time': a time that “manifests nothing in its effective reality aside from its 
exchangeability”.87 Different forms of social activity were thus equated to one anoth
(an equation furthered by the trope of a disconnected spectator, for whom all life 
equally separate), thus denigrating the traditional Marxist primacy of labour and
informing the S.I.'s shift in focus away from production towards the 'everyday'. 
Consequently, whilst Debord's account employs the Marxist framework of reification, 
fetishism, subject-object inversion, etc., its desire to update Marx and to do aw
wage labour undermines the primacy of the latter to the very concepts that it 
appropriates and employs. As we’ll see later, this pertains to
theory focuses on capital's 'effects' rather than its 'causes'.  
 Debord was in fact obliged to expand the wage-relation in a manner that would 
allow him to talk of the alienation of life as a whole, rather than that of labour time p
se. This however renders that relation so abstract as to cast it as a binary opposition 
rather than a dialectical interaction: within the spectacle “the entirety of labour sold”, 
i.e. the total activity of society, becomes “the total commodity”,88 i.e. spectac
which is then returned in fragments to its fragmented producers. The social, 
interpersonal antagonism of the wage relation thus becomes the opposition of 'hu
as a whole to 'capital', or rather of 'life' to its denial. Thus although the theory of 
spectacle relies on traditional Marxist concepts, it removes their bases; and whilst the 
following contention may seem facile, its use of Marx's fetish could, from a classical
perspective, be said to exemplify the fetish itself, insofar as the theory focuses only 
upon the immediate appearances of the social relations from which capital arises.   
 These remarks should be tempered by noting that such problems stem from 
Debord and the S.I.'s desire to open up a “Northwest Passage”89 through and beyon
19th Century analyses, and the models of struggle and organisation associated with 
 
85 Debord 1995, p.84; 2006, p.816 
86 S.I. 2006 p.141; 1997, p.309 
87 Debord 1995, p.110; 2006, p.831, emphasis in the original 
88 Debord 1995, p.29; 2006, p.779 
89 S.I. 2006 p.148; 1997, pp.323-4.  
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ime and Contingency
them. These ambitions, and the group’s attempts to re-imagine what might be entailed i
actually achieving them, doubtless number amongst the S.I.'s greatest contributions. I
can also be noted that their rejection of any sense in which labour might be liberated 
rather than abolished also recalls aspects of Postone's recent provocative work,90 and 
some, such as Jappe, Debord's move away from a focus on labour is one of his c
virtues. Whilst making reference to Lukács' 1967 preface to History and Class 
Consciousness Jappe contends that its corrected presentation of labour as a constitutive 
force “turn[ed] a characteristic of capitalism into an eternal ontological necessity”,91 as
for Jappe such a fixation on the primacy of labour and class denigrates their historical 
mutability, and thereby their potential supersession.92 Yet one could respond by noting 
that neither Lukács nor the Marx of the Manuscripts equate all constitutive activity to 
contemporary capitalist labour; there remains a marked difference between recognising,
on the one hand, that such a capacity for activity is at present given over to labour, an
reducing the former to the latter on the other. Consequently, and as opposed to th
who would hold that the relevance of Debord's theory lies in its resonance with 
contemporary
too abstract.  
  
T  
 these 
an 
 perhaps be best introduced with the following passage, taken from a 
tter of 1974:  
the 
age and to speak schematically, the basic theoreticians to retrieve and develop are no longer Hegel, 
arx an
                                                
 
 I've argued that addressing Debord's work via its themes of time, history and 
subjectivity serves to clarify the meaning of his notion of spectacle. I've also used
themes to highlight that theory's failings, insofar as they inform its emphasis on 
subjectivity and its quasi-existential notion of poverty. I'll now contend that these same 
issues also illuminate Debord's oft-noted but largely un-theorised interest in strategy: 
interest that can
le
 
The principle work that, it appears to me, one must engage in – as the complementary contrary to The 
Society of the Spectacle, which described frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit in it) – is 
theory of historical action. One must advance strategic theory in its moment, which has come. At this 
st
M d Lautréamont, but Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz. 93  
 
 
90 Postone 1996. Postone's account will be discussed in the conclusion to part two. 
91 Jappe 1999, p.151 
92 Jappe 1999, p.151 
93 Debord 1974a 
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 In the absence of the themes that I've drawn attention to above, this interest in 
strategy can appear to be a mere idiosyncrasy without any inherent connection to the
theory of spectacle's deeper concerns. I will however show that it can be viewed as 
being directly related to the notions of temporality and subjectivity discussed ea
Again, this is largely missing from the extant commentaries on Debord. In the
introduction to part three I'll discuss some of the existing attempts to engage 
theoretically with Debord's interest in strategy; here we can simply note that it's s
used as much more than a means for Debord's biographers to add shade to their 
portraits. Merrifield, for example, enjoys picturing a melancholy philosopher-poet given 
to “ruminate” on “quiet, lonely summer days” over classics of military theory;94 H
presents a self-consciously Machiavellian figure; Bracken95 similarly describes a 
“player of human chess”.96 Yet if as a result of its identity with time the subject is (like 
Sartre's 'for-itself') located in perpetual opposition to its present – even to the reality t
it has itself created, and by extension to its own self – then that subject is inherently 
transitory, and characterised by finitude. These claims will be developed further below, 
but it seems that for Debord consciousness is always bound to particular moments and 
contexts, precluding any God-like trans-historical viewpoint. Actions would thus have
to be based upon limited knowledge of the factors in play, and this in turn means tha
the dialectical relation between subject and world described above must inevitably 
involve chance (albeit a degree of chance that was to be fostered through play and 
Situationist activity; thus Debord: “all progress, all creation, is the organization of new 
conditions of chance”).97 In other words, the construction of history becomes a strateg
enterprise: or as Debord put it via one of his many quotations from Clausewitz, “one
must become accustomed to acting in accordance with general probabilities; it is
il  to wait for a time when one will be completely aware of everything”.98  
 This homology between existential and strategic concerns99 pertains to the S
                                    
95 
tion with the self-conscious creation of history with acts of 
997, p.105).  
99 
 all 
wn” (Clausewitz 1993, p.95); after all, “war is the realm of 
94 Merrifield 2005, p.11 
Bracken's book does however contain some real insight: “for Debord [the] apprehension of time was 
coloured [by a] Hegelian preoccupa
negation”. (Bracken 1
96 Bracken 1997, p.viii 
97 Debord 2006, p.296 emphasis in the original 
98 Debord 2003a, p.180; Debord 2006, p.1388  
A situational subject created and defined through its own strategic projects bears obvious relation to 
Sartre, but further homologies can be found: compare for example De Beauvoir's claim that “we must 
decide upon the opportuneness of an act and attempt to measure its effectiveness without knowing
the factors that are present” (De Beauvoir 1976, p.123) and Clausewitz's assertion that “the only 
situation a commander can know is his o
uncertainty” (Clausewitz 1993, p.117).  
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ivorce between theory and the movement that it purports to clarify and 
articulate.106  
    
goal of transforming life into a game,100 and I'll show in a moment that it becomes 
particularly significant in relation to Debord's views on Marx's 'inversion' of Hegel.
First however, and in order to introduce the 'openness' that I attributed to Debord's 
Hegelian view of history in the preface above, I'll offer some comments on the m
in which these issues entail that 'truth' – as opposed to the spectacle's 'falsity
corresponds to historical action, and thereby to the contextuality of praxis. 
 As we've seen, the subject's identity with time necessitates autonomy and self-
determination. This precludes political representation101 (as the S.I. put it: “We wi
organize the detonation: the free explosion must escape us and any other control 
forever”),102 although this is not to suggest that Debord and the S.I. were in favour of 
“sub-anarchist spontaneism”: according to the S.I., anyone who associated them with 
the latter would show that they “simply don't know how to read.”103 Their interpretation 
of councilism, which I'll take up in part three, does however differ sharply from Le
own disavowal of 'spontaneity'. Where Lenin held that the latter would constit
“nothing more nor less than consciousness in an embryonic form”,104 Debord 
maintained that the knowledge required to deal with an insurrectionary situation 
never be 'imputed' by external, intellectual managers: “The task of directing the 
proletariat from without,” he held, “by means of a disciplined clandestine party under 
the control of intellectuals who had become 'professional revolutionaries',” entailed tha
Bolshevism “gave rise to a genuine profession ... of total social management”.10
Debord, theoretical knowledge was to develop immanently through praxis; and 
remembering the comments on Hegelian identity in difference signalled above (i.e. the 
unity of a thought with its referent, form with content, subject with object, etc.), it can 
be noted that just as the separation of thought from practice was to be avoided, so too 
was any such d
                                             
100 We might note here that for Clausewitz (1993, p.97) “In the whole range of human activities, war 
most closely resembles a game of cards”. 
“We shall never begin to understand Debord's hostility to the concept 'representation,' for instance, 
unless we realize that for him the word always carr
101 
ied a Leninist aftertaste. The spectacle is repugnant 
lize, as it were, the Party's claim to be the representative of the working 
ith 2004, p.479)  
7, p.324 
105 
106 
n 
lf 
do not confront the 
because it threatens to genera
class.” (Clark and Nicholson Sm
102 SI 2006, p.148; 199
103 S.I. 2006, p.356; 1997, p.637 
104 Lenin 1988, p.97 
Debord 1995, p.68, emphasis in the original; 2006, p.805 
“The proletarian revolution is predicated entirely on the requirement that, for the first time, theory as 
the understanding of human practice be recognised and directly lived by the masses. This revolutio
demands that workers become dialecticians” (Debord 1995 p.89; 2006, p.819). This position was itse
much informed by the young Marx. As the latter famously put it in 1843: “we 
31 
 I'll argue in chapter nine that Debord identifies theoretical truth with history, or 
rather with the negative that drives the latter forwards. For example, and whilst alluding 
to Marx and Engels' famous remark on communism as a negative historical process 
(referred to above), Debord stated that “Nothing is ever proved except by the real 
movement that dissolves existing relations”.107 This means that if theory is to attain 
validity it must express a shared circumstance or problematic, insofar as it is to express 
and articulate that negative: hence the S.I.'s famous claim that “Our ideas are in 
everybody's heads”,108 and hence also Debord's later qualification that the group had not 
put those ideas there through “the exercise of some outside influence or other,” but 
rather had merely given voice "to ideas that were necessarily already present in these 
proletarian heads”.109 Whilst this can be seen to involve a notion of recognition, it does 
not entail giving voice to a stable ontological truth: rather, it would seem to be fat closer 
to the acknowledgement and clarification of a shared, temporary exigency. As validity 
thus stems from an ability to diagnose and affect an existing historical tendency, the 
recognition and adoption of theory on the part of those who are to actualise it serves as a 
measure of truth. Hence Debord's claim that Marx's Capital is “obviously true and false: 
essentially, it is true, because the proletariat recognized it, although quite badly (and 
thus also let its errors pass)”.110 One might also note here his own and the S.I.'s view 
that the events of May 1968 demonstrated the truth of their own arguments.111 These 
points can be placed in opposition to the erroneous notion of a lost, true, Arcadian past 
discussed above: for Debord, truth is ultimately history itself (the difficulties raised by 
such evaluation will be discussed in the thesis’ conclusion). 
 In short: the subject's identity with time casts historical action as a strategic 
enterprise; yet in doing so, it entails that theoretical truth must itself be contingent, or at 
least historically contextual. Consequently, theory can only provide the articulation and 
clarification of a given moment, and this, as I will now suggest, connects to the anti-
dogmatism that characterises Debord's Hegelian Marxism.  
 
History and Hegelian Marxism 
                                                                                                                                               
world in a doctrinaire way with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it! We develop 
new principles for the world out of the world’s own principles” (Marx 1843). 
107 Debord 2003a, pp.144-5; 2006, p.1347 
108 S.I. 2006, pp.275; 1997, pp.529 
109 S.I. 2003, p.9 emphasis in the original, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1089  
110 Debord 2004a, p.457 
111 See in particular the S.I.'s 1969 essay 'The Beginning of an Era' (S.I. 2006 pp.288-325; 1997, pp.571-
602). 
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 Debord's views on the relation between Marx and Hegel can be introduced by 
noting his contentions that Marx “demolish[ed] Hegel's detached stance with respect to 
what occurs”, and that “theory thenceforward had nothing to know beyond what it itself 
did”.112 As argued above, Debord rejects any a priori human identity that might requir
a specific form of realisation, and instead casts humanity as radically historically self-
determinate. The full expression of such subjectivity cannot therefore be found within a 
particular, conclusive historical moment, but only in the continuity of historical process 
itself. This position is certainly closer to Hegel's own views than might be imagined, but 
the important difference, and indeed the source of Debord's allegation of 'd
this: although Hegel grasps the identity between historical action and self-
consciousness, he presents that identity in terms of a trans-historical notion of the 
necessary conditions of freedom, and thus via a discrete body of thought that purp
pertain to the entirety of historical action; the developing identity of thought and 
practice in praxis is thus lost.113 For Hegel, we are certainly free self-determining 
agents, but our freedom requires the acceptance and actualisation of the “divine”,114 
quasi-pantheistic115 reason that his philosophy purports to express; having ascended 
the level of Hegelian philosophy, the self-consciousness of historical action accords 
with that logic, following, as far as it is able, a fixed, eternal schema. Hence Debord's 
charge of contemplative detachment: for insofar as this schema coincided with many of 
the defining features of Hegel's age,116 it served, as Marx later put it, to “tran
glorify what exists”;117 and whilst Kojève's end of history thesis is certainly 
questionable, it would seem that history after Hegel was to be more re-affirmed within
its present state of affairs than made anew. We'll see that with Debord, in contrast, the 
meaning of history cannot be confined within a given end point, but is rather one with
the actual process of a self-determinate history (just as the human subject is one
time). In fact, it seems that Debord re-cas
purported end as that very process itself. 
 
112 Debord 1995, p.51, emphasis in the original; 2006, p.795 
113 “[Hegel] constitutes himself at the end of history, since he gives (as the author of a system) the 
meaning of history, at the same time that he affirms that this meaning can only be found when history 
has been completed. This is the comic aspect of Hegel, which comes from a general tragedy of the 
bourgeois revolution” (Debord 1969). 
114 Hegel 1991, p.147 
115 See Beiser 2005, pp.143-4 
116 This is not to deny that Hegel's work is without critical content, or indeed the ambiguity and debates 
surrounding the degree to which the work of history is in his view entirely complete. This point will 
be taken up in chapter one.  
117 Marx 1976, p.103 
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 Debord holds that Marx rectified historical thought's separation from the history 
that it contemplated through the famed 'realisation' of philosophy in praxis, and w
develop this point and thereby introduce some of the more distinctive aspects of 
Debord's Hegelian Marxism by noting his admiration for a Polish Young Hegelian 
named August von Cieszkowski. Debord discovered the latter's Prolegomena for a 
Historiosophy (1838) “after 1972”,118 but the book does nonetheless echo and there
illustrate many of the themes presented in 1967's The Society of the Spectacle. For 
Debord, Cieszkowski's significance was to have lain, “five years before the young 
Marx, and one hundred and twenty years before the Situationists”, the “primary basis” 
upon which “the 
th
Cieszkowski annihilates the central aporia of the [Hegelian] system, simply by recalling that 
time had not ended. Hegel had concluded history, in the form of thought, because he fi
accepted the idea of glorifying the present result. In a single movement, Cieszkowski 
reversed the system, by putting the
because he recognized in the th ug
ower to transform the world.   
 
 Hegel's claims are of course far more subtle than this, and Cieszkowski's crit
is in fact slightly different: he contends that Hegel, in limiting his focus to the p
failed to think history as a totality121 (he does however certainly maintain that 
philosophy is to be realised as praxis).122 Nonetheless, this description of Cieszkowski's 
contribution does chime with Debord's own remarks on Hegel and Marx in The Society 
of the Spectacle: there Debord claims that the crux of Marx's famous 'inversion' was n
a “trivial substitution”123 of unfolding categories for developing social relations, but 
rather a change in perspective; where Hegel cast the present as the conclusion of the 
past, Marx is viewed as having rendered every present moment the genesis of an open 
future. Th
e 4  
 Debord's own Hegelian Marxism can be understood in very similar terms, and 
 
118 Debord 2008, p.84. The following year saw the book's publication through Champ Libre, the 
publishing house with which Debord was affiliated. 
119 Debord 1983 
120 Debord 1983 
121 “The totality of history must consist of the past and of the future, of the road already travelled as well 
as the road yet to be travelled” (Cieszkowski 2009, p.51). 
122 “The future of philosophy in general is to be practical philosophy or, to put it better, the philosophy of 
praxis” (Cieszkowski 2009, p.77 emphasis in the original). 
123 Debord 1995, p.51; 2006, p.794 
124 Debord 1995, p.51; 2006, p.795 
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one can begin to reconstruct its 'inversion' by way of the following. The Society of the 
Spectacle's central fourth chapter on the workers' movement begins with a discussio
Hegel, and places his philosophy at the roots of what Debord refers to as 'historical 
thought' (i.e. the self-consciousness of historical agency).125 The history that was to 
emerge from the spectacle is thus presented as having been anticipated, in however 
'mystified' a form, by Hegelian philosophy. If one takes this in conjunction with the 
spectacle's status as a final, dialectical separation (i.e. its historical location prior to
grand, revolutionary unification of subject and object afforded by the Situationist 
future), then one can claim that the unity that Hegel presents at the apex of his sys
in fact a depiction – a Vorstellung perhaps – of what Debord takes to be the real, 
objective conditions of a self-determinate history: the identity of the ideal and the 
material afforded by Hegel's absolute Idea constitutes a philosophical representation 
the more dynamic unity of thought and practice involved in praxis. Hence Debord's 
claim that “Hegel was merely the philosophical culm
he “superseded separation, but in thought only”.126  
 As noted in the preface, Debord does not state this explicitly; this is something 
that I myself am ascribing to his account. I will however attempt to develop this claim 
through textual evidence as the thesis progresses. It might also be noted here that such 
speculation is almost impossible to avoid: Debord gives us very little to work with when 
it comes to reconstructing these aspects of his thought, as is also the case with his vie
on the links between dialectics
reconstruct in chapter seven). 
 Hegel's supposed end of history thus becomes Marx's end of pre-history, or 
rather an anticipation thereof, insofar as Debord's theory describes an era pregnant with
the possibility of actualising the unity that had Hegel had glimpsed in his presentation 
of the absolute. Given Debord's remarks on workers' councils and his antipathy towards 
hierarchy and separation, one could add that this actualisation would realise not only the
unity of thought and action, but also, in terms of collective agency, that of the univer
and the particular. Furthermore, as there is no essence to be realised by that agency 
other than the perpetuity of self-determination itself (“history”, for Debord, “has no
[n'a pas d'objet] aside from whatever effects it works upon itself”),127 and as such 
perpetuity entails the re-constitution of the conditions that render that agency possibl
 
125 Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.793 
126 Debord 1995, p.49, translation altered; 2006, p.793, emphasis in the original 
127 Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.792 
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one might also make the more tentative claim that this implies a unity of means and 
ends that
thesis.   
 My suggestion, then, is that communism emerges from Debord's account as a
historical process rather than as a discrete goal, and that this process is linked to the 
Hegelian absolute. Yet doesn't this contradict the points made above regarding Debord's 
critique of Hegel? The objection noted above was as to the assumption that the thoug
of history could be comprised within a conclusive point. My claim, however, is that 
Debord takes Hegel's depiction of that point as a static representation of an ongoing
movement, and that this reflects a sensitivity to the degree to which Hegel himself 
presented the absolute as a state of continual movement and flux (a point that will be 
substantiated in chapter one). Furthermore, whilst a focus on the absolute is perhaps 
uncommon, it's not without precedent: Feuerbach, distancing his materialism from its 
Hegelian roots, made a similar claim in a preface to The Essence of Christianity128 (a 
preface that provides the epigraph to The Society of the Spectacle's first chapter), and a 
more explicit example can be found in the work of Raya Dunayevskaya. The founder
Marxist Humanism and a passionate advocate of Hegelian Marxism, Dunayevskaya 
models her account not on one of the famous stages on the paths towards the Hegelian 
absolute, such as th
absolute itself.129  
 Lefebvre too employs a notion of the absolute, but despite his links to Debord 
his use of the concept is rather different. For Lefebvre, the goal of history was the 'total' 
or “'de-alienated' man”:130 a “living subject-object”131 said to arise immanently from the 
privations and demands of everyday life. Lefebvre's concept of the total man emerged as
a reaction to the purportedly a-political relativism of existential freedom, as it offe
distinct target for political agency to aim towards: “only the notion or idea of the 
 
128 “...the 'Idea' is to me only faith in the historical future, the triumph of truth and virtue; it has for me 
only a political and moral significance” (Feuerbach 1989, p.xiv). 
129 Dunayevskaya would later claim that she made this “breakthrough” in 1953, in a series of letters in 
which she established that “within the Absolute Idea itself is contained the movement from practice as 
well as from theory” (Dunayevskaya 2000, p.5). In her view, the absolute “signifies transformation of 
reality” (Dunayevskaya 2002, p.187), and constitutes not an end, but rather a “new beginning” 
(p.177). I don't mean to suggest a direct line of influence here, but there is a point of contact: Champ 
Libre, the publishing house with which Debord became involved in 1971, released a translation of her 
Marxism and Freedom that same year. There are also differences, as whilst Debord emphasises the 
'inversion' of Hegel, Dunayevskaya presents her views as an interpretation of his philosophy: “When 
Marx said that the Ideal is nothing but the reflection of the real, translated into thought, he was not 
departing either from Hegel's dialectical method or from his Absolutes” (Dunayevskaya 2000, p.37). 
130 Lefebvre 1968, p.162  
131 Lefebvre 1968, p.162  
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 Theory that Invites its Own Supersession
absolute [i.e. the total man]”, he claimed, “gives a sense (in other words both a meaning 
and a direction) to historically acquired knowledge”.132 Yet this 'absolute' would seem 
to be a perpetually receding target rather than an attainable status: the total man was 
said to be “a figure on a distant horizon beyond our present vision”,133 and was 
described as a “mathematical limit” to which “we are forever drawing nearer but have 
never reached”.134 Lefebvre's deliberately anti-dogmatic dialectic thus maintains its 
'openness' through the constant deferral of final synthesis. I would however contend tha
Debord founds his own 'open' dialectic upon the establishment of the very subject-
object unity that Lefebvre defers: subject-object unity
conditions of historical agency rather than as its distant objective. 
 It should however be admitted that Debord tends to avoid the term 'subject-
object unity', perhaps because of its association with Lukács and the Party. He does 
nonetheless frequently emphasise the importance of the identity between the acting 
subject and his or her actions (indeed, the whole theory of spectacle rests upon the 
deprivation of that identity). Yet Lukács provides a useful contrast here too. In his vie
“no path leads from the individual to the totality,”135 as “the form taken by the class 
consciousness of the proletariat is the Party”.136 As it is the latter alone that constitutes 
the historical self-consciousness of the proletariat, the Party remains necessary so long
as historical agency exists: the conditions for a permanently open history are thus the
conditions for the permanence of the party form, and thus, in Debord's view, for the 
perpetuation of a power that was “external”137 to the proletariat and to its historical 
agency. Debord's emphasis on direct, collective self-determination in workers' councils 
is perhaps arguably more coh
a
 
A  
                                                
 
 Having now set out some of the primary features of Debord's account and my 
 
132 Lefebvre 2008a, p.67 
133 Lefebvre 2008a, p.66 
134 Lefebvre 1968, p.109 
135 Lukács 1971, p.28 
136 Lukács 1971, p.41, emphasis in the original 
137 Debord 1995, p.81; 2006, p.814 
138 'The Party' is of course understood here in an arguably limited and Leninist sense. The S.I. themselves 
could be viewed as a party of sorts, and their self-presentation as an artistic avant-garde was coupled 
to the notion of a political vanguard. The crucial difference, however, is that the S.I.'s own attempts to 
articulate and express existing concerns were conducted in a manner that sought to avoid 
representation, control and centralised hierarchy.  
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reading thereof I'll draw this introduction to a conclusion, and in doing so I'll indicate 
the problematic that the thesis as a whole will pursue. As noted, Debord's acc
seem to entail that the conditions of historical action need to be continually 
reformulated: for if communism becomes a historical process, in the sense of free, self-
determinate agency, then the latter's actions must also re-constitute its own groun
this is viewed in relation to the issues of chance and contingency that arise from 
Debord's concerns with time and subjectivity, then one could contend that the agency 
involved in this process would need to be 'strategic' in some sense: theories, decisions 
and actions would need to be historically contextual, and geared towards moving that 
agency beyond a specific, present moment. This can be seen to pertain to the S.I.'s ca
for their own supersession,139 but also to Debord's broader remarks about the role of
theory. For example, in
s
Theories are only made to die in the war of time. Like military units, they must be sent into
battle at the right moment; and whatever their merits or insufficiencies, they can only be 
used if they are on h
are constantly being 
artial defeats.    
 
 Theory, in other words, is akin to the contextuality of strategic thought. Yet 
Debord's views on the theory of spectacle would seem to depart from this position: in 
1979 he declared that he had “no doubt that the confirmation all my theses encou
would “last right until the end of the century and even beyond”141 (according to 
Prigent's anecdote, Debord thought this period of validity would extend as far as 
2030).142 I would suggest that the bases for both this assumption and the drive towards 
theoretical reformulation that it perhaps contradicts can be identified within the them
of time, history and subjectivity introduced here: for on the one hand, these themes 
inform Debord's focus on praxis, negativity and change; on the other, they further the 
overly subjective perspective of the theory of spectacle described above. There is thus 
perhaps a sense in which addressing Debord's work in this way – i.e. approaching it via
its intellectual history, and thereby pursuing the concepts that it rests upon – revea
 
139 For example: following the events of May 1968, the S.I. remarked: “From now on we are sure of a 
satisfactory consummation of our activities: the S.I. will be superseded” (S.I. 2006, p.325; 1997, 
p.602). 
140 Debord 2003a, pp.150-1; 2006, p.1354 
141 Debord 1979; 2006 p.1465 
142 “Around 1982, [Debord] told me that his 1967 La Société du Spectacle would be valid for the next 
fifty years. I told him: 'Are you sure?' His answer was categorical, his book would last for that period 
of time” (Prigent 2009a). 
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disparity, if not an outright contradiction: for the theory of spectacle's subjective 
abstraction and departure from concrete social relations jars with the strategic concerns 
that inform it. The theory omits any clear sense of what capital is, how it operates, and 
thus of how it might be combated. Yet if this problem is viewed in relation to the aspects 
of Debord's Hegelian Marxism indicated above, then Debord's account need not be 
dismissed outright: rather, the ideas about history that inform the theory can be seen to 
over-arch it and point beyond it. The theo
far broader notion of historical agency.  
 The thesis will develop the claims introduced here via its three primary sect
and in doing so it will pursue the sense in which the ideas that found the theory of 
spectacle may project beyond Debord's own formulations. In the closing sections of t
thesis I'll contend that viewing subject-object unity as the grounds and conditions of 
agency can, when viewed in relation to some of the nuances of Hegel's absolute
to
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 One might think here of Peter Hallward's notion of a 'dialectically voluntarist' general will. The degree 
to which the latter is said to be able to “make the way by walking it” (Hallward 2009, p.17) will be 
echoed to some extent in chapter nine's attempts to think the circular, self-determinate movement of 
the Hegelian absolute in relation to praxis. 
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PART ONE  
 
Art and Negativity 
1952-1961 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview of Part One 
 
 This first part of the thesis will expand upon the contentions presented in the 
thesis' general introduction, whilst also outlining some of the more pertinent aspects of 
Debord and the S.I.'s intellectual history. It will present two sets of claims. Firstly, I'll 
argue that the essential premises of the theory of spectacle can be traced back to Debord 
and the S.I.'s early concerns with the 'realisation' of art; I'll also show that the theory's 
problematic subjectivism can be seen to stem from these same avant-garde roots. 
Secondly, I'll argue that some of the aspects of Debord's Hegelian Marxism that I 
described above can be discerned within the S.I.'s early views on the construction of 
situations. My principal concern in this latter regard will be to indicate influences that 
correspond to the perpetual process that Debord attributes to time and history, and also 
those that pertain to the nature and status of the Hegelian system's ostensibly final 
'closure' and resolution. I'll thus be looking at the influences of French Hegelianism, 
Surrealism and existentialism – influences that remain largely unexplored within the 
existing literature on Debord and the S.I. – and my focus will rest, broadly speaking, 
upon the inception and development of Debord's notions of situation and spectacle 
between 1952 and 1961. This is a period that begins with Debord's membership of the 
Letterist1 movement, and ends with his own and the S.I.'s adoption of an increasingly 
Marxist and theoretical stance in the early 1960's. I've adopted the S.I.'s fifth conference 
in Gothenburg as a marker for the latter transition, as the claims and positions 
developed there led to the expulsion in 1962 of the S.I.'s 'artistic right wing': a primarily 
Scandinavian sect whose refusal to renounce the traditional plastic arts will be discussed 
in chapter two.  
  
Spectacle and Tragedy  
                                                 
1 Translations of the term Lettrisme vary; 'Lettrism' and 'Lettrist' are often used. As the term stems from 
the French word for letter I will however follow the more recent trend of referring to the movement as 
'Letterism'. 
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 Many of the writers discussed in part one can be seen to be engaged, in various 
ways, with the nature and possible implications of Hegelian dialectical resolution. Of 
particular interest in this regard will be those who've suggested that Hegelian negativity 
might threaten that closure or render it problematic, and as indicated in the thesis' 
preface I'll use the common theme of tragedy as a means of connecting some of the 
more disparate elements of the material under discussion. To be clear however: I'm not 
claiming that tragedy is a particularly pressing concern for Debord or the S.I., and nor 
will I describe their work as tragic itself. Tragedy is simply a useful motif; partly for the 
simple reason that it's frequently invoked by the writers that we'll be looking at, but also 
because it affords a critical approach to some of the oppositional stances taken towards 
Hegel's alleged neutralisation of the 'restless' negativity that his work described.  
 Hegel himself was greatly interested in tragic art. In his early years in Tübingen 
and Frankfurt he became particularly interested in its presentations of human 
protagonists subjected to the dictates of fate and the gods; such works united the finite 
(humanity) and the infinite (fate, the divine) within a coherent artistic whole, and this 
led him to consider taking tragic art as a paradigm for the speculative unity that his 
philosophy sought to embody.2 This was subsequently rejected in favour of the pursuit 
of an immanent logic (i.e. a mode of expression that would be one with its subject 
matter as opposed to depicting it, however artistically), but as is often noted, tragedy 
does nonetheless feature within Hegel's mature work. The manner in which I'll employ 
it here is indebted to the recent work of Theodor George, whose study of the 
Phenomenology looks at the theme of tragedy in relation to that of dialectical closure.3 
My approach is also informed by Nietzsche's claim that tragic art met “an ardent 
longing ... for redemption through illusion”.4 For Nietzsche, tragic art figures the 
'Dionysian' impulse through its rational, 'Apollonian' counterpart, thereby rationalising 
and ordering a potentially dangerous and subversive force; and as we'll see in chapter 
one, the Surrealist affiliate Georges Bataille effectively reads Hegel's philosophy 
through this very notion of rationalisation. For Bataille, the Hegelian system offers a 
tragic “spectacle”5 of negativity: the latter, in his view, is inherently resistant to utility, 
 
2 George 2006, p.8 
3 George 2006. George's reading ultimately argues for the virtues of viewing tragedy as a trope of 
resignation to a world that one cannot control; my own use of the concept here emphasises the 
'contemplative' implications of such a position (see Bunyard 2009).  
4 Nietzsche 1992a, p.45 
5 Bataille 1990, p.20  
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order and rationalisation, and in consequence Hegel's philosophy merely 'stages' a 
closure that can never be attained. Likewise, Breton and the Surrealists held that the 
Hegelian system stifles the very excessive and limitless negativity that it describes. In 
consequence, tragedy provides us with a useful motif for the sense in which Hegelian 
closure might stifle a potentially endless negativity within the artistry of a closed, 
ordered system.  
 I'll use this motif to form a narrative by way of which I'll elaborate on my earlier 
comments on Debord's Hegelian Marxism. I've claimed that Debord's account can be 
seen to base its own 'open' negative historical process not on the constant deferral of a 
final resolution, but rather on the defining figure of that resolution itself: the Hegelian 
absolute becomes an ideal, philosophical representation of the real conditions and 
requirements of historical agency. The Hegelian resolution of negative difference can 
thus be viewed as tragic in the sense outlined above, albeit with the further qualification 
that it is now not the negative per se that is equated to the dangerous and the Dionysian, 
but rather the figure of unity itself: a spectacular depiction of unity prevents its real 
instantiation in praxis. I will thus argue that Debord locates a negative, transformative 
force within that which many of the other writers discussed here viewed as that force's 
denial.  
 Now, if Hegel depicts a unity of thought and practice whilst sanctioning its real 
absence (a claim in keeping with Debord and Marx's claims that Hegelian philosophy 
validated the bourgeois order), and if his system can thus be viewed as analogous to 
tragic art, then so too can philosophical or theoretical accounts that argue for the 
necessity of deferring that absent unity, or indeed for its impossibility. If this connection 
can be made, we then also have a means of locating Debord and the S.I.'s critical 
relation to existential philosophy within this schema: for according to the S.I., the 
purportedly inevitable angst and anguish of existential subjectivity presented the 
symptoms of spectacular society as if they were eternal attributes of the human 
condition. As anticipated in the thesis' general introduction, I'll also show that 
something similar can be found in Lefebvre's own perpetually receding absolute.   
 
The Structure and Content of Part One 
 
 I'll begin by discussing French Hegelianism's characteristic focus on the themes 
of negativity, time and perpetual unrest. Of particular importance here will be Wahl's 
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reading of the 'unhappy consciousness'6 and Kojève's idiosyncratic account of the end 
of history, as I'll attempt to introduce the sense in which Hegel's philosophy can b
interpreted as being characterised by both perpetual difference on the one hand (a flux 
that for Wahl, as we'll see, “even risk[s] breaking the bounds of the [Hegelian] 
system”,7 and which for Koyré means that history must be “eternally unfinished”),8
final resolution on the other (e.g. Kojève's emphatic claim that for Hegel “Histor
completed”).9 The tension between those two positions can be seen to inform the 
Surrealists' interest in a dialectical negativity devoid of any such final resolution, and I'll 
introduce this via Bataille's contention that the Hegelian system constitutes a tragic 
'spectacle'. I'll then suggest that this interest in an 'open', transgressive dialectic pertains 
to the Situationists' views on the negative temporality of the constructed situation, 
particularly when linked to French Hegelianism’s concerns with time, and to the 
Surrealists' call for the unification of art and life (Breton: “Marx said 'Change the 
world', Rimbaud said 'Change life': for us these two watchwords are one”).10  
 Having thus indicated the degree to which Situationist time is not only 
dialectical but also somehow excessive and transformative, chapter two will then 
develop the claim that the spectacle constitutes the restriction of such a time. This will 
be attempted by way of a discussion of the S.I.'s roots in the artistic avant-garde: whilst 
discussing the ideas that informed the S.I.'s desire to realise art in lived praxis, I'll 
contend that the theory of spectacle can be seen to arise from Debord and the S.I.'s early 
concerns with the separation of a static art object from a passive observer. I'll also make 
 
6 As the unhappy consciousness is rather less famous than the lord and bondsman relation (often 
translated as master and slave) a few words of explanation may be helpful. In short, the 'unhappiness' 
of this form stems from its awareness of its own finite, contingent particularity and from its fruitless 
pursuit of stability, universality and necessity: it continually pursues an absolute that forever eludes it, 
but which is nonetheless its own alienated self. It's introduced at the end of the Phenomenology's 
chapter on self-consciousness, throughout which Hegel develops the contention – introduced at the 
end of the preceding chapter – that self-consciousness arises and is characterised by negation. This 
negativity drives the lord and bondsman's struggle to the death, as for each to recognise the other as a 
self-consciousness each must negate the other; it later prompts a stoical consciousness to negate the 
world by retreating into itself, and it causes a sceptical consciousness to declare that it alone is true, 
necessary and existent. This sceptical consciousness is however marked by the following 
contradiction: it had become sure of itself through negating an allegedly false world; yet doing so 
requires it to be contingent upon that which it declares to be secondary to its own necessity. The 
unhappy consciousness emerges as a new form that brings that contradiction to the fore: it knows 
itself to be both necessary and contingent, and locates its own necessity, permanence and stability 
within a separate object beyond itself: a universality that perpetually eludes its own finite particularity. 
Every attempt that it makes to grasp this 'Unchanging' absolute fails, because every attempt arises 
from – and thus demonstrates – its own separation from the latter. 
7 Wahl 1951, p.194 
8 Koyré 1971, pp.188-9; also quoted in Baugh 2003, p.27 
9 Kojève 1980, p.98 
10 Quoted by Trebitsch in Lefebvre 2008a, p.xx 
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some preliminary indications as to the manner in which the theory's shortcomings can 
be traced back to this basis.  
 In chapter three I'll develop the contention that it is in fact the absence of 
Hegelian resolution (or rather the absence of the unity represented by the latter), and not 
just that resolution itself, that can be viewed as 'tragic' in the sense set out here. By 
looking at the S.I.'s focus on the 'everyday', and by addressing the provenance of the 
concept of 'situation', I'll introduce some of the salient features of Debord and the S.I.'s 
debts to existentialism, and will make reference to the links between existential 
subjectivity and the Hegelian unhappy consciousness (a link famously identified by 
Sartre himself: “human reality”, he claimed, “is by nature an unhappy consciousness 
with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state”).11 I'll then expand on my 
suggestion that a similarly problematic deferral of resolution and unity can be found in
Lefebvre, and I'll do so by distinguishing his theory of 'moments' from the S.I.'s 
constructed situation. Lefebvre himself states that his moments – intimations of the 
absolute – are “tragic”,12 because they are finite instances within time, and pass as soon
as they arise. By contrast, I'll argue that the S.I.'s situations were an attempt to move 
with time: the absolute thus becomes not a finite point, but rather a continual temp
process.  
  
H  
d 
ferentiate 
 
at 
                                                
 
 Before we begin I should make a few initial explanatory remarks on Hegelian 
negativity and its Marxist appropriation, and an apposite starting point might be foun
in Hegel's fondness for a statement that he (incorrectly)13 attributes to Spinoza: “the 
basis of all determinacy is negation”14 (a line that Marx would later adopt).15 Hegel's 
point is very simple: in order to have a discrete, positive identity, one must dif
and distinguish it through negation (i.e. this is this because it's not that). This 
differentiation provides an example of the characteristic movement of Hegelian 
philosophy: in defining this through its difference from that, an initial, abstract and
indeterminate identity becomes 'other' to itself before returning to itself from th
 
11 Sartre 2003, p.114 
12 Lefebvre 2008b, p.347 
13 “This tag, which Hegel loves, is a misquotation. The nearest equivalent in Spinoza's surviving texts is 
in Epistle 50, 'Figure is nothing else but determination, and determination is negation'” (Gaerts, 
Suchting and Harris in Hegel 1991, p.326) 
14 Hegel 1991, p.147 
15 Marx 1976, p.744 
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difference, incorporating the new determination thus provided. The end of this 
movement is thus its own starting point, albeit given a 'higher' and more complete 
expression. This may illustrate that Hegelian negativity is not an abstract, outright 
negation that simply erases an existing positivity, but rather “supersedes [aufhebt] in 
such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded”16 (a crude example: if I w
to criticise something by way of an abstract negation I would simply dismiss it; with 
Hegel however, in po
b roved).  
 As Magee points out, recent trends towards a “non-metaphysical reading”17 of 
Hegel contradict his work's explicitly cosmological and theological aspects (e.g. “nat
is an embodiment of reason”),18 and the Hegel that will be discussed in this th
most certainly a metaphysician. In this latter respect negativity is not only an 
epistemological function, but also an ontological force that generates difference and 
destruction, but which thereby promotes creation. Within the realm of human histo
this means opposition, conflict and revolt; within nature itself (which for Hegel is 
devoid of history, as reason remains latent and implicit within it) it means the continual 
collapse of existent forms. It is in this sense that he famously associated negativity w
“death”, “dismemberment” and “devastation”,19 and infamously cast history as the 
“slaughter-bench”20 upon which “Divine Providence”21 works. Yet as that metaphor 
may illustrate, Hegel's negative is an expression of the 'divine' reason that shapes and 
directs the world (Hegel states this explicitly: “Reason directs the world”);22 and whilst 
nature is devoid of Spirit's telos, the Spirit that emerges from it is driven by the negat
to make explicit being's implicit, foundational onto-logical reason, and to thus bring 
being to the level of self-consciousness. This corresponds to the 'circular' pattern of the 
Hegelian system. The pure, abstract 'being' with which the Logic begins proves itself to 
be reason; this reason becomes other to itself as nature; nature gives rise to Spirit, whic
then ascends to the point where it is able to investigate the inherent logic of being (i.e. 
to the point where it can undertake Hegelian speculative philosophy). Thus whilst the 
movement of the negative gives rise to new positive forms, it does so whilst followin
the rationale laid out by the absolute Idea that lies immanent in the circuit's star
 
16 Hegel 1977, p.115 
17 Magee 2001, pp.14-5 
18 Hegel 2004, p.12 
19 Hegel 1977, p.19 
20 Hegel 2004, p.21 
21 Hegel 2004, p.13 
22 Hegel 2004, p.12 
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point, and which becomes manifest at its conclusion. Furthermore, whilst that 
conclusion does not erase negativity in favour of a final, static positivity, but rather 
sublates it and retains it within itself (the absolute Idea is “essentially process, because 
its identity is...the absolute negativity and hence dialectical”),23 and whilst Hegel thus
maintains that the negative remains forever 'restless', even after Spirit's attainment
self-consciousness, its movement remains 'enclosed' within its own conditions o
existence, i.e. those necessary structures of the fundamental ontological reason 
expressed by the Hegelian system. Hence the attraction, clearly felt by some of the 
commentators that we'll look at belo
disrupt or subvert that stable unity.  
 To turn now to Marx: the latter's relation to Hegel is complex, and develo
throughout his lifetime. Arthur and proponents of value form theory, being less 
concerned with the young Marx's philosophical anthropology, have offered useful 
insights into the degree to which the negative dimensions of Hegelian logic pertain to 
his mature economics.24 As regards our concerns here however, the most salient issu
lies in the degree to which Marx adopted – however cautiously and figuratively –
sense in which historical progress might be engendered through critical, hostile 
opposition. Hence his claim, made whilst ridiculing Proudhon, that “it is always the bad
side [of history] that in the end triumphs over the good side,” and which “produces
movement which makes history, by providing a struggle”; if one was to set about 
erasing that 'bad side', as Marx claims Proudhon advocates, one “would have set ones
the absurd problem of eliminating history.”25 Debord and the S.I. took these lines to 
heart, frequently identifying themselves with history's 'bad side',26 and claimed to be 
one with the historical negative (e.g. “the S.I. itself is merely the concentrated 
expression of a historical subversion which is everywhere”).27 This theme will be taken
up in part three, but what becomes particularly important with Debord, as signalled 
above, is the degree to which this negative movement is allied to that of 
to address this w
 
 
 
23 Hegel 1991, p.290 
24 See Arthur 2004 
25 Marx 2000, p.227 
26 S.I. 2003, p.8; Debord 2006, p.1089 
27 S.I. 2003, p.7; Debord 2006, p.1088 
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ryChapter One: Negativity and the End of Histo  
 
 
The Context of the S.I.'s Hegelianism 
 
 I'll offer a few remarks on time in Hegel in a moment, before discussing the 
relevance of the interpretations offered by several French Hegelians; the second part of 
the chapter will then view the influence of Surrealism on Debord and the S.I. in 
connection to those readings. First howe ll begin with a few words on the 
background to Debord and the S.I.'s interest in Hegel. 
 The first thing to note here is that Hegel's work was translated and discussed in 
France from a very early date: the 1850's in fact, and thus far earlier than the history-
oriented and Phenomenology-centric readings of the 1920's and 30's with which we are 
perhaps more familiar. As Kelly argues,
ver I'
n 
passing 
an-logicis
c
h  below; a text that “laid,” as Kelly 
ent existentialist movement”.3 A trend 
    
1 the latter readings were in fact responses to an 
earlier set of interpretations and concerns. French Hegelianism's initial focus lay not o
the Phenomenology but rather the Encyclopaedia, and thus entailed a concern with the 
nature and structure of the Hegelian system as a whole; and, in a manner that prefigured 
many more recent complaints, much early commentary presented the all-encom
'p m' of the system as troubling and implicitly imperialist. This gave rise to two 
opposed responses. Firstly, that of rejecting Hegel's philosophy of history and its 
account of ascending developmental stages whilst retaining his epistemology; and 
secondly – once it was recognised that his epistemology was in fact the source of the 
problem – that of salvaging his conception of history from his epistemology by 
problematising the degree to which the latter ensured the formers' completion and 
finality.2 Focus thus shifted towards Hegel's views on history and historical action, and 
an interest developed in extracting negative dialectical movement from the positivity of 
a completed system.   
 This was furthered by Jean Wahl's influential study of the Phenomenology's 
se tions on the 'unhappy consciousness' (Le Malheur de la Conscience dans la 
ilosophie de Hegel of 1929), which I'll return toP
puts it, “Hegelian foundations” for a “nasc
towards a Phenomenology-centric reading was given added impetus by Kojève's 
seminal lectures in the 1930's. Attended by some of the most significant figures within 
                                             
Kelly 1992, p.71 
Baugh 2003, pp.10-17 
Kelly 1992, p.33 
1 
2 
3 
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20th century French thought,4 these lectures, despite the idiosyncrasies of Kojève's 
interpretation (which were perhaps glossed by the absence of a complete French 
translation of the Phenomenology prior to Hyppolite's version in 1939), did much 
colour French theory and philosophy for years to come. Kojève emphasised H
notorious 'end of history' and the Phenomenology's lord and bondsman relation, adding
much impetus to the mistaken5 but no less prevalent assumption that it might offer a ke
to Marx (Sartre and Hyppolite would later claim, respectively, that “the…master-slave 
relation…profoundly influenced Marx”,6 and that “the master and slave...bec
inspiration of Marxian philosophy”).7 Marx's debts to Hegel had already been 
highlighted in 1932 with the publication of the 1844 Manuscripts (followed by their 
partial translation by Lefebvre in 1933). The Communist Party however, perhaps 
sensitive to the degree to which the critique of alienation n
c
Hegel but rather vanqui
c
purportedly subversive credentials of a Hegelian Marx, lending credence to the view 
that addressing Marx's use of Hegel might afford a more 'authentic' reading.  
 In the years following Stalin's death the Party's prohibition of Hegel rel
somewhat. Lukács and Korsch, both of whom had developed deliberately anti-dogm
forms of Hegelian Marxism in the 1920's (and had been criticised by the Party as a 
result) came to be translated and discussed in France. Essays by Lukács began to app
in France from the late 1950's onwards; History and Class Consciousness itself 
appeared in France in 1960 and received a reprint in 1967; a translation of Korsch's
Marxism and Philosophy appeared in 1964. Lefebvre's early Hegelian works, such as 
his Dialectical Materialism of 1940, were also republished. The consequent reaction 
provoked by this surge of interest took the form of Althusserian structuralism (For Mar
appeared in 1965; Reading Capital in 1968), which was of course current at the time
                                                 
4  Participants included Aron, Breton, Bataille, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and others; it seems that Sart
contrary to popular belief, did not attend (Arthur 1983) 
5 See Arthur 1983 for a useful discussion of these issues.  
6 Sartre 2003, p.61, also quoted in Arthur 1983 
re, 
 
7 Hyppolite 1969, Studies on Hegel and Marx, p.29, also quoted in Arthur 1983 
9  Isaak Illich Rubin – a Russian economist, whose excellent Essays on Marx’s 
nform the second part of this thesis – in 1930, an official Soviet philosopher 
 Rubin and the Menshevizing Idealists…treated Marx’s revolutionary method 
sm. …The Communist Party has smashed these trends alien to Marxism” 
bin 1972, p.277). Rubin was imprisoned, forced to confess and finally executed.  
8 Lefebvre (1968, p.16): “We cannot confine the use of the concept of alienation to the study of 
bourgeois societies.”  
 Following the arrest of
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that Debord and the S.I. were formulating their ideas.10 Hegelian philosophy was thu
not only very much present within the intellectual milieu: in addition, the potentially 
subversive character ascribed to 
furthered by its distinction from the academic tastes and fashions of the day. 
 Debord and the S.I. could thus view Hegel and a Hegelian Marx as possessi
an air of potential radicalism; yet what becomes important here is the degree to which 
Debord's adoption of Hegel was coloured by trends within French Hegel studies. 
Pursuing this issue, given the import of time and subjectivity outlined in the 
introduction above, will entail looking at a number of different perspectives on the 
nature and status of time in Hegel. I should therefore first indicate the reading that I 
myself will adhere to; in doing so I'll develop my earlier contentions as regards the 
import of perpetual process within the Hegelian absolute. 
 
Time and Circularity 
 
 At the very end of Being and Time Heidegger attempts to clarify his own ac
of temporality by contrasting it with Hegel's, on the grounds that Hegel offers
count 
 “the most 
ity 
e 
to the 
man
 itself 
14  and time subsequently become one as 'matter' – i.e. space in 
ut just as 'being' gives rise to 'nothing' and thereby 'becoming' in 
 
radical way in which the ordinary understanding of time has been given form 
conceptually.”11 This 'ordinary' conception of time is that of a series of finite 'nows' 
(“now-time”),12 and it differs from Heidegger's own version of temporality wherein 
Dasein's being is “stretche[d] along between birth and death.”13 Heidegger bases his 
comments on an early section of Hegel's The Philosophy of Nature, which forms the 
second part of the Encyclopaedia; a work that thus follows directly from the final 
moment of the Logic, in which the Idea becomes 'other' to itself as nature. As negativ
has been shown in the Logic to be an aspect of the positive unity of the Idea, when th
latter becomes other to itself, so too does the negativity within it. This gives rise 
im ent emergence of negative determinations within space (points, lines, planes, 
shapes, solids, etc.), and it becomes’ for itself' as time (“negativity, thus posited for
is time”).  Both space
temporal process – b
                                                
” 
11 
12 
13 
14 
10 “I was happy to have attempted – in 1967 and completely contrary to the sombre dementia of 
Althusser – a kind of 'salvage by transfer' of the Marxist method by adding to it a large dose of Hegel
(Debord 2008, p.212). 
Heidegger 1962, p.480 
Heidegger 1962, p.474 
Heidegger 1962, p.425 
Hegel 1990  
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the Logic, so too does time emerge as present, past and future. It is this moment that 
Heidegger focuses on, taking the consequent differentiation of time into moments as
succession of discrete instants.  
 If time is viewed as being composed of such instants, he claims, then the 
continuous, 'stretched' temporality of Dasein's being is masked, or rather rendered 
inauthentic, as Dasein's true identity with time cannot be accessed. The Hegelian Spirit, 
he claims, is not truly one with time but merely coincides with it: Hegel, for Heidegge
is unable to show an identity between Spirit and time beyond that of their “formal 
dialectical connection”,15 i.e. their shared movement through the negation of negations. 
In reinforcing this claim Heidegger claims that Hegel links time to Spirit's development, 
insofar as time offers Spirit a means by which it can become more 'concrete'; a point 
that he illustrates through the 
and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself”.16 He thus seems to view 
Hegel as presenting time as a vehicle by which Spirit ascends to self-knowing: a vehicle 
that can be cast off at the point when such knowledge is achieved. For Heidegger on the
other hand, Dasein is always already “factically” concrete by virtue of its “thrown 
existence”, which involves the “primordial temporalising of temporality”.17  
 I make reference to Heidegger's reading not in order to contest it,18 but rath
make two points. Firstly, that time should not be separated from Spirit, inso
are aspects of the 'being' to which Hegel's system gives voice; secondly, that time does 
not come to an end with the attainment of absolute knowing (as we saw Debord 
rather carelessly earlier), but that it remains wedded to the absolute. I'll address the
point by way of reference to the circularity of the Hegelian system, and in looking at the
second I'll discuss the work of Jean Hyppolite: the French Hegelian writer to whom 
Debord would seem to be closest.19 Hyppolite will in turn bring us to the theme of 
 As regards the first issue: if Hegelian time is indeed composed of an endless a
ear series of finite moments, and if, as Heidegger indicates, these moments are 
 
16 
17 
19 
ture...until 
ge of heart and asked someone else.” (Merrifield p.50). Clark and Nicholson-
polite's lectures with Debord. Hussey (2002, 
a the work of Jean 
15 Heidegger 1962, p.484 
Hegel 1977, p.487 
Heidegger 1962, p.486, emphasis in the original 
18 See however Houlgate 2006a. 
Debord was actually in contact with Hyppolite for a time. Merrifield claims that just prior to the 
publication of The Society of the Spectacle Debord “was all set to help out with a lec
Hyppolite had a chan
Smith (2004, p.479) also recount visiting one of Hyp
p.115) however goes so far as to claim that “Debord first encountered Hegel vi
Hyppolite, then a professor at the Collège de France”. This is incorrect: Hyppolite took up that 
position in 1963, and Debord was clearly reading Hegel from a much earlier date.  
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ime-form”;23 a line that would seem to reinforce Heidegger's claim. Yet Hegel also 
 existent Concept itself”,24 i.e. its external manifestation in the 
hysical world, and he indicates that it is to be recognised as just such an outward 
ation 
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distinct from the completed circularity of 'absolute kn
absolute is separate from the finite, and from the bad or 'spurious' infinite of time's
successive, discrete moments.20 This would mean that the absolute could not be tru
infinite at all, as it would be limited by that which it is not. It thus seems more accurate 
to read Hegel as contending that the negative flow of time falls within the truth that 
Spirit's full self-consciousness reveals, and this can be supported by the following: all of 
the determinations presented in the Logic and in the rest of the Encyclopaedia do no
replace the 'being' with which the Logic begins, but are rather progressively more 
sophisticated aspects of that initial starting point;21 being's self-consciousness qua Spirit 
thus entails Spirit's comprehension of its own true identity with all other determination
of being.22 This must include that of time, which as noted emerges immanently from t
determination of space. 
 The second point noted above is more complex. Hegel certainly states that wh
the Concept (the motive force of Spirit and of Hegelian logic per se) “grasps itself”, i.e.
returns to itself from the externality of nature via the agency of Spirit, it “sets aside its 
T
states that time is “the
p
appearance (“Time is the Concept that is there and which presents itself to 
consciousness as an empty intuition”).25 The implication, given that Hegelian neg
entails sublation, is that time is not abandoned by Spirit at the point of absolute 
knowing: rather, the absolute unity of subject and object can be understood as the 
comprehended identity between the physical, temporal world and the logic that founds 
it. This means that the absolute, as the lived self-consciousness of Spirit, can be see
constitute an effectively endless temporal process:26 time still exists, but its true nature 
 
20 I'll describe the bad infinite in detail in the conclusion to part one. Here we can simply note that it 
constitutes a form of infinity in which the finite is not fully negated (an example would be an endless 
sequence of finite elements: 1+1+1+... etc.), and which thus falls short of the true infinity of Hegelian 
21 
e... [but rather] by specifying more clearly what is entailed 
ate thought of being itself” (Houlgate 2006b, p.45). 
als itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and...at the end of 
 freely externalising itself...into the creation of a world which contains all 
elopment which preceded that final result” (Hegel 1969, p.71). 
slation altered for continuity 
ranslation altered for continuity, emphasis in the original 
 the actualisation of the Concept as a task that must be 
d. As Fackenheim (1996, p.49) has pointed out, the actualisation of reason in the 
circularity.  
As Houlgate puts it, Hegel's account does not advance “by simply replacing an initial incorrect 
definition of being with a more adequate on
by the initial indetermin
22 “...absolute Spirit...reve
the development is known as
that fell into the dev
23 Hegel 1977, p.487 
24 Hegel 1977, p.27, tran
25 Hegel 1977, p.487, t
26 It's significant to note that Hegel depicts
continually actualise
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and underlying identity with Spirit is comprehended. 
 Hyppolite makes much the same claim. Recognising Hegel's quasi-vitalist 
currents he holds that the circular return to the self of the Concept constitute
in , and that Hegel's “concepts of life and infinity are identical”.27 This leads him
claim that the life of Spirit is both infinite and necessarily temporal: for if the Concept i
a state of continual self-separation, and thus process, then in order to become present to 
itself in consciousness it requires the continuity of the latter's temporal existence.28
History therefore comes not to an end, but rather to fruition; and insofar as this entails 
the actualisation of philosophy in a fully self-aware, self-determinate life,29 Hyppolite
able to claim – persuasively – that Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (“T
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to cha
it”)30 “was not too unfaithful to Hegelian thought.”31  
 I would suggest that this notion of the absolute as continual temporal process 
informs the aspects of Debord's account discussed above. Hyppolite's em
retention of neg
 
H  
 
d 
tails 
                                                                                                                                              
 
 For Hyppolite, the absolute “divides and tears itself apart in order to be 
absolute”.32 Thus as Butler puts it, the absolute in Hyppolite’s account “is not an 
achievement as such, but the dialectic of achievement and loss”;33 it is in fact such a
state of continual rupture that Hyppolite holds Hegel's “panlogicism” to be tantamount 
to a “pantragedism”.34 This pertains to the sense in which Hegel offers a theodicy, i.e. a 
justification of God's apparent cruelties (Hegel himself uses the term 'theodicy' in 
connection to his philosophy of history).35 For Hegel, existence is the “life of God” an
the “disporting of love with itself,” but he stresses that it is so only insofar as it en
 
, is not a permanent condition; and as Harris (1995, p.107) puts it, “there is 
s 
 
29 
30 
33 
34 
35 5 
world, once achieved
nothing in [Hegel’s] logical theory to warrant the belief that the motion of consciousness must alway
be progressive”. We can, in short, regress.  
27 Hyppolite 1969, p.6
28 Hyppolite 1969, p.13 
Hyppolite 1974, pp.596-7 
Marx 2000, p.173 
31 Hyppolite 1974, p.598 
32 Hyppolite 1969, p.7 
Butler 1999, p.83 
Hyppolite 1975, p.30-1, see also p.194 
Hegel 2004, p.1
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 the labour of the negative”;36 for as 
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luding that of the system itself.  
“the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and
Hegel put it, and as Hyppolite (and more recently Nancy)37 would later emphasise, 
Spirit “wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself”.38  
 Because Hegel's account explains the necessary structural conditions within 
which that suffering takes place, it also presents an underlying cohesion and unity: th
human individual, as a finite entity within a fractured reality that far exceeds it, can th
find solace and purpose by acknowledging, accepting and aligning itself with this 
underlying reason. The divine order can thus be grasped, and one's own place within it 
can be understood. Hence the suggestion that Hegelian philosophy can be viewed as 
being analogous in some respects to tragic art: it offers an 'Apollonian' image that 
placates its observers and neutralises the 'Dionysian' negativity that it serves to 
rationalise. For many of the writers discussed below Hegel presents just such an 
unwarranted and conservative resolution, whilst the negative that he described ough
properly to exceed any bounds, even inc
  
Time and Closure in French Hegelianism 
 
 This view can be traced back to Jean Wahl's reading of the unhappy 
consciousness. The unhappy consciousness pertains to this notion of an 'open' 
dialectical negativity, as its constant dissatisfaction and self-alienation entails the 
perpetual re-constitution of opposition. For those who would view the absolute as a 
state of static repose or as a totalitarian imposition, such deferral remains attractive; and 
for Wahl, who held that the unhappy consciousness exemplified the motive force of th
entire Phenomenology  (a point that Hyppolite would later reiterate),  its constant 
self-separation “risk[s] breaking the bounds of the [Hegelian] system”  itself. It was 
thus said to how aspects of Hegel's earlier, more romantic work subsisting within the 
                                                
e 
39 40
41
 
36
37
 Hegel 1977, p.10 
ss, one cannot help being struck by the perpetual transfer from contrary to contrary, which 
is one of the most profound traits of Hegelian thought.” Wahl 1951, p.1  
40 Hyppolite 1975, p.190 
iscover, however, still living, the primitive elements of his thought, those which 
est part of his merits [as a philosopher], though they even risk breaking the 
lian] system. Because perhaps they are more precious than the system.” Wahl 
 See Nancy 2002. Nancy is in fact so keen to stress these aspects of Hegel's work that he effectively 
transforms Hegel's claim into the contention that Spirit finds itself as 'utter dismemberment'.  
38 Hegel 1977, p.19 
39 “If one studies a passage in Hegel, for example the pages of the Phenomenology on the unhappy 
consciousne
41 “We can always red
for us found the great
bounds of the [Hege
1951, p.194 
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 I'm drawing on Bruce Baugh's extremely useful French Hegel: From Surrealis
to Postmodernism (2003) in this chapter, as it traces echoes of the unhappy 
consciousness through a series of French writers from Wahl, through the Surrealists to 
Deleuze, thereby discussing differing approaches to the issue of dialectical closure. 
According to Baugh, Wahl's reading derived in part from the work of V
who observed – and I'll use a problematic shorthand here for the sake of clarity – that 
the synthesis that unites thesis with antithesis must lie in the original thesis itself. This 
entails that the synthesis must somehow precede itself, which in turn entails that the 
final moment of unity must perpetually give rise to its own rupture and division into its 
own grounds. This of course echoes Hegel's own claims (certainly as regards his talk of
a “circle that returns into itself...that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the 
end”),43 but for Alexandre Koyré, who took Delbos' ideas further, it precluded any
'conclusion' to the dialectic of history.  
 The influence exerted by Wahl's reading was such that Koyré was able to remark
in 1934 that modern Hegel interpretation was now characterised by the attempt to find 
the “hot passion” of Hegel's youth beneath the “frozen steel” of his ater “dialectical 
formulas”.44 Yet for Koyré, reading Hegel's mature work through his early writings 
risked misinterpretation, and in order to rectify that problem he translated and discusse
the account of time presented in Hegel's Jenenser Realphilosophie of 1805-6; a text that
showed a transition between the early and late Hegel, and one that brought to light an
important contradiction. Koyré contended that Hegelian time entails that the future mu
precede the past. If the truth of the present is its future, then the past from which that 
present emerges is itself defined
such movement would perpetually re-define itself from out of its own future. One can 
see nascent elements of Sartre's existentialism here, and also echoes of Debord's vie
on subjectivity and temporality: echoes that become stronger when one notes that for 
Koyré this view of ti
s because man says 'no' to his present – or to himself – that he has a future. It is because he negates 
himself that he has a past. It is because he is time – and not simply temporal – that he has a present... 
Yet] if time is dialectical and constructed from out of the future, it is – whatever Hegel says – eternally 
inished.45  
                                             
42 Wahl 1951 p.vi 
43 Hegel 1977, p.488 
44 Koyré 1971, p.149 
45 Koyré, 1971, pp.188-9 (translation taken from Baugh 2003, p.27) 
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Debord seems to have avoided the post-Kojèveian error of reading both Hegel 
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self is Nothingness or annihilation of spatial Being. And we know that for Hegel 
ihilation of Being that consists the Negativity which is Man, that Action of 
N
 
 This is
a  of the Hegelian system is that 'time had not ended'. In order to clarify the relat
between that claim and my earlier arguments regarding time’s perpetuity in the absolute 
we might turn now to Kojève (Kojève in fact stated that that Koyré's essay provided the 
“source and 
 
and Marx under the rubric of the lord and bondsman relation (Vaneigem however makes 
extensive reference to masters and slaves).47 That said, his work certainly evidences a 
concern with the connection between self-consciousness and negative, historical a
th
stressed.48 The most obvious influence here however is his account of Hegel's historica
resolution, the fame of which belies the fact that the actual phrase 'end of history' 
appears only once in Hegel's entire oeuvre: it serves as a metaphorical illustration in Th
Philosophy of History,49 a work that Hegel didn't actually write directly, but which
instead compiled posthumously from his own and his students' lecture notes. W
s xt Hegel also describes America as the “land of the future”,50 and we should 
note his various indications that the task of Spirit is not yet fully complete (e.g. The 
Philosophy of Right claims that “the unity of the divine and the human” is a principle 
“charged upon the Germanic nations to bring to completion”,51 and contends that
future is not absolute but remains exposed to accidents”;52 The Encyclopaedia Logic 
indicates that not everything that exists conforms to the Concept).53 Kojève however 
maintains that for Hegel human history was at an end, and he sets his claim 
of the following contentions:    
...if Man is Time, he him
it is precisely in this ann
Fighting and Work by which Man preserves himself in spatial Being while destroying it ...And this 
egativity – that is, this Nothingness nihilating as Time in Space – is what forms the very foundation of 
                                                 
Kojève 1980, p.134 
See Vaneigem's 'Basic Banalities', published in two parts in Internationale Situationniste #7
2006, pp.117-31; 1997, 272-81) and # 8 (S.I. 2006, pp.154-73; 1997, pp.330-43). See also Vaneig
1994. 
e.g. according to Hegel, through his “formative activity” the bondsman “posits himself as a negative in 
the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his own 
account” (Hegel 1977, p.118). 
Like the movement of the sun, “The Hist
46 
47  (S.I. 
em 
48 
49 ory of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is 
50 
51 
52 
53 
absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning” (Hegel 2004, p.103). 
Hegel 2004, p.86 
Hegel 2005, p.204 
Hegel 2005, p.54 
Hegel 1991, pp.29-30 
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the specifically human existence – that is, truly active or creative, or historical, individual, and free, 
existence.54    
 
 Humanity, in other words, is a negating, temporal process: an entity that thus 
does not coincide with the world that it work
c hat the human subject is both negative and 'one with time'). Kojève then contend
as follows:  
 
Man opposed to single and homogeneous spatial Being...is necessarily Error and not Truth. For 
that does not coincide with Being is false. Thus, when specifically human error is finally transfo
the truth of absolute Science, Man ceases to exist as Man and history comes to an end. The overcoming o
Man (that is, of Time, that is, of Action) in favour of static Being (that is, Space, that is, Nature), 
therefore, is the overcoming of Error in favour of Truth.55     
 
 In short: if humanity is a negating, temporal process that relies on a difference 
from objective being, and if the conclusion of that process entails the eradication of that 
difference, then that conclusion must also mean that humanity and history come to an 
end too (the peculiarities of this reading are manifold and have been discussed at 
length,56 as have their influence on Fukuyama's equally questionable claims). 
 We might now sum up as follows. Save for Hyppolite, I don't mean to suggest 
that Debord studied the writers discussed here individually, but I would contend that his 
work echoes and is seem
historical arrest can be seen to be modelled on Kojève's end of history,57 and the 
importance of time to anti-spectacular subjectivity echoes Koyré's views on the manner 
in which time's continuity renders Hegelian closure untenable.58 Yet to repeat, I am not 
suggesting that Debord adopts the continual self-alienation of the unhappy 
consciousness as a framework for that temporality: if anything, the unhappy 
                                                 
54 Kojève 1980, p.155 
55 Kojève 1980, p,156 
56 See for example the essays collected in Stewart's useful The Hegel Myths and Legends (1996); see in 
particular Philip Grier's contribution. 
ffers from Fukuyama's own, the latter can serve to illustrate the 
y end of history; a point not lost on Debord himself (Debord 2001a, 
p.31). Fukuyama's views on the events of May 1968 are also pertinent, albeit ironically so: 
presumably familiar with the views associated with the May uprisings, he claims in The End of 
Histo
nothi  part 
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are faced with...the time of things...time becoming itself a thing, a res. This time, in effect, is space” 
 commodification entails that “time sheds its qualitative, variable, 
es space” (Lukács 1971, p.90). 
57 Although Kojève's account di
spectacle's status as an illusor
ry and the Last Man that once the just cause of liberal democracy has been realised there is 
ng to rebel against, save empty, directionless revolts against that cause itself; those who took
thus fought “out of a certain boredom”, and the “substance of their protest...was a matter of 
indifference; what they rejected was life in a society in which ideals had somehow becom
impossible” (Fukuyama 1992, p.330).  
58 Koyré's comments on temporal arrest are remarkably similar to Debord's, and perhaps echo element
of Lukács' account: “stop the incessant movement of the temporal dialectic,” writes Koyré, and “we
(Koyré 1971, p.178); for Lukács,
flowing nature...in short, it becom
57 
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consciousness is more akin to spectatorship (a point that will become important in 
chapter three in relation to existentialism). Rather, I've argued that Debord follows 
Hyppolite in associating the absolute with a form of subject-object unity that 
continual self-d
 The degree to which the concept of spectacle chimes with the Hegelian end of
history (or rather Kojève's interpretation thereof) corresponds to the sense in which 
Hegelian philosophy is itself said to depict, in a separate, alienated form, the genuine 
unity of historical praxis: for in the same manner, the spectacle represents self-
determinate agency, thereby neutralising and rationalising it, and is thus also 'tragic' in 
the sense outlined above. One could even venture that the spectacle is a kind of inverte
realisation of Hegelian philosophy: not the latter's actualisation in praxis, but rather a 
form that retains its detachment from lived reality (“far from realising philosophy, 
spectacle philosophises reality, and turns the material life of everyone into a universe of 
speculation”).59 This can be seen in Debord's claims that the unity that it affords merely
serves to maintain isolation: for although it presents itself as a world of satisfied desire
and meaningful action, it arises from and perpetuates the separation of subject and 
object (“The spectacle thus unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its 
separateness”).60  
 My major claim here, in other words, is that it is the actualisation in lived praxi
of the subject-object unity that Hegelian philosophy depicts that constitutes the real 
challenge to its supposedly static arrest, and which also stands opposed to a society that 
mirrors that philosophy's merely ideal resolution. It does however remain the ca
for many writers the continual deferral or rejection of dialectical resolution proved 
attractive, and echoes of the unhappy consciousness and the bad infinite can be found 
the important influence exerted on the S.I. by Surrealism. This line of influence can be
introduced by way of reference to Bataille. 
 
Negativity without Limit 
 
 The Surrealists were particularly attracted by the manner in which Hegelian
negativity constituted a force of creation as well as destruction. Gifted with the power to 
transform and erase fixed identities, it lent itself to Surrealism's concern with 
dissociating fixed meanings via new, unexpected and poetic combinations of existing 
 
                                                 
06, p.770 
774 
59 Debord 1995, p.17; 20
60 Debord 1995, p.22; 2006, p.
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the degree to which he'd understood the human 
ubject as a fundamentally negative creature: as a 'living death', driven towards negation 
 demise. Yet Bataille also claimed that Hegel had 
verlooked the fact that any such 'living death' could – insofar as death constituted its 
ess, 
l 
egativity by binding it within the positive unity 
and rationality of his system reflected a fundamental human characteristic. We are 
, for Bataille (we are fascinated by our own and that of others); we 
 (it lies, for Bataille, at the base of eroticism); but insofar as we are 
n from death 
              
elements. For Breton and his compatriots the negation of the negation necessarily 
entailed the supersession of any fixed limitations, even the bounds set by the Hegelian 
system itself; to impose any kind of arrest upon dialectical flux was entirely 
inadmissible.  
 Bataille took up a similar position, but in his view this rejection of limit also 
meant the impossibility of imposing utility, purpose and function on negativity. For 
Bataille, the negativity articulated within the Hegelian system ought properly to be free
from any rationalisation. This is expressed particularly clearly in an essay of 1
entitled 'Hegel, Death and Sacrifice', in which he built on the ideas advanced in earlier 
works such as 'The Notion of Expenditure' (1933) and The Accursed Share (1946-9)
and which is of particular significance to our concerns as it associates such a neutered
rationalised negativity with the 'tragic' and the 'spectacular'. The essay focuses on 
Hegel's famous assertion (referenced by Hyppolite and Nancy above) that Spirit neithe
“shrinks from death” nor “keeps itself untouched by devastation”, but rather “win
truth” upon finding itself “in utter dismemberment”.  Strongly influenced by Kojè
(Bataille and Breton had both attended Kojève's famous seminars at the École des 
Hautes Études), albeit located in steadfast opposition to the latter's notion of historical 
conclusion (as discussed by Agamben in The Open),  and perhaps also exhibiting the 
influence of Heidegger (whom he'd read as early as the 1930's), Bataille advanced the 
claim that Hegel's true profundity lay in 
61
62
s
and towards its own ultimate
o
true identity – only attain full self-consciousness at the very point of death itself, and 
that it was thus forever denied full, final resolution. Like the unhappy consciousn
Bataille's human subject was thus constantly opposed to its own self: a self that it 
perpetually strives towards, but which it can never reach.  
 In Bataille's view, this drive towards unity underlies Hegel's own philosophica
ambitions, insofar as his desire to tame n
driven towards death
take pleasure in death
alive we forever remain apart from it. As a result of this constant separatio
                                   
61 Hegel 1977, p.19 
62 See Agamben 2004, pp.5-8 
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we are compelled, he claims, to construct “spectacles” and “representations”63 of it. 
Tragic art, for Bataille, is an example of this compulsion: for “In tragedy,” he writes, “it
is a question of identifying with some character who dies, and of believing that we 
although we are alive”.64 His claims are thus close to those of Nietzsche, as tragedy is 
viewed as affording a safe, neutered communion with the negative, and he holds Hegel'
system to present just such a “representation of the Negative”.65 I don't want to claim 
any direct line of influence between these views and Debord's own notion of spectacle 
(although this link is argued for by Brown),66 but Bataille's account of trag
'r ntations' in Hegel is nonetheless analogous to the spectacle's representation of 
historical agency; as Debord doubtless read Bataille this may have helped form his
views. Furthermore, and as with Lefebvre, Debord and the S.I. share with Bataille a 
sense in which negativity might involve festival and excess:67 Bataille argues that a 
truly “sovereign”68 negativity must be completely exempt from utility or constructive 
purpose, and although he seems to indicate that the 'representation' of death and 
negativity can never be entirely overcome, he does allude to the need for glorious, 
purposeless negation and destruction (“a luxurious squandering of energy in every 
form!”).69 This notion of excession brings us to the influence exerted on Debord and
S.I.'s work by Surrealism's own objections to Hegelian closure. In order to present that 
m l I'll employ a number of connections based around the links discussed abov
between Hegelian negativity and time.  
Negativity and Surrealism 
The second volume of Panegyric, Debord's peculiar and complex autobiography
s first published posthumously in 1997. It included a chronological outline of 
nificant events in its author's life leading up to the publication of the first volume
89, and Verso's English translation of 2004 took the liberty of continuing that timelin
 to Debord's suicide. Its entry for 1994 reads as follows: “On 30th November, Guy 
bord carries out one last potlatch.”70  
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63 Bataille 1990, p.20 
64 Bataille 1990, p.20 
65 Bataille 1990, p.21 
66 Brown 1986 
For the S.I., “proletarian revolutions will be festivals or nothing” (S.I. 2006, p.429). 
Bataille 1990, p.25 
Bataille 1991, p.33 
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 Casting Debord's suicide as 'potlatch'71 may seem crass, but it does perhaps 
contain an element of truth. It was prompted by alcoholic polyneuritis, a conditio
Debord cast in terms of negative defiance (“It is the opposite of an illness that one 
might contract through a regrettable imprudence. On the contrary, one must see in it the
faithful obstinacy of an entire life”),72 and one can, perhaps, detect something sim
in his suicide itself. His widow, Alice, described his suicide as a “beautiful gift”,73 and 
when taken in conjunction with his request for the posthumous burning of Panegyric's 
unpublished third volume it might be interpreted as a final act of refusal.  
 Debord's interest in potlatch owes much to figures such as Bataille, w
interest in its negative aspects can be seen to stem from Dada's concerns with the 
negation and refusal of bourgeois society. Dada's refusal did however extend at times 
that of existence itself. Suicide had been a tragic, romantic ideal in the 19th cent
in the hands of the Dadaists it became a gloriously absurd denial of an inherently a
world.74 Arthur Cravan, one of Debord's great heroes, spoke of suicide as art;75 Rigaut 
shot himself through the heart in 1929, as would Debord some 65 years later; Jacques 
Vaché greatly impressed Breton and his Surrealist contemporaries not only with
poetry but also with his anti-social attitude and ultimate suicide. The January 1924 
edition of La Revolution Surréaliste even went so far as to ask 'Is Suicide a Solution?
 Dada's outright, absolute negation and refusal (Tzara: “I am neither for no
against and I do not explain because I hate common sense...Dada means nothing”)76 
                                                 
71 The term 'potlatch' gained common currency through the widespread influence of Marcel Maus
anthropological study The Gift (1923), which used the word to refer to a wide variety of gift exchange 
systems. The word is taken from the language of the Haida, a North American Indian tribe, and means 
to “'to feed', 'to consume'” (Mauss 2004, p.7); this furthered the association of the concept to notions
of dialectics, particularly for Bataille and the Surrealists, insofar as it pertains to the negative 
dimensions of Aufhebung. Mauss describes many different variations of gift exchange, but the most 
significant in this respect is that of the Haida, in which each party would try to outdo the other in 
destroying wealth, as opposed to simply giving it away. For th
s' 
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72 Debord 2006, p.1878 
73 Hussey 2002, p.375 
iscussion of this theme. 
ebord 
ravan once drew a full house to watch his own supposed suicide: 
and with his balls draped across the table he drunkenly harangued the 
ade a social event of death” (Hale 2005, p. 20). 
ak of killing wealth” (Mauss 2004, p.111), this was to be achieved through the destruction of 
 own property; in the extreme, participants would destroy all their possessions, signifying that 
they care nothing for their opponent's own self-destructive response. The journal of the Letterist 
International, Debord's group prior to the S.I., produced a journal called Potlatch that was given aw
free; it was sent to randomly chosen addresses and correspondents, but it “was never sold”, and “only
given” (Debord 2006, p.130). This latter point can however be qualified by Marcus’ anecdote: “’You 
picked names out of a the phone book?’ I asked [the Letterist] Wollen. ‘Let’s not exaggerate,’ he sai
‘We didn’t have a phone book. For that matter, we didn’t have a phone’” (Marcus 1989, p.391). 
74 See Hale 2005 for a d
75 “The people I respected more than anyone alive were Arthur Cravan and Lautréamont...” (D
2004, p.12; 2006, p.1662). C
“drinking a bottle of absinthe 
audience for having m
76 Tzara 1996, p.249 
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sense in which the negative might be able to exceed the 'limits' of the 
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 S.I.'s 
own ambitions. Where the Surrealists had sought to overcome the disjuncture between 
    
burned itself out by virtue of its own nihilism, but it was subsequently given a deg
clarity and articulation by the Surrealists for whom negativity became a force of 
positive change. This view was directly informed by the importance of Hegel in Franc
at the time, and partly as a result of the interpretations discussed above the Surrealists' 
adopted the 
s . “It seems impossible,” wrote Breton, “to assign any limitations...to the exercise 
of a thought finally made tractable to negation, and to the negation of the negation”
 This informed their interest in the endless dissociation and reinvention of f
meanings and identities in new, poetic combinations (hence their praise for 
Lautréamont, one of Debord's favourite poets,78 and their enthusiasm for his now 
famous words in Maldoror: “As beautiful as the chance juxtaposition on a dissecting 
table of a sewing machine and an umbrella!”).79 This excessive, transgressive 
negativity would also be given an overtly politicised form. Surrealism had found 
common cause with the communist project, as both sought the full realisation of hum
potential (Blanchot: “the service that Surrealism expects from Marxism is to prepare for
it a society in which everyone could be Surrealist”).80 In the second Surrealist 
Manifesto, released in 1929, Breton pledged Surrealism's allegiance to both d
materialism and to Communism: both “Surrealism” and “historical materialism”, he 
declared, take as their “point of departure the 'colossal abortion' of the Hegelian 
system”.81 Claiming that the very nature of Hegelian negation precludes its limitation to 
the traditional spheres of social transformation (i.e. production and distribution), he 
argued that the task of emancipating labour ought to be allied to that of liberating 
dreams and the imagination. This is of course very close to the S.I.'s attempt to re-think 
the communist project, as is his proposal for a dialectical relation between dream an
waking life: “The poet to come”, Breton claimed, “will surmount the depressing idea o
the irreparable divorce between action and dream”.82  
 Surrealist negativity, with its aspirations towards subversion, liberation
art able to unify thought and practice, can thus be seen to pertain directly to the
dream and reality, the S.I. aimed to go one step further by abolishing art altogether 
                                             
77 Breton 1996, p.447  
78 For further discussion of Debord and the S.I.'s interest in Lautréamont see Bunyard 2011a. 
80 
81 
79 Lautréamont 1978, p.193 
Quoted in Baugh 2003, p.54 
Breton 1996, p.447 
82 Breton 1990, p.146 
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f art or of anything else”).84 As a result, the 
onstant, negative movement admired by Surrealism came to be actualised as creatively 
ved time.  
I'll return to the peculiarities of Situationist time in chapter two; suffice it to say 
here that the identity between consciousness, negativity and time discussed above, 
which had been given transgressive qualities by writers such as Wahl and Koyré, 
becomes infused via Surrealism with an equally transgressive artistic and creative 
dimension. The importance of the Surrealists' influence should in fact be stressed. The 
very first issue of Internationale Situationniste contained the observation that “for us, 
Surrealism has been only a beginning of a revolutionary experiment in culture, an 
experiment that almost immediately ground to a practical and theoretical halt. We have 
to go further”;85 yet this would ultimately entail an engagement with capitalism and 
everyday life, and a progressive departure from the S.I.'s early avant-garde concerns in 
favour of a far more explicitly Hegelian Marxist notion of historical agency.86  
 I'll close this chapter by returning to George's study of tragedy in the 
Phenomenology, insofar as his own attempts to draw on these themes are strikingly 
different to Debord's own Hegelianism. Hegel's “deep concern for tragedy”, George 
writes, may point towards the “joy” that can be found by “those who learn to accept that 
they belong to a world they cannot master”.87 Such resignation, insofar as it entails a 
relinquishment of agency, is of course the absolute antithesis of Debord's own use of 
Hegel, and thus perhaps serves to illustrate the homology between the spectacle and the 
Hegelian system's rationalisation of the negative. In contrast, I've sought to show – 
following Bataille – that the tragic elements of Hegel's work can be viewed in a more 
critical sense: as an attempt to locate contingency, change and excession within the 
ordered and necessary coherence of a stable whole. Yet where Bataille rejects 
rationalisation and utility altogether, and where Wahl and others opt for forms 
                                                
through its actualisation in lived practice;83 and thus rather than produce discrete 
artefacts, the S.I. would create instances of experience (“we care nothing,” wrote 
Debord in 1957, “about the permanence o
c
li
 
 
83 “Dadaism sought to abolish art without realising it, and Surrealism sought to realise art without 
abolishing it. The critical position since worked out by the Situationists demonstrates that the 
abolition and the realisation of art are the inseparable aspects of the one same supersession of art” 
(Debord 1995, p.136, translation altered; 2006, p.848, emphasis in the original).    
84 S.I. 2006, p.41; Debord 2006, p.326 
85 S.I. 2006, p.48 
86 The basis of such a position is of course linked to the very notion of an avant-garde. As the German 
Dadaist Richard Huelsenbeck once put it: “The highest art will be that which in its conscious content 
presents the thousand-fold problems of the day…” (quoted in Marcus 1989, p.234). 
87 George 2006, p.133 
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Chapter Two: We are Artists only insofar as We 
are No Longer Artists”1 
 
 
Antitheses and Aesthetics 
 
 This chapter will show that the theory of spectacle's conceptual roots can be 
identified in the S.I.'s early opposition to 'bourgeois' art and culture. Through doing so, 
it will attempt to provide a clearer sense of quite what it might mean to claim that 
history had been stopped or arrested by modern capitalism. I'll begin with an account of 
the aspirations towards the unification of art and life touched on at the end of the 
previous chapter; having done so I'll then look at the inception of the S.I. itself, before 
considering the theory of spectacle's debts to the group's early concept of cultural 
'decomposition'. This will be followed by a further discussion of Situationist time.  
 We can begin with a letter sent by Debord to Asger Jorn in 1959, in which he 
wrote that “philosophy, like art” tend toward “disappearance in praxis”.2 Where the 
realisation of philosophy was to entail that thought about the world would become 
thought that changed the world, art would now no longer be made about life, but rather 
abolished and realised as life. This meant that the earlier revolutionary project was to be 
re-conceived: as the S.I. would later put it in 1966, “in the 19th century the proletariat 
was already the heir of philosophy; now it has become the heir of m 3odern art”.   
own means of survival; for Debord and the S.I., the 'new' proletariat was composed of 
control over their own lives. As described earlier, this new poverty 
cau  of 
pri
ous slogan once put it, 
thu
    
 This however returns us to the peculiarities of Debord and the S.I.'s conception of the 
proletariat. Marx's proletarian was an individual devoid of any control over his or her 
all those deprived of 
was viewed as having grown from the amelioration of its predecessor – hence Debord's 
stic remarks on the “augmented survival”4 offered by the spectacle's “enrichment
vation”5 – and its supersession, afforded through the abolition of labour and the 
ty's technical capacities, would, as a famreclamation of socie
all ires for reality. In Hegelian fashion the Situationist project 
s aimed at what the present lacked, but at which it had nonetheless made possible 
                                            
ow the taking of one's des
 
S.I. 20061 , p.179, translation altered; S.I. 1997, p.389 
3 
4 
 altered; 2006, p.780 
2 Debord 2009, p.262 
S.I. 2006, p.429 
Debord 1995, p.28; 2006, p.778 
5 Debord 1995, p.31, translation
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 their opposition to 
ctually existing socialism'. Lukács, discussing the dictatorship of the proletariat, once 
 
mous assertion that poetry must be put at the service of revolution, claimed that “the 
e was fundamental to the S.I.'s aspirations. 
s plans for 'New Babylon', an early experiment in Situationist 
 city based on psychogeographical10 principles and geared 
dérive:11 composed of endless branching corridors of interconnected 
Yet 
(“mankind”, after all, “always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve”).6 As the result 
would most certainly not be a more equitable version of the present, one could comment 
here that the more utopian7 aspects of the S.I.'s goals were not a romantic gloss upon an
essentially traditional communist project, but rather a marker of
'a
warned that “Freedom cannot represent a value in itself,” and must “serve the rule of the
proletariat, not the other way round”;8 the S.I. however, reversing the Surrealists' own 
fa
point” was in fact “to put revolution at the service of poetry”; doing so, they maintained, 
would ensure that “the revolution does not betray its own project”.9  
 The view that labour could be made obsolet
For example, Constant'
architecture, depicted a future
towards an endless 
environments, its inhabitants would wander at whim, rearranging its ambiances 
according to their wishes as they did so. Psychogeography and the dérive are perhaps 
the most widely known aspects of the S.I.'s oeuvre, and are certainly the most discussed. 
Yet however trite their contemporary 'recuperation' might be, they do reflect one of the 
group's major virtues: namely, a reaction against the reduction of Marxism to a statist 
ideology. “The next form of society will not be based on industrial production,” 
declared the S.I. in 1962: “it will be a society of realised art.”12  
 We'll see in chapter five that in this respect Debord and the S.I. can be seen to have 
positioned themselves further up the dialectical spiral than Marx and his successors. 
                                                 
6 Mar  2000, p.426 
7 The S.I.'s optimism should not be underestimated. In 1959 Debord claimed that the use of “one-man 
helicopters” would “have spread to the general public within twenty years” (S.I. 2006, p.70; 1997, 
p.104); also in 1959, Constant declared that “space travel, which seems likely in the near future” 
would further the development of Situationist architecture, “since establishing bases on other planet
will immediately raise the problem of sheltered cities, which may provide models for our study of 
x
s 
future urbanism” (S.I. 2006, p.72; 1997, p.107).  
8 Lukács 1971, p.292 
ed over into the S.I. from Debord's earlier membership of the 
n of Internationale 
 geographical environment (whether 
ley 
12 
9 S.I. 2006, p.151; 1997, p.327 
10 Psychogeography – a term carri
Letterists and the Letterist International (L.I.) – was defined in the very first editio
Situationniste as “The study of the specific effects of the
consciously organized or not) on the emotions and behaviour of individuals.” (S.I. 2006, p.52; 1997, 
p.13). For useful overviews of issues pertaining to these themes see Sadler (1999) and Cover
(2007).  
11 The dérive, or 'drift' – essentially a form of Freudian free-association in terms of architectural 
experience – involved wondering through an environment, navigating and engaging with it purely in 
terms of the psychological effects that it engendered.  
S.I. 2006, p.114; 1997, p.257 
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g to rise 
this location not only enjoyed the status of a purportedly penultimate state of sepa
between social power and its producers: in addition, it also constituted the conclusio
another line of teleological development, namely that of art and culture's drive towards
its own self-abolition as a sphere separate from everyday life.  
 
...just as in the first half of the nineteenth century revolutionary theory arose out of philosophy (ou
critical reflections on philosophy and out of the crisis and death of philosophy), so now it is goin
once again out of modern art and poetry, out of its supersession, out of what modern art has sought and 
promised, out of the clean sweep it has made of all the values and rules of everyday behaviour.13 
 
 The spectacle's illusory end of history was thus also the real end of art. Having 
made these initial observations we can now turn to Debord and the S.I.'s early years, in 
which that conception first arose. 
   
The Beginnings of the S.I. 
  
 Debord began using the term 'spectacle' in the early 1950's,  and references to 
'situations' can be found in his work as early as 1952.  The concepts emerged from
remained intimately connected to his own and the S.I.'s early opposition to the 
purported detachment of 'bourgeois culture', as evidenced by his seminal Report on the 
Construction of Situations of 1957: a text that was prepared for and accepted by the 
S.I.'s inaugural conference, and which compares modern life as a whole to a cultural 
trend towards 'spectacle'. “The construction of situations,” Debord writes, “begins 
beyond the collapse of the modern concept of spectacle. It is easy to see which aspect of 
the alienation of the old world is attached to the very principle of spectacle: non-
intervention.”   
14
15
16
 and 
 As the names, events and dates involved in the S.I.'s birth have been rehearsed 
many times17 I'll take much of their background as read, but the following may help to 
orient what follows. The S.I. formed in 1957, in the Italian town of Cosio d'Arroscia, 
following an initial meeting of several avant-garde groups in Alba in 1956.18 It arose 
                                                 
13 S.I. 2006, p.139; 1997, p.307  
14 e.g. Debord 2006, p.46 and 70 
16 
17 
18  invent?’ 
rbach, 
was so fond of. We knew 
15 “The future arts will be upheavals of situations, or nothing” (Debord 2006, p.62). 
S.I. 2006, p.40, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.325 
See for example Bracken 1997; Ford 2005; Gray 1998; Hussey 2002; Merrifield 2005; Sadler 1988. 
Thus Ford (1995, p.viii): “the familiar type of beginning, 'The S.I. was formed in 1957...' is 
superfluous here”.  
 As Ralph Rumney put it in an interview: “‘What was decided in Cosio? What did you
‘...Collectively, we created a synthesis using Rimbaud, Lautréamont, and some others like Feue
Hegel, Marx, the Futurists, Dada, the Surrealists, and the Vandals that Jorn 
how to put all that together.’” (Rumney 2002, p.37) 
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Debord met Isou and the Letterists at the Cannes film festival in 1951, where 
g to cause sufficient scandal to merit the showing of Isou's Traité de bave 
 Eternity'). Debord, who was only nineteen years 
ld at the time, was sufficiently impressed to move to Paris – ostensibly to study law at 
 
f 
that served to stifle revolt.21 Isou initially condoned this event, but 
ed 
 as an 
er's 
hich he referred to as 'amplic' (amplique) and 
from the union of a number of avant-garde groups – ex-members of C.O.B.R.A., 
Debord's Letterist International (L.I.), the International Movement for an Imagini
Bauhaus and the London Psychogeographical Association (an 'association' formed of 
just one member)19 – on the grounds that all were moving in a similar direction. Each 
group was characterised by the view that art, culture and architecture should be 
employed in the creative construction of lived experience (or, to use the phrase 
employed by Debord's faction, in the construction of a 'unitary urbanism'),20 leading 
towards the fusion of life and art. This however could only be attained through the 
abolition of contemporary culture, and whilst that view certainly owed much to Dada 
and Surrealism, it was also informed by the ideas of Isidore Isou and his Letterist group. 
 
they were tryin
et d'éternité ('Treatise on Slobber and
o
the Sorbonne – in order to join them. However, in October 1952 he and what amounted
to the Letterists' left wing split from Isou to form a new group, named the Letterist 
International. The break was prompted by their sabotaging of Charlie Chaplin's press 
conference: in a paper handed out at the event, entitled 'No More Flat Feet', Debord and 
three other signatories (Berna, Brau and Wolman) declared Chaplin to be a “swindler o
emotions and a master singer of suffering”, whose films presented a sentimental and 
reactionary ideology 
upon recognising it as the work of a breakaway faction he denounced it and offer
support for Chaplin; the L.I. denounced Isou in turn, and established themselves
independent entity.22 
 However, and despite Debord's stated antipathy towards Isou, some of the latt
central tenets are echoed in Debord's later work; for example, the contention that the 
real source of society's creative potential lay in 'youth' rather than in a classical 
proletariat. Perhaps the most pertinent line of influence lies in Isou's claim that art and 
culture move through two cyclic phases, w
                                                 
19 ake our movement sound international I suggested that we should mention the London 
Psychogeographical Committee.’ ‘What was that?’ ‘Nothing at all. It was just me. I said “OK, I
 “‘To m
’m the 
London Psychogeographical Committee.” It was a pure invention, a mirage.’” (Rumney 2002, p.37) 
20 As the L.I.'s statement to the conference put it: “a unitary urbanism – the synthesis we call for, 
incorporating arts and technologies – must be created in accordance with new values of life, values 
 cane, some have felt the truncheon of a cop...but we who are young and 
ear suffering” (Debord 2006, p.84). 
akes rather more of Debord's tactical moves in this regard.  
which we now need to distinguish and disseminate”. S.I. 2006, p.21; 1997, pp.687-8 
21 “...behind your rattan
beautiful, reply Revolution when we h
22 See Hussey (2002, p.66), who m
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t 
hey set 
'chiselling' (ciselante): first, culture expands and develops, until it reaches its greates
possible stage of development; once it has done so, cultural progress takes place 
through a 'chiselling', negating process until such time as it is able to expand once more 
in an entirely new manner (thus, as Debord put it rather dramatically in 1952, “Letterist 
poetry screams for a crushed universe”).23 Isou's Letterists believed themselves to be 
located at a point where this 'chiselling' process was close to completion, and t
out to complete it by breaking words down into single letters; through doing so they 
hoped to inaugurate a genuinely new mode of poetry. As Debord put it in a letter from 
April 1951, “poetry will only survive in its destruction”;24 a view that can be seen to be 
echoed by the S.I. from their formation in 1957 right the way through to their demise in 
1972.  
  
Decomposition and the End of Art 
 
 This concern with negating art and culture bears direct relation to the no
historical arrest presented above, particularly as regards the S.I.'s early preoccupation 
with cultural 'decomposition'. The latter concept stemmed from the Letterists view that 
culture was stagnant, having grown ripe for destruction and reinvigoration, and it would 
be retained by the S.I. and employed for many years to come; it can in fact be seen in 
Debord's writings in the 1990's.  I'll contend here that it also bears direct relation to t
theory of spectacle.  
 The term 'decomposition' was defined in the first issue of Internationale 
Situationniste as denoting the manner in which “traditional cultural forms have 
destroyed the
tion of 
he 
mselves as a result of the emergence of superior means of controlling 
ure as 
cal 
reconstruction that had yet to take place.  
 to Debord's claim that the spectacle's full emergence 
0's, and it's thus interesting to note that the S.I. 
    
25
nature which make possible and necessary superior cultural constructions”.26 It thus 
refers to the progressive demonstration and recognition of the inadequacy of cult
regards the new possibilities afforded by society's evolving economic and technologi
basis: possibilities that were held to have long since reached a point that necessitated a 
 I drew attention earlier
could be dated back to the late 192
                                             
Debord, in 1952: “Letterist poetry screams for a crushed universe” (Debord 2006, p.46) 
Debord 2006, p.36 
See for example Debord 2008, p.237 
S.I. 2006, p.52; S.I. 1997, p.14 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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. 
ntings produced by machines and supplied in rolls like 
allpaper. In this latter regard it might be noted that détournement should not be solely 
ebord included an excerpt from the S.I.'s early text 'Détournement as Negation and 
etics. 
otoriously (and arguably),31 Hegel claimed that the development of art came to an end 
                                              
claimed that decomposition had started “around 1930”.27 Debord also made similar 
claims prior to the S.I.'s inception: in 1955, whilst still with the L.I., he wrote that “the 
movement of [cultural] discovery culminated around 1930”, having been arrested by th
“very serious retreat of revolutionary politics, bound up with the blinding bankruptc
the workers' aesthetic”.28 In the absence of any such advance and of any new 'aesthe
culture had descended into a state of repetition that merely reinforced its own 
obsolescence: “suffice it to say,” wrote Debord and Wolman in 1956, “that in our view 
the premises for revolution...are not only ripe, they have begun to rot”29 (one might a
note here the S.I.'s much later claim in 1966's 'On the Poverty of Student Life': art bein
long dead, the “student is necrophiliac”).30 Consequently, art work that demonstrated or 
reflected the inadequacy of contemporary culture, or which – following the Letterists –
exacerbated its collapse, was favoured and pursued by the early S.I. Of particular note 
here is their interest in détournement: a technique that involved subverting existing 
cultural forms into new configurations by actualising the negative potential within them
Examples of détournement include Debord's anti-cinematic films, which were 
composed of existing material and designed to antagonise a passive audience, and Pinot 
Gallizio's 'industrial painting': pai
w
associated with the subversion of adverts and films, but rather in more general terms as 
a kind of strategic Aufhebung of an opponent's force (it's thus significant to note that 
D
Prelude' as an appendix to 1972's The Real Split in the International, the text in which 
he announced that the S.I. would terminate itself in order to avoid recuperation and 
stagnation).  
 Thus whilst the Hegelianism that I stressed above is certainly less overt in the 
S.I.'s early years it's by no means absent, and it's worth noting in this regard the 
congruence between the concept of decomposition and Hegel's views on aesth
N
   
 S.I. 2006, p.52; S.I. 1997, p.14 
 Debo
 S.I. 2
realisation of [the] Idea that the wide Pantheon of art [i.e. its various styles, forms and practitioners] is 
being erected, whose architect and builder is the spirit of beauty as it awakens to self-knowledge, and 
is 
ork in which he seems to 
 means complete. Inwood however contends that Hegel is 
27
28 rd 2006, p.195  
29 006, p.14; Debord 2006, p.221  
30 S.I. 2006, p.413, translation altered; S.I. 1966 
31 Hegel's Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics concludes with the claim that “It is as the external 
to complete which the history of the world will need its evolution of ages” (Hegel 1993, p.97). Th
can be taken in conjunction with the many other comments in Hegel's w
indicate that the work of history is by no
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ods' status as alienated, separated expressions of human reason is mitigated by their 
and 
uman
end 
cle 
with the completion of Spirit's drive towards self-consciousness, on the grounds that a
for Hegel, is an expression of the absolute. Philosophy affords the clearest conception of
the latter, but representations and intimations of it can nonetheless be derived through 
art, just as they can through religion. Thus in societies in which philosophy has not 
developed to the point where it can grasp the absolute in a clear and self-conscious 
manner through philosophy – and in which the 'revealed religion' of Christianity was
not present – art, or more specifically religious art, offers the closest possible proxim
to Spirit's final goal. Hence Hegel's fondness for ancient Greek culture, in which the
g
human form, and by the degree to which they denote principles and traits of human life 
a point that also pertains to Hegel's interest in tragic art's fusion of universal fate (
h  particularity). Yet once 'absolute knowing' has been achieved in philosophy, any 
such role for art falls away, as does art's capacity for further development: it can add 
nothing new, as its goal has already been attained. It can thus only rehearse old themes 
in new combinations and forms; hence the correspondence between these ideas and the 
notion of decomposition. In The Society of the Spectacle Debord in fact talks of the 
of the history of art and culture:  
 
 The end of the history of culture manifests itself under two antagonistic aspects: the project of 
culture's self-transcendence [son dépassement] as part of total history, and its management as a dead thing 
to be contemplated in the spectacle. The first tendency has cast its lot with the critique of society, the 
second with the defence of class power.32 
 
 My contention, therefore, is that the earlier concept of decomposition became a 
cultural symptom of the more objective, economic problems that the notion of specta
sought to address. After all, decomposition – a perpetuation of art's separation from life, 
maintained by capitalism’s arrest of their tendency towards unification – rendered its 
present a frozen moment of (cultural) history; for art's purpose and role was over, 
requiring its abolition and supersession through actualisation as lived praxis.  
 
Art, Negativity and Time 
 
 In the very first issue of Internationale Situationniste the S.I. defined culture as 
lities of organisation of everyday life in 
                                                                                                                                              
“the reflection and prefiguration of the possibi
 
erspective located at the very beginning of art, and is looking ahead to its 
wood in Hegel 1993, pp.196-7).  
4-5 
speaking here from a p
completion within his own present (In
32 Debord 1995, pp.131-2; 2006, p.84
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he 
ulation implies (remembering here that 
re 
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rded by 
y the 
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erience, this would seem to raise two issues. Firstly, we have a 
 
tion 
according to Debord in 1967, “the point is to take effective possession of the 
each historical moment; a complex of aesthetics, feelings and mores through which
collectivity reacts on the life that is objectively shaped [donnée] by its economy.”33 T
homology with the Hegelian Spirit that this form
Spirit is, in essence, the self-consciousness of a community)34 would become mo
overt in Debord's later work: for example, in The Society of the Spectacle, and whilst 
referencing Hegel's Differenzschrift (perhaps by way of Lukács, who uses the same 
quotation),35 Debord described culture as “the general sphere of knowledge, and of 
reflections on lived experience,” and as “the power to generalise”.36 He continued
 
The whole triumphant history of culture, can be understood as the history of the revelation of culture's 
insufficiency, as a march towards culture's self-abolition [autosuppression]. Culture is locus of the search 
for lost unity. In the course of this search culture as a separate sphere is obliged to negate itself.37 
 
 Just as the Hegelian Idea becomes other to itself as nature and Spirit in order t
return to itself from that otherness, so too is culture presented here as a means by which 
humanity achieves self-reflexive thought before sublating the detachment affo
that reflection. Yet where from the S.I.'s perspective the Hegelian Spirit merely ascends 
to the point where it is able to 'interpret' the world, the 'cultural' self-consciousness 
described here was to be actualised in an attempt to change it. This is reinforced b
sense in which culture, in Debord's usage, would seem to correspond to Hegelian 
'Understanding' and 'picture-thinking': modes of thought that fall short of the identity in 
difference grasped by speculative, dialectical philosophy. This separation of art an
culture from everyday life, in other words, is analogous to the distinction between an 
observing subject and a separate object of enquiry; and, as the 'object' in question here is 
history and lived exp
sense in which the separation of artistic representations of life from life itself constitutes
a primary conceptual basis for the theory of spectacle. Secondly, insofar as the object to 
be reconciled with is life and history, the realisation of art that would be achieved 
through that unification would necessarily be one with lived temporality (a posi
similar to Hyppolite's view that the nature of the Concept's self-division entailed that it 
could only become present to itself in consciousness through temporality). Thus 
                                                 
33 S.I. 2006, p.52, translation altered; 1997, p.14. 
ividual and universal” (Hegel 2004 p.82); “the unity of the different and 
esses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 
s 'I'” (Hegel 1977, p.110), 
 
34 Spirit is “the unity of the ind
independent self-consciousn
'I' that is 'We' and 'we' that i
35 Lukács 1971, p.139.  
36 Debord 1995, p.130; 2006, p.843 
37 Debord 1995, p.130; 2006, p.843
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community of dialogue and the game with time that up till now have merely been 
represented by poetic and artistic works”38 (as he puts it in his correspondence, “any 
spirit of the 'pictorial' must be stamped out”).39  
 These later formulations stem directly from the S.I.'s early concerns. For 
example, in 1958 Debord claimed that art must cease to be “a report about sensations 
and become a direct organisation of more advanced sensations.”40
texts can at times be seen to figure the realisation of art in praxis through notions of 
commodity fetishism: again in 1958, and in the very first issue of Internationale 
Situationniste, Debord advocated – in connection to the creation of art –  “produc[ing]
ourselves rather than things that enslave us”.41 This brings us back to the point made i
the previous chapter as to the sense in which the S.I. rejected the production of static, 
durable artworks in favour of the creation of transient moments of experience. “The
goal of the Situationists,” Debord explained, “is immediate participation in a passionate 
abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral 
[périssables] moments.”42 I'd like to put particular stress on that notion of ephemerality
here, in order to relate it back to the ideas about time and negativity outlined in the 
previous chapter. It can also be n
represented, for to do so would be to introduce the very duality that the situation was 
intended to overcome; as a result, “the success of these moments can reside only in th
fleeting effect [leur effet passager].”43 Debord thus claimed in his Report on the 
Construction of Situations of 1957 that “our situations will be without a future, they
be passageways [lieux de passage]”, as “we care nothing about the permanence of ar
of anything else.”44   
 If we jump forward a decade to The Society of the Spectacle once again 
see that these aspects of the constructed situation inform that later work, particularly as
regards Debord's assertion that “Man – that 'negative being who is to the extent that he 
abolishes being' is one [identique] with time.”45 As noted in the thesis' gene
introduction, the line quoted in that statement stems from Hyppolite’s translation of th
Phenomenology. It is however possible that Debord found it in Kostas Papaioannou's 
                                             
Debord 1995, p.133; 2006, p.846 
Debord 2009, p.149 
S.I. 2006, p.53; 1997, p.21 
S.I. 2006, p.53; 1997, p.21 
S.I. 2006, p.53;1997, p.20 
S.I. 2006, p.53; 1997, p.20 
S.I. 2006, p.41; Debord 2006, p.326,
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44  translation altered 
45 Debord 1995, p.92; 2006, p.820 
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preface to a French edition of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history,46 and the 
context in which Papaioannou employs it – which may well have inflected Debord’s 
appropriation of it – bears useful relation to our concerns here; at the very least, it serve
as an illustration of some of the points under discussion. This is because Papaioannou 
employs the quotation whilst presenting a set of claims that present Hegel as depictin
human agency as a process of change, de
 Papaioannou begins by contending that Hegel's significance as a philosopher lie
in his supersession of the classical separation of God and man, thought and world, etc. 
He also notes that the Hegelian Concept, which perpetually becomes other to itself in 
order to become more fully itself, is one with humanity, and that Hegel thus casts the
human subject as a negative, transformative and self-constitutive force: “because he is 
the Concept,” explains Papaioannou, “man must, by his own same essence, negate 
nature and abolish (aufheben) matter, fixity and finitude, until they cease to resist 
until they enter into the tumult of his moving life [le tourbillon de sa vie mobile].”47 As 
the movement of the Concept gives rise to time, Papaioannou – like Hyppolite, Ko
and Kojève – claims that humanity's identity with the Concept entails that it is also one 
with the latter's temporal flux.  
 The constructed situation echoes this notion of constant temporal unrest. This
greatly informs the 'ephemeral moments' and the 'fleeting effect' that Debord and the
S.I. attributed to the situation, as also the sense in which it was to function as a means o
'going with the flow of time'. Whilst this may seem tacit within the S.I.'s formative 
years, it certainly comes to the fore in Debord's later work: for what we find clearly 
stated there is a sense in which human identity lies in temporal becoming, achieved via 
a continual process of self-separation, negation and otherness; albeit a form of 
separation in which the subject remains one with itself in its own externalised actions, 
as opposed to the contemplative detachment of spectatorship. Hence The Society of the
Spectacle's claim, referred to earlier in connection to Lukács' troubles with 
objectification, that “time is a necessary alienation, as Hegel showed; the medium in
                                                 
46 Papaioannou in Hegel 1965. Debord does not indicate the provenance of the quoted phrase, and nor 
does he include it within the list of détournements that he produced to assist his translators in 1
This abse  appropriate enough, given the fact that the line in question is a quotation and no
détournement, but Bill Brown has however inte
973. 
nce is t a 
rpolated (without signalling the addition) what he 
takes to be its source into his own translation of Debord’s list (Brown 2007). Brown traces it to 
Papaioannou, perhaps because all internet searches lead to that source, and perhaps also because 
hin his own text. It may however be the case 
 Papaioannou’s book, as it was at the time the only French 
 1992, p.73). As noted above, thanks are due to John McHale for his 
is quotation. 
Papaioannou himself neglects to provide a reference wit
that Debord found the quotation in
translation of these lectures (Kelly
assistance in tracing th
47 Papaioannou in Hegel 1965, p.12 
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ical system, the spectacle is a mere image of the real unity of thought 
nd practice afforded by Situationist praxis. 
ncy and strategy described in 
e thesis' introduction. The realisation of art as temporal experience gave rise to a sense 
f the 
, 
e 
ationist 
Yet whilst we can see the beginnings of some of the characteristic themes of 
f spectacle's problems. As I've indicated, one could suggest that this concern with the 
s 
ove in step with that time takes on the 
which the subject realises himself in losing himself, becoming other in order to becom
truly himself [pour devenir la vérité de lui-même]”;48 hence also the sense in which 
spectacle – insofar as it maintains the separation of thought and practice – was said to
constitute an “abandonment of any history founded in historical time”.49 As with 
Hegel's philosoph
a
 This also brings us back to the issues of continge
th
in which time itself was to become “playful in character”,50 and with this notion o
ludic we also have the strategic: for moving with time, as we'll see in chapter eight, 
involves the negotiation of chance. In an unpublished note on chance, written in 1957
Debord states that “In known conditions the role of chance is conservative”; yet h
maintains that all “progress, all creation, is the organization of new conditions of 
chance”.51 Thus in order to be truly ludic Situationist practice would need to constantly 
create, negotiate and then create again a succession of new fields of chance. Each 
constructed situation, in other words, would involve contingency, rendering Situ
subjectivity a historical and strategic project.  
 
Debord's Hegelian Marxism here – and I'll develop that contention in chapter three, 
when we look at the situation in greater detail – we can also see the roots of the theory 
o
separation of artworks from their observers served as the paradigm for a society marked 
by an equally redundant separation from its own agency; as a result, one can find a basis 
here for the theory of spectacle's problematic over-emphasis on the alienation of 
subjective consciousness, and thereby for its consequent denigration of the alienation of 
objective activity within the wage-relation. These artistic and cultural themes can also 
be seen to inform the romanticisation of political struggle: for insofar as they accord 
something akin to the sublime or the absolute to the passage of time (e.g. Debord'
comments on accessing “a terrible and magnificent peace, the true taste of the passage 
of time”),52 political struggle deemed to m
attributes of an almost theological force.  
                                                 
48 Debord 1995, p.115-6, translation altered; 2006, p.835  
49 Debord 1995, p.114; 2006, p.834 
6 
31; 2006, p.1669 
50 Debord 1995, p.116; 2006, p.836 
51  Debord 2006, p.29
52 Debord 2004b, pp. 
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 The aesthetic aspects of Debord's views on time will be discussed in chapter 
eight, and I'll return to the contention that the theory of spectacle's problems can be 
traced to these early, cultural roots in a moment. First however I'll offer some further 
omments on the S.I.'s rejection of traditional art, and oc
M t theory.  
 
Socialisme ou Barbarie and the Turn towards Marx 
 
 Although always keen to maintain the international dimension of the S.I., 
Debord and the French section quickly rose to prominence and established Paris as the 
group's hub. Debord's ideas consequently gained ground, and members of the group 
who insisted on continuing to work within the traditional plastic arts came to be 
increasingly sidelined. This culminated in the split of 1962, in which the S.I.'s primarily 
gen 
e S.I.'s 
he poin n 
 be art
 the 
summarise many of the claims advanced above: for according to Debord in 1989, the 
e encapsulated in a single sentence: “The S.I. must now realise 
omments on that conclusion are however worth quoting in 
f
 
...fr ny of the 
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Scandinavian artists (the so-called 'Nashists', named after the Danish Situationist Jør
Nash) were ousted. The break was prompted by Vaneigem's opening address to th
fifth conference in Gothenburg, held in August 1961, in which he included the 
following, deliberately provocative assertions:   
 
T t is not to elaborate a spectacle of refusal but to refuse the spectacle. In order for their elaboratio
to istic in the new and authentic sense defined by the S.I., the elements of the destruction of the 
spectacle must precisely cease to be works of art. There is no such thing as Situationism, or a Situationist 
work of art, and no advantage to [being] a spectacular Situationist. Once and for all.53 
 
 To continue to produce art was to perpetuate decomposition, and to reduce the 
Situationists' revolutionary project to a mere spectacle of itself. Upon returning from
Gothenburg conference, and prior to the expulsion of the 'Nashists', Debord, Kotányi 
and Vaneigem formulated the S.I.'s unpublished 'Hamburg Theses' whilst on a dérive 
through “a series of randomly chosen bars in Hamburg.”54 These theses would seem to 
theses could b
philosophy”.  Debord's c55
ull. The theses signified, he claimed, that: 
om that moment [onwards], one could no longer accord the least importance to the ideas of a
olutionary groups that continued to subsist, in as much as they were inheritors of the old movrev ement fo
social emancipation which had been annihilated [anéanti] in the first half of the century; and that one 
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e 1959,59 and in 1960 he begun his short-lived 
iendship with Lefebvre (discussed in the following chapter). Debord also engaged in 
ation with Socialisme ou Barbarie (S ou B) between the end of 
960 and May 1961; this despite the S.I.'s prohibition of simultaneous membership of 
u 
could therefore only count on the S.I. to begin another era of contestation, by renewing all the bases of
departure, constituted in the 1840's, from which such groups had emerged. This point did not imply th
rupture that would follow with the artistic 'right' [wing] of the S.I., but rendered it extremely probable. 
One can thus recognise that the 'Hamburg Theses' marked the end, for the S.I., of its first era – the searc
for a genuinely new artistic terrain (1957-61); they also fixed the point of departure of the operation 
which led to the movement of May 1968, and what cam
 
 Consequently, and with the expulsion and departure of those Situationist factions 
that failed to fully accept art's obsolescence, the themes that I've sought to highlight 
within the S.I.'s early years – i.e. the concern with the separation of art from life, and 
desire to supersede that separation in praxis – came to the fore, leading to the 
development of an explicitly revolutionary stance (Dauvé puts this well: “Previously
most lucid artists had wanted to break the separation between art and life: the S.I. r
this demand to a higher level in their desire to abolish the distance between life an
revolution.”)57 The return to an early and Hegelian Marx, already evident in the S.I.'s 
early years, would now become increasingly explicit.  
 These themes have led some, such as Home, to bemoan the split of 1962 as 
marking the eclipse of the more interesting aspects of the Situationist project by 
Debord's ascendant 'specto-situationism' (Home's own term, named after the theory
spectacle).58 I take the opposite view: the split marks the S.I.'s turn towards greater 
theoretical depth and clarity, and thus towards a more sophisticated and political stance.  
 A drift towards the latter position can however be easily identified in the years
leading up the split. Debord had been aware of the importance of figures such as Georg 
Lukács and Lucien Goldmann sinc
fr
an even briefer affili
1
other groups,60 and indeed despite the hostile attitude that he'd once held towards S o
B.61 The reason that Debord gave for resigning from S ou B was simply that he didn't 
                                                 
56 S.I. p.703 
57 Dauvé 1979 
58 See Home 1991 and 1996 
59 In a letter to Jorn of July 1959, Debord encloses an article by Lucien Goldmann on 'Reification' which 
had been published in Les Temps Modernes, and advises him to address both this and Lukács' History 
and Class Consciousness in a pamphlet on value that Jorn was then producing. “Lukács,” Debord 
remarks, “is becoming very fashionable here” (Debord 2009, p.264). History and Class 
Consciousness would not however receive a full French translation until the following year. 
60 Khayati, who resigned in 1969, would later be attacked for his dual membership of the S.I. and the 
; see 
refers to them as “mechanistic to a frightening extent” (Debord 2009, p.152); his 
 mellowed by 1959: the departure of Claude Lefort (who would later be attacked in 
onale Situationniste) and “the rebel wing of the anti-organisationalists” within S 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (S.I. 2003, p.84; Debord 2006, p.1136
also Gray 1998, p.132, and Dauvé 1979). 
61 In a letter of 1958 he 
views had however
the pages of Internati
77 
y 
is own and the S.I.'s 
creas
 
tion as a 
dis, 
so 
d at 
adis, 
, as 
“feel up to the task”; he remarked, somewhat ironically, that “it must be very tiring 
organising a revolutionary organisation”.62 Yet however tenuous his membership ma
have been, it was symptomatic of – and indeed informed by – h
in ingly militant and theoretical stance.  
 The influence exerted by S ou B on Debord's developing theory of spectacle will
be described in part two, but suffice it to say here that the group sought to investigate 
the modernisation of capitalism and the new conditions of militant struggle, and that 
they were particularly concerned with addressing Marxism's own ability to func
repressive ideology. For Castoriadis, the group's primary theorist, classical Marxist 
economics were no longer able to explain contemporary capitalism, and tended to 
accord primacy to impersonal, abstract economic 'laws' rather than to subjective 
autonomy; a denigration of the individual that corresponded, in their view, to the new 
primary contradiction of modern capitalism itself. Modern capitalism, for Castoria
was said to rely on reducing individuals to “mere order-takers” in production, yet al
on cultivating and satisfying their needs and desires in consumption.63 The resultant 
alienation that this engendered was to lead not towards greater equality within the 
existing mode of production and distribution, but rather towards a challenge levelle
the entire mode of contemporary life. The potential was there, according to Castori
for “a total movement, concerned with all that men do in society, and with their real 
daily lives.”64 One can of course see clear links to Debord and the S.I.'s account here
will be discussed in chapter five.  
 
Art and Spectacle 
 
 When discussing religious art in the Phenomenology Hegel discusses Greek 
tragic drama, and comments on what he refers to as the “spectator-consciousness”  of 
the tragic chorus. For Hegel, the chorus is an on-stage representation of the drama's 
audience, and it constitutes an echo, higher up the Phenomenology's 'spiral', of the 
unhappy consciousness' separation from its own true essence: for the chorus is sep
from its own negative nature, i.e. from the Concept, which takes the form of the fate
necessity that unfolds 'behind' the narrative of the play. As the Phenomenology 
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o have led to “progress” within its eponymous journal (Debord 2009, p.265). 
.163; see also Guillaume 1995 
63 Castoriadis 1974 
ou B was said t
62 Hussey 2002, p
64 Castoriadis 1974 
65 Hegel 1977, p.445 
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With Hegel, consciousness is thus required to get beyond artistic representation, 
ent as the template for a theory of modern 
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e surface of society”  
 
the bearing that they originally had upon capital's source, mechanics and potential 
rogresses, this self-separation is superseded by the emergence of a more complete form
o
explain the rationale and nece
 
and so too with Debord. Yet as we've seen, doing so for Debord entails moving beyond 
a society that echoes Hegel's own view of historical resolution: for Hegel's end of art is 
refigured as decomposition, a stage located prior to the realisation of art and philosophy 
in lived historical time. Doing away with representation, in this sense, entailed 
overcoming the separation of subject and object in favour of their unity in praxis. Hence 
my claim that these early concerns with art greatly inform Debord's later theory of 
spectacle, which replaces the separation of the artistic observer from the contemplated 
art object with that of the human subject from his or her life. The fact that the theory of 
spectacle arose from concerns with the separation of art and culture underlies the 
problematic abstraction that I complained of in the thesis' general introduction: for 
taking that separated, contemplative detachm
capitalism led to an over-emphasis on the latter's subjective effects, i.e. on the alienatio
of individual consciousness. As a result, the objective causes of that alienation are 
overlooked, and this leads to the denigration of the importance of capitalist social 
relations per se, and thus to the reduction of the proletariat to a classless abstraction. 
 It thus also informs the theory of spectacle's flattening and generalisation of 
social practice. If all aspects of social life are as alienated and commodified as every 
other, then they are all equivalent (as noted, spectacular time “manifests nothing in its 
effective reality aside from its exchangeability”),66 meaning that the primary importance 
of capital's basis in production came to be obscured by an interest in life as a whole, or 
rather the 'everyday'. It is to the latter that we'll now turn in chapter three. However, and 
whilst prefiguring the claims that will be made in part, it can be noted here that this can 
perhaps be seen as tantamount to a shift in focus from production to the purportedly 
more superficial sphere of consumption: to a critique that deals with capital's forms 
primarily in terms of the ways “in which they appear on th 67
(Marx). I'll suggest later that this can be seen to pertain to the manner in which the 
theory of spectacle employs Marx's concepts and categories whilst moving away from
vulnerabilities.
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Tragedy and the Everyday 
 
 As indicated in chapter two, by the early 1960's the S.I. had taken up an 
increasingly politicised and theoretical stance that involved a more explicit concern with 
modern life as a whole. Their desire to unify and art and lived experience, together with 
their rejection of traditional, 'orthodox' Marxisms, led them to turn towards the everyday 
rather than to the factory: for as the 'new' poverty that they identified ultimately 
stemmed from the deprivation of meaning rather than means of subsistence, the arena in 
which it would be contested would be life as a whole. In pursuing these issues here I'll 
make some further comments on the S.I.'s debts to existential philosophy and to the 
work of Henri Lefebvre, which will lead towards a more involved account of the 
constructed situation. Once again, tragedy will be used here as a useful means of 
establishing links within this material.  
 For Debord in 1961, the triviality of everyday life and the individual subject's 
inability to change it beyond the bounds set by social norms constituted a “scandalous 
, 
                                                
poverty”,1 and one that necessitated a “reinvention of revolution”.2 Three years earlier
and in the very first issue of Internationale Situationniste, Debord had stated that 
“There can be no freely spent time until we possess the modern tools for the 
construction of everyday life”,3 and in this respect it can be seen that the S.I.'s concern 
with everyday life followed directly from the premise of constructing situations, i.e. the 
conscious direction of one's own time. It's thus perhaps unsurprising that one can find 
references to the everyday within Debord's work from as early as 1953;4 long before his 
friendship with Lefebvre in the early 1960's (the first volume of Lefebvre's Critique of 
Everyday Life was however published in 1947). Yet whilst this concern with the 
everyday thus followed directly from the post-Surrealist aim of uniting art and life – and 
whilst it would also become inflected with the move away from an orthodox focus on 
production, labour and the factory described above –  
I would suggest that it was also informed by the general ambiance of existential 
philosophy, particularly as regards the latter's concerns with human finitude and the 
 
1 S.I. 2006, p.92; Debord 2006, p.574 
rd 2006, p.577 
, p.21 
2 S.I. 2006, p.94; Debo
3 S.I. 2006, p.53; 1997
4 Debord 2006, p.108 
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 philosophy presents a 'tragic 
pectacle' that merely 'stages' the resolution and rationalisation of a negativity that is 
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and object (as afforded by praxis) that would constitute the dangerous 'Dionysian' 
 be taken to be 'tragic' because it safely depicts such a 
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need to act within time.  
 The manner in which I'll approach that connection here can be illustrated by way 
of reference to Lukács' own early views on the everyday. Prior to his own explicit turn
towards Marxist theory in the early 1920's, Lukács adopted a comparatively romantic 
opposition to present society. This is particularly evident in his Soul and Form o
in which he talks of fleeting moments of authenticity within everyday life, presenti
them as intimations of the 'absolute': life within present society, he claims there, “is
always unreal, always impossible,” until “suddenly there is a gleam, a lightning that 
illuminates the banal paths of empirical life: something disturbing and seductive, 
dangerous and surprising; the accident, the great moment, the miracle; an enrichment 
and a confusion.”5 Such moments, Lukács adds, “cannot last, [as] no one would be able 
to bear it... One has to fall back into numbness.”6 There's clearly a sense of tragedy 
here, in the traditional sense of the term (as Löwy puts it, “society,” for the early 
Lukács, is “the arena of a tragic conflict between the desire for personal fulfilment and 
reified objective reality”):7 a tragedy that pertains to the inaccessibility of an ineff
unattainable absolut
c
 We've seen Bataille's contention that Hegelian
s
inherently resistant to any such synthesis; we've also looked at the work of othe
viewed the Hegelian absolute as an unwarranted conclusion, forced upon an otherwise 
open, negative process. However, I've also argued that with Debord that which Hegel 
describes as an end is in fact an ideal, philosophical depiction of a real historic
beginning. On this view, Hegelian philosophy would not constitute a 'tragic spectacl
because of the imposition of a state of unity: rather, it would be the real unity of subject 
element. If then Hegelianism can
unity whilst maintaining its real absence, then one could also contend that accounts 
uing for the necessity of the continual deferral of subject-object unity and totality are
mselves 'tragic' for the same reason, insofar as they present philosophies that stage a 
e, aimless negativity that precludes its real instantiation. The unhappy consciousness 
cussed in chapter one would then not be a figure of potential emancipation, but rather 
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of what Debord referred to in his 1978 film In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur
“this restless and exitless present”.8 For example: whilst the young Lukács' unattain
absolute serves to illuminate the inadequacies of the everyday, its very inaccessibility 
undermines its instantiation within the process of transforming such a life (this would 
rectified in his later work: in History and Class Consciousness, the Party – the 
embodiment of subject-object unity – effectively becomes a conduit between that 
distant absolute and the proletariat).9 This can also be seen to pertain to aspects of 
existentialism, particularly to that of Sartre, for whom the for-itself's doomed attempt 
become in-and-for-itself – an attem
b ing God, and of thus attaining the absolute – entails, as noted earlier, an explicit 
association with the Hegelian unhappy consciousness.10 I'll claim below that something 
similar can be discerned in Lefebvre's theory of 'moments', which I'll use as a means of
developing a more involved account of the constructed situation. In showing that 
Lefebvre's 'moments' echo the young Lukács' fleeting moments of authenticity, I'll
to develop my earlier contentions regarding the status of time and the absolute in 
Debord's account.  
 
Existentialism and the Realisation of Philosophy 
 
 Although Debord and the S.I.'s concerns with time and situations bring 
Heidegger to mind, there are very few direct references to his work within the pages
Internationale Situationniste, or indeed in Debord's broader oeuvre. One can cer
find echoes of his work, albeit seemingly accidental ones (such as the loss of 
authenticity that arises when Dasein “lets itself be carried along by the looks of the 
world”),
 of 
tainly 
11 but Heidegger's relevance here lies largely in his impact upon the intellectual 
                                                 
8 Debord 2003, p.165; 2006, p.1371 
9 A point also made by Löwy (1979).  
10 For Sartre, “The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted
a totality which it is without being able to be it (Sartre 2003, p.114): it surpasses its present se
towards its future self, but in doing so it continually becomes other. Like the unhappy conscio
 by 
lf 
usness, 
it continually strives towards a full resolution that is its own true self, but which it cannot attain. The 
for-itself is thus continually denied the necessity that would come from being its own foundation, and 
unjustified'. It desires to become “in-itself-for-itself” but cannot do so; 
 conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man 
 be God” (Sartre 2003, p.587). This is an impossible project: 
 self-separation means that it can only be the foundation of its own 
ous statement that “man is a useless passion” (Sartre 2003, p.636) stems from 
version of the passion of Christ: the individual sacrifices him or herself in the 
ut to no avail. 
remains forever contingent and '
consequently, “the best way to
is the being whose project is to
consciousness' constant
nothingness. The fam
this idea, and is an in
hope that God might be born, b
11 Heidegger 1962, p.216 
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art and philosophy described in chapter two: “since individuals are defined by their 
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ambiance of the time, and as the primary source of the concept o
's n'. Sartre (who also makes much of the 'look' in Being and Nothingness) is 
however a much more obvious influence, albeit one that was rejected in the strongest 
terms: he was variously described by Debord and the S.I. as a purveyor of “mistakes, 
lies and stupidity”12; a “nullity”, “puffed up by the various authorities that are so 
satisfied with him”;13 a consumer and purveyor of “Stalinist illusions”,14 and as one 
the prime “celebrities of unintelligence”.15 Yet as was the case with their similarly 
vituperative relation to Breton, the S.I. seem to have owed rather more to Sartre than 
they may have wanted to admit.  
 In Heidegger's usage, the situation is the network of relations with and within the
world that Dasein 'discloses' through orienting itself towards its own future death, 
thereby giving meaning to itself and to its present context. Sartre's own version of the 
situation is similar, insofar as it denotes the context that the for-itself is loca
and which emerges through the temporality that arises from its own nothingness. 
Revealed not by attending to death per se but rather by the projects and aims that the 
individual posits beyond the present moment, the Sartrean situation is the univer
condition of consciousness: we are always “immediately 'in situation'”,16 and our 
consciousness always “arises in situation”.17 Debord and the S.I. can be seen to have 
adopted this view to an extent, and as we'll see in a moment they certainly took on 
aspects of the temporality that informs it. Yet for them it implied the themes of
situation,” they wrote, “they need the power to create situations worthy of their 
desires”.  Consequen18 tly, they would “replace existentia
f moments of life”: alluding to Marx's Theses on Feuerbach they claimed that whilst
hilosophers and artists have only interpreted situations; the point now is to transfo
m”.19 Insofar as this would entail self-determination through the conscious creati
of lived experience, there is perhaps a sense in which the S.I.'s project constituted an 
empt to realise that which Sartre viewed as the doomed attempt to become God (a 
int that could be seen to be in keeping with Debord's Feuerbachian notions of 
                                                 
S.I. 2006, p.134; 1997, p.301 
S.I. 2006, p.235; 1997, p.488 
S.I. 2006, p.289; 1997, p.572 
S.I. 2006, p.413; 1966 
Sartre 2003, p.63 
Sartre 2003, p.115 
S.I. 2006, p.178; 1997, p.388  
S.I. 2006, p.178, translation altered; 1997, p.3
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alienation: for “God,” we remember, is “the mirror of man”).20  
 As the allusion above to the Theses on Feuerbach indicates, it's possible to 
suggest that the influence of existential thought on Debord and the S.I. was analogous
some respects to that of Hegel on Marx. Hegel, for Debord, grasps w
is beginning to become capable of, but does so in an alienated, separate form that 
reflects that era's shortcomings21 (i.e. a 'contemplative' perspective on “a world that 
made itself”,22 stemming from the rise of capitalism), and which thus required Marx and 
the Young Hegelians to reconfigure it as praxis; likewise, existentialism – particula
that of Sartre – implied the conscious construction of one's own life, but did so in a 
manner that affirmed modern conditions.23 The existential subject's disconnection from
its factical existence recalls the alienation and separation of spectatorship: for if the 
investigation of 'being' entails that the negative characteristics of the subject are roo
in an ontology that prevents subject-object unity (as in Sartre, according to 
Dunayevskaya),24 or if subject is effectively reduced to object (as Adorno claims i
case with Heidegger),25 then angst, anguish, alienation and anxiety are grounded in th
nature of being itself, and are thereby rendered eternal characteristics of human 
existence.26 Yet existential philosophy was nonetheless credited with having contr
to the new nexus of revolutionary potential constituted by the spectacular present. In
1964 the S.I. grouped a “poor Heidegger!” and a “poor Sartre!” together with an equ
'poor' Barthes, Cardan, Lefebvre and Lukács, declaring that each offered only 
                                                 
20 Feuerbach 1989, p.63  
21 This point is also made by Korsch (1946), Lukács (1971, p.77), and Hyppolite (1969, p.73). 
22 Debord 1995, p.49; 2006, p.793, emphasis in the original 
23 Vaneigem 2003, p.48 
24 “One would have thought that Sartre, who returned to a work of philosophical rigour [with his 
Critique of Dialectical Reason] after he had become, or at least was in the process of becoming, an 
adherent or Marx's historical materialism, would at least in theory attempt to end the bifurcation 
between subject and object [which characterised Being and Nothingness], would concretise his project 
of 'going beyond' as the Subject appropriating objectivity, not vice versa” (Dunayevskaya 2002, 
p.203). 
25 For Adorno, Heidegger's supersession of the subject-object distinction takes 'being' as a primal object 
to which subjectivity is reduced. This not only removes the difference required for critique, but 
consecrates a world marked by commodity fetishism: “if men no longer had to equate themselves with 
things, they would [not] need...an invariant picture of themselves, after the model of things” (Adorno 
milar point: “Sein und Zeit is...merely a document of the day showing 
osure of ultimate truth” (Lukács 1973).   
the unhappy consciousness and Sartrean existentialism, this point can 
azzling 
-awaited promised land of total consumption”, but as soon as it is purchased “its 
 revealed”, and another is “assigned to supply the system with its justification” 
 
ng causes to appear, which is nothing but our running itself, and which thereby is by 
Sartre 2003, p.225). 
1973, p.96) Lukács makes a si
how a class felt and thought, and not an 'ontological' discl
26 Remembering the links between 
perhaps be illustrated with the following comparison. Debord makes the following remarks on the 
fleeting satisfactions of consumption: “Each and every new product represents the hope for a d
short-cut to the long
essential poverty stands
(Debord 1995, p.45, translation altered; 2006, p.790). After having likened consciousness to a donkey
following a carrot and pulling a cart behind it, Sartre writes that “we run after a possible which our 
very runni
definition out of reach” (
84 
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human existence is thus forever contingent, haunted by a necessity that eludes it (as is 
t  
Where for Sartre individuals are rendered perpetually 
 the inescapable 'facticity' of their existence, i.e. their status as 
u
“caricatural fragments of the innovating ideas that can simultaneously comprehend 
contest the totality of our era” (this list was followed by a dismissive “tics, tics and 
tics”;27 a reference to Lautréamont28 that perhaps also illustrates the correspondence
between the 'realisation' of philosophy and that of art and poetry).  
 Time is particularly important here, as Debord's claim that “man – that 'negati
being who is to the extent that he abolishes being' – is one with time”29 not only echoe
the aspects of French Hegelianism discussed in chapter one, but also Sartre's ph
(which was of course itself influenced by Hegel).30 Sartre for example talks of the 
“nihilating structure of temporality”,31 and presents the subject as perpetually eng
in a process of negation and self-realisation (as De Beauvoir puts it: “between the p
which no longer is and the future which is not yet, this moment when he ['man'] e
nothing”).32 However, with Sartre this temporal process is almost an affliction: for 
although this negativity is a means of 'transcendence', it can only ever deliver the 
individual into further separation, ambiguity and angst. A stable identity between 
subject and object is ruled out, as indeed is that between consciousness and itself, as 
Sartre does away with Hegel's presentation of negativity as intrinsic to the being of the 
world: instead, negativity – or rather nothingness – becomes the sole preserve of 
consciousness, resulting in a timeless positivity on the one hand (world) and a self-
negating process on the other (consciousness).33 As self-identity cannot be attaine
consciousness cannot establish its own foundation despite its compulsions to do so (f
Sartre all of the values that we posit are at root our own unattainable self-identity),34 
hence the impossible project of becoming God noted above. Denied this foundation, 
he unhappy consciousness). Something rather similar can perhaps be discerned in the
structure of authentic Dasein. 
contingent by virtue of
njustifiable brute facts within the world, Heidegger can be seen to present Dasein's 
                                                 
S.I. 2006, p.176; 1997, p.368 
Knabb in S.I. 2006, p.483; Cf. Lautréamont 1994, p.244 
Debord 1995, p.92; 2006, p.820 
For a technical discussion of Being and Nothingness' debts to Hegel's Logic see Hartmann 1966; f
further comments on the links between Sartre and Hegel see Butler 1999 and Bernstein 1999. 
Sartre 2003, p.58 
De Beauvoir 1976, p.7 
“The self can not be a property of being-in-itself” (Sartre 2003, p.100). Hartmann writes that “What 
Sartre rejects is, in Hegelian terminology, the 'ingredience of negation in being'” (Hartmann 1966, 
pp.36-7). 
Sartre 2003, pp.117-8 
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28 
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al of final synthesis that we discussed earlier in relation to the 
losure
 
associations, and Sartre's series of engagements with ethics and attempts to link the 
un  
of 
authentic being as contingent upon its own future death.35 In order to be authentic, 
Dasein must orient itself towards its own death, as towards the totality of its own 
and thereby “take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself”36 by choosing
itself as the “hero”37 of its own totality; and although Heidegger maintains that “dea
a way to be”,38 Dasein would thus seem to be grounded in its own as-yet unattain
future. The link to the Hegelian themes set out above is more tenuous here than is the
case with Sartre,39 but this structure is nonetheless reminiscent of the unhappy 
consciousness' contingency upon and consequent pursuit of its own true, distant self. 
 These existential concerns with finitude thus recall aspects of the endless 
negativity and deferr
'c ' of the Hegelian system; and rather than constituting a source of endless 
transgression and excession, as Bataille and Breton advocated, it seems here to result in 
political ambivalence (for Sartre, one is “condemned”40 to freedom, and does not 
choose it; Lukács remarks that “this cynical view that there are no unfree acts has 
significant resemblance to the view that there are no free acts”).41 The problem lies in 
the difficulty of establishing necessary grounds or conditions for political action: a 
difficulty that Sartre struggled with from Being and Nothingness' seemingly nihilistic
ontology onwards, and which Heidegger's own trajectory arguably exemplified. The 
latter's emphasis on 'home' and 'dwelling' invites obvious and frequently debated 
iversality of Marxist politics to his seemingly individualist philosophy raise a number
problems.42 De Beauvoir's own attempt to take up the challenge set by Being and 
                                                 
The following remarks are indebted to Dr. Marie Morgan, who offered helpful suggestions on the 
contingency of Dasein.  
Heidegger 1962, p.434 
Heidegger 1962, p.437 
Heidegger 1962, p.289 
We might however recall here Koyré's views on the priority of the future over the past; his 'Hegel à
Iéna' was written in 1934, seven years after the appearance of Being and Time. 
Sartre 2003, p.506 
Lukács 1973 
Being and Nothingness famously claimed that “the slave in chains is as free as his master” (Sartre
2003, p.570; perhaps an allusion to Hegel's equally famous comments on the indifference of stoicism:
Hegel 1977, p.121); yet if all situations are equal in terms of the freedom that they afford, then there is
no reason to change them. In his later Notebooks for an Ethics Sartre pursued the idea that the fru
35 
36 
37 
38 
39  
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 abandoned, and that the inevitable freedom that prompts that 
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o offer little in response to the charge of relativism. The Critique of Dialectical Reason shows 
citly towards Marxism, but considers terror as a means of maintaining group 
erhaps interesting in relation to the S.I.'s views on Sartre's comments on the 
 an Imbecile' in the tenth issue of Internationale Situationniste). 
pursuit of becoming God might be
pursuit might itself be taken as an absolute idea. He however offers little sense of what form
might take (Anderson 1993, p.64). Existentialism and Humanism presents the almost Kantian cla
that in acting “I am creating an image of man as I would have him be” (Sartre 1973, p.30), which 
seems t
Sartre move more expli
unity (this point is p
U.S.S.R.: see their 'Concerning
86 
ith ambiguity, contingency 
nd open totality – can be seen to provide inadequate grounds for a political project 
e S.I.'s description of Sartrean thought as “an intellectual 
ead end”).48 I would suggest that Debord's re-configuration of the Hegelian absolute as 
hat 
        
Nothingness is alarmingly pragmatic at times, but seemingly commensurable with 
present society,43 and whilst Debord clearly admired Kierkegaard's writing44 the 
emphasis placed by the latter on knowing oneself through God once again implies 
orientation towards a transcendent beyond.45  Despite these attempts at solutions, it 
remains the case that the emphasis placed here on the contingency of the acting, 
situational subject can lead towards a relativism that is perhaps best exemplified by 
Sartre's remark that “all human activities are equivalent,” and that it thus “amounts to 
the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations”;46 for “nothing,” 
he claims, “absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value. ...I 
am unjustifiable”.47 
 In other words, and despite its purportedly radical and transgressive credentials, 
the rejection or deferral of resolution and synthesis in favour of a more 'open' notion of 
negativity – exemplified here by existentialism's concerns w
a
(hence, perhaps, Debord and th
d
the grounds of historical action is important in this regard, as it can be seen to entail 
necessary conditions for action and freedom, i.e. those that allow the self-determinate 
subject-object unity of Situationist activity. I'll now move towards developing t
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contemporary political economy, which effectively define freedom in terms of market choice: the 
pursuit of capitalism means more products, thus more freedom for all, etc. This is evidenced in the 
problematic arguments advanced by Ernesto Screpanti, whose presentation of 'libertarian communism' 
entails a similar notion of market choice and an equally dubious attempt to quantify freedom. Some 
e however reminiscent of existential concerns (Screpanti 2007; see also 
onnection to this notion of a quantified freedom one could also think here of the 
dvanced within the anarchist and libertarian communist milieus for a 'participatory 
ect for a Participatory Society 2009 for a critical overview.  
6, p.854 
 
46 
47 
48 
Anderson's research on Sartre's unfinished later ethics presents an almost Hegelian position: all nee
and values are said to stem from the 'integral man', which is effectively a Hegelian universal that 
present, however implicitly, within existing norms and morals. I as a moral individual should therefore 
recognise that my ends are those of all others, as they lie in the satisfaction of universal need 
(Anderson 1993, p.122).  
43 For De Beauvoir, “in order to win an urgent victory, o e has to give up the idea, at least temporarily
of serving certain valid causes; one may even be brought to the point of fighting against them” (De 
Beauvoir 1976, p.98); for “love”, as she puts it, “authorises severities which are not granted to 
indifference” (De Beauvoir 1976, p.137). Yet in the absence of further political or economic 
qualifications her claim that the freedom of all rests on that of the individual (which chimes with th
rtre's Notebooks for an Ethics) would seem quite commensurable with some strands of 
aspects of his account ar
Bunyard 2011). In c
recent arguments a
economy'; see Libcom and The Proj
44 Debord 1995, p.145; 200
45 For Kierkegaard, in relating itself to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is grounded 
transparently in the power that established it” (2004, p.165). This however means wanting to be 
oneself whilst believing oneself to be created by a remote God in whose existence one can only have
faith.  
Sartre 2003, pp. 646-7 
Sartre 2003, p.62 
S.I. 2006, p.233; 1997, p.487 
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 'absolute' that it accesses is inherently transitory; yet 
here the moment is a finite instance within time, Debord and the S.I.'s situations were 
suggestion by way of reference to the connection and differences between the S.I.'s 
situations and Lefebvre's theory of 'moments', and in doing so I'll contend that one can 
find the beginnings of Debord's later Hegelian Marxist notions of agency within the 
structure of the constructed situation. Lefebvre's account is particularly apposite her
virtue of the characteristics ascribed to it in the thesis' general introduction: Lefebvre
presents the goal of historical action, and indeed the instances of genuine, authentic 
experience that he holds to be accessed by the 'moment', in 
absolute, however, that would seem to be perpetually receding, and which can never be 
fully grasped. As signalled above, this is close to the moments of authenticity described
by the young Lukács: for according to Lefebvre, “the tragic is omnipresent within the 
genuine moment”,49 insofar as the
w
intended to establish the conditions for moving with time.  
 
Lefebvre and the 'Moment' 
 
 Much ink has been spilt over the details of Lefebvre's relationship with Deb
(it was “a love story that ended badly, very badly”,
ord 
fice 
ey 
 
50 according to Lefebvre), so suf
it to say here that the primary bone of contention lay in mutual accusations of 
plagiarism over a set of theses on the Paris commune. To an extent, the question of 
Lefebvre's influence can perhaps be approached through that of the date when th
actually met: Lefebvre, eager to claim influence, stated that their friendship began in
1957 (the same year that the S.I. was founded);51 Hussey holds that they met in 1958;52 
Kaufmann claims that their meeting did not take place until 1960.53 The latter claim is 
persuasive, and can be backed up by evidence within Debord's correspondence.54  
 There was however certainly common ground between them. Between 1960 and 
                                                 
Lefebvre 2008b, p.352 
Ross 2004, p.268 
Ross 2004, p.267 
49 
50 
51 
.174-6.  
Debord in January 1960, saying that “I've been wanting to meet you since the 
is immediately suspect). the following month, Debord noted in a letter to a fellow Situationist 
 
thin the S.I. 
52 Hussey 2002, p.138 and pp
53 Kaufmann 2006, p.167 
54 Lefebvre wrote to 
beginning of your journal” (the journal first appeared in 1958, so Lefebvre's claim that they met in 
1957 
that aspects of Lefebvre's work were “very interesting; and close to us”, but added that “I haven't seen
him yet” (Debord 2009, p.331; see also Kaufmann 2006, p.167). Letters sent by Debord wi
prior to 1960 indicate that he was excited by the similarities between Lefebvre's work and the 
Situationist project, but there is no prior reference to any personal meeting.   
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ferencing Lefebvre's 'Vers un Romantisme Révolutionnaire' (1957)59 – a text that 
l as well as the economic spheres of 
ociety – Debord argued that Lefebvre's position simply indicated the need for 
volut
ing 
ded 
 
1962 mutual influence clearly took place,55 and prior to their meeting they would s
to have been moving in the same direction. Lefebvre's concern with the everyday was 
greatly informed by his reconfiguration of Marxism as a form of sociology (Marxism, 
he claimed in his first Critique, is “the scientific knowledge of the proletariat”;56 it 
therefore “describes and analyses the everyday life of society”, and is as a result “a 
critical knowledge of everyday life”).57 As with the S.I., the everyday for Lefebvre wa
both the locus and the stakes of the revolutionary project.  
 Lefebvre first described the 'moment' in 1959's La Somme et le Reste, and
greater clarity (notably during his friendship with Debord) in the second volume of h
Critique (1961). He himself described the distinction between the moment and the S
constructed situation as follows:  
 
They [the S.I.] more or less said to me...”what you call 'moments' we call 'situations', but we're taking it 
further than you. You accept as 'moments' everything that has occurred in the course of history: lo
poetry, thought. We want to create new moments.58  
 
 This perhaps illustrates the sense in which Lefebvre, in the S.I.'s view, had in 
effect remained on the same level as Sartre's philosophical 'interpretation' of situations,
and had fallen short of the task of actualising them in transforming the world. For 
example, in the very first issue of Internationale Situationniste (1958), and whilst 
re
called for a Marxism able to revitalise the cultura
s
re ionary cultural transformation, and failed to investigate what forms it might 
actually take. Lefebvre, in other words, had failed to identify the importance of realis
art.60 This is perhaps understandable: given that the theory of moments seems inten
to function as a form of immanent critique it is perhaps unsurprising that it merely 
indicates in negative the necessity and desire for an alternative society.61 Yet for the S.I.,
                                                 
55 For Jappe, Debord's 'Perspectives for onscious Changes in Everyday Life' (a text that was famously 
delivered via a tape recorder in a suitcase to Lefebvre's Group for Research on Everyday Life) an
second volume of Lefebvre's Critique of Everyday Life, both of which appeared in 1961, “corresp
almost word for word” (Jappe 1999, p.75). 
56 Lefebvre 2008a, p.147 
57 Lefebvre 2008a, p.148 
58
C
d the 
ond 
 Ross 2004, p.271 
59 A text that was written with Goldmann, Roy and Tzara, and published in Nouvelle Revue Française 
 Lefebvre would however argue that “The transformation of the world is not 
n of art” (Quoted in Roberts 2006, p.68). 
“must be capable of offering a window on supersession, and of demonstrating 
e age-old conflict between the everyday and tragedy, and between triviality 
#59. 
60 A later, post-Situationist
only a realisation of philosophy but a realisatio
61 The theory of moments 
how we might resolve th
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who were concerned with researching and actualising a radically different future, 
Lefebvre had simply demonstrated the need for that future by focussing on the 
 Central to this is the finite, fleeting and thus 'tragic' character of the moment, and 
its relation to Lefebvre's notion of the “possible/impossible”.62 This concept refers
the sense in which the present that declares a revolutionary future to be impossible al
makes that future necessary, and thus possible. However, for Debord, this meant that 
Lefebvre essentially affirms the present: rather than pursuing “profound cultural 
modification”, Lefebvre had instead developed a “consciousness of the possible-
impossible (still too remote), which can be expressed in any sort of form within the 
framework of cultural decomposition.”63 Thus where Debord and the S.I. sought to 
build a path towards that future from within the present, Lefebvre – in their view – 
content to merely identify its necessity. I would suggest that this relates to the 
distinction between the forms of the 'absolute' accessed in their accounts. Where 
Lefebvre addresses tragic, fleeting instances of meaning and significance within the 
present – 'absolute' moments that collapse as soon as they arise – Debord and the S.I
can, on my reading (and in keeping with the temporality of the absolute described via
Hyppolite in chapter one), be seen to present the absolute as a communion with tim
The absolute thereby forms the grounds of historical action rather than its ineffab
 
The Moment, the Situation and th  
 
ted 
lf-
ia 
 praxis, i.e. from the satisfactions implied by contemporary 
e link to the 'possible/impossible'), and thereby provides direction 
t's thus an emergent, albeit continually reformulated 'absolute', 
                                                                                                         
 
 The 'impossible possibility' of the moment pertains to Lefebvre's notion of the 
'total man', which I referred to in the thesis' general introduction. The total man was
developed in the 1940's as part of a critical response to existentialism: against the 
allegedly empty, subjective idealism of 'anguished' Sartrean freedom – a freedom so 
indeterminate as to make any action as valid and viable as any other – Lefebvre posi
the goal of a 'total', “'de-alienated' man”.64 This is a figure that denotes complete se
identity: a “living subject-object”.65 Importantly, the figure of the total man emerges v
determinate negation in
privations (hence th
and political purpose. I
                                      
008b, p.358) 
on altered; 1997, p.21 
and festival” (Lefebvre 2
62 Lefebvre 2008b, p.347 
63 S.I. 2006, p.54, translati
64 Lefebvre 1968, p.162 
65 Lefebvre 1968, p.162 
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'tactical' and the 'strategic' (and we might remember here that the second volume of 
which this appears, was written during his friendship with 
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and in Lefebvre's view “only the notion or idea of the absolute gives a sense (in other
words both a meaning and a direction) to historically acquired knowledge.”66  
 However, the total man is himself both possible and impossible, and seems to b
just as unreachable as the goal pursued by the unhappy consciousness. Again, I'm 
drawing from Baugh here, who notes that history for Lefebvre “has an end”67  – the 
total man seems to be a definite, finite goal – but that this is a goal that would se
be continually receding. As we saw in the general introduction, Lefebvre himself states
that “the total man is but a figure on a distant horizon...a limit, an idea, and not a 
historical fact”;68 a “mathematical limit” to which “we are forever drawing nearer but 
have never reached”.69 The absolute of the total man would thus seem to be perpetu
drawing away from the present, and something similar can be found in Lefebvre's 
'moments'. Although the latter make contact with this absolute, it remains “ever-sought
and ever-inaccessible”:70 for although moments anticipate the coming of the total man,
they collapse as soon as they emerge. The moment, Lefebvre explains, “becomes an
absolute”71 because it stands above the triviality of the everyday; yet this renders it 
“tragic”, because in “proclaim[ing] itself to be an absolute, it provo
d ined alienation [from the rest of lived experience]”.72 Furthermore, to live
moment is to “exhaust it as well as to fulfil it”,73 as it is a finite instance in time 
(moments are “mortal”; they are “born, they live and they pass away”).74 The absolute 
that it accesses “cannot endure”.75 
 Lefebvre does however indicate the need to consciously construct moments 
(“the moment is constituted by a choice”).76 In order to discuss this, and by extension 
its distance from Debord and the S.I.'s account, we will be obliged to take up some of 
Lefebvre's technical terminology; this is for the simple reason that Debord himself uses
that terminology when discussing Lefebvre's work. The first terms involved here 
Lefebvre's Critique, in 
Debord). The everyday, for Lefebvre, is the domain of 'tactics' and 'strategies', as i
                                             
Lefebvre 2008a, p.67 
Baugh 2003, p.68 
Lefebvre 
66 
67 
68 2008a, p.66 
71 
72 008b, p.347 
74 
 
69 Lefebvre 1968, p.109 
70 Lefebvre 2008b, p.355 
Lefebvre 2008b, p.346 
Lefebvre 2
73 Lefebvre 2008b, p.348 
Lefebvre 2008b, p.354 
75 Lefebvre 2008b, p.345
76 Lefebvre 2008b, p.344 
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nd finally, Lefebvre's moments can be characterised and sorted 
own favoured example was 'love').81 This means that moments tend to 
 repeated types, whilst the context in which 
ey take place corresponds to the conjunctural. Thus, in short: creating a moment 
r 
lained 
 
mpt 
ance 
h would thus be “particularized and unrepeateable”.84 Each situation 
ith 
ficulty of providing a list of his various types of moments, whilst the only 
    
characterised by strategic “projects, decisions, plans for action and for the future”.77 
This is closely affiliated to his views on the inevitability of chance within human af
and also to the free play that should characterise the future (which he also connects to 
tragedy: “the tragic is nothing other than gambling in all its breadth and seriousness”
points that bear obvious resemblance to Debord's own interest in the strategic and the 
ludic.79 Secondly, Lefebvre also uses the concepts of the 'conjunctural' and the 
'structural'. The latter corresponds to stability and continuity within the everyday (i.e. 
forms that repeat or last for a period of time), and the former denotes the links and 
relations between the various elements that compose a structure: relations that force the
change and rupture of structures, and which thereby necessitate their “inclusion in 
strategies.”80 Thirdly a
into 'types' (his 
correspond to structure, insofar as they are
th
entails engaging strategically with a conjuncture and 'gambling' upon it in the aim of 
establishing structure in the form of a particular type of moment.  
 However, whilst Lefebvre's moments were associated with structure, the 
constructed situation was deliberately less pre-ordained. In an article written one yea
prior to the appearance of the second volume of Lefebvre's Critique the S.I. exp
that the constructed situation was “on the path toward a unity of the structural and the
conjunctural”.82 It was to be a structure deliberately geared towards chance: “an atte
at structure of (in) the conjunction”;83 a structure that “controls (and favours)...ch
instants”, and whic
would thus be different. Consequently, for the S.I., Lefebvre was said to be faced w
the dif
                                             
Lefebvre 2008b, p.106 
Lefebvre 2008b, p.137 
If the importance of the ludic to Debord is to be taken in relation to the question of Lefebvre's 
influence, then it is perhaps significant to note that Debord became acquainted with Huizinga's 
seminal Homo Ludens (1938) as early as 1953 (Hussey 2002, pp.74-5). It’s particularly relevant to 
note that Huizinga links play to both warfare (Huizinga 1955, p.89) and poetry (Huizinga 1955, 
p.132).  
Lefebvre 2008b, p.148 
“When we [Lefebvre and the S.I.] talked about [the constructed situation and the moment] I always 
gave as an example – and they would have nothing to do with my example – love” (Ross 2004, 
p.271). 
S.I. 1960; 1997, p.119. S nd
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 ee also Debord's letter to Andre Frankin of the 22  February 1960, which 
tes for this text (Debord 2009, pp.335-7).    provides preliminary no
83 Debord 2009, p.337 
84 S.I. 1960; 1997, pp.118-9 
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difficulty that they themselves faced lay in “marking [the situation's] precise end”85 
(“What do I want?” asked Vaneigem; “Not a succession of moments but one huge 
instant”).86 Furthermore, where the moment was a discrete point in time, the situation – 
though finite, and 'without a future' – was described as a “direction or 'way'”.87 The 
situation was to be a passage within the “movement of time”, and one that contained
“its own negation”88 in that it would evolve into something else. If we now adopt 
Lefebvre's terminology, we can also add – in keeping with my own earlier claim
such 'passageways' towards further instances of subject-object unity (i.e. towards furthe
situations) involved a degree of strategic agency, insofar as they would be del
open to chance (a point that I alluded to in chapter two when referring to Debord's note
on chance of 1957).    
  
The Absolute as the Grounds of Action 
 
 It's significant that Debord approved of the manner in which Lefebvre ha
the absolute as characterised by transition and negation. “Lefebvre,” he noted, “has 
revealed many of the fundamental conditions of the new field of action across 
revolutionary culture may now proceed: as when he remarks that the moment tends 
toward the absolute and its undoing”.
d cast 
which a 
89 My suggestion, however, is that where 
Lefebvre's absolute is a perpetually receding goal – something that slips away every 
time one tries to grasp it – the self-negation of Debord's own absolute involves the 
establishment and subsequent re-establishment of the conditions and grounds of 
historical action.  
 I noted earlier that Debord avoids the phrase 'subject-object unity'. This is 
                                                 
85 S.I. 1960; 1997, p.118 
86 Vaneigem 1994, p.93. One could perhaps contend that this call for a single moment jars with my 
claims regarding progression through time. Vaneigem’s remark does however reflect his associati
revolutionary subjectivity with a kind of sublimity, and I will argue in similar communion with a 
on of 
sublime, absolute time can be found in Debord; the difference being that with the latter there is far 
more of a sense of finitude, temporal progression and contextual engagement. The S.I., whilst 
nate 
he 
87 
 2009, p.337 
distinguishing themselves from 'diamat' (Soviet dialectical materialism), once contended that “In the 
[present] era of fragmentation the organisation of appearances makes movement a linear succession of 
motionless instants” (S.I. 2006, 159, translation altered; 1997, p.334). This could be seen to affirm 
Vaneigem’s ‘one huge instant’, but I’d argue that it is in fact a critique of the abstract identity of 
blocks of spectacular time. Whilst the model that I'm ascribing to Debord is also 'linear' in a sense, its 
moments are by no means static, but are rather characterised by a degree of 'circular', self-determi
qualitative movement. Furthermore, the S.I. also add here that this “immobility” is imposed “within 
the real movement” (S.I. 2006, 159; 1997, p.334): an allusion to the 'real movement that abolishes t
present state of things'.  
S.I. 1960; 1997, p.118 
88 Debord 2006, p.507 
89 S.I. 1960; 1997, p.119; Cf. Debord
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perhaps because of its association with Lukács and the Party, and perhaps beca
potential assumption that it might designate historical conclusion and arrest. As was a
noted, his work clearly emphasises the need for the supersession of separation and for 
relation of identity between the human subject and its objective actions. Yet rather than 
positing that identity as a distant goal, Debord and the S.I.'s account would seem to 
present it as the grounds and process of such action,90 and this returns us to my claim
the introduction that communism for the S.I. is not a discrete state, but rather a 
historical process. It also brings us back to the suggestions presented in chapte
to the degree to 
d inate and temporal movement: for it would seem here that the 'absolute' spoken 
of by Debord and the S.I. in connection to the situation involves a form that recreates 
itself through negating itself; that constitutes a 'passage' or 'way' towards itself, marke
by the transition of one situation to its successor. We can thus find in the S.I.'s ear
views on the situation the beginnings of a notion of historical agency. 
 If this is to be a continual process it must perpetuate itself, and if it is to 
perpetuate itself it must involve a structure that re-create its grounds and has itsel
own goal (a view echoed in Debord's remarks on self-determination, e.g. “the 
proletarian movement becomes its own product” with the result that “the producer has 
himself as his own proper goal”).91 This would seem to imply that such an agency relies 
upon and aims towards certain conditions; hence my earlier indications that one could
perhaps take these themes as the basis for an ethics. The point that I want to raise here 
however is that it would also seem to be marked, like Hegel's absolute, with a degr
self-founding circularity.   
 In The Society of the Spectacle Debord opposes the unity of thought and action
afforded by Marx's inversion of Hegel to “the contemplation of the movement of the
economy in the dominant thought of present-day society”.92 The latter is said t
“non-inverted legacy” of the “undialectical part of the Hegelian attempt to create a 
                                                 
90 This is perhaps a virtue: as an associate of Bakunin once put it, “A goal which is infinitely remote is
not a goal at all, it is a deception” (quoted in Ward 2004, p.32). It's significant that Vaneigem was lat
criticised in similar terms. As noted, The Revolution of Everyday Life certainly casts revolutionary 
subjectivity and temporality in terms of the sublime and the absolute, but for Debord in 1970 this 
reflected Vaneigem's “unhappy consciousness of never really becoming the Vaneigem of his dr
 
er 
eams” 
(S.I. 2003, p.165, Debord 2006, p.1182). Vaneigem's book is in fact criticised in similar terms to 
Lefebvre's 'possible/impossible': “The aim [for Vaneigem] being an all-encompassing one, it is viewed 
solely in the context of an abstract present: it is already there in its entirety, as long as it is thought 
ed absolutely inaccessible: nobody has managed 
it” (S.I. 2003, p.151; Debord 2006, p.1174, emphasis in the original).  
anslation altered; 2006, p.818 
5 
possible to give that impression, or else it has remain
to define it or get anywhere near 
91 Debord 1995, p.87, tr
92 Debord 1995, p.51; 2006, p.79
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ciously directed and lived reality (hence Debord's 
omparison to the flow of alienated value). The genuinely dialectical movement implied 
y Hegel's philosophy would then be that of a more dynamic interaction between 
ought and the real. Hence my earlier claims that Debord would seem to imply 
stablishing the Hegelian absolute as historical praxis: something that Hegel himself 
omes close to doing, but which many of the figures discussed here in part one avoid. 
iven that this state of Hegelian unity is not static repose, but rather the relatively stable 
onditions within which change can take place (e.g. for Hegel the Concept “pulsates 
ithin itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest”),95 its actualisation in 
praxis can be seen to constitute not a final eschatological end but rather a unity of 
process and goal. This, I would suggest, not only informs the situation's self-
perpetuating movement, but can also be seen to pertain to Debord and the S.I.'s later, 
more overtly political positions: for example, when discussing workers' councils in 
1966 they claimed that “self-management must be both the means and the end 
of...struggle”, and thus “not only what is at stake in the struggle, but also its adequate 
form”96 (this is not to claim that these ideas would lose their more playful and artistic 
elements: Debord writes in The Society of the Spectacle that the “subject of history ... 
can only be the self-production of the living: the living becoming master and possessor 
of its world – that is, of history – and coming to exist as consciousness of its own 
                                                
circular system”,93 and this can be seen to imply the following. If there is
'u ectical' and 'non-inverted' part of Hegelian circularity, then it would seem that 
there is a potentially inverted and dialectical aspect to it too; and given the oppositio
that this passage sets up between such contemplation and the realisation of philosophy, 
Debord would appear to credit that inverted circularity to the self-determinate agency 
prescribed by Marx (after Marx, Debord writes, theory – which Debord delibera
distinguishes from philosophy – “thenceforward had nothing to know beyond what 
itself did”).94 But how could Debord charge Hegel, of all people, with being 
'undialectical'? 
 The answer to this question was touched on in the general introduction above. It 
would seem that the Hegelian system is undialectical for Debord because it presents the 
movement of the historical negative within a static, separated system of thought that 
remains distinct from any cons
c
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e
c
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c
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93 Debord 1995, p.51, translation altered; 2006, p.795 
94 Debord 1995, p.51; 2006, p.795 
95 Hegel 1977, p.100 
96 S.I. 2006, p.210; 1997, p.432 
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activity [conscience de ']”).97 
The potential relevance of this interpretation can be first introduced via Debord's 
 Comments of the modern spectacle's almost Baudrillardian loss of 
. The spectacle is presented there as having engaged in “outlawing [mise hors la 
] histo
n 
 son jeu: literally, 'consciousness of its game
 
depiction in the
history
loi ry”; as “having driven the recent past into hiding”, and as having thus made 
“everyone forget the spirit of history within society”.98 The Comments is often 
erroneously linked to Baudrillard's hyperreality as a result of such claims, and thus 
taken as a vexed admission of defeat. I'll contest that reading in part three, but we can 
note here that if the operation of Debord's historical agency is indeed self-grounding in 
some sense, then it can perhaps be seen to build its own history and orientation through 
its own operation, thus charting and creating its own path. In the closing sections of the 
thesis I'll suggest ways in which this might be pursued beyond its explicit identificatio
with the theory of spectacle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.792 
emphasis in the original 98 Debord 1998, p.15; 2006, p.1602, 
96 
Conclusion to Part One 
 
 
Art and Time 
 
 The three chapters of part one have set out some of the principal aspects of the 
philosophical currents that inform Debord's work. In presenting this I've tried to provide 
re. I 
e S.I.'s views on art 
a clearer sense of the ideas that found the theory of spectacle, particularly as regards the 
notions of time, history and self-determination that I presented in the thesis' general 
introduction. I showed the basis of Debord's concern with negativity and time in French 
Hegelianism and its existential echoes, and I discussed the manner in which this 
pertains to his presentation of Hegel's philosophy as both an arrest and an anticipation 
of praxis. The sense in which the spectacle corresponds to a Kojèveian end of history 
was also introduced, as was the importance of Surrealism's opposition to such closu
also showed the bases of the theory of spectacle's problems within th
and culture: my contention was that their objection to the separation of observer and art 
object becomes, in Debord's later theory, that of the worker from his or her alienated 
product. This lends itself to the privileging of subjective alienation over the objective 
externalisation of labour. That shift from labour was also linked to the S.I.'s move 
towards the everyday, which was in turn connected to their re-conception of the 
proletariat. Through presenting differing perspectives on the nature and status of 
Hegelian closure I've also attempted to clarify my contentions regarding Debord's use of 
the Hegelian absolute. In order to further that discussion I'll now conclude part one with 
a more involved account of some of the Hegelian concepts referred to in the chapters 
above; I place these discussions here partly as they'll provide a means of developing my 
earlier contentions, but also because they'll serve to introduce some of the themes that 
will be taken up in part two. 
  
Subject-Object Unity 
  
 As we've seen, Debord describes the “proletariat” (or rather his own and the 
S.I.'s version thereof) as “demanding to live the historical time that it creates”.1 This 
statement can be qualified by adding that time, according to Debord, exists 
independently of humanity, whilst history – as a consciousness of time's passage, both 
                                                 
1 Debord 1995, p.106; 2006, p.829 
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formulation, they remain distinct from it: the concept of spectacle rests on the notion 
    
in terms of a memory of past events and constitutive, pro-active action – only emerges 
with human beings.2 Humanity thus creates 'historical time' by creating and becoming 
conscious of events within time. Yet as the agents that create those events can be 
alienated from their actions, so too can they be alienated from
conversely, the supersession of such alienation through self-determinate action affor
identity with that time.   
 To be self-conscious is to be conscious of oneself, and for Hegel this requires 
that one become 'other' to oneself in order to take oneself as an object of enquiry. 
Likewise, self-determination entails consciously determining oneself: the subject tak
itself as the object that it determines and directs. Yet in both cases – self-conscious 
thought and self-determinate action – the subject remains self-identical in that 
otherness. This differs from Sartre: consciousness, for Sartre, is always at one remove 
from itself, and is always denied the stability of self-identity (“the being of 
consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence”).3  
 I'll return to Sartre shortly, but to clarify further: this notion of becoming ot
oneself through action returns us to the distinction between subjective and objective 
alienation that I noted in the general introduction. Whilst discussing Lukács I 
highlighted the difference between a contemplative, subjective alienation from one's 
own actions (Entfremdung, to use Marx's term from the Manuscripts), and the 
necessary, objective alienation and externalisation of consciousness in action per se 
(Vergegenständlichung). Although self-determination involves making oneself 'other' 
through externalising oneself in action, it's possible to do so in as manner that avoids 
Entfremdung: the externalisation (Entäusserung) of the subject through objectification, 
in other words, is a necessary form of alienation and otherness within which self-
identity is retained. As we saw earlier, although Debord replicates the symptoms of 
Lukács' conflation of Entfremdung and Vergegenständlichung (capitalist society is 
understood under the rubric of a separated consciousness, thus effacing the particularit
of concrete social relations), he does nonetheless retain a sense of necessary objective 
alienation: time for Debord is “a necessary alienation”, being the medium in which
subject realises himself while losing himself, becomes other in order to become truly 
himself”.4 Whilst Sartre's views on temporality are certainly reminiscent of that 
                                             
Debord 1995, p.92; 2006, p.820; Cf. Marx 1988, p.111. 
Sartre 2003, p.98 
2 
3 
phasis in the original 4 Debord 1995, pp.115-6; 2006, p.835, em
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 necessity”,6 my italics). There is thus perhaps a sense in which 
 
that the subject can be
far bleaker outlook. Subject-object unity for Debord – identity with one's own actions –
is not a static positivity, as Sartre contends, but rather an ongoing temporal process that 
affords unification with the 'historical time' discussed above. 
 There is however a sense in which Debord's account involves traces of that 
Sartrean disconnection. Within Hegel's philosophy, subject-object unity pertains to an 
identity between the knower and the known. In the Phenomenology this state of self-
identity is shown to be immanent to all human consciousness (the religious analogue 
being that each person carries a potential path to God within them). Ascending this 
“ladder” provides an entry point to the Hegelian system as a whole,5 as the identity
subject and object attained at the end of the Phenomenology allows thought to think 
itself entirely immanently within the Logic. Debord however is no metaphysician, and 
the contextual aspects of his own notion of consciousness give rise to an important issue
here. With Hegel, freedom comes from self-determination, but that self-determination 
ultimately consists in aligning oneself with the fundamental structures of a divine 
reason (in effect, the rational state becomes the kingdom of heaven on earth). However, 
with Debord there is no such eternal order, the only permanence being that of change: 
freedom, insofar as it is linked to historical self-determinate action, would seem to ent
an ongoing process in which the conditions of subject-object unity are continually re-
established. The knowledge required to effect this cannot be given in advance – hence
the importance of chance and play to the situation, as noted above – but must rather be 
specific to each circumstance, entailing that the agency involved must be strategic to 
some degree. Yet this also entails that each instance of self-determinate unity woul
different, as the process through which it was enacted and acted upon would be lim
and determined by a given context; and whilst that affords an anti-dogmatism, it also 
means that where Hegel equates freedom to necessity, freedom for Debord 
contingency (as we'll see later, he in fact states that “the real exercise of freedom ... is 
consciousness of present
Debord's account presents a set of conditions within which something akin to the 
movement of the Sartrean for-itself (qua the apparent otherness of the world and the 
emphasis on context) might fall, and this recalls the difficulty of founding an ethics on
                                                 
5 Hegel presents the Phenomenology as a “ladder” to “Science” (Hegel 1977, p.14); in The Science of 
Logic he writes that the Phenomenology “exhibited consciousness in its movement...to absolute 
knowing”, and writes that this “deduction” of “the Concept of pure science” is “presupposed” by the 
Logic itself (Hegel 1969, p.49).  
6 S.I. 2006, p.36; Debord 2006, p.320 
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question of quite what that condition of unity might entail. 
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 would lose all critical purchase. To link 
e deprivation of that unity to boredom or unhappiness, as Debord and the S.I. often 
, is also unsatisfactory: modern society is obviously not devoid of excitement 
r pleasure, and to cast some forms of pleasure as more 'true' than others is obviously 
' (as 
urce 
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ctive power (or more specifically, of labour); yet as he focuses on  
ontem  
 
 in 
d in the 
'external' figures of the commodity, the state or the Party. If such concentration and 
ari
an existential basis.  
 This also raises the 
T that it consists of a relation between thought and practice is to say very little, as 
clearly all action is in some sense united with thought. If the conditions of subject-
object unity cannot therefore be distinguished from capitalist or spectacular mode
behaviour, the concept of subject-object unity
th
tend to do
o
problematic. An answer can however be found if we return to Lukács. If, as in his 
account, the deprivation of subject-object unity is linked to a 'contemplative attitude
is also the case in Debord), and if contemplation stems from reification, then its so
would seem to derive from the reduction of subjects to the status of objects. This could 
offer a response to the apparent problem that all action, regardless of its nature, would
seem to be linked to thought (one could have a unity of thought and action
conducted in a 'thing-like' way). Yet whilst this might seem to invite tracing the prob
back to an analysis of the commodity form, I would point out that Debord's spectacle, 
noted in the introduction, pre-dates capitalism: its real essence lies in alienated so
power, and capitalism simply provides the latter with its most adequate expression to 
date. But if that is the case, then one could contend that the separation of subject and 
object ultimately pertains not to a divorce between thought and action per se, but rather 
to a social situation in which individuals are dominated by their own externalised and 
objectified power. Although this is certainly present in Debord's account it is also 
hidden to an extent. The contemplative detachment that he is concerned with is of 
course connected to the commodity, and thus stems from a necessarily social alienation 
of colle
c plation, the separation of social power is treated under the rubric of that between
thought and action. 
  I would suggest that this concern with alienated social power can be seen to
imply an anti-hierarchical ethics: for subject-object unity would then mean a situation
which collective social power is not alienated, and is not thereby concentrate
alienation is to be avoided, then so too must representative power. Consequently, what 
ses here is a sense in which the conditions of freedom qua self-determination might 
100 
ary, 
re in order to note the potential interest of this material, and 
lie in a situation in which that power remains one with the subject despite its necess
objective externalisation.  
 I signal this point he
do so primarily as a marker for the further work that could be pursued in this vein. I will 
however return to the issue in part three. I'll close with some further explanatory 
remarks on Hegelian identity in difference.  
 
Infinity 
 
 Any rejection of the dialectic's final synthesis, or indeed a Surrealist desire
'liberate' negativity from the Hegelian system's circularity, would give rise to
Hegel referred to as 'bad infinity'. Hegel's actual wording for this term is schlecht 
Unendlichkeit, the contrast of which with 'genuine' (echt) infinity has prompted some to
render it as 'spurious infinity': a phrasing that reflects the sense in which this is not a 
poor or inadequate version of infinity, but rather not truly infinite at all.
 to 
 what 
 
he 
ce involves 
 
ine 
 
ntity that includes within it that which it is 
ld be 
identity and difference' touched on above in relation to the structure of self-
    
7  
 A first example of bad infinity can be found in an endless sequence of finite 
elements (e.g. 1+1+1+1...etc.), as there the infinite remains wedded to the finite. T
latter has not been fully negated, insofar as the infinity of this sequen
perpetually stepping beyond the finite only to reach another finite point. Or, as Hegel
puts it: “a limit is set, it is exceeded, then there is another limit, and so on without 
end”.8 To be 'genuine', therefore, the infinite must somehow differentiate itself from the 
finite. Yet the second example of infinity that this might bring to mind is similarly 
'spurious': for an infinite God who existed entirely separately from the finitude of his 
creation would not be infinite at all; he would be limited by what he is not. The genu
infinite must therefore negate and differentiate itself from the finite, but without casting
itself as finite.  
 So, what is required is a positive ide
negatively distinguished from. Or, in keeping with the previous example, this wou
a means of saying that God is infinite, but that his infinitude is such that he is both 
different from and yet also somehow identical to his creation. This is 'the identity of 
                                             
“A bad dog is a d7 og, a bad painting is a painting, so bad infinity would presumably be a bad form of 
her hand...spurious infinity is presumably not really infinite” (Martin 2007, 
8 
infinitude. On the ot
p.170). 
Hegel 1969, p.149 
101 
ught to think itself in the absence of any 
iven contingencies or interference from the philosopher. Each of the Logic's 
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consciousness, and it lies at the core of Hegel's philosophical attempts to unite the 
positive with the negative, the universal with the particular, and the infinite with the 
finite.  
 The 'seed form' of identity in difference can be found in the opening moments of 
the Logic:9 a text that attempts to allow tho
g
determinations
w
or assumptions thought can think nothing other than its own being – and its first 
determination is thus “being, pure being”.10 This 'being' is however so 'pure' and 
indeterminate as to be equivalent to 'nothing', which is thus the Logic's next 
determination. Yet this means that 'being' and 'nothing' are identical but also distinct, as 
the two determinations perpetually flow into and arise from one another. Furthermore, 
they can only be considered as opposed by virtue of their difference from one another 
(i.e. the determination 'nothing' is what it is because it is not the determination 'being', 
and vice versa), because the abstraction of this approach means that there can be no 
other point of reference. We thus have a third determination, 'determinate being': 
particular, differentiated being (i.e. it is either 'being' or 'nothin
 My point here is that Hegel, at the very outset of the Logic, provides himself 
with a notion of identity that is bound up with difference: a way of thinking tha
one to say that 'to be A is to not be B; therefore, the identity of A involves that of B; 
thus, A is A, but it is also B, albeit only insofar as A is not B'. The particular identities o
A and B rely on their negative difference from one another, which is itself reliant on
universal, shared identity of their interrelation. Hegel has given himself a means of 
saying that the universal is by no means abstractly distinct from the particular, and that 
it is in fact the organising principle of the latter's interrelation. God, in other words, 
need not be distinct from his creation.  
 The next major determination that follows 'determinate being' is 'infinity
Having derived finitude from the distinct identities of pure being and pure nothing, and 
having shown that each tends towards its other, Hegel finds true infinity in the perpet
 
9 “It has often been claimed – and not without a certain justification – that the famous chapter in Hegel's 
g, Non-Being and Becoming contains the whole of his philosophy” (Lukács 
11  it is with Pure Being. Pure 
s of Pure Nothing before it can be thought at all” (Carlson 2007, p.11). 
Logic treating of Bein
1971, p.170). 
10 Hegel 1969, p.82 
“Just as one needs a contrast between light and dark to see anything, so
Being will require the darknes
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, 
 itself in its other, or (when it is 
flux of the return to self of identity in difference. In “going beyond itself,” Hegel writes
each determination “only unites with itself. This identity with itself, the negation of the 
negation, is affirmative being and thus the other of the finite...this other is the 
infinite”,12 which “consists...in remaining at home with
expressed as a process) coming to itself in its other”.13  
 
The Concept 
 
 Hegel has thus developed a perpetual, negative flux within a positive totality, 
and in this regard these initial structures of the Logic can be seen to anticipate the 
absolute Idea, i.e. the pinnacle of the Hegelian system. The Idea can perhaps be 
schematised as the self-consciousness of a Spinozist God, insofar as it is the unit
logic that underlies existence with a reality that actualises and recognises it: a God w
becomes other to himself in order to become more fully himself. The motive force that 
drives that movement, as of that from original identity to otherness and back to self,
the 'Concept': something that I've referred to several times already, but which I'll discus
here in ord
y of the 
ho 
 is 
s 
er to reinforce the importance of circularity to dialectical movement, and also 
 
, 
f other to itself through action (particular), thereby 
to introduce some of the themes that will be taken up below.   
 The Concept is an ontological force: it is immanent to being itself, it is made 
manifest in the agency of Spirit, and it achieves full expression in speculative, 
dialectical thought. Its movement operates through the interrelation of its three aspects 
(universality, particularity and singularity; the latter correspond to the Christian trinity
as much as they do to syllogistic reasoning),14 and an initial example of this can be 
found in Hegel's views on subjective agency and will.15 According to the latter, the 
willing subject is at first a self-identical universal, albeit one that contains the capacity 
for negative difference (qua specific determinations); it resolves on a course of action
determining itself and becoming other to itself through its objective actualisation (i.e. 
the initial universal is particularised); it then returns to original unity from that 
determinacy, thereby defining itself as a singular individual. An initially indeterminate 
subject (universal) has made itsel
defining itself on the basis of that action (singular). The same pattern can be seen in the 
                                                 
12 Hegel 1969, p.137 
13 Hegel 1991, p.149 
orld that confronts him as an other, but...has from all eternity begotten a Son 
f” (Hegel 1991, p.238). 
14 “God not only created a w
in whom he, as Spirit, is at home with himsel
15 See Hegel 2005, pp.xxix-lvii 
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'), and 
ithin all of the concepts with which we think: all contain moments of 
, 
re 
to 
organic body: 
 each particular element is what it is through its relation to the others 
nd to the whole. As that analogy might also indicate, this does not constitute a form of 
universality in which the parts are subordinated to the whole, but rather one in which 
the whole is an expression of their own essential identity. Thus whilst it may do little to 
alleviate the concerns of those who find Hegel inherently totalitarian, it's relevant to 
note his claim that “the universal ... takes its other within its embrace, but without doing 
violence to it”; for it is, “in its other, in peaceful communion with itself”, and should 
thus be thought of as “free love and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its 
other as towards its own self”.18  
 One last point, and one that pertains to the notions of praxis outlined here in part 
one. A truly infinite God must be the cause of himself, and must be absolutely necessary 
               
opening determinations of the Logic ('being' is blank and unknowable until it becomes 
'determinate being' by way of its own immanent negative difference, i.e. 'nothing
in the structure of the Hegelian system as a whole (logic becomes other to itself as 
nature and returns to itself at a higher level via Spirit). 
 There is no abstract separation between the Concept's three moments:16 each of 
its moments “is no less the whole Concept than it is a determinate Concept and a 
determination of the Concept”.17 As an illustration: when classifying things we might 
find that a universal type contains a particular genus, which in turn contains a singular 
species; yet both genus and species are themselves universals within which particular 
elements can be identified. Likewise, in order for a universal to be identified as a 
singular identity it must render itself particular by differentiating itself from other 
universals. The Concept is thus a pattern for limitless differentiation, and exists 
immanently w
universality, particularity and singularity, and thereby interconnect with one another. 
The Concept is the essential structure of that dialectical network, and is revealed to 
itself in accordance with its own pattern via the movement from logic, through nature
to Spirit.  
 As the particular differences that are engendered through this movement a
further determinations of the universal ground from which they arise, and as all are thus 
ultimately elements of the whole, the movement of the Concept gives rise to totality: 
a complex, interconnected organic structure. It's thus akin to the life of an 
a body in which
a
                                  
17 
18 
16 See Hegel 1991, p.242  
Hegel 1969, p.600, emphasis in the original 
Hegel 1969, p.603, emphases in the original.  
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through himself alone. The C ich returns to its origin at 
ts conclusion, responds to thi at its end is also its 
beginning renders it “the c in, the 
origin is shown t ovement 
rough self-differentiation and return to self is what actually drives Hegelian dialectics 
nd totality, and if it is inherently ictly Hegelian perspective the 
ar resolution (as advanced by some of the writers considered 
ere in part one) is nonsensical: for if each 'pulse' of the dialectic relies on the return to 
 
ry 
, 
list) 
nel' 
erhaps akin to taking the engine from a car and 
t 
l 
oncept's circular movement, wh
s problem insofar as the fact thi
ause of itself”.19 Because the conclusion is also the orig
o be necessary in and of itself.20 Now, if the Concept's m
th
a  circular, then from a str
idea of precluding circul
h
self that instantiates a further stage, and if each return to self is rendered possible by the
overall structure of the Concept, then to reject circular resolution is to reject the ve
structure that drives dialectical movement itself. Circularity does not preclude endless
negative movement: rather, Hegelian circularity is in fact the condition for that infinite 
movement.  
 It goes without saying that to Hegelian eyes any Marxist (or indeed Surrea
attempt to appropriate this movement is simply nonsensical. To take its 'rational ker
from Hegel's 'metaphysical shell' is p
then expecting it to move forwards. Even so, one could suggest that basing a Marxis
historical dialectic on the Hegelian absolute is more coherent in this regard than 
advocating its rejection. If one recognises that the absolute is not a final, eschatologica
closure, but rather a state of continual unrest, then one can base a model of constant, 
negative process on what might otherwise seem to be its positive denial.  
  
 
                                                 
19 Hegel 1969, p.582 
20 “Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself...is the True. It is
process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also
 the 
 as its 
beginning; and only by being worked out to its end is it actual” (Hegel 1977, p.10) 
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PART TWO 
 
Capital and Spectacle 
(1962-1975 and The Society of the Spectacle) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview of Part Two 
 
 I argued earlier that Debord's theory could be best understood as an account of 
an alienated relation to the construction of history. In the chapters that followed I 
discussed the philosophical currents that informed it, and set out the themes of time, 
subjectivity and history upon which it relies. I also argued that the bases of some of its 
.I.'s early avant-garde concerns, and here in part two 
ll attempt to develop that claim further. In order to do so I'll look at the theory's 
arxis nd 
 a 
lienated than ever. The 
result was a new form of conflict: as technology and automation could now ensure the 
t vival without a reliance on wage labour, existential 
po  
bu
problems could be found in the S
I’
M t components and influences, and will thereby present a more involved a
critical account of the theory itself.  
 We’ve already seen the problems involved in reducing Debord’s theory to
critique of the mass media. Here I’ll claim that it’s similarly erroneous to simply and 
reductively equate the spectacle to Marx’s commodity fetish. Although Debord quite 
obviously builds on Marx’s account, his theory effectively presents Marx’s fetish as 
falling within the broader historical tendency from which the spectacle arises. To 
clarify: I noted earlier that Debord indicates that the spectacle pre-dates modern 
capitalism, and that it arises from a historical tendency towards the separation of the 
power to shape history from that power’s producers. As argued in the thesis’ 
introduction, this tendency was said to have been brought to an extreme and rendered a 
decisively identifiable problematic by modern capitalism: society had become so 
subsumed under the demands of commodity production that more aspects of life were 
shaped by human activity than ever before, whilst at the same time control over the 
arrangement of that activity had become more distanced and a
sa isfaction of the needs of sur
verty was replacing the material poverty that had exercised Marx; as a result, the
decisive social contradiction was now no longer that between labour and capital per se, 
t rather between those who demanded more from life and those who sought to 
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m in the present system. Marx’s account thus falls within the historical narrative 
presented by Debord’s own, insofar as it describes an earlier stage in the evolution of 
the alienated power that forms the spectacle. I'll argue, on the basis of these claims, tha
there can therefore be no easy, simple equivalence between the image and the 
commodity. This disparity will provide a means of accessing some of the theory's 
shortcomings as an account of capitalist society. 
 My focus will rest on the period between the expulsion of the S.I.'s artistic 'right 
wing' in 1962, and the appearance in 1975 of Debord's film  Refutation of all the 
Judgements, Pro or Con, thus far Rendered on the Film 'The Society of the Spectacle'. 
This period thus brackets 1967's The Society of the Spectacle, the cinematic version of 
the latter in 1973, the Refutation that followed it, and the dissolution of the S.I. in 19
  
Universality and Particularity 
 
 We've seen that Hegel's philosophy, according to Debord, “superseded 
separation, but in thought only”.1 Its account of the resolution of the ideal and the 
material offered only a representation of their 'real' unity in praxis; likewise, the 
spectacle was said to present an illusory unification that masked and arose from a real 
state of separation (the spectacle is a “unity...of generalised separation”).2 Given the 
degree to which it mirrors Hegelian resolution, and given also that to which the latter
was presented as an image of real pra
 
xis, I'll suggest here that the spectacle can be 
iewed as being analogous to the 'lifeless' categories of what Hegel refers to as the 
rt of the Concept's organic unity, insofar as 
e diverse elements that they bracket are united only through the abstraction of their 
 
Consequently, where part one employed the trope of tragedy as a means of establishing 
the
    
v
everyday 'understanding': forms that fall sho
th
particular differences.3 The implication is that the forms of collectivity that would arise
from the spectacle's supersession can be seen to echo the Concept's organic unity.4 
connections between the material under consideration, part two will take as its theme 
 Hegelian interrelation of the universal and the particular.  
                                             
Debord 1995, p.49, translation altered; 2006, p.793, emphasis in the original 
Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.767 
“The abstract universal of the [everyday] understanding...relates itself to the particular only b
subsuming this particular which it does not have in itself” (Hegel 1991, p.280, emphasis in the 
original). 
Discussing the relation of parts to whole, Hegel writes that “the members and organs of a living body 
should not be considered merely as parts of it, for they are what they are only in that unity and a
indifferent to that unity at all. ...[They] become mere 'parts' only under the hands of the anatomist; b
for that reason he is dealing with 
1 
2 
3 y 
4 
re not 
ut 
corpses rather than living bodies” (Hegel 1991, p.204).  
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ommodity fetish, which describes a society in thrall to the abstract, homogenised 
 labour: a society in which a universal form becomes 
lienated from the particular elements that it mediates. Debord's account can be seen to 
cho m
le 
ted, 
 These contentions can perhaps be substantiated by way of the following. He
Philosophy of Right (1820) describes the rational state as a universality composed of
particular elements, united as a singular, coherent whole: a whole that arises from the 
identity in difference between the elements that compose it, and which thus actualises 
the logic of the Idea. This notion of interrelated universality drives Hegel's opposit
social forms that merely impose a merely 'external' unity upon the particular individuals 
that compose them.5 The young Marx however criticised Hegel on these very terms: i
his early 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', written between 1843 and 1844, 
Marx claimed that Hegel's political philosophy had offered only a philosophical illusio
of the individual's unification with society. This problematic can be seen to be retained
throughout Marx's work, certainly as regards his contention that the capitalist state 
offers a merely apparent unification of the antagonistic interests that compose it. I'll 
argue that these early concerns can thus be seen to inform his 'mature' account of the 
c
universality of its own alienated
a
e any of these themes, but the manner in which it presents them is itself marked by 
a problematic relation between the universal and the particular. The theory of spectac
effectively extrapolates an equally separate universality from the figure of the aliena
occidental spectator, under which the particularities of capitalist social relations are 
subsumed and ultimately obscured.  
 
The Structure and Content of Part Two  
 
 Chapter four will present a short, revised account of the theory of spectacle, in
which I'll rehearse and clarify the interpretation set out in the opening sections of the 
                                                
 
 
5 This can be introduced via Hegel's infamous claim in The Philosophy of Right that “what is ra
real [wirklich]; and what is real is rational” (Hegel 2005, p.xix). Wirklich can however be translat
more successfully as 'actual': for whilst reality is certainly a manifestation of reason for Hegel, no
reality expresses that reason in full. Hegel makes this point in Th
correcting misinterpretations of that famous statement: readers, h
tional is 
ed 
t all 
e Encyclopaedia Logic whilst 
e stresses, should note his distinction 
betw only 
 
ing is 
unrealised, even though existence may be predicated of it” (Hegel 2005, p.138). A state is only 
 
een actuality and mere existence, for “what is there [in reality] is partly appearance and 
partly actuality” (Hegel 1991, pp.29-30, emphasis in the original). This point is made in The 
Philosophy of Right itself: a state that does not fully actualise the Concept and which consists instead
of a “unorganised multitude” or “formless mass” (Hegel 2005, p.181) would be irrational, for 
“actuality is always the unity of universality and particularity”; when “this unity is absent, the th
“absolutely rational” when its existence lifts “particular self-consciousnesses...to the plane of the   
universal” (Hegel 2005, p.133).  
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r 
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thesis. In doing so I'll also make some initial remarks on the connections between 
Marx's commodities and Debord's images. Chapter five will then offer a reading of 
Marx's account of the commodity and the fetish, in which I'll discuss the connections 
between the latter and Marx's theories of alienation and value. Chapter six will then set 
out a more critical take on Debord's theory, and will begin by discussing the S.I.'s 
departure from Marx's account whilst also outlining some of their theoretical influen
in this regard. In the second half of chapter six I'll develop my earlier contention that 
Debord's theory effectively bases its analysis of modern society upon consumption 
rather than on production, and thus upon what might be termed capital's effects rather 
than its causes. Having thereby argued that the theory remains at the level of the very 
appearances that it describes, I'll suggest that its failings in this respect can be seen to ja
with Debord's strategic concerns. I'll conclude part two with some short remarks 
h gies and differences between Debord's theory and the work of Moishe Postone. 
 
The Labour Theory of Value 
 
 As signalled above, because the theory of spectacle reflects the S.I.'s attem
move beyond what they viewed as traditional Marxism – particularly as regards the 
latter's concerns with labour, union organisation and the factory – it also exhibits a 
tendency to depart from the classical focus on labour's status as the basis of capitalist 
pts to 
value. In effect, and prefiguring aspects of Negri's work to a degree, Debord and the S.I. 
a
jar if 
b
cri t 
ce
co
 o suggest that attempting to move beyond classical 
r will I claim that the problematic aspects of Debord and 
t
    
do not focus on the production of value, but rather on that of 'life' (a similar point is 
m de by Jappe, although in a different but related context).6 As a result, their account 
s with the classical schema: for if capitalist value does stem from labour, and 
la our is left largely unaddressed, then so too are the mechanics of capital. Clearly, a 
tique of capitalist society that aspires towards practical application (as Debord's mos
rtainly does) without being able to ascertain quite what capital actually is faces 
problems, and the difficulty here lies in the fact that the theory employs Marxist 
ncepts and categories – the commodity, the fetish, value, etc. – whilst effectively 
undermining the primacy of labour that they rely upon.  
This is certainly not t
Marxism is a mistake, and no
he S.I.'s account are without virtue. Rather, they highlight some of the difficulties 
                                             
“The Situationists even believed themselves to have discovered the vastest and most irreducible 
subject possible: ‘life’” (Jappe 1999, p.136). 
6 
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appearance that disguises it”.15 Yet it remains 
involved in adapting a set of 19th century ideas to present day exigencies, and they 
pertain in particular to one of the most widely debated aspects of those difficulties: 
namely, the labour theory of value. Being based around industrial production, the latter 
can seem challenged by forms of labour that produce 'affect' rather than physical object
per se;7 arguments can also be made as to the degree to which it is undermined by the 
import of so-called 'symbolic value'.8 Such difficulties can be taken to reinforce the 
famously problematic nature of Marx's transformation of value into price,9 insofar as 
they too invite scepticism as to the existence of a value said to lurk 'behind' or 'ben
its immediate monetary appearances.10 This is the so-called 'transformation problem', 
which is often seized on by those seeking to dismiss Marx's critique: for if the bas
value in labour can be denied, then so too can the notion of surplus-value, and thu
extension the claim that exploitation is intrinsic to the structure of capital itself.  
 Marx's theory is able to respond to the notion of immaterial labour and symbo
value,11 and solutions to the transformation of value into price can be found12 
(Rosdolsky, viewing the latter as a demand for harmony, asks “since when has it been 
the task of Marxists to prove that it theoretically possible for the capitalist economy 
proceed without disturbances?”).13 Perlman argues that “Marx did not ask what 
determines market price; he asked how working activity is regulated”,14 and Postone 
makes a similar claim: Marx's “intention is not to formulate a price theory”, he writes, 
“but to show how value induces a level of 
                                                 
7 See Negri's 'Value and Affect' (1999). See also Lazzrato for seminal comments on ‘immaterial labour’.  
8 For Baudrillard (1993, pp.9-10), “production, the commodity form, labour-power, equivalence and 
surplus-value ... are now things of the past. ...we have passed from the commodity law of value to th
structural law of value, and this coincides with the obliteration of the social form known as 
production”. 
9 In volume three of Capital cost price – originally the value of the raw material and labour employed i
the production of a commodity – becomes a price of production when this item is employed as raw 
material by further capitals. Marx's argument implies that the original determination of the value of 
the first commodity should also be reconfigured as a price of production; as a result, the connection 
between value and price can be seen to become strained. This is the famed 'transformation problem' 
 
e 
n 
(see in particular Marx 1981, pp.264-5).  
10 As Marx himself puts it in volume three of Capital: fluctuations in price “seem to contradict both the 
determination of value by labour-time and the nature of surplus-value as consisting of unpaid surplus 
labour” (Marx 1981, p.311). 
11 sponse to these issues see Aufheben 2006. 
 a very useful overview of the problem, and for a response that attributes the 
 
15  correct contention that “the divergence of prices from values should...be 
t to 
t of labour value is at risk of being cast as an 
For a broad, indicative re
12 See Ramos 1998 for
confusion to Engels' editing.  
13 Rosdolsky 1980, p.411
14 Perlman in Rubin 1972, p.xxx 
Postone moves from the
understood as integral to...Marx's analysis” towards suggesting that as a result one shouldn't fixate on 
the connection between value and price: Marx's “intention is not to formulate a price theory bu
show how value induces a level of appearance that disguises it” (Postone 1996, p.134). Yet if that 
connection cannot be demonstrated, the very concep
110 
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t well-
 
omy'.19 It does 
 
It 
 
 
 
 
; 
those theoretical mechanics themselves may 
xhibit difficulties, or require development. I think it possible to locate both 
roblematics within the schema that one can draw from Debord's account, particularly 
s regards his claim that theories are “made to die in the war of time”, and “have to be 
placed because they are constantly being rendered obsolete” by their “victories even 
                                                                                                                                            
the case that the theory can seem to struggle with aspects of contemporary capitalism
Postone, tacitly admitting the difficulties posed in this regard by contemporary forms of 
labour and commodification, follows Negri in claiming that the seemingly anachronis
aspects of Marx's economics prove its timeliness. Both make much of Marx's claim
the Grundrisse that “as soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the grea
spring of wealth labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure”;16 Negri thus 
claims that within real subsumption labour has become 'immeasurable', and that it is 
therefore ready to shake off the 'parasite' of capital;17 for Postone (and much like
Debord and the S.I.), these same difficulties reflect technology's emergent potential to 
end wage labour.18 Postone in fact goes so far as to claim that Marx's 'critique of 
political economy' should not be taken as a 'critical political econ
however remain the case that both the latter assertion and Perlman's indication that the
relation of value to price is not a major question for Marx seem strange; particularly 
given Marx’s extensive attempts in Capital's third volume to explain the movement 
from value, through surplus-value, profit, price of production etc. to market price. (
might be added here that Rubin’s close reading of Marx affords relevant and useful 
comments on the degree to which fluctuations in price alter the labour determinations of
value.20 Such an approach perhaps affords a means of reconciling the labour theory of
value with some of the contemporary factors that have been said to replace its purported
status as the prime determinant of price).  
 Thus on the one hand, with Debord, we have the problems posed by the theory
of spectacle's tendency to depart from the Marxist mechanics that drive its key concepts
on the other, we have the possibility that 
e
p
a
re
   
unfounded assumption. 
 Marx 1973, p.705 
 See Negri 2003, p.29. See also Negri 1999, and Hardt and Negri 2001. 
 Postone 1996, p.197  
 Postone talks of the mistaken “assumption that Marx intended to write a critical political economy” 
(Postone 1996, p.133). 
 Rubin 1972, pp.250-3. “Thus the theory of production price must without fail be based on the labour 
theory of value. On the other hand, the labour theory of value must be further developed and 
completed by the theory of production price. …The labour theory of value…describes only one aspect 
, p.253).  
16
17
18
19
20
of the capitalist economy…” (Rubin 1972
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more than by their s an impetus 
wards the critique and reformulation of theory, in accordance with changing contexts 
m to entail that the aspects of Debord's thought 
 attempting to draw from his theory are not necessarily undermined by the 
s dif
s account 
aterial 
 
 
 partial defeats”.21 Such a statement obviously implie
to
and situations. Not only does this see
that I'm
latter' ficulties, but would rather seem to point towards new formulations: in 
addition, and insofar as this projection is marked by a strategic dimension, it would also 
seem to carry an obligation to address the economic mechanics of the contexts that it is 
to address. In other words, and by virtue of its emphasis on praxis, the model of 
historical agency that one can draw from Debord contains an inherent tendency towards 
both the ‘critique of political economy’ (the critical analysis of theory) and ‘critical 
political economy’ (the theoretical analysis of concrete society) 
 The position that I'm adopting here is intended to avoid the obvious problems 
that would arise from criticising Debord's theory for its departure from Marx'
per se. It makes little sense to present his own and the S.I.'s corpus as source m
for an anti-dogmatic communism if that claim is made via the assumed validity of 
Marx's concepts and categories. Thus rather than measuring Debord against Marx, I will 
instead show that the theory of spectacle, in adopting Marx's concepts whilst departing 
from their bases, faces difficulties when called upon to perform the strategic analysis 
that it would itself seem to advocate. This provides a means of assessing Debord on his 
own terms, i.e. of addressing the strategic, practical efficacy of the theory of spectacle.
The question that we will thus pursue is this: to what extent is the theory of spectacle 
able to provide a sense of quite what capital is, of what it does, and of how it might be 
addressed?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Debord 2003a, pp.150-1; 2006, p.1354 21 
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Chapter Four: The Spectacle 
 
 
The Spectacle as Historical Arrest 
 
 In both the general introduction and the first part of the thesis I discussed som
of the themes and ideas that inform Debord and the S.I.'s views on the 'new' proletariat, 
the realisation of art and the decomposition of culture. Here, in order to expand on the 
interpretation provided above, it can be stated that all of these issues can be seen to 
cohere around the following, rather problematic contention: namely, Debord's apparent 
e 
p
.  
who were separated form the means of 
eans of subsistence, the 'new proletariat' consisted of all those 
eans of consciously producing their own lives.  
 Defining the present in terms of this revolutionary crux – a potentially final 
dia
 in time as a retrospective explanation of all prior 
 the 
de
s 
    
assum tion that by the middle of the 20th Century the various illusions and fetishes 
occluding humanity's capacity for historical self-consciousness had begun to fall away
 According to Debord and the S.I., it was now possible to recognise that history 
was not made by God, kings or by the economy, but rather by human beings 
themselves: religion was obsolete, politics an empty charade, and economic 
determinism and Party representation were losing their credibility. 'Actually existing 
communism' had proved just as capable of brutality as capitalism, and the increasing 
scale and banality of commodity consumption had furthered a drive towards something 
more. Consequently, although the revolutionary movement was said to have collapsed 
into its own representation in the early part of the century, Debord and the S.I. held that 
it was about to return at a new, 'higher' level: for it now stood fully revealed not as the 
demand for a fairer and more equitable mode of industrial production and distribution, 
but rather for a free, self-determined history. As noted, this entailed a reformulation of 
the revolutionary class: no longer those 
producing their own m
who had been separated from the m
lectical juncture, brought about by the 'perfected' separation of the spectacle – 
e e spectacle backntailed projecting th
forms of separated social power. 1  All earlier examples of ideology, hierarchy and of
nial and deprivation of autonomy became nascent denials of the self-determination 
that the modern revolution would realise.2 In addition, the present becomes figured a
                                             
“...the spectacle makes no secret of what it is, namely, separated power developing on its own” 
(Debord 1995, p.20
1 
; 2006, p.772). 
roots of the spectacle as far back as Greek philosophy, and 
s...been spectacular” (Debord 1195, p.20, translation altered; 
2 As we saw earlier, Debord traces the 
contends that “all separated power ha
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e final shell from which a fully free and self-determining humanity is to emerge: a 
history per 
nt, 
l, 
ilar 
ise 
“try to construct situations”8 consciously and 
existence as temporal, contextually situated beings. This then is not the full expression 
f-
co
 
Re
th
potential end of “pre-history”,3 despite its aspiration to stand as the end of 
se. The concept of spectacle thus rests on the contention that 20th Century commodity 
capitalism reveals the true nature of all prior forms of separated power, and that this 
fully exposed the real heart of the revolutionary project: namely, the end of “all 
specialisation, all hierarchy, and all separation”.4 This would result in a historical 
subject able to determine itself as its own object, and thus freedom. Yet if there is no a 
priori human essence or fixed notion of species-being in Debord and the S.I.'s accou
why might there be specific historical conditions for the realisation of human freedom?  
 It's worth noting here that Marx's notion of species-being is in fact devoid of any 
fixed identity, but rather pertains to the full expression of human beings as historica
self-determinate creatures.5 This is a position that can also be found in Hegel himself, 
contrary to popular belief,6 and I would suggest that Debord had something very sim
in mind: the capitalist economy had developed to a point where it had made wage 
labour and thus itself redundant, and which afforded new means of shaping and 
affecting lived experience. Thus although “a person's life” may well have been “a 
succession of accidental situations”7 in the past, the task now – engendered by the r
of the modern spectacle – was to 
deliberately. The construction of situations can thus be seen to involve rendering 
explicit our own implicit nature, i.e. allowing self-conscious control over our own 
of a given identity or essence, but rather the realisation of the conditions for free, sel
nstitutive self-determination. 
ality and Representation 
                                                                                                                                               
3 
4 
5 
6 
om 
7 
8 
2006 p.772). He also holds that “power draped itself in the outward garb of a mythical order from the 
very beginning” (Debord 1995 p.20, 2006, p.772). 
Marx 2000, p.426 
Debord 1995, p.87; 2006, p.817 
“The whole character of a species – its species character – is contained in the character of its life 
activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character. Life itself appears only as a means to 
life.  ...Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.” (Marx 1988, 
p.76 emphasis in the original). 
“For Hegel, the absolute truth of humanity is that human beings have no fixed, given identity, but 
rather determine and produce their identity and their world in history, and that they gradually come to 
the recognition of this fact in history” (Houlgate 2005, p.17). It should however be added this freed
entails the realisation and expression of true reason, which can be seen to constitute an implicit, 
immanent identity. 
S.I. 2006, p.40; Debord 2006, p.325 
S.I. 2006, p.40; Debord 2006, p.325 
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 'real' and the 'true', in other words, are ultimately the historical process 
self. T
means 
f 
 
 I've also argued that the conceptual roots of Debord's 'images' and 
'representations' can be found in Hegelian objections to the abstract categories of non-
dialectical thinking: forms of thought that retain a distinction between thought and its 
referent. As noted earlier, these roots are certainly informed by Lukács' account, bu
by the predominance of the Phenomenology within French Hegelianism: for just as 
consciousness remains separated throughout the Phenomenology from an object that 
its own, albeit alienated true nature (a separation that is not present in the Logic, for 
example, in which thought thinks itself), so too is the spectator alienated from his or her
own actions. The spectator merely 'contemplates' the world that he or she creates.9 Thus 
the 'reality' that underlies these representations is best thought of not in terms of a 
material world masked by ideology – although Debord's formulations can at times 
suggest this – but rather as an alienated capacity and potential for self-determinate 
agency. The
it hus although many have drawn attention to the links between Debord's spectacle 
and Baudrillard's theory of simulation,10 within Debord's work the real has by no 
disappeared or become inaccessible: it in fact always persists in the possibility for 
conscious negation and change.  
 With Hegel, subject and object are at root identical by virtue of the Concept's 
identity in difference. That unity can however go unrecognised, and representations o
                                                 
9 “The spectacle's externality with respect to the acting subject is demonstrated by the fact that the 
individual's gestures are no longer his own, but rather those of someone else who represents them
him” (Debord 1995, p.23; 2006, p.774). 
10 Debord does in fact use the term 'simulation' himself: in
long after the appearance of Baudrillard's Simulacra an
 to 
 1993's Cette Mauvaise Reputation, and thus 
d Simulation in 1985, he wrote that 
“eve laims 
that th t's 
 
2008, 
u ple, and 
again in Cette Mauvaise Reputation, Debord objects to a Hegelian reviewer of the Comments on the 
Society of the Spectacle. The reviewer had contended that with the integration of spectacle and reality 
ectacle must become untenable, as must the Hegelian framework that founds it. 
satisfactory, but significant nonetheless: he replies by describing this 
t to the contention that one could no longer be a Heraclitian within 
raclitus had claimed that “language [or rather the Logos] is that 
teresting to note that in 1989 Debord sent thanks 
etin has 
me that Baudrillard is going to get tough 
nning wild, or being out of control] and that I 
such good company...” (Debord 2008, p.74). Thanks are due to 
advice. 
rywhere, excess simulation has exploded like Chernobyl” (Debord 2001a, p.92). Bracken c
is is a “tip of the pencil” to Baudrillard (Bracken 1997, p.227), and goes on to criticise Plan
correct view that Debord's spectacle is antithetical to Baudrillard's hyperreality: “for all we know,” he
writes, “Debord might've been flattered in the way [sic] that Baudrillard followed some of his 
interests” (Bracken 1997, p.228); in fact, and although Bracken could not have known this prior to the 
publication of Debord's correspondence, he viewed Baudrillard as a 'mediatic clown' (Debord 
p.248). Furthermore, Debord and Baudrillard's theories are q ite incommensurable. For exam
the very concept of sp
Debord's response is not entirely 
objection as a “sophism” equivalen
the modern spectacle, because He
which is common” (Debord 2001a, p.46). It's also in
to his publisher for refusing, on his behalf, an invitation to an academic conference: “A cr
written to me from the University of Montana...informing 
there ['va y sévir': this also carries connotations of ru
would do well to appear there in 
Jonathan Brookes for translation 
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14 
s claim 
ectacle, “the 
etuates itself according to 
l model 
 
endent 
 re-fashions the world in its own image. Through doing so, this set of 
nded to encompass the world, together with the behaviours that 
lienated. Yet the ensemble that 
sults remains located within historical time, however much it prevents the latter's 
 Yet as this 
unity, such as religion, can be adopted in place of its full philosophical self-
consciousness (e.g. religion is “the relation to the absolute in the form of feeling, 
imagination, faith”).11 With Debord, the subjective powers and capacities of society are 
alienated into the separated objectivity of an autonomous economic system, resulting in 
a world and a way of life that becomes 'image' qua its separation from those who 
actually live it; life thus becomes a mere representation of its “proper unity”.12 This 
representation has however taken on a degree of independence: the spectacle is “the 
world of the autonomous image”;13 it is composed of “independent representation”,
and the spectacle thus “represents itself”15 (see also Debord's allusion to Hegel'
that truth verifies itself by virtue of its own necessity: in the world of the sp
liar lies to himself” insofar as a self-referential falsehood perp
its own false necessity).16 The occlusion of its original referent allows it to operate as a 
genetic model for all social praxis (“the spectacle constitutes the dominant socia
of life”).17  
 Debord thus states at the outset of The Society of the Spectacle that the spectacle 
is best viewed as “a Weltanschauung that has been actualised, translated into the 
material realm. It is a vision of the world that has become objectified”,18 and he also 
describes it as 'ideology in material form'. It is a set of ideas about the world, deriving
from and corresponding to the exigencies of capitalism, that has become indep
and which now
ideas has also te
compose the latter; thought and practice thus become a
re
conscious direction, and is as such subject to it.  
 Debord maintains that within the spectacle lived reality is considered only 
“partially”,19 insofar as consciousness is focussed on the spectacle's images.
partial view presents itself as the sole repository of validity, and as all consciousness is 
focussed upon it, it becomes a “pseudo-world apart”.20 Historical agency is thus 
                                                 
11 Hegel 2004, p.145.  
12 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766 
13 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766 
14 Debord 1995, p.17; 2006, p.770 
6, p.766; see also Debord's list of détournements (2006, p.862).  
emphasis in the original 
15 Debord 1995, p.22, translation altered; 2006, p.774 
16 Debord 1995, p.12; 200
17 Debord 1995, p.13; 2006, p.767, 
18 Debord 1995, p.13, translation altered; 2006, p.767 
19 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766 
20 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766 
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r 
as not vanished, as Debord equates reality and truth to history, and 
t 
s 
 
separated from itself, but the spectacle still ultimately falls within the latter: the “social 
practice which the autonomous spectacle confronts is also the real totality which 
contains the spectacle”, despite the fact that “the split within this totality mutilates i
the point of making the spectacle appear as its goal”.21 Reality, in other words – qua 
real historical praxis – contains the spectacle, but is subordinated and in thrall to it: it is
“determined by a part of itself that places itself above the rest and is exterior to it”;22 fo
the “perceptible world” is “replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and 
which simultaneously impose themselves as the perceptible par excellence.”23 The 
whole, in other words, is dominated by a part, and as the practice of the whole 
corresponds to the demands of that part, the life of the whole 'recedes into 
representation' insofar as direct self-determination is denied.  
 Yet the 'real' h
holds that history will always exist (however unconsciously) so long as human 
consciousness exists within time. (“History,” Debord writes, by way of a détournemen
of Marx,24 “has always existed, but not always in its historical form... The unconsciou
movement of time manifests itself and becomes true in historical consciousness”).25 
Because history consists of a conscious awareness of events and actions, there remains a
sense in which consciousness is able to remain rooted within the 'real' of history and 
thereby view the spectacle as a distinct modality that has grown separate and 
autonomous.  
  
The Concentrated and Diffuse Forms of Spectacle 
 
 The spectacle is, ultimately, “simply the economic realm developing for 
itself”.26 Yet the independence and autonomy of that 'economic realm' is contradicted by
its own obsolescence: for whilst it had guaranteed society's survival in the past, the 
contemporary possibilities of automation and for new modes of social organisation 
rendered that economy's survival dependent upon the continued dormancy of the 
'historical consciousness' that it suppresses (for once “society discovers that it is 
 
had 
                                                 
ot always in a reasonable form” (Marx 1843). 
06, p.820, emphasis in the original 
21 Debord 1995, p.13, translation altered; 2006, p.767 
22 Debord 2006, p.1064 
23 Debord 1995, p.26; 2006, p.776 
24 “Reason has always existed, but n
25 Debord 1995, p.92; 20
26 Debord 1995, p.16; 2006, p.769 
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 concentrated spectacle alienated social power is condensed within a 
d and 
enated 
other détournement of Marx28 
lation 
 
he 
an”, 
se 
Reciprocally, this informs the level of commodity production possible within such 
s
e located within the bureaucracy, insofar 
contingent on the economy, the economy has in fact become contingent on society”).27 
In consequence, the perpetuation of this obsolete mode of production is said to be
reliant upon the degree to which it not only validates itself, but also masks its own 
redundancy. This brings us to the distinction between the 'concentrated' (bureaucratic 
and fascistic) and 'diffuse' (consumer capitalist) forms of spectacle, which address this
problem in different ways (the 'integrated spectacle' described in Debord's Comments, 
which combines the diffuse and the concentrated forms, will be discussed in part
Briefly: within the
ruling body, Party or dictator with whom society is obliged to identify; within the 
diffuse form it is dispersed across society through commodities, fashions, fads, 
behavioural models etc. – images of subjective satisfaction – and thereby actualise
rendered normative. 
 Particular individuals are thus oriented towards alienated forms of collective 
social power, with the result that the social whole comes to be mediated by ali
expressions of its own general capacities (by way of an
Debord claimed that “the spectacle is not an ensemble of images, but a social re
between persons that is mediated by images”).29 Yet whilst the diffuse spectacle is able 
to take this mediation to a high level through its abundance of commodities, the relative
“quantitative weakness”30 of the concentrated spectacle's own mass of commodities 
precludes it from disseminating its merits and raison d'être in this way. Thus where the 
diffuse spectacle relies on the dispersal of “image-objects”,31 the concentrated spectacle 
tends to present its ruling body as the embodiment of the will, agency and identity of t
social whole. An “image of the good which is a résumé of everything that exists 
officially”32 thus tends to be identified with the state, the Party or even  a “single m
and stands as a “catch-all of socially recognised qualities”33 (Debord: “if every Chine
has to study Mao, and in effect be Mao, this is because there is nothing else to be”).34 
ocieties: according to Debord, the ruling bureaucracy can leave no notable margin of 
choice to its subjects; all valid decision must b
                                                 
27 Debord 1995, p.34; 2006, p.782 
28 See Marx 1976, p.932: “…capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons which is 
mediated by things”.  
Debord 1995, p.12, translation altered; 2006, p.767;  29 
31 
32 
33 
34 
30 Debord 2006, p.685 
Debord 1995, p.16; 2006, p.769 
Debord 1995, p.42; 2006, p.788 
Debord 2006, p.685 
Debord 1995, p.42; 2006, p.788 
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 Production in the concentrated 
pectacle is thus geared towards a more traditional notion of survival than the 'gilded 
he diffuse form (hence Debord's claim that the bureaucracy 
ithin such forms “appears as the under-developed version of the old European 
ourge
d' 
 
e real and the true are 
ltimat . the claim 
y 
e' it, and 
as the latter's validity relies on its supposed status and necessity as an expression of the 
agency and will of the whole.35 In consequence, “any independent choice [choix 
extérieur], even the most trivial – concerning food, say, or music – is therefore the 
choice for [the bureaucracy’s] complete destruction”.36
s
poverty' available within t
w
b oisie”).37   
 The distinction between the concentrated and diffuse forms brings us to one of 
Debord's more puzzling assertions. In the Comments, when referring to the 'integrate
spectacle, he writes that “when the spectacle was concentrated, the greater part of 
surrounding society escaped it; when diffuse, a small part; today, no part.”38 Yet The 
Society of the Spectacle begins with the seemingly unequivocal declaration that all life
has receded into representation. How then can there be any peripheral reality 
surrounding either the concentrated or diffuse forms?  
 Because Debord's notion of history means that th
u ely linked to self-determination, his formulation in the Comments – i.e
that some aspects of the real exist 'outside' the concentrated and diffuse forms – would 
seem to indicate that this historical reality persist more directly and immediately within 
aspects of life that do not (yet) fall within the spectacle's bounds. This means that the 
spectacle can be understood as a kind of frame (cadre) imposed upon historical agency, 
through which the latter is channelled and thereby co-opted:39 a frame that is broader 
within the diffuse form than within its concentrated counterpart, which is forced to 
make greater recourse to ideology, propaganda and police methods. Thus, activit
within the spectacle is representation, insofar as it constitutes a territory that exactly 
corresponds to the spectacle's genetic map;40 the 'real' however remains 'outsid
                                                 
35 “Exclusive owner of the entire society, [the bureaucracy] declares itself the exclusive representative of 
that society's superior interests. In so doing, the bureaucratic state is the fulfilment of the Hegelian 
State” (S.I. 2006, p.284; 1997, p.538). 
6, p.788 
he original 
39  outside of activity, and in the context [cadre] of the spectacle all activity is 
40 95, 
774). This can be compared with Baudrillard’s later use of a similar 
 discussion of the French Revolution, he remarks that 
” (Nietzsche 1992b, p.239, italics in the original).  
36 Debord 1995, p.42, translation altered; 200
37 Debord 2006, p.694, emphasis in t
38 Debord 2002, p.9; 2006, p.1598 
“There can be no freedom
negated – all real activity having been captured in its entirety and channelled into the global 
construction of the spectacle” (Debord 1995, pp.21-2, translation altered; 2006, p.772).  
The spectacle is a “map of this new world, a map which exactly covers its territory” (Debord 19
p.23, translation altered; 2006, p.
image from Borges (Baudrillard 1994, p.1). Incidentally, an interesting and far earlier precedent can 
however be found in Nietzsche: commenting on
“the text finally disappeared under the interpretation
119 
ue by the concept”.41  
cannot be subsumed by it. One might also note here that in 1966 Debord remarked that 
“it seems to me that the S.I. would be seriously in error were it to suggest that all life 
outside Situationist activity was completely reified”, as were it to do so such activity 
would become “a mystical resc
 
Generalised Separation 
 
 It should however be stressed that the spectacle is a form of mediation, as this 
informs the rather confusing sense in which Debord's term 'spectacle' refers to several
distinct aspects of society at the same time. The spectacle is a focal point, being
body of images that model social praxis; yet it is also the mode of action and intera
that these images engender, insofar as life lived in conformity with it is alienate
becomes representation. As a result, the spectacle is not just a part of society, but a
society as a whole. Hence Debord's Hegelian and tripartite claim that “the spectacle 
appears at once as society itself, as a part of society and as a means of unification”.
 
 the 
ction 
d, and 
lso 
 
er a 
his 
e two: 
44 in consequence, it is also 
 form
s. 
42
This brings us back to the structure of Hegel's Concept. 
 As we've seen, the Concept is composed of three primary moments – 
universality, particularity, and singularity – and as indicated in the introduction to part 
two, there is a sense in which Debord presents the spectacle as a perversion, or rath
representation of the authentic, organic unity implied by the Hegelian model. Hence 
claim that the spectacle is at once a whole, parts of that whole, and the unity of th
it is the 'images' that individuals focus upon (i.e. it exists apart from them);43 it is the 
interaction between them mediated by these alienated forms;
a  of unification. Yet as these individuals are mediated only by images, i.e. 
alienated forms of their own social power, the unity that results is, as noted above, no 
more than a “unity...of generalised separation”45 characterised by a “constant 
reinforce[ment of] the conditions of isolation of the 'lonely crowd'46”.47 The spectacle 
thus constitutes a 'false' unity that merely aggregates a collection of isolated element
                                                 
41 S.I. 2003, p.138; Debord 2006, p.1167 
42 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766  
43 “As a part of society, it is that sector where all attention, all consciousness, converges” (Debord 1995, 
p.12; 2006, pp.766-7). 
44 “The spectacle cannot be set in abstract opposition to concrete social activity... lived reality is 
materially invaded by the contemplation of the spectacle, and repeats within itself the spectacular 
order while giving it positive cohesion” (Debord 1995, p.14, translation altered; 2006, p.768). 
45 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.767 
46 A reference to The Lonely Crowd, an American sociological study by David Riesman, Nathan Glazer 
tered; 2006, p.774 
and Reuel Denney that first appeared in 1950.  
47 Debord 1995, p.22, translation al
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e latter's unity of universality and particularity, it seems reasonable to suggest 
at the 'true' unity posited beyond it might actualise that unity in some respect. This 
ill be taken up in part three.  
he Spectacle and the Commodity
Insofar as this false unity is modelled upon the Hegelian Concept, and yet clearly falls 
short of th
th
w
 
T  
As indicated in the introduction to part two, the reading of Debord's theory that 
m advancing here implies that not only are the spectacle's images irreducible to the 
ass media: so too are they irreducible to a specific economic form (hence the 
oncentrated and diffuse forms), or indeed to a specific mode of perpetuating and 
alidating the latter (Debord's 'images' refer equally to entertainment, activity, 
ommodities, propaganda, behaviour, etc.). I would argue that this means that the 
moval of capitalism is not necessarily the removal of the spectacle, as some form of 
eparation might be retained in a post-revolutionary future (thus Debord: “wherever 
ere is independent representation, the spectacle reconstitutes itself”).48 Consequently, 
lthough Debord focuses on consumer capitalism – and although there is certainly a 
ense in which the latter is viewed as providing the clearest expression of spectacle, and 
s having rendered identifiable the defining problems of the modern revolutionary 
ovement – Western commodity capitalism is perhaps best understood as the (best, 
ost successful) vehicle for a tendency towards spectacle. The latter is thus not 
ductively and exclusively equivalent to the former: rather, commodity capitalism 
affords the most adequate content for the spectacles’ form.   
 I’ll build on this claim in chapter six when drawing attention to Debord’s claim 
that the spectacle exhibits the “principle of commodity fetishism”49 (my italics); a claim 
that I'll distinguish from the common contention that the spectacle corresponds to 
Marx's fetish per se. The 'principle' that Debord refers to here, I will argue, is that of the 
inversion of subject and object, and the reification and rationalisation that the latter 
gives rise to. Yet as indicated above, I'll also show that Debord moves away from the 
economic account that founds that inversion (hence the 'principle' of the fetish, as 
opposed to the fetish per se). To that end, chapter five will now set out Marx's own 
views on capital and the fetish. In doing so I'll demonstrate the importance of Marx's 
characterisation of capital as a social relation, and I'll contend that Debord's theory of 
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48 Debord 1995, p.17; 2006, p.770, emphasis in the original 
49 Debord 1995, p.26; 2006, p.776 
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alls short of the practical purchase on modern capitalism that Marx's position 
a
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Chapter Five: Fetish and Appearance 
 
 
Alienated Universality and Religion 
  
 I've highlighted the sense in which the spectacle can be seen as a 'false', or
illusory form of social unity: an external, imposed means of cohesion within which 
particular individuals remain isolated and separate, but which nonetheless derives from 
the alienated powers of those that it relates and binds together. This of course bears 
obvious relation to many of the major themes within Marx's mature economics, and in 
order to begin tracing these connections we might start by looking at their conceptual 
roots. To that end, we can begin here with Hegel's early works on religion: texts that 
argue against religious forms in which God is held to be separate and distanced from hi
believers. These early writings present a seminal account of an alienated and separated 
universality that stands distinct from the particularities to which it pertains, and I'll show 
during the course of this chapter that this can be seen to inform Marx's mature 
economics. I'll thus start with a few words on Hegel's early religious writings before 
looking at their echoes in Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy. Having done 
so I'll then move on to address Capital itself, before outlining the connections between 
Marx's concepts of value and commodity fetishism. 
 It may be tempting to cast
 
s 
 Hegel as a closet atheist,1 but he remains an avowedly 
ore specifically a Lutheran and pietist philosopher.2 After all, in his view 
 of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its very objectivity, 
the explication of God”3 (it might be added that Hegel 
and which thus engender humanity's separation from its own true nature and essence. 
un
Ph
    
Christian, or m
“the object of religion, like that
God and nothing but God and 
initially studied as a theologian: whilst at the Tübingen academy he took philosophy for 
two years before transferring to theology for a further three). Throughout the 1790's 
Hegel argued against forms of religion that perpetuate humanity's alienation from God, 
These works can thus be read as a template for Hegel's mature concerns with the 
ification of the finite and the infinite, which finds its initial resolution in the 
enomenology of 1807: a book that argued, as we saw earlier, that each individual 
consciousness contains its own “ladder”4 to the 'absolute' (or rather God) within itself. 
                                             
1 See for example Kojève 1980.  
For more details on Hegel's religious background see Magee 2001. 
Quoted in Houlgate 2005, p.245 
Hegel 1977, p.14 
2 
3 
4 
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However, these early concerns can also be identified within Hegel's last major work, 
Philosophy of Right, which describes the full actualisation of the “divine Concept”5 
within a rational state: a society that comprises an organic totality, the universality
which emerges from the shared identity of the elements that compose it.  
 Consequently, one can argue that many of Hegel's later positions can be 
glimpsed within his early arguments as to the benefits of 'subjective' forms of r
over their 'objective' counterparts. The former, as defined in 1793's 'On the Prospec
a Folk Religion', are linked to sentiment, feeling and lived experience; the latter a
associated with dogma, ritual and the imposition of scripture as positive 'fact'.6 Heg
argument here is that religion should be lived and felt rather than submitted to as an 
e l doctrine, and he reiterates this point in his 'The Positivity of the Christian 
Religion' (1795): a text in which he described objective religion as an 'external' tr
separated from the particularities upon which it is imposed. Against this separation 
Hegel would argue for the Christian model of a congregation, composed of mutually 
loving and forgiving believers who actualise their faith within their lived social activity. 
This is in effect an argument for the realisation of philosophy in praxis,7 and it can
seen to inform Hegel's later notion of Spirit; for as Hegel's thought developed, religiou
love and mutual forgiveness became the mutual recognition that founds Spirit, and 
which ultimately finds complete expression in the rational state's organic, interacting 
community.  
 
Universality and the State 
 
 Although Debord and Marx take Hegel's mature work as their principal point of
reference, one can nonetheless find links to these early writings.
 
que 
                                                
8 Hegel's objections to 
the alienated universality of a separate and detached God would evolve into his criti
 
5 Hegel 1991, p.147 
ormer is 
 
eserved in alcohol...” (Hegel 1984; see also Hegel 1977, p.31 for the continuity 
nd Hegel's later work). 
ith what needs to be done 
8 – simply reiterates their aversion to 
unaware that Hegel had 'resolved' the problem of alienation identified in religion 
 Kedourie Marx then compounds the error by 
itique of religion. 
6 “Subjective religion is something individual, objective religion a matter of abstraction. The f
the living book of nature, of plants, insects, birds and beasts living with and surviving off each other...
The latter is the cabinet of the naturalist, full of insects he has killed, plants that are desiccated, 
animals stuffed or pr
between this view a
7 In his 'On the Prospects for a Folk Religion' Hegel writes: “my concern is w
so that religion with all the force of its teaching might be blended into the fabric of human feelings, 
bonded with what moves us to act, and shown to be efficacious” (Hegel 1984).  
For Kedourie (1995), Feuerbach – who was unaware of these texts 
religious alienation, 
in his conception of the rational state. According to
criticising the state in similar terms to Feuerbach's cr
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e, Marx also 
vil society 
 
in the 
e 
rect relation to Debord and the S.I.'s own 
of the static, dichotomous concepts of everyday representational thought (religion is 
after all described in his mature philosophy as a mere representation of the truth grasp
by philosophy).9 This would not only inform the Young Hegelian contention that 
philosophy itself might be a mere Vorstellung of praxis: in addition, it also pertains to 
Marx's related criticism of Hegel's rational state. Where Hegel held the latter to be “the
Divine Idea as it exists on Earth”,10 Marx viewed the Philosophy of Right as a 
philosophical representation of unity that perpetuated, by way of apology, the real 
division of the particular elements of bourgeois society. Furthermor
contends that Hegel's (debatable)11 celebration of the Prussian state contradicts his 
philosophy's own emphasis on historical movement, flux and change.  
 These points can be illustrated by looking at Marx's adoption of Hegel's concept 
of the 'universal class'. For Hegel, the latter consisted of bureaucrats whose own 
particular interests lie in the mediation and reconciliation of the other diverse elements 
of society (their task would thus involve unifying the particular demands of ci
with the more universal concerns of political society).12 For Marx however, as argued in
his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', it was the proletariat that constituted 
society's truly 'universal class', as in order to “emancipate” itself the proletariat would 
also liberate “all the other spheres of society”, thereby affording the “total redemption 
of humanity”.13 Marx's implication here is that the true conditions of freedom lie 
actualisation of these philosophical concerns with universality and particularity in 
collective revolutionary action (“philosophy cannot realise itself without the 
supersession [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot supersede itself 
without the realisation [Verwirklichung] of philosophy”).14 As we'll see later, th
famously defiant words that Marx attributes to this proletarian universal class – “I am 
nothing and I should be everything”15 – bear di
existential re-formulation of the proletariat, but the salient point here is simply that 
Marx's concern with achieving true organic unity through the actualisation of 
                                                 
9 “Religious consciousness views the world in a more concrete, pictorial way [than Hegelian 
philosophy]...and so requires a positive Vorstellung of the essential unity of man and God [as offered 
by the figure of Christ] in order to be brought into the way of truth” (Houlgate 2005, p.255; see also 
Hegel 1977, p.479  
10 Hegel 2004, p.39 
11 For differing views on this issue see the essays collected in Stewart 1996. 
, the class devoted to the service of the government, has directly in its structure 
ranslation altered; Marx 1999 
s p.254, emphasis in the original 
12 “The universal class
the universal as the end of its essential activity. ...Only [through this class] is the actual particular in 
the state securely attached to the universal” (Hegel 2005, p.181). 
13 Marx 1975, p.256 
14 Marx 1975, p.257, t
15 Marx early writing
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isunity of bourgeois society. In the main body of his critique Marx argued that Hegel 
n 
, also written in 1844).17  
 of 
n of 
 atomised individuals together is their own alienated social 
ower (a view that is of course repeated by Debord, who maintained that “separation 
id 1840's Marx had 
egun to express this in explicitly economic terms: the sale of labour for a wage, Marx 
r is 
er 
mentary and individual interests, whilst the results of 
als 
                                                
philosophy reflects his contention that Hegel had presented only the appearance and 
illusion of unification: a mere philosophical 'image' that served only to mask the rea
d
had generated a model of unity from the pure heavens of the 'Idea', and that he had the
imposed it upon a separate and disunited reality. The Philosophy of Right, he claimed, 
treats “the people...as idea [Vorstellung], fantasy, illusion, representation ...[thus 
occluding] the real opposition between people and government”16 (a point that Marx 
ould repeat in 'On the Jewish Question'w
 Marx would however go on to do rather more than just use the interrelation of 
universality and particularity as a means of criticising Hegel's philosophical depiction
bourgeois society. Despite his rejection of Hegelian metaphysics he would later employ 
this notion of unity when casting real, existing bourgeois society as an aggregatio
discrete, separate individuals. This contention was framed by way of the Feuerbachian 
notion of humanity's submission to its own alienated self, insofar as the alien 
universality that binds these
p
makes itself part of the unity of the [spectacular] world”).18 By the m
b
contends in his Paris Manuscripts, causes “the product of labour” to confront its 
producer “as something alien, as a power independent of its producer”.19 The worke
thus alienated from his activity and product, but also from himself and from others: for 
insofar as work is conducted in pursuit of individual means of subsistence, each work
becomes separated from the universality of humanity's 'species-life', i.e. from 
humanity's collective transformation of the world20 (or, as Debord and Lukács would 
later have it, from the construction of history). 
 Collective, universal powers and interests thus come to be articulated through 
the pursuit of separate, frag
individual activity come to appear as a power standing over and above the individu
concerned. Hence the following claims, made in The German Ideology of 1845-6 (a 
 
16 Marx 1975, p.134 
ber of a fictitious sovereignty, 
real individual life and filled with an unreal universality” (Marx 1975, p.220). 
19 
20 
17 Marx writes there that in the state the individual “is the imaginary mem
he is divested of his 
18 Debord 1995, p.13, translation altered; 2006, p.767 
Marx 1988, p.71 
Marx 1988, p.76 
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rant, 
f 
stitutes no more than the appearance of the genuine communality that 
work that Debord also drew on in The Society of the Spectacle),21 in which alienated 
social power is linked to the state and presented as a means of illusory unification
 
Just because individuals [in bourgeois, capitalist society] seek only their particular interest, which for 
them does not coincide with their communal interest, the latter will be imposed on them as an interest 
'alien' to them, and 'independent' of them... the practical struggle of these particular interests... makes 
practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory 'general' interest in the form of the state. 
The social power, i.e. the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different 
individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals... not as their own 
united power, but as an alien force existing outside them... the origin and goal of which they are igno
[and] which they thus cannot control[.]22    
 
 The universal ends of bourgeois society as a whole are thus pursued through the 
fragmentation and separation of individual ends via private property, the division o
labour and the wage-relation. This results in the alienation of the powers and capacities 
of separated individual's into a universal, but no less 'alien' generality that binds 
particular individuals together, albeit by way of aggregation rather than interrelation: a 
unity that thus con
this state of affairs denies.  
 
'Real' Appearances and the Structure of Marx's Capital 
 
 It can be noted here that a trajectory of sorts can be traced through the texts 
discussed above, in which abstract, detached forms of universality become steadily
more concrete. The mystical and religious forms with which we began became the m
solid reality of the state, and when we trace these themes further into Capital and its 
account of the commodity form we'll find that this separate universality in fact 
constitutes 
 
ore 
the very social relations and organising principles of concrete society itself. 
 Although Marx spent over two decades working on Capital only one of its 
 
sev its author's death 
– that all three books finally appeared in 
The abstract, in other words, would seem to have become real, 23 and in order to 
develop that point I'll make a few comments on the relation between the structure of 
Capital and its themes of appearance.  
projected volumes was published in his lifetime. It was not until 1894 – and thus twenty
en years after the first volume's publication, and eleven years after 
print, the second and third having been 
                                                 
See Debord 1995, p.52, p.117 and p.125; 2006 p.795, p.836 and p.841 
Marx 2000, p.186 
The remarks made here that pertain to the contemporary interest in real abstraction owe much 
discussions with Alberto Toscano, whose work on the subject (see for example Toscano 2005 and
2008) has also proved helpful. 
21 
22 
23 to 
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 that's an important point, as it perhaps 
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rrect' 
reconstructed by Engels from the notes and manuscripts left to him by Marx. Ev
extant form Capital is a vast construction, but it was initially envisaged as being 
possessed of an even grander scale: according to Marx's original outline of 1857 there 
were to be six books in total; an initial book on capital, followed by further works on 
landed property, wage-labour, the state, foreign trade and crisis.24 This was revised in 
the early 1860's, when Marx elected instead to create a work of four volumes, composed
of three theoretical books on capital, and one on the history of attempts to theorise 
capitalist society (the preparatory notes to which were published posthumously as 
Theories of Surplus Value). It would thus seem that Capital's existing tripartite structu
conforms to Marx's original intentions, and
serves to substantiate the view that the three books' homology with the movement of th
Hegelian Concept was intended by their author, and not just by their subsequent editor
(Engels' later enthusiasm for framing Marx through Hegel is of course the subject of
much debate).25  
 As we saw earlier, the Concept's movement involves an initial, immedi
starting point which becomes differentiated and other to itself before returning to self 
identity, albeit whilst incorporating the resultant differences into a mediated, complex 
totality. Likewise, volume one of Capital famously begins with capitalist society's 
immediate 'appearance' as an “immense accumulation of commodities”,26 and goes
to outline the general schema for capitalist production; volume two describes the
in ation of the various capitals within society; volume three then returns to the 
'surface' of capitalist society, and develops its more complex aspects (e.g. price, interest, 
speculative finance) in the light of the determinations established by the previous 
volumes.  
 The debts owed here to the Hegelian Concept can be illustrated by way of 
reference to the opening paragraph of volume three,27 but a more explicit discussion of
Marx's approach can be found in the Grundrisse. There, whilst setting out the 'co
                                                 
24 See Felton Shortall's The Incomplete Marx (1994) for useful discussions of the structure of Capital. 
Shortall's book presents an excellent overview of Marx's work and did much to inform my own 
rd’s work might point beyond itself to new formulations.   
useful introduction to this issue, and Rees 1994 for an opposing view. See also 
ine 1984. 
to 
form in which they appear on the surface of society...” (Marx 1981, p.117). 
suggestion that Debo
25 See Colletti 1972 for a 
Carver 1983 and Lev
26 Marx 1976, p.125 
27 “In volume one we investigated the phenomena exhibited by the process of capitalist production, 
taken by itself, i.e. the immediate production process... in the second volume... we considered the 
circulation process as it mediates the process of social reproduction... [this] third volume [aims] ...
discover and present the concrete forms which grow out of the process of capital's movement 
considered as a whole. ...The configurations of capital, as developed in this [third] volume, thus 
approach step by step the 
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method of political economy, Marx explains that if he was to take society as it 
immediately presents itself he would fail to see it as an interrelated whole, and would 
have only a “chaotic conception [Vorstellung]”28 of the latter. In order to understand it 
as a totality he must first break it down thro
its root concepts. Having done so, he must then reassemble these concepts, noting their
interrelation and tensions, and thereby conceive that society as a dynamic whole, i.e. as 
a totality.29 This is echoed again in 1873, in the postface to the second German edi
of volume one, where Marx explains the distinction between his mode of analysis 
(breaking reality down into concepts) and his mode of presentation (reconstructing a 
model of reality from those concepts).30   
 Thus it is in order to get past the immediate, superficial appearances of society 
that Capital develops a series of increasingly complicated and sophisticated levels o
analysis from its initial root concept of the commodity. One can thus sympathise to 
some degree with those who argue, like Lukács,31 that Capital's opening chapter 
contains in nuce all that will follow from it; one might also note that it is this 
methodology that gives Capital its daunting scale.32 Yet there is more to the theme o
appearance than a need to theorise complexity per se: for capital, according to Marx
somehow generates illusions and false appearances that occlude and distort its real
nature. Capital, with its tripartite structure and increasingly sophisticated levels of 
analysis, is shaped rather like a wedge, and is designed to break through them.   
 However – and despite Marx's frequent analogies to the 'depths' and 'surface
appearances' of society – these appearances are not solely ideal and ideological, but a
form real aspects of lived social reality. For example, although real, concrete labour 
only counts as socially necessary labour within capitalism, socially necessary labour 
still constitutes a concrete determination of real social practice, and forms a regulative 
measure to which the latter must conform. Likewise, exchange-value may well be the 
form of appearance taken by value when a commodity is placed in an exchange-
relation, but it is no less a concrete aspect of the real exchanges that structure and shap
                                                 
28 Marx 1973, p.100 
29 Marx 1973, p.100 
30 Marx 1976, p.1
31
02 
 1026 pages of volume three – and thus after the 1084 pages of volume 
one and the 599 pages of volume two – Marx remarks, seemingly without irony: “as the reader will 
have recognised in dismay, the analysis of the real, inner connections of the capitalist production 
proc
of sci x 
1981, p.428).  
 Lukács 1971, p.170  
32 Over 400 pages into the total
ess is a very intricate thing and a work of great detail”; “it is,” he adds soberly, “one of the tasks 
ence to reduce the visible and merely apparent movement to the actual inner movement” (Mar
129 
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owever, where Marx's account presents the reality 
asked
hat 
. In order to do so I'll 
begin by indicating quite what capital's appearances might be said to hide.   
society. By extension, and as I'll also argue below, the commodity fetish is not just a 
subjective illusion. Not only do the powers of subjects appear as those of objects: rather, 
those objects really do act as if they were subjects, determining real human subjects
if the latter were themselves mere objects.  
 The implication that this gives rise to is that the real, inner core of capitalism – 
the 'depth' that underlies its 'surface appearances' – is not a real, material reality that 
become masked by ideology and illusion. Rather, what Marx's analysis reveals
something more akin to a logical core: the inner workings, as it were, of an operative 
whole. For some, such as Postone, this means that reading labour as if it were a 'natural'
reality upon which the 'false' framework of capital has been imposed must be flawed, 
because labour is itself an integral component of the workings of this 'machine'; as we
see later, this leads him to contend that Marx's early philosophical anthropology is 
rendered untenable by his mature economics. We'll also see later that Debord and the 
S.I. similarly rejected any identification of emancipation with labour per se (although it 
should be remembered that this does not entail rejecting the philosophical anthropolog
that Postone dismisses: capitalist labour is merely one alienated expression of a 
broader capacity for activity). H
m  by capitalist appearances as the inner workings of capitalism – the social 
relations that compose it, and which bind together atomised, particular individuals by 
way of the alienated universality of capitalist value – Debord's contention that the whole 
of life has become image tends towards locating the 'real' and the 'authentic' in the 
historical capacity that spectacular society suppresses. The 'real' thus becomes 'life', 
considered as an abstract and romantic potential, against which stands a 'capital' that has 
become equivalent to all present social existence. Hence my earlier contention t
although some have held Debord to be a useful theorist of real abstraction, his theory is 
in fact too abstract: it tends towards viewing society as a homogeneous whole, separated 
from a potential that ultimately resides in the dormant subjectivity of the spectator.  
 These claims will be substantiated as this second part of the thesis progresses, 
and I'll now move to look at Marx's account in a little more depth
  
Capital and Appearance 
 
s: “the wealth of societies in  The very first sentence of Capital reads as follow
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producers. In other words, capital is not just wealth, as opposed to poverty: it is a form 
ders, and which in fact relies upon poverty.  
    
which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears [erscheint] as an immense 
accumulation of commodities; the individual commodity is its elementary form”.33 I've 
altered Fowkes' translation slightly because he employs the English word 'appears' 
twice: once for capitalist wealth, as in my rendering, but also when referring to the 
commodity's status as this wealth's 'elementary form'.34 In losing the distinction 
between the appearance of wealth and the presumably surer ground of its 'elementary
form', Fowkes loses the indication of illusion or performance expressed by the word 
erscheint.35 Marx's sentence can be nuanced further by way of reference to Hegel's vie
that “appearance [erscheint]...must not be confused with mere semblance [schein],” or 
more literally with 'shine': for Hegel, the latter is merely the initial, inner determin
an essence that has yet to 'shine forth'; appearance, on the other hand, is the external 
expression of this inner form.36 Interestingly, vis a vis the theme of real abstraction 
noted above, this leads Hegel to contend that “essence therefore is not behind or beyond 
appearance, but since it is the essence that exists, existence is appearance”.37 Capitalis
wealth, in other words – that immense (or rather monstrous: ungeheure) collection of 
commodities – is thus indicated to be the 'external' expression of some hitherto 
unacknowledged inner 'logic'.  
 In order to illustrate the contrast between those inner workings and their outer 
appearances we might now compare volume one's first sentence with its last. This read
as follows: “the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore cap
private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of that 
private property which rests on the labour of the individual himself; in other words, the 
expropriation of the worker.”38 The book thus begins by claiming that the wealth proper 
to capitalist production appears as a mass of commodities, but it ends with the 
contention that this wealth relies upon impoverishment; for although we open the book 
with a great collection of private property (i.e. commodities), we learn during the c
of its analyses that the production of commodities entails the expropriation of their 
of wealth that engen 
                                             
Marx 1976, p.125; Marx 1962. 
Fowkes has “...the individual commodity appears as it
33 
34 s elementary form” (Marx 1990, p.125). 
e.  
36 
f but in 
37 
35 I am indebted to Professor John Hutnyk for suggesting this reading of Capital's opening sentenc
“Essence is initially a totality of inward shining, but it does not remain in this inwardness; instead, as 
ground, it emerges into existence; and existence, since it does not have its ground within itsel
an other, is quite simply appearance” (Hegel 1991, p.199-200) 
Hegel 1991, p.199 
38 Marx 1976, p.940 
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r it by tracing some of Marx's statements on the subject 
rough Capital's developing stages of analysis. Marx begins by telling us that value is a 
 measure of labour; that “this quantity is measured by its duration,” and that 
labour-time is itself measured on the particular scale of hours, days, etc.”39 Yet this 
e the 
 
labour, and that it thereby represents a quantity of value. It 
 
 
ly 
f 
to 
er. The analysis of surplus-value and the determinations that it gives rise to leads 
 the contention that the very existence of capital relies upon the continued existence of 
he 
wage relation that engenders production rests on exchange). Marx's answer to the 
q
                                                
 So what then is capital? This is by no means as facile a question as it m
seem, and we can begin to answe
th
quantitative
“
value is not a measure of the real, physical labour conducted in order to produc
item in question, but rather of the amount of average, socially necessary labour time 
required given society's extant means of production.40 Labour, in other words, has no 
intrinsic value, even though the social relations that articulate labour attribute value to
it.41 We are then told that the commodity is an object that represents a quantity of 
socially average, necessary 
can in consequence be exchanged with others by way of the mediation of the universal
commodity of money, and if the initial 'bearer' buys cheap and sells dear, then a quantity 
of value will transfer between the physical forms involved (i.e. from commodity to 
money and back again) and will grow in the process. It is in this form that capital is first
identified in Marx's text: as value that has the capacity to grow through the (necessari
social) exchange of commodities that represent quantities of social labour.42  
 Yet whilst it soon transpires that mercantile exchange is not the true source of 
capital, exchange is nonetheless intrinsic to capital's real origin in the exploitation o
labour through the extraction of surplus-value:43 for although the price of a day’s 
labour-power may represent the quantity of labour performed, it is by no means equal 
the latt
to
a working class deprived of the means of providing for their own means of subsistence 
independently, and who are thus obliged to sell their labour in return for a wage (i.e. t
uestion above, therefore, is ultimately that capital is a social relation:44 a social 
 
40 
41 of 
se, 
42 definition of capital is that of a “value” that “increases its magnitude” by passing 
e 
44 ific] relation of 
39 Marx 1976, p.129 
Marx 1976, p.129.  
“Labour is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but it has no value itself. ...'value 
labour'...is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary expressions ari
nevertheless, from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for the forms of 
appearance of essential relations.” Marx 1976. p.677 
Marx's initial 
through the successive forms of money, commodity and then money once more (i.e. the famed M-C-
M' sequence); this “movement,” Marx writes, “converts it into capital” (Marx 1976, p.252). 
43 “Capital, therefore, is not only the command over labour, as Adam Smith thought. It is essentially th
command over unpaid labour” (Marx 1976, p.672). 
“capital is a social relation of production. It is a historical [i.e. contextually spec
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relation marked by class antagonism,45 and which thus holds the potential for its own 
upersession implicit within it.  s
 
Fetishism 
 
 Now, if capital is a social relation, then it must be contingent upon the 
perpetuation of a certain set of social conditions. If that is so, then capitalism is by no 
means a 'natural' and eternal necessity: rather, it can be superseded if those conditions 
are understood. The problem however is that capital tends to present itself as a thing 
(money, perhaps, or means of production), and this illusion lies at the core of the notion 
of commodity fetishism.46  
 This can be illustrated with one of Marx's own examples. He often follows his 
theoretical discussions in Capital with factual and historical demonstrations (e.g. the 
mous chapter on the length of the working day, which illustrates the drive towards 
g chapters), and he concludes volume 
ne as a whole with just such a demonstration of its overall argument.47 There Marx 
is 
 
don 
of 
ons 
s left 
               
fa
surplus-value extraction theorised in the precedin
o
describes capital's emergence from a historical process, driven by its own needs, 
towards the institution of conditions favourable to its production and growth.48 This 
followed by a demonstration ad absurdum: whilst quoting Wakefield, a 'bourgeois
economist' greatly concerned with the tendency of workers in the colonies to aban
their employment in favour of independence, Marx writes of an unfortunate Mr. Peel 
who:  
 
...took with him from England to the Swan River district of Western Australia means of subsistence and 
production to the amount of £50,000. This Mr. Peel even had the foresight to bring besides 3,000 pers
of the working class, men, women and children. Once he arrived at his destination, 'Mr. Peel wa
                                                                                                                                
 “The  
repro
hich 
om the 
(1785); a text that Marx, according to Wendling, “read in German translation in 1842” (Wendling 
2009, p.51).  
r of 1877 that the book's final sections are “nothing else than the short summary 
s previously given in the chapters on capitalist production” (Marx 1968).  
red to as 'primitive' or originary accumulation, and is said to have taken place 
riation of society's means of 
talist class, and the consequent formation of a proletariat.  
production.” Marx 1976, p.932n.  
45  capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected process, i.e. a process of
duction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and 
reproduces the capital-relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer” 
(Marx 1976, p.724).  
46 Marx's use of the term 'fetish' is of course an allusion to elements of African religion, in w
supernatural powers would be attributed to man-made objects. The word 'fetish' comes fr
French 'fétiche', which stems from the Portuguese 'feitiço'; this is in turn derived from the Latin 
'facere', which means 'to make'. The term was used by the Portuguese as a means of describing 
African magical artefacts, and became popularised by Charles de Brosse's Le Culte des Dieux Fetishes 
47 Marx states in a lette
of long development
48  This process is refer
through the division and destruction of common land, the approp
production by a capi
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without a servant to make his bed or fetch him water from the river'. Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided f
everything except the export of English relations of production to Swan River!49 
 
 In the new colonies, where the workers are able to abscond and meet their needs
of subsistence independently, the capital relation breaks down: the resources that Mr. 
Peel shipped to Australia thus cease to be capital. “A mule,” Marx writes, “is a machine
for spinning cotton. Only in certain relations does it become capital. Outside these 
circumstances it is no more capital than gold is intrinsically money, or sugar is the pr
of sugar.”50 Nonetheless, the “capitalist soul” of such items is “so intimately wedded, 
the mind of the political economist, to their material substance, that he christens
capital under all circumstances”.51 Yet why does this confusion take place, and how is it 
connected to the themes of universality and particularity described above? In order to 
respond to that question it may be useful to rehearse some of the basic as
account of value and the commodity form.  
 
Time, Universality and the Commodity Form 
 
 Just as capital can only exist under certain social circumstances, so too are the 
principal characteristics of the commodity form similarly reliant upon specific 
conditions, which are delineated within the opening chapter of Capital. This first 
chapter describes a society of independent commodity producers, each of whom 
produces items that are of use to persons other than themselves, and each secures the 
items that they themselves require by exchanging their own products with those of
others. Following the comments above on the structure of Capital, we might rehearse 
the fact that this initial chapter is not an historical depiction of pre-capitalist society:
 
 An entity can only be a commodity if it is to be sold to another individual. It 
r 
tha
va
    
52 
rather, it is an abstraction, an initial schema that arises from and comprises the 
conditions of existence of the commodity form itself.  
must therefore be useful to someone other than its producer, or rather to someone othe
n its initial possessor, and it must therefore have a social use-value.53 The 
commodity's location within a system of market exchange gives rise to its exchange-
lue: a measure in which the value of one commodity is related to that of another. Use-
                                             
Marx 1976, p.933 
Marx 1976, p.932 
Marx 1976, p.933 
See Arthur 2004 for a particularly clear discussion of this issue. 
Marx 1976, p
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 .131.  
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bstractive equivalence of 
 The commodity form is thus peculiar to a social system in which 
ange, and in which particular, 
ualitatively distinct labours thereby become abstract, universal labour.  
is 
 even 
 
lar 
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tutes a relation between these individuals; yet insofar as it falls short 
value and exchange-value, in other words – the two dual aspects of the commodity – 
presuppose the existence of the market. Furthermore, the value that comes to be 
expressed as exchange-value is similarly bound to the market: it does not represent the 
quantity of real, physical labour expended in producing the item in question, but ra
the amount of socially necessary labour time that this act of production represents, i.e. 
the quantitative sum of the abstract, socially average labour that would need to be 
expended in order to produce that item given the current means of production. Such 
abstraction and homogeneity54 can only arise through the generalisation of exchange
between different labours, i.e. from the quantitative, a
qualitative differences.
individual, particular need is met through generalised exch
q
 What becomes apparent here is the degree to which qualitative particularity 
subsumed and articulated by a quantitative generality: a generalisation that entails 
organising particular temporalities under the rubric of abstract social time.55 Thus
within the terms introduced in Capital's first chapter we can see that particular labours
are cast as elements of the universal mass of social labour, and that the exchanges that 
this involves are conducted in accordance with a measure that stems from the very 
generality and abstraction of that same universality. In more Hegelian terms, particu
individuals are thus related by way of their own universal, shared identity (i.e. abstract 
social labour). This however is an inherently alienated and separate form of universality
These individuals do not interact directly: the reproduction of society takes place 
through market exchange, and not through the direct interaction and organisation of the
individuals concerned. As a result, this universality is a real, concrete aspect of society,
insofar as it consti
of full organic interrelation it can be classed as a representation of a more authentic 
                                                 
54 “The total labour-power of society, which is manifested in the values of the world of commoditi
counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour-power, although composed of innumera
units of labour-power.” Marx 1976, p.129 
55 See Postone 1996 for a more involved discussion of this theme. As he points out, time in fact becom
tyrannical: struggles take place over the length of the working day, as capital pursues the extraction
absolute and relative surplus-value, and time, qua measure, dictates the movements, actions an
es, 
ble 
es 
 of 
d 
expectations of those subject to it. Thus Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy: “time is everything, man 
is nothing; he is at most time's carcass. …the pendulum of the clock has become as accurate a measure 
f two workers as it is of the speed of two locomotives” (quoted in Lukács, 
e passage, 1995, p.110; 2006, p.831). Qualitative human becoming 
o be subsumed by the quantitative accumulation of value. See also Hutnyk (2004, 
ussion of time in Marx and Derrida, considered in relation to speed and 
of the relative activity o
1971, p.89; Debord quotes the sam
within time comes t
pp.55-113) for a disc
technology. 
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minant theme in Capital itself, but it can 
 
,56 
unity, in much the same manner as the objections to the bourgeois state discussed above
 Admittedly, this latter point is not a do
nonetheless be discerned therein. It can also identified in Debord's work, and it's notable
that he raises it in relation to the issue of time and temporality: whilst referencing 
Marx's claim that “the reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis 
for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals”
Debord talks of a collectivity composed of “a variety of autonomous yet effectively 
federated times”.57 The conditions of unity and historical action would thus seem to 
involve the interrelation of individual temporalities. 
   
Fetishism, Alienation and the Labour Theory of Value 
 
 Having made these observations we can now return to the fetish. In market 
exchange, value appears as exchange-value,58 because the value of one commodity 
omes 
f a 
on of 
r a 
 
 
universality derived from the 
interrelation of particular producers becomes expressed in the form of a universal 
co
, Marx writes, is “the finished form of the world of 
                
c to be expressed in a quantitative relation with that of another. Now, if the 
exchange-vale of linen, to use one of Marx's own examples, is equivalent to that o
coat, then the use-value, i.e. the physical body of the coat, serves as the expressi
the value of the linen (x amount of linen = one coat). This is the basis of the fetish: fo
value that stems from social relations (socially average labour) appears here as the 
objective characteristics of a product of those relations (“the coat,” Marx writes, seems
to be “endowed with the form of value by nature itself...just as much as its property of
being heavy or its ability to keep us warm”).59 Value's origin in social labour thus 
becomes occluded, as it now appears as an attribute of the coat itself. When the coat is 
replaced with gold, or rather with money, this basis is obscured entirely, as value then 
appears as price.  
 I described above the way in which the ubiquity of exchange rendered different, 
particular labours equivalent by way of the universality of socially average labour; now, 
with the introduction of money into the analysis, the 
mmodity – money, the general equivalent – to which each particular commodity is 
rendered equivalent.60 Money
                                 
 2006, p.836 
59 
60 Marx goes on to note that the price of money itself fluctuates, and in 
56 Marx 2000, p.196 
57 Debord 1995, p.116;
58 Marx 1976, p.152  
Marx 1976, p.149 
This point is more complex: 
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loitation, but rather actively facilitate it.66  
    
commodities” because it “conceals the social character of private labour and the socia
relations between the individual workers”.61  
 Marx's opening account of the commodity in Capital's first chapter thus alr
depicts the denigration of the producers' ability to consciously manage and organise 
their own affairs. As the social relations by way of which society reproduces itself “take 
on the fantastic form of a relationship between things”,62 each individual becomes 
separated from the overall organisation of the whole. Individuals become subordinated 
to an abstract and separate universality that arises from them, but which in fac
their movemen
m ent made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact 
control them”).63 Here at the outset of volume one this simply means that individual
are related by way of the interactions of their products; later it will transpire that socia
activity per se comes to be dictated by the alienated labour involved in commodity 
production and exchange. 
 In order to move towards that claim it might be helpful to look at the connectio
between the fetish and the wage. Within the wage-relation the peculia
commodity form – which identifies things with their prices – causes the labour 
performed during the working day to become conflated with the price of the labour-
power sold to the capitalist. The distinction between paid and unpaid labour is masked
and capital's origin in surplus-value falls from view. In consequence, the inequ
capitalist production appears as the equality of commodity exchange: both the bu
and seller of labour confront one another as equals, possessed of the same propert
rights. Thus Marx: “all the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capi
all capitalism's illusions about freedom, all the apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, 
have [this] as their basis”.64 Hence Marx's famous distinction between the “sphere of 
circulation,” where “everything takes place on the surface and in full view of
and the “hidden abode of production”.65 Bourgeois notions of justice and right not only
mask exp
                                                                                                                                           
volume three he describes the buying and selling of money as a discrete commodity in its own right. 
s that it serves as an expression of the universality of socially average labour.  
 
lity as the 
' itself. 
The point however i
61 Marx 1976, pp.168-9
62 Marx 1976, p.164 
63 Marx 1976, p.167 
64 Marx 1976, p.680 
65 Marx 1976, p.280 
66 As indicated in the introduction to part two, Capital offers considerably more than a merely moral 
critique of inequality, which would remain mired within the same liberal notions of equa
'sphere of circulation
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 The subsequent determinations of the fetish presented in the further stages of 
Capital continue to mask capital's status as an antagonistic social relation. In volume 
two, the blurring of the price of labour with that of the finished commodity's raw 
materials is said to bring the fetish “to fulfilment” (as “the origin of the surplus-value
present in the product [is thereby] completely withdrawn from view”);67 in volume 
three Marx claims that “the fetish character of capital” becomes “complete” in the fo
of interest bearing capital, insofar as value seems to spontaneously grow there of its 
own accord (it thus “appears as a mysterious and self-creating source...of its own 
increase”).68  
 This brings to the fore the following point, which will become important when
we look at Debord's own account in chapter six. It should now be apparent that the 
fetish is intimately linked both to Marx's labour theory of value and to his account of 
a ion (or rather to his mature formulations of the latter): for the fetish's occlusio
capitalist social relations furthers capital's status as an autonomous force that dict
the nature and allocation of labour and activity within society. The fetish is therefore 
intimately connected to Capital's theme of subject-object inversion. 
 We first encounter the latter in Marx's initial account of the fetishistic aspects of
exchange, but as Capital proceeds it becomes increasingly apparent that capitalism is, 
as Marx puts it in volume three, “production only for capital, and not the rev
the [production of] ...a steadily expanding pattern of life for the society of the 
producers”.69 Human subjects, in other words, become subservient to their own 
objective products and alienated activity. This inversion takes various forms (for 
example, the subordination of the producer to the means of production70 and the 
transformation of means of reducing labour into the means of prolonging the latter),71 
but it ultimately entails the dominance of the “automatic subject”72 of capitalist valu
Frankenstein's monster, to use a suitably Gothic metaphor:73 a “self-moving 
substance”74 that is in effect the shared universal substance of society's own alienat
labour.  
 Yet what's important here – and it can easily be missed – is the sense in which 
                                                 
67 Marx 1978, p.303 
68 Marx 1981, p.516 
69 Marx 1981, p.352 
70 Marx 1976, p.425 
71 Marx 1976, p.532 
73 has great fun with the many Gothic aspects of Marx's account (werewolves, 
ust, etc.), and even goes so far as to cast Capital as a Gothic novel. 
72 Marx 1976, p.255 
See Wheen 2006. Wheen 
vampires, Dante, Fa
74 Marx 1976, p.256 
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arx: “those who demonstrate that all the productive force ascribed to capital is a 
isplacement, a transposition of the productive force of labour, forget precisely that 
apital itself is essentially this displacement, this transposition”.75 It's thus a mistake to 
treat capital as if it were a force in its own right; and as can perhaps already be seen 
from my earlier discussions of Debord's work, I'll go on to suggest in chapter six that 
one can find a tendency towards such a position in the theory of spectacle. To view 
capital in such terms is to further a sense in which it is a monolithic entity rather than a 
contingent set of social relations, and thus undermines the sense in which it might be 
inherently internally antagonistic. In consequence, such an approach undermines the 
identification of the 'weak points' that a strategic analysis might single out for attack.  
 We can close here by returning to Marx's unhappy Mr. Peel: the unfortunate 
colonialist who mistook his means of production for capital, and whose workers 
abandoned him when presented with the possibility of escaping from the conditions 
engendered by private ownership of the means of production. It can now be stated that 
the root of Peel's error lies in the degree to which the commodity form causes value to 
appear as an attribute of the commodity itself: hence his failure to recognise that money, 
means of production and means of subsistence “only become capital under 
circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation of, and 
domination over, the worker.”76 With this error thus comes a consequent tendency to 
view the relations that it relies upon as “an eternal necessity ordained by nature”.77 Yet 
Mr. Peel's unhappiness also serves to illustrate a further issue. Although capital's true 
nature as a social relation is masked, and although that nature is shown to permeate and 
inform the entirety of society, Marx nonetheless retains a clear target: his analysis, 
insofar as it shows capital to be an antagonistic social relation reliant upon exploitation, 
identifies the wage-relation as the point that any engagement with capital ought to 
address. Whilst I won't argue for the absolute validity of that diagnosis in the chapters 
that follow, I will contend that Debord's differs from it, and in a manner that gives rise 
to a number of problems: for where Marx points to the wage-relation, Debord's own 
point of rupture would seem to be located within the alienation of the individual subject 
                                                
casting capital as alienated power doesn't quite capture the full nature of the situatio
Rather, capital is a social relation within which that p
M
d
c
 
75 Marx 1973, pp.308-9, emphasis in the original; quoted in Arthur 2004, p.48. Arthur presents a helpful 
discussion of this issue.  
76 Marx 1976, p.933 
77 Marx 1976, p.575 
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Chapter Six: Marxism and Spectacle 
 
 
Debord and Marx 
 
 This chapter will highlight some of the more problematic aspects of Debord's 
theory by way of its relation to Marx and Marxism. I'll begin by showing the manner in 
which the theory of spectacle's historical and teleological dimensions cast the relation 
between the two writers as a Hegelian Aufhebung; I'll then try to put Debord's views on 
ok at 
 
 
 
ated social 
eth
ve supersession of Marx’s classical account. 
8, The Times Literary Supplement reviewed Debord's 
Ad s 
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an
    
Marx into a theoretical and historical context. The second part of the chapter will lo
the problematic aspects of the theory of spectacle in detail, primarily by way of the 
relation between the image and the commodity.   
 In the discussions above I've drawn attention to Debord's characterisation of the 
spectacle as a historical tendency that had been brought to its full expression by modern
commodity capitalism.1 Yet I've also argued that the spectacle is not ultimately specific
to commodity capitalism per se: on my reading, the end of capitalism is not necessarily 
the end of the spectacle, as the latter is primarily the denial of historical agency. Some
form of spectacle would thus continue to exist so long as some form of separ
power remained, and for this reason there can be no easy equivalence between the 
spectacle and the commodity. After all, it is not only commodities that are cast as 
spectacular, but also modes of behaviour and forms of political opposition2 (hence the 
S.I.'s objection to their own 'contemplative' admirers, whom they dubbed 'pro-situs'). It 
would thus seem that struggle against the spectacle cannot be restricted to attempts to 
address capitalism alone, and that in fact entails a broader project: one that it as much 
ical and aesthetic as it is economic. I'll suggest that it is for this reason that Debord’s 
work implies its own effecti
 On the 21st of March, 196
The Society of the Spectacle and Vaneigem's The Revolution of Everyday Life. 
mitting that “under the dense Hegelian wrappings with which they muffle their page
eral interesting ideas are lurking”, the reviewer made the following analogy: “M. 
bord and M. Vaneigem have brought out their long-awaited major texts: the Capital 
d What is to be Done?, as it were, of the new movement.”3 Although misplaced, such 
                                             
“The most developed [i.e. the modern spectacle] shows the origin in another light, which is fin
true light” (Debord 2004a, p.45). 
See for example Debord 2006, pp.519-20. 
1 ally its 
2 
1 3 Quoted by Knabb in S.I. 2006, p.50
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“merited the universal hatred of the society of my time”,10 and stated that he “strove to 
comparisons are nonetheless common, and were cheerfully endorsed by the S.I. 
themselves. In 1964, and on the centenary of the original I.W.A.'s formation, the S.I. 
declared themselves to be the first international's direct successors,4 and in 196
made the following allusion:  
 
 It is known that Eisenstein wanted to make a film of Capital. Considering his formal conceptions
and political submissiveness, it can be doubted if his film would have been faithful to Marx's text. But for 
our part, we are confident that we can do better.  For example, as soon as it becomes possible Guy Debo
will himself make a cinematic adaptation of The Society of the Spectacle that will certainly not fall shor
o
 
   That film was eventually made in 1973, and it was followed it in 1975 by 
nother: Debord's self-explanatory Refutation of All the Judgements, Pra
Far Rendered on the Film 'The Society of the Spectacle', in the script to which Debord 
claimed that “there have not been three books of social critique of such importance [as
The Society of the Spectacle] in the last hundred years.6 Debord was also not averse 
equating himself to Marx personally, albeit ironically,7 just as he was to Hegel: havi
been born in the evening, when 'the shades of night are gathering', he would joke abou
being the owl of Minerva.8 Much of this was of course ironic, but behind the humour 
there seems to be a sense in which he really did view himself and the S.I. as 
contemporary embodiments of the 'thought of history', and as having been afforded a 
'higher' perspective than their predecessors by virtue of their historical location.9  
 In order to introduce this we might look again, very briefly, at one of the many 
examples of his enthusiasm for history's 'bad side'. Debord himself claimed that he ha
                                                 
4 A tract produced in celebration of that centenary featured a photograph of Marx with an added speech 
ist 
5 
6 
7 
9 
the 
 “as for 
m (often caused by political 
e progressive in their own countries, they play a reactionary role 
S.I. 2006, p.35; 2006, p.319-20). Again, this is tempered by Debord 
ents on the need for a global revolution (see for example his remarks on Congolese 
e 
evelopment must be resolved on a worldwide scale, beginning with the revolutionary 
). 
10  p.146; 2006, p.1349 
bubble: “On 28th September 1964 it will be exactly one hundred years since we started the Situation
International. It's really going to get going now!” (Gray 1998, p.118).  
S.I. 2006, p.379;1997, p.673 
Debord 2003, p.127; 2006, p.1310 
See for example Debord 1974b. 
8 Hussey 2002, p.13 
This should be tempered by noting that Debord and the S.I. recognised their own inevitable historical 
location and limitation: in his 'Theses on the S.I. and its Times', Debord wrote: “Whoever helps 
present age to discover its potential is [not]... shielded from this age's defects” (S.I. 2003, p.72; 
Debord 2006, p.1133). Nonetheless, when describing the evolution of culture, Debord held that
the productions of people who are still subject to cultural colonialis
oppression), even though they may b
in the advanced cultural centres” (
and the S.I.'s comm
revolutionary movement (Debord 2006, p.692)); yet even there one can still find a sense in which th
'higher' expresses the true nature of the 'lower'. When discussing Algeria he wrote that 
“underd
domination of the irrational overdevelopment of productive forces in...the various forms of 
rationalised capitalism” (S.I. 2006, p.191, translation altered; 1997, p.458, emphasis in the original
Debord 2003,
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be...intolerable”.11 He and the S.I. had enlisted in the “Devil's Party”12 (an unattributed
reference to Blake),13 and his remarks even take on messianic overtones14 when he 
casts himself and the S.I. as “emissaries of the Prince of Division”.15 Amongst such
comments is his adoption of Mallarmé's claim that “Destruction was my Beatrice”,16 
and if we place this in relation to one of Marx's own references to The Divine Come
we can form a quick illustration of the S.I.'s purported Aufhebung of classical Marxism
In the conclusion to the first preface to Capital's first volume Marx wrote as follow
 
I welcome every opinion based on scientific criticism. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion
which I have never made concessions, now, as ever, my maxim is that of the great Florentine: 'Segui il
corso, e lascia dir le genti. [Go on your way, and let the people talk]'17  
 
 Marx is quoting Canto V, line 13 of the Purgatorio. When beginning t
of Mount Purgatory Dante and Virgil pass the souls of the 'late repentant': individuals 
who are punished for their indolence with a delay in t
pauses to listen to them marvel at his corporeal nature he is scolded by Virgil, who 
reminds him of the need to strive ever upwards towards the divine.18 At each stage
the Divine Comedy Dante – as protagonist rather than as narrator – mirrors the nature o
the circle that he passes through,19 and in this instance he reflects the idle souls' concern
with the worldly and the trivial. Given that this reflection of context and mentality
concern with developmental movement chimes with Hegelian and Marxist notions of 
history, one could read Marx's further literary flourishes in this preface – which are 
largely given over to the “iron necessity” that governs the “natural laws of capitalist 
                                                 
11 Debord 2003, p.159; 2006, p.1364 
12 Debord 2003, p.173; 2006, p.1379 
13 This is not signalled in Debord's list of détournements, but he seems to be referencing Blake's Th
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in which Blake links the artistic, the passionate and the potentially 
transgressive to the 'diabolical': “the reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, 
and at liberty when of devils and Hell, is because he was a true poet and of the Devil's party witho
knowing it” (Blake 2008, p.129).  
14 Again, this is not signalled in Debord's list of détournements, but it seems to be an allusion to Jes
Christ, no less: “I am come to send fire on the earth...Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on
earth?  I tell you, nay, but rather division” (Luke 12, 49 – 56). Debord's 'Prince' is however the 
e 
ut 
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historical proletariat, as it is immediately cast as “he who has been wronged” (Debord 2003, p.174; 
, according to Debord’s notes to In Girum, was a password used by “Italian 
in (Debord 2006, p.1418).  
 
 
nd let the people talk! ...the man who lets his thoughts be turned aside/ by one 
t 
rth in Dante can be no more than the reflection of what it has in itself” (Sayers in Alighieri 
2006, p.1383); this
millenarists”, and referenced by Bakun
15 Debord 2003, p. 174, 2006, p.1381
16 Debord 2004, p.15; 2006, p.1663
17 Marx 1976, p.93 
18 “'Keep up with me a
thing or another, will lose sight/ of his true goal, his mind sapped of its strength” (Alighieri, 1985, 
p.49). 
19 “..the soul [in the afterlife] is fixed eternally in that which it has chosen...  Therefore the reaction i
calls fo
2001, p.50).  
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owever also contends that the defeat of the 1848 insurrections and 
 bolster that struggle with a knowledge of such 
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production”20 – with a certain degree of irony: for just as Dante mirrors the idle souls' 
preoccupation with the present, so too, according to Debord, does
d inism” reflect “the weakness of the revolutionary proletariat of his time.”21  
 Debord claims that for Marx “it is the struggle – and by no means [economic] 
law – that has to be understood,”22 and he would seem to hold Marx's calls for the 
realisation of philosophy and emphasis on pr
work. Debord h
Commune furthered Marx's attempts to
e
ground of the dominant forms of thought”.23 This gave rise to the “scientific-deter
side of Marx's thought”, which opened a “breach” into which the process of 
“'ideologisation'” was able to “penetrate”: “it was in this mutilated form, later ta
definitive, that Marx's theory became 'Marxism'.”24  
 One could in fact contend that Debord and the S.I. viewed Marxist 'eco
as an example of the very fetishism that Marx himself had identified: for 'upward' 
progress, to return to the illustration above, came to be hampered by an approach t
merely reflected the manner in which human history within capitalism really is shaped
“by the products of men's hands”25 rather than by the producers themselves.26 In 
contrast, as we saw in part one – and as Debord's negative Beatrice might indicate – 
and the S.I. advocated a constant negativity, perpetually opposed to the present moment, 
and thus opposed to any attribution of agency to economic or structural determination.27
Hence the S.I.'s dismissal of Ernest Mandel as a “Trotskyist” whose “Treatise on 
Marxist Economics by its title alone contradicts the whole revolutionary method of 
Marx”.28 Marx's account of the separated, generalised universalities of capitalism's 
operative abstractions – which as we saw in chapter five were said to be alienated from 
the particular individuals that they structure and articulate – was thus itself cast as a 
body of abstract law, separate from and even hostile towards the individuals whose 
historical self-awareness it purports to provide. In fact, its analysis of capitalism is 
                                                 
20 Marx 1976, p.91 
21 Debord 1995, p.55; 2006, p.797 
22 Debord 1995, p.52; 2006, p.795 
23 Debord 1995, p.55; 2006, p.797 
24 Debord 1995, pp.54-5; 2006, p.797 
 “some of [Marx's] views of capitalism reflect the influence of capitalist ideology 
4).  
 do not march in the street” (Quoted in Noys 2010, 
; 1997, p.442 
25 Marx 1976, p.165 
26 See also Castoriadis:
itself... [and] express, in their depths, the essence of the capitalist vision of man” (Castoriadis 197
27 As a slogan from May 1968 put it: “structures
p.54). 
28 S.I. 2006, p.217
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viewed as retaining the latter's inversion of subject and object, insofar as human age
remain subordinate to the 'law
 In contrast, the 'enemy' for Debord and the S.I. was not just capitalism itself, b
rather all separation from history; for the political failures of the 20th century were held 
to have revealed that “the revolutionary organisation...can no longer combat alienatio
by means of alienated forms of struggle”.29  
   
Marxism as Ideology and Spectacle 
 
 These claims can be contextualised by noting some of the influences that 
informed them, amongst which are Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy and Lukács' 
History and Class Consciousness. Both appeared in 1923, but received French 
translations in 1964 and 1960 respectively (helped in part by the notoriety engendered
by the Party's initially hostile reaction to these works). Korsch's Marxism and 
Philosophy is particularly pertinent, as it set out to combat the Second Internatio
tendency towards social democracy and static ideology. In a sense it prefigures the 
Situationists' attempts to retrieve the communist project from its own representatio
and similarly claims that Marxism should be an ong
 
nal's 
n, 
oing historical movement rather 
 
 by 
ing 
 
urces 
ukács 
has been discussed already, but we can note here History and Class Consciousness' 
 'bourgeois' thought's essential error lay in its tendency to view the 
ed 
    
than a theoretical depiction of a particular historical moment. For Korsch, reducing 
Marxism to a set of economic laws entailed separating its connection to the construction
of history, and thus invited reformism: for if it remains “within the limits of bourgeois 
society and the bourgeois state,” its criticisms will “no longer necessarily develop
their very nature into revolutionary practice.”30 The official denunciations that Korsch 
received31 furthered his drift towards the ultra-left,32 and by 1950 he would be argu
that “all attempts to re-establish the Marxist doctrine as a whole in its original function”
were “reactionary utopias”;33 revolutionary practice and theory should look to so
beyond Marx34 (a position that accords with the S.I.'s views on art and poetry). L
contention that
historical moment of capitalist society as an eternal truth: Debord seems to have view
                                             
Debord 1995, p.89; 2006, p.819, emphases in the original.  
Korsch 1970, p.57 
See 'The Present State of the Problem of 'Marxism and Philosophy'' in Korsch 1970, pp.89-129. 
See Giles-Peters 1973 for a useful overview. 
Korsch 1975 
Korsch 1975 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
145 
 part of 
e 
 
y 
 
cated 
al 
longer be 
Marx's talk of the 'natural laws of capitalist production' and their 'iron necessity' as 
exemplars of this very error.  
 The purportedly subversive credentials of a Hegelian approach to Marx were 
also promoted by Lefebvre, whose interest in the everyday and influence on the S.I. was 
discussed in chapter three. It might however also be noted here that a move towards 
something akin to the everyday can also be found in Sartre at this time. In his 'Search 
for a Method' – an essay that first appeared in 1957, and which would later form
the introduction to his Critique of Dialectical Reason – he objects to what he takes to b
Marxism's tendency to collapse the particularity of specific individuals and 
circumstances into a priori universal categories. “For the majority of Marxists,” Sartre 
writes, “to think is to claim to totalise and, under this pretext, to replace particularity by
a universal”.35 Such a method, he claims, “has already formed its concepts; it is alread
certain of their truth; it will assign to them the role of constitutive schemata. Its sole
purpose is to force the events, the persons, or the acts considered into prefabri
moulds.”36 Sartre's objections to classical Marxism are thus similar to the S.I.'s 
antipathy to abstract, universal economic 'laws', and he argues that any such univers
form ought to emerge from a study of the particular elements concerned,37 citing 
Lefebvre's concern with the everyday approvingly. 
 There are of course other influences and homologies that could be noted here, 
notable amongst which are the links that can be discerned with anarchist thought,38 but 
Debord's take on Marx can perhaps be framed in terms of the conjunction – afforded in 
the early 1960's by his friendship with Lefebvre, and by his brief membership of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie – between Lefebvre's interest in the everyday and Castoriadis' 
contention that the primary contradiction of modern capitalism could no 
conceived in classical terms. This can be illustrated by way of reference to Castoriadis' 
'Modern Capitalism and Revolution': a text that was drafted in 1959, but which 
coincided, in terms of its publication in Socialisme ou Barbarie, with Debord's 
                                                 
35
36
 Sartre 1960 
 Sartre 1960 
 men in depth, not dissolve them in a bath of sulphuric acid” (Sartre 
38 Debord also seems to have drawn on some anarchist writings, particularly those of Bakunin, whose 
tacit Hegelianism may have furthered Debord's interest. Bakunin objected to the “disciples of the 
mplaining of the subjugation of life and the individual to 
w: “What I preach is the revolt of life against science” (Bakunin 1970, p.59). See 
ociety of the Spectacle for Debord's criticism of anarchism, but it should be noted 
e Spanish anarchists of 1936 as having instituted “the most advanced model of 
ver realised” (Debord 1995, p.64; Debord 2006, p.803). 
37 “Marxism ought to study real
1960).  
doctrinaire school of German Communism” (Bakunin 1970, p.55) in a similar vein to Debord's 
objections to economic dogmatism, co
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th  not least because it emphasises subjective autonomy and claims that classical 
Marxism tends to replace the actions of individuals with “an objective dynamic and 
'natural' law”.40 For Castoriadis, unemployment had dropped, wages and the standar
living had risen, and the working class were said to be no longer a 'class for itself'. He 
however also held that class struggle remained an economic determinant, and when 
is viewed in connection to these new conditions it revealed, for Castoriadis, the 
redundancy of traditional Marxist analysis: capital’s ability to support a rise in wages, 
he held, jars with the theory of surplus-value; and as these increases result from class 
struggle, individuals must be possessed of a greater degree of agency than that which he 
held to be allowed by Marx's laws and tendencies (or indeed by the bureaucrat
of political organisation that he claimed Marx's account fostered). The revolutionary 
potential within modern capitalism could thus no longer be understood in terms of 
surplus-value extraction, and instead a new contradiction was identified. For 
Castoriadis, capitalism is obliged to both include and exclude its workers: to reduce 
them to mere order-takers and automatons in production, alienated from their own 
activity, but also to foster the subjectivity that production denies through consumption. 
Neither requirement can be fully satisfied, and the result is a disaffected workforce and 
the consequent division of society into “order-givers and order-takers”.41 This obviously 
chimes with Debord and the S.I.'s own views, particularly when one note
c  which I drew attention to in chapter two – that this new context might en
a revolt that would criticise “all aspects of contemporary life, a criticism far more 
profound than anything attempted in the past”.42 Thus “narrow 'economic' and 'po
issues,” he claimed, were tending to become “less and less relevant”.43  
 This brings us to Debord and the S.I.'s 'new' proletariat; a concept that aros
part as a response to the apparent absence from modern capitalism of the material 
poverty that had exercised Marx. Addressing this will bring us towards some of the
problems in Debord's account.  
 
The 'New Proletariat' 
                                                 
39 The text appeared in Socialisme ou Barbarie #31-33 between 1960-1; Debord was a member of S ou 
B from the end of 1960 to May 1961. 
40 Castoriadis 1974 
41 Castoriadis 1974 
42 Castoriadis 1974 
43 Castoriadis 1974 
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 In chapter five I made reference to Hegel's 'universal class', as described in h
Philosophy of Right, and I also discussed Marx's appropriation of that concept
critique of Hegel's text. We saw that for Hegel this was a class of state bureaucrats, 
tasked with mediating the general and particular interests of society; for Marx, on the 
other hand, the true universal class was th
abolishing the separated, false universality of bourgeois society and with institutin
more authentic form of commonality. Thus where Hegel presented the bourgeois stat
the actualisation of the Idea, Marx called for its abolition via the realisation of a n
and more genuine form of social community. I also noted that the rallying cry of Marx's 
universal class – “I am nothing and I should be everything”44 – bears marked 
resemblance to the existential drive of Debord and the S.I.'s own proletariat, particularly
as regard the latter's drive towards a form of subject-object unity. Yet where Marx's 
universal class stood opposed to the bourgeoisie, and was to afford the conditi
true universality through the revolutionary supersession of that opposing class, Debord 
and the S.I.'s formulation involved a move away from traditional notions of class and 
economic categorisation. The universality of their own proletariat stems from its 
ubiquity, which in turn derives from its opposition to separation rather than to econom
factors per se. Thus where the spectacle cannot be reduced to capital alone, so too is th
force that would address it irreducible to purely economic determinants. 
 In this regard it may be helpful t
p riat and Debord and Vaneigem's comments on 'survival', as this will take 
to their views on the technical redundancy of wage labour. Marx had defined the 
proletarian class as all those deprived of the means of independently reproducing their 
own means of subsistence, and thereby compelled to sell their labour-power for a 
wage;45 for Debord and the S.I. however, technology and automation meant that
capital's continued growth mea
bolishing wage labour altogether, just as the goods and needs that capital was said to 
nufacture in order to mask its own obsolescence were be
and banal (“the consumption of goods,” clai
seeds of its own destruction and the conditions of its own transcendence”).46 Although
 
45 
46 
44 Marx 1975, p.254, emphasis in the original 
Marx 1976, p.272; see also p.874.  
Vaneigem 1994, p.162 
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the abundance of commodities had solved the “basic problem of survival”, it had do
so “only in such a way that the same problem is continually being regenerated at a 
higher level”:47 in the midst of abundance, in other words, humanity was still 
continually obliged to labour not only for the essentials of survival (or rather for th
basic requirements of life within such a society),48 but for the gilded poverty of what 
Debord termed “augmented survival”.49  
 Hence the links suggested in chapter three between spectatorship and the 
Hegelian unhappy consciousness: for as Vaneigem put it, “the consumer cannot and 
must not ever attain satisfaction: the logic of the consumable object demands the
creation of fresh needs, yet the accumulation of such false needs exacerbates the mala
of men confined with increasing difficulty solely to the status of consumers”.50 
However, for Debord in 1967 the recognition and supersession of this constant pursuit 
of one's own alienated self was almost inevitable, because capital could never fully 
master and subsume human desire: it could only attempt to satisfy it with the 
“consumable survival”51 of more commodities, the increasing abundance of which was
inversely proportional to their ability to satisfy. Through locating revolutionary potential
within this “air-cond
p  the S.I. felt they'd identified the possibility of a new mode of life altogether: 
revolutionary future that would not constitute a more equitable version of the present, 
modelled on a 'fairer' form of production and distribution, but which would instead
constitute something genuinely new.53  
  The salient issue here is that the obsolescence of labour also meant the 
obsolescence of politics based reductively around labour, and thus precluded the 
restriction of the proletariat to the working class per se. This is not to deny the centr
of the latter within this expanded proletariat. In 1962 the S.I. claimed that those who 
object, based on capitalist society's increasing wealth in commodities, that “the 
                   
95, p.28;  2006, p.778 
 “...the number and extent of [the worker's] so-called necessary requirements, as also the manner in 
50 Vaneigem 1994, p.162 
0 
efore in 
icism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo” (Marx 1975, p.244, emphasis 
t to overcome scarcity, but to master material abundance 
.not just changing the way it is shared out, but totally re-orienting it” 
47 Debord 19
48
which they are satisfied, are themselves products of history, and depend therefore to a great extent on 
the level of civilisation attained by a country...” Marx 1976, p.275 
49 Debord 1995, p.28; 2006, p.778 
51 Debord 1995, p.30; 2006, p.779-8
52 S.I. 2006, p.103; 1997, p.246. This is an allusion to Marx: “The criticism of religion is ther
embryo the crit
in the original). 
53 “...for the first time the problem is no
according to new principles. ..
(S.I. 2006, pp.198-9; 1997, p.419). 
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reactionary, because the 
arx states that “the worker stands on a higher plane than the capitalist ... 
ince the latter has his roots in the process of alienation and finds absolute satisfaction 
 confronts it as a rebel”.57 Yet with the 
anality of spectacular life the ubiquity of alienation and external determination is 
and 
dy 
o 
 
existential concern that individuals “are not the masters of their own activities, of their 
f the 
S
 
Th  
per
    
proletariat has been integrated or that the workers are now satisfied”, were “either 
declaring themselves satisfied [with the present]” or “identifying themselves with some 
ategory separate from the workers”.54 Such a claim would be c
workers' demand for the supersession of wage-labour was necessarily one with a 
broader, more universal desire to supersede the banality of a society founded on wage-
labour55 (Dauvé is thus quite wrong to claim that “an historically insurmountable 
incompatibility” existed between the S.I.'s mottoes of “'Down with Work!' and 'Power to 
the Workers !'”).56 This point can be clarified by referring back to the sense in which 
both worker and capitalist are equally determined by capital. Although both are 
alienated, M
s
in it whereas ... the worker is a victim who
b
rendered all the more obvious. Opposition to capital thus breaks the class divide, 
ceases to be bound to industrial struggles within the workplace. It is for these reasons 
that the S.I. contended that the “new proletariat” was “tending to encompass everybo
[tout le monde].”58  
 This new proletariat is clearly akin to Castoriadis' 'order-takers', opposed t
whom stand society's 'order-givers'. For example, in 1963 – and thus after Debord's 
membership of S ou B – the S.I. wrote that “in the context of the reality presently 
beginning to take shape, we may consider as proletarians all people who have no 
possibility of altering the space-time that society allots to them,” and held that the 
“rulers are those who organise this space-time, or at least have a significant margin of
personal choice”;59 in 1965 they wrote that “a new proletarian consciousness” was 
emerging amongst the population, and described this as being marked by the seemingly 
own lives”. This view can be seen to lead directly into 1967's The Society o
pectacle: 
e proletariat is the bearer of the revolution that cannot leave anything outside itself, the exigency of the
manent domination of the present over the past,60 and the total critique of separation... No quantitative 
                                             
54 S.I. 2006, p.111; 1997, p.253   
See for example Debord' comments on May 1968 (e.g. S.I. 2006, pp.288-9; 1997, p.571). 
Dauvé 2000  
55 
56 
58 
60 
57 Marx 1976, p.990 
Knabb 2006, p.111; S.I. 1997, p.253 
59 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.309 
A reference to The Communist Manifesto: “In bourgeois society...the past dominates the present; in 
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isfaction, 
e in the 
ern to historically ground his claims within a specific context,62 the 
 the 
relief of its poverty, no illusory hierarchical incorporation, can supply a lasting cure for its dissat
for the proletariat cannot truly recognise itself in any particular wrong it has suffered, nor therefor
righting of any particular wrong, nor even in the righting of a great many of these wrongs, but only in the 
absolute wrong of being rejected [and cast] to the margins of life.61 
 
 In sum, the new proletariat were simply those who wanted more from life, as 
opposed to those satisfied with the present or engaged in maintaining it. Thus despite 
Debord's conc
defining contradiction within modern society was viewed in terms of an abstract 
opposition between a fixed present and a potential future. This, despite the virtues of
S.I.'s work, perhaps serves to highlight their rather limited take on capitalist social 
relations.  
 
 The Image and the Commodity 
 
 I've argued that the spectacle, on my reading, over-arches capitalism and 
includes it within itself, despite the degree to which the spectacle is itself brought to ful
expression by capitalism.
l 
d 
 1969 
's 
ort, 
ich appeared in the February 1968 edition of La Quinzaine 
63 As I've also indicated, if the spectacle is not reductively 
equivalent to capitalism, then it would seem that it cannot be restrictively identified 
with the commodity and its fetish. One could also contend that to make a direct, 
reductive equation between the commodity and the image is in fact to contradict Debor
and the S.I.'s own statements. This can be illustrated by way of reference to their
article 'How Not to Understand Situationist Books', which responded to published 
criticisms of recent works by Debord, Vaneigem and Viénet.64 As regards Debord
book, the review singled out for attack was a highly critical article by Claude Lef
who was an ex-member of S ou B (albeit prior to Debord's own membership of that 
group).65 Lefort's article, wh
                                                                                                                                               
Communist society the present dominates the past” (Engels and Marx 1985, pp.97-8). 
61 Debord 1995, p.85, translation altered; 2006, p.816, emphasis in the original 
62 This historical location is important, and Debord can be seen to criticise a member of the Italia
section for neglecting it, referring to his work as idealism (Debord 2006, p.341). A similar pos
can be found in his critique of anarchism, as set out in The Society of the Spectacle: his objectio
seems not to be to anarchism per se, but rather with the degree to which it expects its demands t
immediately realisable regardless of historical context. Debord's insistence on the difference between 
the S.I. and anarchism would seem to be largely due to the sense in which Situationist possibilities are 
n 
ition 
n 
o be 
bound to a specific technological, artistic and economic juncture. 
63 
st the spectacle; the moment at which the revolution discovers its task in the general and 
004a, p.44). 
 the Spectacle (1967), The Revolution of Everyday Life (1967) and Enragés and 
 the Occupations Movement (1968) respectively. 
ad been viewed unfavourably by Debord in the late 1950's. In the 
ionniste discussed above, which was written nearly ten years later, he is 
“[I]t is now the hour of the spectacle... one also recognizes the present-day moment as that of the 
struggle again
direct realization of all historical life” (Debord 2
64 The Society of
Situationists in
65  As noted in chapter two, Lefort h
article in Internationale Situat
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m 
f the 
on fetishism, Debord is said to lead us to “understand that it is not the 
ystem of commodity production to which we owe the phantasmagoric movement that 
goria governs that of 
ommodities.”68 Lefort, in other words, seems to have read the spectacle as coterminous 
 
 
nds 
thus erroneously focussing on the fetish and obscuring its real 
med that 
 
n 
r historical tendency towards the production of alienated 
social power. However, if one remembers that commodity capitalism brings that 
ap
                                                                                             
Littéraire, is in fact interesting in its own right: although he makes a number of 
interpretive errors, he also presents several critical points that echo aspects of my own, 
and it's perhaps significant that the S.I.'s replies to these points were largely ad homine
and insubstantial. They were however fully justified in attacking the conclusions that 
Lefort draws from his contention that Debord simply changes “the commodity into the 
spectacle”.66  
 According to Lefort, Debord is “intoxicated [grisé]”67 by Marx's account o
fetish. Drunk 
s
inhabits [commodities]; rather, the production of the phantasma
c
with the commodity fetish, or as a grand extension of the latter. He thus contends that
Debord confuses the fetish with the 'self-moving substance' of value (he presumably had
Debord's references to the spectacle's “self-movement” in mind).69 His article remi
us, in a rather didactic manner, that for Marx it is value that makes commodities move 
and not the fetish, and in 
basis Debord is said to have missed the real source of the problem. In general terms, 
Lefort is quite correct: Debord does indeed address a symptom as if it were a cause. 
However, in terms of the technical components of the theory, Lefort is wrong: the real 
symptom that Debord focuses on is not the fetish, but rather a far broader, trans-
historical notion of alienated power; and where Lefort holds that Debord clai
the production of the fetish governs that of commodities, Debord himself (as the 
Situationists were quick to point out) had in fact stated “the exact opposite”: the 
spectacle, as the S.I. put it in their response, is “simply a moment of the development of
commodity production”.70  
 That statement could be taken to contradict my claim that commodity productio
is in fact a moment of a broade
tendency to its full expression, thus actualising it and making it manifest, then the 
parent contradiction is perhaps alleviated. Debord's own actual words in the passage 
                                                  
lutionary organisation as doomed to collapse into 
97, p.616 
68 
69 
charged with the conservatism of having cast all revo
bureaucracy. 
66 Lefort 1968; S.I. 2006, p.341; S.I. 19
67 Lefort 1968 
Lefort 1968 
Debord 1995, p.26, 2006, p.776 
70 S.I. 2006, p.341; 1997, p.616 
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r that has 
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to which the S.I.’s response to Lefort refers are in fact as follows: “The spectacle 
corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonis
of social life”.71 This need not entail a reductive identity between the commodity and 
the spectacle: rather, as indicated above, commodity capitalism is simply the form that 
is, at present, most adequate to the economic tendency towards separated powe
given rise to the spectacle. If a different social system was introduced that replicated
even advanced that separation, then it would be characterised by its own mode of 
spectacle.72   
 
The Spectacle and the 'Principle' of the Commodity Fetish 
 
 This returns us to Debord's claim that the spectacle exhibits the “princ
commodity fetishism”
iple of 
 a 
d 
human needs” is said to have 
t not 
e 
ly 
n as 
 a use-
73 (my italics), and to my contention that this 'principle' entails
departure from Marx's account. In order to address this we might look back to the 
'augmented survival' mentioned above, and to the connection between that concept an
the notion of use-value.  
 Within the spectacle the “satisfaction of primary 
been replaced by the “ceaseless manufacture of pseudo-needs”.74 This means tha
only had the forms of use and need proper to survival per se been bound up within the 
framework of capitalist value: in addition, the spectacle was “monopolising” th
“fulfilment” of “all human use-value”.75 This leads Debord to claim that the 
contradictory tension between use-value and exchange-value had given way to the 
victory of the latter over the former.76 Use-value, he claims, having become entire
secondary to the commodity's capacity to realise capital, is now required to functio
an alibi;77 and as the commodity's real utility is eroded, it comes to function as
value qua commodity (a prime example of Debord's point can perhaps be found in the 
'pet rock' fad of the 1970's).78  
                                                 
71 Debord 1995, p.29; 2006, p.778 
72  
 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 ed, 
r-
1).  
ary Dahl came up with the idea of marketing 
“[W]ill...future peoples dominate, through an emancipated practice, the current technique, which is
globally that of the simulacrum and dispossession? Or...will they be dominated by it in a manner that
is even more hierarchical and pro-slavery than today?” (Debord 2006, p.1592).  
Debord 1995, p.26; 2006, p.776 
Debord 1995, p.34, translation altered;  2006, p.782 
Debord 1995, p.31; 2006, p.780 
Debord 1995, pp.31-2; 2006, p.780 
“The use-value that was formerly implicit within exchange-value must now be explicitly proclaim
within the inverted reality of the spectacle, precisely because its effective reality is eroded by the ove
development of commodity production” (Debord 1995, p.32, translation altered; 2006, p.78
78 In 1975 an American advertising executive named G
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key 
l fixation on 
e branding, denotations, kudos etc. of an item (i.e. as opposed to the actual bearing of 
 of conscious control over the organisation of social 
ctivity). Yet just as we saw Postone present the more seemingly problematic aspects of 
ence, ceases to refer 
nything like as explicitly to labour and surplus-value.  
 
is position would seem to be that labour becomes a less important economic 
eterm
eal' 
 
our. 
 is 
 Debord's primary concern here is with the construction of 'false' needs, but these 
positions do bring him close to something akin to Baudrillard's notion of symbolic 
value:79 for if commodities are purchased because of their symbolic denotations, then 
we're extremely close to a perspective from which such denotations are viewed as 
economic determinants, eclipsing that of labour. Furthermore, despite his own 
understanding of Marx, Debord also comes close to adopting a position akin to the 
common assumption that the commodity fetish simply refers to an irrationa
th
Marx's concept on the abdication
a
the labour theory of value as a marker for its validity, here too Debord presents the 
disparity between this more superficial notion of fetish and Marx's own as a 
demonstration of capitalism having given rise to a purer, more concentrated form of 
fetishism: for here we have a sense in which the commodity mystifies not because it 
masks the social relations from which it arose, but rather because of the status that it 
confers and the desire that it attracts. Mystification, in consequ
a
 Debord does not explicitly reject a classical labour theory of value – the 
importance of alienated activity is after all crucial to his account – but the corollary of
th
d inant than the images and ideas associated with its products. This however 
follows from his views on society's technical capacity to end wage labour: for insofar as 
the symbolic dimensions of the commodity pertain not to the satisfaction of 'r
material needs, but rather to the pseudo-needs and uses generated by a redundant 
economic system in order to ensure its perpetuity – if, in other words, useless 
commodities arise from labour’s obsolescence – then to desire the use of these entirely
useless commodities is implicitly to desire the use of a world without lab
 The sheer scale of the inversion of subjects and objects described by Marx
                                                                                                                                               
stones as pets. They were sold, wrapped in straw and enclosed in a cardboard box (complete with 
breathing holes) for $3.95. Whilst the real product was the packaging and manual, which instructed 
the purchaser on how to care for their stone, the labour value of these items was clearly very low 
indeed. The fad lasted six months, and made Dahl a millionaire. Again, one can respond to this by way
of Marxian economics, and present it as a 'surface phenomena' supported by the broader mass of 
production and consumption; in volume three of Capital Marx himself notes the existence of 
 
commodities without value (“the exceptional cases of those commodities which have prices without 
onsidered here” (Marx 1991, p.292)). Nonetheless, the pet rock – 
now be purchased on Ebay – does perhaps provide an example of the 
a which concerned Debord jar with the classical account.  
43-4; 2006, p.789. 
having any value will not be c
antique versions of which can 
degree to which the phenomen
79 See for example Debord 1995, p.
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ersion, 
: 
t 
n 
thus viewed as having resulted in a situation in which the actual cause of that inv
i.e. the wage relation, has become increasingly irrelevant. The problem however is this
if labour and production drop from view, then one also begins to lose a clear sense of 
capital’s status as a social relation (or at the very least, one begins to lose sight of 
Marx’s views on the latter); and with that loss comes that of a clear sense of quite wha
capital actually is, and of how it might be addressed. Instead, we end up with a positio
that comes extremely close to positing capital as an entity in its own right. 
 
Production and Consumption 
 
 I've already drawn attention to the S.I.'s classification of the proletariat as all 
those denied the ability to organise the “space-time” that “society allots to them”.80 It 
might now be added here that the opposing class that these individuals stood against 
 
82  
ication 
e duty of the masses.”   
It might be helpful to show how this informed the S.I.'s understanding of 
ix 
 
m Fall of the Spectacle-Commodity Economy', 
d circulated in England and the U.S. by the end of that 
was simply described as “those who organise this space-time”.81 And, insofar as the 
rulers organised whilst the ruled received direction, Debord and the S.I. presented the 
revolutionary class as 'consumers' rather than as 'producers':  
 
The vast majority everywhere consumes the odious, soul-destroying social space-time 'produced' by a 
tiny minority. (It should be noted that this minority produces literally nothing except this organisation, 
whereas the 'consumption' of space-time, in the sense we are using here, encompasses the whole of
ordinary production, in which the alienation of consumption and of all life obviously has its roots.)
 
 Consumption – figured in terms of the passive experience of one's own life – 
thus becomes the defining paradigm for production, by virtue of the fact that reif
and rationalisation now pertain to the entirety of the individual's activity and 
experience: one simply 'consumes' the life to which one is assigned. And, just as 
production is encompassed by consumption, so too does consumption become just as 
alienated as production: “alienated consumption,” as Debord put it in 1967, had been 
“added to alienated production as an inescapabl 83
 
political revolt. In 1965 the Watts district of Los Angeles erupted in a riot that lasted s
days, and which resulted in 34 deaths and over 3400 arrests. The S.I. responded with a
se inal essay entitled 'The Decline and 
which they quickly translated an
                                                 
80 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.309 
81 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.309 
82 S.I. 2006, p.141; 1997, p.309 
83 Debord 1995, p.29; 2006, p.779 
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d bove (“the Los Angeles rebellion,” wrote the S.I., “is the first in history to 
,85 
ld of 
ropaganda literally, insofar as they demanded “to possess now all the objects shown 
 to 
88 se the 
tempt to reclaim life itself. This however 
y 
 back 
 
roductive, historical potential of society is alienated as a whole, and returned as 
lar elements that ensure the continued atomisation of the individuals 
oncerned. This process ensures its own perpetuity: in the diffuse spectacle one 
atts 
year. The text links predominantly working class unrest to the “new poverty”84 
scribe  ade
justify itself with the argument that there was no air-conditioning during a heatwave”)
and it explicitly casts the riot as “a rebellion against the commodity, against the wor
the commodity”.86 Debord and the S.I. claimed that the rioters took modern capitalist 
p
and abstractly accessible”.87 In doing so, the rioters were “challenging [the] exchange-
value [of these objects], the commodity reality which moulds them and marshals them
its own ends,” insofar as this was a demand to “use them”.  In other words, becau
spectacle must locate all 'human use-value' within its framework, the riot constituted a 
direct challenge to the spectacular order: an at
reflects the sense in which the contradiction that marks spectacular society is essentially 
that between 'life' and the “non-life”89 of the spectacle. 
 According to Debord, in the diffuse spectacle the “entirety of labour sold” is 
transformed overall into “the total commodity,” which is then “returned in fragmentary 
[i.e. reified] form to a fragmentary individual completely cut off from the concerted 
action of the forces of production”.90 Within the concentrated spectacle “the commodit
[that] the bureaucracy appropriates is the totality of social labour, and what it sells
to society – en bloc – is society's survival”.91 In both cases the universality of the
p
fragmentary, particu
c
continually chases the perpetually receding satisfactions of augmented survival; in the 
concentrated spectacle it is survival itself that is eked out. In consequence, the W
rioters' desire to claim all use-value, here and now, is implicitly a demand for 
unification, and a desire to break that endless pursuit; an attempt to move beyond the 
constant flight of the unhappy consciousness.  
 
A revolt against the spectacle – even if limited to a single district such as Watts – calls everything into 
question because it is a human protest against a dehumanised life, a protest of real individuals against 
                                                 
84 S.I. 2006 p.141; 1997, p.309 
85 S.I. 2006 p.200; 1997, pp.419-20 
86 S.I. 2006, p.197, emphasis in the original 
87 S.I. 2006, p.197, emphasis in the original 
88 S.I. 2006, p.197, emphasis in the original 
06, p.779 
p.41; 2006, p.787 
89 Debord 1995, p.12; 2006, p.766 
90 Debord 1995, p.29; 20
91 Debord 1995, 
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t 
 
d and 
 
heory 
s within it is replaced by an emphasis on opposition to it; hence the 
their separation from a community that could fulfil their true human and social nature and transcend the 
spectacle.92  
   
 Yet whilst this hints at the forms of subject-object unity discussed earlier, my 
concern here is with the degree to which these views depart from Marx's own. For 
example, towards the end of the Capital's first volume Marx makes the following cl
 
The capitalist class is constantly giving to the working class drafts, in the form of money, on a portion of
the product produced by the latter and appropriated by the former. The workers give these drafts back jus
as constantly to the capitalists, and thereby withdraw from the latter their allotted share of their own
product.93   
 
 Where Marx emphasises opposition between classes, Debord, drawing on 
Marx's notion of universalised alienation, presents a generalised opposition between life 
and present society. So what then is capital?  
 The primacy of labour value would seem to have fallen away within Debor
the S.I.'s account. An emphasis on the wage relation had become anachronistic, 
entailing a move away from a focus on surplus-value, and economic analysis was cast
as a foray into the enemy's territory. As a result, and despite its other virtues, the t
of spectacle offers little in terms of the analysis of capital. In Debord's account social 
existence is alienated 'en bloc': as a result, any sense in which there might be intrinsic 
contradiction
abstract dichotomy between 'life' and 'capital' (or rather 'non-life') noted above.  
 
Cause and Effect 
 
 These claims can perhaps be clarified by way of reference to Dauvé and Lefort
who both make similar objections. Dauvé's seminal 'Critique of the Si
, 
tuationist 
ld 
a whole; Dauvé’s phrasing here seems to associate it with exchange alone. The point 
                                                
International' (1979) contains a short section on Debord's theoretical problems that 
informs and echoes some of my own objections.  According to Dauvé, for example, “the 
S.I. had no analysis of capital: it understood it, but through its effects. It criticized the 
commodity, not capital – or rather, it criticized capital as commodity, and not as a 
system of valuation which includes production as well as exchange.”94 Now, one cou
be a little pedantic here: as we saw in chapter five, the commodity is in fact intrinsic to 
both production and exchange, and by extension to the organisation of social activity as 
 
3; 1997, p.423, emphasis in the original. 
13 
92 S.I. 2006, p.20
93 Marx 1990, p.7
94 Dauvé 1979 
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ect 
er 
sing, marketing, fashions etc. as the defining feature of modern 
cuses on them rather than attending to the mode of production that 
ey reflect. On my reading, on the other hand, Debord is in fact describing a far 
till 
 
one 
 account of the fetish set out in the first 
bounds of value per se). Yet that move away from a theoretical engagement with value's 
s that some of Lefort's objections can, like Dauvé's, be maintained: “the 
                         
however is that he correctly identifies Debord and the S.I.'s disavowal, or simply their 
disinterest, in capital's basis in the exploitation of labour. “Debord,” Dauvé writes, 
“remains at the stage of circulation, lacking the necessary moment of production, of 
productive labour”, despite the fact that what “nourishes capital is not consumption, as 
[Debord] leads one to understand, but [rather] the formation of value by labour.”95  
 Rather like Lefort, whom I'll return to in a moment, Dauvé reaches this corr
conclusion by the wrong route. Although he claims that Debord “reduces capitalism to 
its spectacular dimension alone”,96 he seems, as I noted in the thesis' general 
introduction, to link the spectacle to the ideological and semiotic forms that perpetuate 
the capitalist order; Debord's 'representations' are thus treated in what seem to be rath
literal terms. In consequence, Dauvé's correct complaint as to the absence of labour 
from the spectacle also seems meant in literal terms: on Dauvé's reading, Debord 
presents adverti
capitalism, and fo
th
broader notion of alienation. Yet despite this disparity, Dauvé's major complaints s
stand. For example, he claims that the theory of spectacle is an example of the 'fetishism
of capital':  
 
In the fetishism of commodities, the commodity appears as its own movement. By the fetishism of 
capital, capital takes on an autonomy which it does not possess, presenting itself as a living being... 
does not know where it comes from, who produces it, by what process the proletarian engenders it, by 
what contradiction it lives and may die.97  
 
 This is of course precisely what the initial
chapter of volume one evolves into, but again that's beside the point: the issue here is 
that Debord's focus on effects results in a disavowal of their causes.  
 Dauvé's claim is in fact also similar to Lefort's objections, which I drew attention 
to above. As we saw earlier, for Lefort Debord presents the fetish as the motive force of 
capital, ignoring value and its basis in labour. As we also noted, this is strictly incorrect: 
the spectacle is distinct from the fetish (if anything, Debord adopts the sense in which 
capitalist value is composed of separated power, but then extrapolates it beyond the 
real basis mean
                        
95 Dauvé 1979 
96 Dauvé 1979 
97 Dauvé 1979 
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cterises 
 of absolute knowing: referencing 
egel’
society of the spectacle,” Lefort writes, “is laid out before a gaze that is never troubled, 
and which wants to know nothing of the place in which it is made.”98 This is becau
alienation is “distributed according to a panoramic perspective”;99 and whilst the S
rightly objected to the placid vision that Lefort thus identifies (“Lefort is therefore able 
to reach the pleasing conclusion that 'according to Debord, all history is futile'!”),100
does perhaps illustrate the sense in which the absence of the antagonistic relations 
engendered by value production render history's re-appearance somewhat mysterious. 
Mocking Debord's Hegelianism (the frequency with which Hegelian sentence reversals 
occur in The Society of the Spectacle is described as “obsessional”), Lefort chara
this re-appearance as the philosopher's attainment
H s notorious ‘cunning of reason’, he writes that “unreason would also seem to be 
cunning”, as “the spectacle of society is accomplished in the spirit of Debord.”101  
  
True and False  
 
 By way of conclusion I'll briefly address the following. One might object, 
against my claims as to the existence of an abstract dichotomy in Debord's theory, that 
he presents the spectacle as being marked by dialectical relations. I would however 
contend that Debord's examples of the spectacle's dialectical characteristics can in fact
be used to reinforce my argument. This can be illustrated by looking at one of The 
Society of the Spectacle's most frequently quoted and often misunderstood statements:
namely, its assertion that “In a world that is really inverted [renversé], the true is a 
moment of the false.”
 
 
 complex. It's actually an oblique reference to 
 
r, 
 Hegel to write that “the 
lse is no longer, qua false, a moment of truth.”104 However, Debord perhaps picked up 
102  
 Debord's claim here is in fact quite
a passage in Hegel's preface to the Phenomenology,103 in which Hegel explains that 
although the genuinely true subsumes the false, the false cannot be considered to be a
moment of the true: the terms 'true' and 'false' rely on their distinction from one anothe
and thus lose their original meaning within that unity. This leads
fa
on this passage through Lukács, who refers to it by way of a rather opaque formulation 
                                                 
98 Lefort, 196  8
 Lefort, 1968 
100 S.I. 2006, p.341; S.I. 1997, p.616 
101 Lefort 1968 
99
102 Debord 1995, p.14 
103 Debord 2006, p.862 
104 Hegel 1977, p.23 
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) has been rendered 'false' as a result of its alienation. The second move implies 
at the world of the spectacle is devoid of the genuine unity of identity in difference 
hich would entail that the unity of 'truth' and 'falsity' has a higher meaning than that 
ossessed by the two terms when in binary opposition), and thus implies the need for 
authentic unity and an end to separation. 
  However, if all 'true', lived practice is a moment of the spectacle's 'falsity', then 
the possibility for authenticity and organic unity exists only as a potential denied by 
present existence. This remains the case even if one attends to Debord's emphases on 
the dialectical interplay of subject and object. He stresses that:  
 
One cannot abstractly oppose the spectacle to actual social activity; this division is itself divided. The 
spectacle that inverts the real is in fact produced. At the same time, lived reality is materially invaded by 
the contemplation of the spectacle, incorporating the spectacular order and thereby giving it positive 
cohesiveness.107  
 
                                                
in his first preface to History and Class Consciousness. Historical materialism, Lukács
explains there, regards the intellectual as an aspect of the material, and thus views 
ideological falsehoods as parts of a real (and thus 'true': note the link to Debord's 
equation of history to truth) historical whole. Such falsehoods are thus not false per
but rather 'true' and 'false' at the same time: for with “the pure historicisation of the 
dialectic” affected by historical materialism, “[Hegel's] statement receives yet another 
twist: insofar as the 'false' [ideology, idealist philosophy, etc.] is an aspect of the 
[historical reality] it is both 'false' and 'non-false'”.105 Lukács' implication woul
to be that the rigid dichotomy between 'true' and 'false' falls away when errors and 
falsehoods are viewed as historical phenomena.  
 Debord's own formulation – which he was sufficiently fond of to reference again 
in his Comments on the Society of the Spectacle106 – reverses Hegel's claim in a 
in ed by Lukács' own 'twist' on the latter. Debord reverses Hegel's statement in two 
senses: firstly, he switches the position of the 'true' and the 'false' within the statem
thus implying that the false subsumes the true rather than vice versa; secondly, he 
indicates that the one really can be considered as a moment of the other (Hegel s
the false cannot be understood as a moment of the true; Debord states that the true is 
moment of the false). The first of these two moves reflects something similar to L
equation of the 'true' to material, concrete, historical reality: the point is that the 'real' 
(i.e. 'life'
th
(w
p
 
105 Lukács 1971, p.xlvii  
, p.1622 
4, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.768 
106 Debord 1998, p.50; 2006
107 Debord 1995, p.1
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 The spectacle is al social practice. 
owever, as this interplay of ideal and material is presented as a cyclic exchange 
ation, and as the spectacle is thus both thought and 
es evident that one cannot make recourse to the existent, present 
 Yet as that assertion perhaps illustrates, 
    
 not just ideology, as we've seen: it is also re
H
between ideology and its actualis
practice, it becom
reality within spectacular society as a stable and external point of opposition to the 
spectacle, but only to the broader field of historical agency that encapsulates the latter 
(plus those few 'peripheral' areas of life that remain external to it). Thus despite 
Debord's claim in 1971 that “society still hasn't become homogeneous”,108 his 
theoretical model would seem to base opposition primarily within a dormant capacity, 
set against the homogenised block of the spectacular world. Opposition, therefore, 
becomes largely an ideal potential, and capital (or rather alienated power qua spectacle) 
becomes so wedded to present existence that it becomes almost indeterminate.  
 One can thus contend as follows. Debord's theory certainly does bear relation to 
Marxist studies of 'real abstraction', and when responding to claims that they had 
ignored the importance of capitalist labour the S.I. replied that “we believe that we 
[have] treated little to no other problem than that of the labour of our epoch; its 
conditions, its contradictions, its results.”109
labour becomes coterminous with life to such an extent that despite the theory of 
spectacle's affinity to real abstraction it is ultimately too abstract to be of much political 
use.  
 
 
 
                                             
Debord 2006, p.1064 
S.I. 1997, p.479 
108 
109 
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Conclusion to Part Two 
 
 
Universality and Particularity 
 
 In the first part of the thesis I organised the material under discussion – the 
philosophical framework of Debord's thought, its intellectual history and the S.I.'s early 
avant-garde beginnings – around themes pertaining to the nature and status of Hegelian 
'closure', and I used the trope of tragedy in order to do so. I concluded part one by 
s the nature of Debord's Hegelian Marxism 
porality of the constructed situation, and suggested that it might be modelled 
ay 
 whom 
eir 
                                                
suggesting that one could find clues toward
in the tem
not on the perpetual deferral of the absolute but rather on its instantiation. Here in part 
two, in addition to discussing the theory of spectacle in greater detail, I've attempted to 
take these ideas further: for if Debord's notion of historical praxis entails the 
actualisation of the absolute, and if the spectacle can be viewed as the latter's denial, 
then one can perhaps draw inferences from the theory as to what that actualisation m
entail. In this regard part two has employed the Hegelian unification of universality and 
particularity as a common theme.  
 I've argued that both Marx's account of capital and Debord's theory of spectacle 
involve a form of universality that becomes separated from the individuals from
it arises: a form that binds and holds those individuals in a relation that maintains th
isolation, and which becomes a force that acts in their stead, subjugating their interests 
to its own. Both writers can be seen to imply alternative modes of collectivity.1 
However, I've also argued that the theory of spectacle can be seen to replicate the 
subjugation of the particular to the universal. Debord and the S.I.'s account was 
certainly informed by the contention that Marx's economics subordinated individual 
agency to that of abstract economic categories, but Debord's own stance is just as open 
to this charge: for in conceiving the entirety of society under the rubric of image and 
observer, the theory of spectacle effectively subsumes the particular differences and 
tensions of lived social relations under the abstract universality of spectatorial 
 
1 See for example Marx's “association of free men, working together with the means of production held 
, all hierarchy, and all separation, and thanks 
, 
in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one 
single social labour force” (Marx 1976, p.171); see also Debord's remarks on the “active direct 
communication which marks the end of all specialisation
to which existing conditions are transformed 'into the conditions of unity'” (Debord 1995, p.87; 2006
p.817; the 'conditions of unity' is an unattributed reference to a passage in The German Ideology 
(Marx 2000, p.196)).  
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consciousness. This gives rise to a problematic dichotomy, in that the theory tends 
towards the presentation of society as a homogenised mass. Thus where Marx locates 
opposition and antagonism within a set of social relations, Debord would seem to locat
it within a consciousness that stands outside them. The result is an opposition betwee
romanticised 'life' and an equally abstract and indeterminate 'capital', which seems 
have become effectively coterminous with society itself. The strategic identification of 
quite how capital might be addressed is thus undermined.  
 
Universality and Represe  
– it can 
al 
 
is is 
 
l 
ubject ed 
 
wh s 
tow
    
 
 Insofar as this problem stems from Debord and the S.I.'s focus on individual 
subjectivity – which in part one I traced back to their early avant-garde concerns 
be seen to reflect a tension between their individualist concerns and their (libertarian) 
communist politics, perhaps echoing Sartre's own difficulties in this regard: for the 
theory of spectacle grounds its account of social totality upon an almost existenti
model of individual subjectivity, and attempts to construct a communist politics by way
of a universal history founded on that same individualistic and subjective basis. Th
certainly not to deny that Debord's account is very much geared towards the importance 
of contexts, moments, and towards the relation between a finite subject and the 
circumstances in which it finds itself; yet it involves the repeated subsumption of 
particular, specific differences. The theory collapses the specificity of capitalist relations
into a generalised whole by focussing on the individual, alienated subject; individua
s ivity is then itself collapsed under a notion of humanity in the abstract, modell
upon the figure of the alienated, Occidental 'spectator'. If Debord's theory relies on
subsuming particular difference under the general equivalence of a universalised 
consciousness – and if in consequence it posits a hierarchical teleology in which the 
higher reveals the truth of the lower – then the theory can perhaps said to employ the 
very representation that it opposes. This of course implies a host of Derridean themes2 
ich I won't pursue here (as stated earlier, my aim is to investigate Debord's attempt
ards a non-representational form of universal history3 on its own terms, and by 
                                             
Gayatri Spivak's work perhaps would offer a primary point of reference here were one to pursue thi
line of thought. See for example Spivak 1988 for relevant notions of political representation, and 
Spivak 1987 for a related approach to value and capital. 
For example, Debord talks of “universal history” when calling for a global evolutionary movement 
(Debord 2006, p.698). It is perhaps interesting to relate his account to Buck
2 s 
3 
-Morss' own gestures 
 history, made by way of a problematic attempt to re-read Hegel's Phenomenology in towards universal
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ry, and forms of non-hierarchical collective agency – then might it 
means of the resources that it itself presents), but it also means that we are now returne
to my earlier proposal that the ideas that found the theory of spectacle may be of greater
interest than the theory itself. For if that theory is limited as an account of capital, and 
addresses the latter by way of formulations that risk undermining the prohibition of 
representation – and if on the other hand the ideas that found it imply the strategic
development of theo
be possible to take those ideas further, or at least indicate where they might lead?  
 
Self-Grounding Capital 
 
 I'll suggest in part three that this can perhaps be attempted by relating Debord's 
strategic concerns to the aspects of his Hegelianism discussed in part one. If the 
connection between the Hegelian absolute and historical process can be linked to the 
implications towards 'authentic' collectivity discussed here in part two – and if the 
notion of agency thus derived can incorporate those strategic dimensions – then 
Debord's work could he taken to imply a theory of collective praxis. I'll try to develo
this by looking at the circular, self-grounding and self-determining aspects of the 
Hegelian Idea, and at its attendant notions of freedom and necessity. In order to provide
an initial introduction to those ideas whilst also orienting my own use of them – and i
order to also conclude some of part two's primary contentions – we might look here at 
Moishe Postone's 'reinterpretation' of Marx, as Postone attributes to capital some of the 
very same qualities that I'll try to relate to Debord's historical agency in part three.  
 Postone's reading of Marx can be seen to take aspects of Debord's account to 
their logical conclusion (a point that has not been lost on the avowedly post-Situ 
Principia Dialectica group, who've enthused that Postone’s Time, Labour and Social 
Domination “is the sort of book that Guy Debord ought to have writte
p 
 
n 
n”).4 For Postone, 
         
labour is fundamental to capitalism; but in his view this means that any political project 
centred around labour risks replicating capitalist wage-labour, i.e. doing away with an 
                                                                                                                                      
er 
emphasising the lord and bondsman: in addition, she holds that the bondsman rebels, despite the fact 
that Hegel describes him as submitting to the lord (Hegel, in her view, neglected to tell us this for fear 
us misses the role of the lord and bondsman within the text as a whole: Hegel is 
 (self-) discipline and labour here, (i.e. one must master oneself in order to 
rlies Spirit's historical struggle towards self-consciousness. Unpleasant 
aiming that discipline and submission are necessary moments of Spirit's 
less, her conclusions are interesting: “Is there,” she asks, “a way to universal 
Morss 2009, p.110-1). Her response is a “politics of scholarship” (Buck-Morss 
rd however would seem to respond via political praxis. 
the light of the Haitian slave revolutions. Not only does she follow the Kojèveian tradition of ov
of censorship). She th
introducing the need for
know oneself), which unde
though it may be, Hegel is cl
self-discovery. Nonethe
history today?” (Buck-
2009, p.150); Debo
4 Prigent 2009a 
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erely a class relation concealed by a universalistic façade”,8 as this 
sic 
 
r 
10 
al view of labour as a constitutive 
                                                
unfair mode of distribution whilst retaining the existing form of production. This is of 
course close to Debord's own position, as described in chapter six, but the differen
that where Debord sets this against Marx, Postone extracts it from Marx's own words
Furthermore, where Debord and the S.I. reformulated class struggle so as to 'free' it 
from its traditional forms, Postone dismisses it as a functional component of the 
capitalist system.5   
 My interest however lies in the emphasis that he places on Marx's presentation 
of capitalist society as an interrelated totality. Postone stresses the foundational
the commodity within the latter: “each commodity,” he writes, “is both particular, as a
use-value, and general, as a social mediation”.6 Capitalist social relations are said to
marked by a tension between this “abstract universalism and particularistic 
specificity”.7 In his view, “the form of domination related to this abstract form of the 
universal is not m
universality does not mask the concrete reality of social relations. Rather, it is intrin
to and actual within them.9 The tension that thus arises between the abstract universality
of value and the particular elements that it structures “points to the possibility of anothe
form of universalism, one not based on an abstraction from all concrete specificity”.
Like Debord and Marx, Postone thus alludes to something closer to the more organic 
forms of Hegelian interrelation discussed above. He also offers a real advance on 
Debord's theory, insofar as he presents capitalist society as an interrelated whole rather 
than as an effectively homogenised block. Yet because in his view this totality rests 
upon capitalist labour, not only does he conclude that a political affirmation of labour is 
problematic: in addition, so too is any philosophic
ontological force (thus Jappe, who would seem to follow Postone here: “[the S.I.'s] 
refusal to make labour the basis of their theory was by no means a fault”,11 as to do 
otherwise risks “turn[ing] a characteristic of capitalism into an eternal ontological 
necessity”).12  
 This leads Postone to undertake some peculiar manoeuvres. He notes that Marx, 
in his early writings, holds that Hegel attributed the self-determining qualities of human 
 
8 996, p.163 
5 Postone 1996, p. 17 
6 Postone 1996, p.151 
7 Postone 1996, p.164 
Postone 1
9 Postone 1996 p.163 
10 Postone 1996, p.164 
11 Jappe 1999, p.151 
12 Jappe 1999, p.151 
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ivity in mystified terms, Postone's mature Marx 
egel 
talist 
hilosophy 
the homologies 
ignalled above, Postone's approach to Hegelian Marxism is almost the antithesis of 
ebord's own.  
 This becomes interesting in relation to the self-grounding movement of the 
Hegelian absolute Idea, which Postone draws on in relation to the operation of capital. 
Referring to abstract labour, and thus to value, Postone writes that “labour grounds its 
own social character in capitalism by virtue of its historically specific function as a 
socially mediating activity,” which means that “labour in capitalism becomes its own 
social ground”:16 and “because such labour mediates itself, it grounds itself (socially) 
and therefore has the attributes of 'substance' in the philosophical sense”.17 Capital thus 
functions as a historical subject that creates its own conditions of existence, and which 
perpetually produces itself anew from that basis. It thus mirrors the movement that I’ve 
suggested Debord ascribes to historical agency.   
 I noted at the outset of the thesis that Chris Arthur has made a useful distinction 
between what he refers to as historicist and systematic Hegelian Marxisms. The former, 
tainted by association with Soviet 'diamat', has largely fallen from favour; the latter, in 
which he locates both himself and Postone,18 seems to be growing in popularity. We've 
also seen that Debord shares Postone's view that Hegel's philosophy reflects the rise of 
                                                
subjectivity and activity to the philosophical Idea, and attempted to correct this by
transposing that movement back onto human activity. Yet Postone then sets Hegel bac
on his head once more:13 for where the young Marx saw Hegelian philosophy as 
describing human action and subject
realises that it is in fact capital, not humanity, that “possess[es] the attributes that H
accorded the Geist”.14 In other words, the young Marx is in effect a victim of capi
ideology,15 as was Hegel: both presented the properties of capital as the fundamental 
properties of the human subjects that create it. From this perspective Hegel's p
can thus be said to not only consecrate the bourgeois state, but also to cast the 
movement of capital as the fundamental logic of being itself. Consequently, to adopt 
that movement for historical agency would be, for Postone, a major error, in that it 
would risk replicating precisely that which it opposes. Thus despite 
s
D
 
13 For a slightly different take on this idea see Aufheben 2007.  
14 Postone 1996, p.75 
15 See Wendling 2009 for a reading that emphasises this contention, and which seems to owe much to 
Postone. 
16 Postone 1996, p.151, emphasis in the original 
17 Postone 1996, p.156 
18 Arthur 2004, p.7 
166 
capit nd 
us required Marx's 'inversion'. Debord might thus have viewed the 'systematic' 
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is regard the third 
    
alism, but that in his view it merely 'contemplated' “a world that made itself”,19 a
th
p  as tending towards the replication of Hegel's failings: Postone could then be 
seen to perpetrate a form of fetishism, in that the characteristics of human agency are 
attributed to their capitalist results.  
 My interest then is in contending that Debord and the S.I. offer a means of 
deriving a 'historicist' Hegelian Marxism that might be able to avoid some of the 
authoritarian and dogmatic failings of its predecessors. I'm also interested in the sense in 
which Debord's work implies a way if attempting this that does rely upon the 
Phenomenology's lord and bondsman or the unhappy consciousness, but which rather 
adopts the 'restless' movement of the Hegelian absolute itself. In th
part of the thesis will try to link the self-founding movement that Postone ascribes to 
capital to the strategic dimensions of Debord's Hegelian Marxism.  
 
 
                                             
19 Debord 1995, p.49; 2006, p.793 
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Postscript: May 1968 and the End of the S.I. 
 
 
 In 1967, perhaps still smarting from their acrimonious split, Lefebvre wrote that 
the S.I. “propose not a concrete utopia, but an abstract one. Do they really imagine that 
one fine day or some decisive evening people will look at each other and say, 'Enough! 
We are fed up with working and being bored. Let's put an end to this!' And that they will 
thereupon proceed into endless Festival and start creating situations? Maybe it happened 
once, at dawn on 18 March 1871, but that particular set of circumstances can never 
recur.”1 The S.I. quoted this statement in the 1967 edition of Internationale 
Situationniste, and they reproduced it again in 1969,2 with what Jappe describes as 
“considerable – and quite understandable – satisfaction.”3  
 Debord and the S.I. viewed May 1968 as the validation of their theories, and 
even went so far as to claim a degree of responsibility for the insurrection.4 However, 
ever sensitive to their purported historical role, they recognised that the May events not 
s 
only signalled “the reappearance of history”5 but also the beginning of their own 
demise. The scandal at the University of Strasbourg in 1966, which centred around the 
dissemination of the S.I.’s 'On the Poverty of Student Life', had brought with it a degree 
of fame and notoriety. Although this assisted the publication of Debord and Vaneigem'
books in 1967, it also brought admirers and imitators. This tendency was furthered by 
the May events, heightening the number of groups and individuals that the S.I. could 
haughtily refer to as 'pro-situs': spectators of the S.I. (the 'pro-situs' were described by 
Debord as “a significant product of modern history” who in no sense “produce it in 
return”).6 The S.I., in other words, was starting to become a spectacle. 
 This caused Debord and the S.I. to withdraw, becoming even harder and clearer 
                                                 
1 S.I. 1997, p.548; also quoted in Jappe 1999, pp.100-1 
2 S.I. 1997, p.574 
3 Jappe 1999, p.101 
4 “In May there were only ten or twelve Situationists and Enragés in Paris and none in the rest of 
France. But the fortunate conjunction of spontaneous revolutionary improvisation with a sort of au
of sympathy that existed around the SI made possible the coordination of a rather widespread action,
not only in Paris but in several large cities, as if there had been a pre-existing nationwide organizatio
ra 
 
n. 
...a sort of vague, mysterious situationist menace was felt and denounced in many places; those who 
re some hundreds or even thousands of individuals whom the bureaucrats 
 or, more often, referred to by the popular abbreviation that 
n 
andals, thieves or hoodlums” (S.I. 2006, p.317; 1997, p.594). 
embodied this menace we
and moderates called Situationists
appeared during this period, situs. We consider it an honour that this term...served not only to 
designate the most extremist participants in the occupations movement, but also tended to evoke a
image of v
5 S.I. 2006, p.292; 1997, p.575 
6 S.I. 2003, p.35; Debord 2006, p.1107 
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 preface to The 
ociety of the Spectacle (1979). The latter text reflects his interest in the tumult of 
alian politics, and a growing concern with manipulation, intrigue and conspiracy that 
ould shape 1988's Comments on the Society of the Spectacle. Debord had also begun 
 withdraw from Paris by the late 1970's – a move that his biographers have presented 
s a self-imposed exile from a city fallen to an enemy force11 – but he was drawn out of 
is retreat in 1984 by the assassination of his friend and patron Gérard Lebovici. 
peculation in the press as to whether Lebovici's death stemmed from his entry into 
ebord's purportedly nefarious circles led to 1985's Considerations on the 
ssassination of Gérard Lebovici, which addressed these charges. The increasing 
isgust with society that these events prompted, together with a growing concern with 
s tangle of conflicting interests, conspiracy and intrigue, would all inform 1988's 
omments. Yet the latter text was only the first of a small flurry of publications that 
ppeared towards the end of Debord's life: the two volumes of Panegyric in 1989 and 
                                              
in focus (like a “crystal”, as Lefebvre would later put it),7 and this in turn meant even 
more expulsions and vituperative denunciations. Somewhat paradoxically, this w
presented as a drive towards egalitarianism: “to the losers who concoct rumours about 
our supposed 'elitism',” wrote Vaneigem, “we should counterpose the anti-hierarchical
example of permanent radicalisation”: for insofar as their organisation was to prefigure 
that of a future society, its minimal requirement lay in “not tolerating those people 
whom the established powers are able to tolerate quite well.”8 There are a number of 
texts and internal documents in which Debord can be found discussing the rationale 
behind expulsions, and letters in which he justifies his own part in them,9 but the r
was ultimately comical: by 1972, the 'International' was possessed of four member
only two of whom remained active (Debord in France, and Sanguinetti in Italy). 
Seventy individuals had passed through the S.I. between 1957 and 1972; of the 
remaining sixty six, forty five had been excluded. Nineteen had resigned, and two had 
split.10     
 In the years following the S.I.'s dissolution Debord produced a number of 
important works, principal amongst which are his cinematic version of The Society
the Spectacle (1973), In Girum Imus Nocte (1978), and the fourth Italian
S
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 Ross 2004, p.275 
S.I. 2006, pp.277-8; 1997, p.533 
For an example of the S.I.'s publicly stated positions on the exclusions see Debord 2006, pp.874-8; as 
an example of internal documents see Debord 1970; for a more personal letter see Debord 2006, 
pp.607-9. 
10 See Gray 1998 pp.132-3 for a full list of the S.I.'s exclusions, splits and resignations. 
errifield 2005. 
7
8 
9 
11 e.g. Hussey 2002 and M
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1990, Cette Mauvaise Répu umous Des Contrats of 
985: a collection of Debo ature of his self-
confessedly “scan
 The growing focus on intrigu e that can be found in these later 
xts will now be addressed in part three, in which I'll try to relate these concerns to the 
egelian and existential themes nd two. Admittedly, given the 
plits and exclusions that shaped and defined the S.I., one could suggest that an attempt 
n their work is inherently misguided. This is most certainly an 
sue that any attempt to build on this thesis’ suggestions would need to take into 
s shown that Situationist historical agency need not result in exclusivity and 
es 
s intellectual history not only provides a 
eans tify 
 
 
 
    
tation in 1993, and finally the posth
rd's contracts that revealed the true n1
dalous”12 machinations.  
e and manoeuvr
te
H considered in parts one a
s
to find such a theory withi
is
consideration. However, part two's emphasis on universality and particularity has 
perhap
separation, just as part one's discussions of self-determination and agency indicated that 
Situationist praxis would be antithetical to hierarchy and representation. If these them
can be related to the strategic aspects of Debord's account, it may well be the case that 
ddressing the philosophical aspects of Debord'a
m of clarifying and correcting existing scholarship, but also serves to iden
aspects of this material that warrant further research and development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
12 Debord 2008, p.458 
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PART THREE 
 
'The Theory of Historical Action' 
(1976-1994) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Overview of Part Three 
 
 As we saw in the thesis' general introduction, Debord stated in a letter of 1974 
that:  
 
The principle work...one must engage in – as the complementary contrary to The Society of the Spectacle, 
hich described frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit in it) – is the theory of historical 
ction. One must advance strategic theory in its moment, which has come. At this stage and to speak 
 to retrieve and develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautréamont, 
ut Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz.1 
: little 
90 
 
w
a
schematically, the basic theoreticians
b
 
 Strategy and military theory had long been an interest for Debord (his 
Kriegspiel, for example, dates back to 1956),2 but these concerns do become much 
more prominent in his later years. This third part of the thesis will discuss these 
concerns in connection to the issues presented in parts one and two, and will focus on 
Debord's work from the late 1970's through to his death in 1994. Yet despite an 
increased propensity for allusions and references to military and strategic themes, the 
man who once declared  “I will never give explanations”3 remains true to form
clue is given as to quite what this 'theory of historical action' might be. This however 
has not arrested writers keen to pronounce on the issue. Giorgio Agamben wrote in 19
that Debord's books “should be used ... as manuals, as instruments of resistance or 
exodus”,4 and many others have followed suit. Yet almost all such commentary can be 
reduced to re-phrased versions of Agamben’s claim, or simply to observations that note
the existence of Debord’s interest in this regard. Very little is said as to quite what that 
interest might mean or entail in relation to Debord’s theoretical concerns and to his 
                                                 
1 D rd 1974a 
2 Cf. Debord 2006, p.285. The Kriegspiel was patented in 1965, developed in 1976, released as Le Jeu 
de la Guerre in 1987, and published in English as A Game of War in 2007 (Becker Ho and Debord 
2007, p.7). Some sections of it were however first published in English as an appendix to Len 
Bracken's Guy Debord: Revolutionary (1997, pp.240-51). 
3 Debord 2006, p.70. The line is taken from a 'clarification' of his Hurlements en Faveur de Sade, 
directed at the French Federation of Film Clubs. 
ebo
4 Agamben 2000, p.73 
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trategic agency that can be inferred 
om this material, and to outline the possible approach to Hegelian Marxism that can 
re part one adopted the trope of tragedy as 
 common thread, and where part two employed that of universality and particularity, 
e ma
work as a whole, or indeed as to what it might allow us to draw from the latter.  
 I'll argue that the ideas and influences set out in the general introduction and
part of the thesis afford a means of rectifying this lack. I will however do so only as a 
means to an end: for having contended in part two that the concept of spectacle is 
problematic, my intention is not to present Debord's books as field guides to the terrain 
of modern capitalism (although I will offer suggestions as to his own intentions in this 
regard). Rather, my aim is to address the notions of s
fr
perhaps be drawn from it. Consequently, whe
a
th terial presented here in part three will be focused around historical, strategic 
agency. 
 
The Strategic and the Ludic 
 
 I've argued that the spectacle constitutes the apex of a line of evolution towards 
the separation of social power, and that its 'perfected' separation constitutes the final 
dialectical juncture from which a free, self-determining history was to emerge. I also 
argued in part one that the structure of Situationist subjectivity was not only informed 
by the Hegelian absolute, but also by the negotiation of chance and contingency. Noting 
e significance of the departure from Hegel that this entails, I pointed out that Debord's 
d by finitude, and that it is 
ontextually specific; that it would seem to be obliged to continually recreate further 
nce 
s 
 
that ought properly to be superseded by 
th
model of subjective agency is always characterise
c
conditions of subject-object unity, and thus new situations, by negotiating the cha
and contingency brought by time. It must therefore be characterised by a degree of bad 
infinity (insofar as it is limited and contingent upon that which it is not; its successive 
stages cannot therefore fully negate finitude), despite the links that I've ascribed to the 
circular, self-determinate movement of the Hegelian absolute. I also indicated that thi
emphasis on chance pertains to the ludic dimensions of the situation, and argued that it
can be seen to connect to Debord's strategic concerns.  
 In developing these claims here I'll try to advance my earlier suggestion that 
Debord's views on history and praxis constitute a framework within which the theory of 
spectacle itself can be located. The latter, as noted earlier, becomes just one tactical 
intervention amongst others; an intervention 
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ntly, 
be seen to become more important 
t 
 
subsequent responses to a changing present. This gives rise to two further corollaries. 
Firstly, that attending to these themes might offer insight into how Debord himself 
thought the spectacle might be overcome; but secondly, and perhaps more importa
it means that this model of historical agency could 
than the instances of theory that it supports. Consequently, in pursuing it we might no
only be able to shed light on Debord and the S.I.'s extant work, but may also derive a set
of ideas that could be developed in their own right. 
 
The Structure and Content of Part Three 
 
 The suggestions that I'll make in that regard will be relegated to chapters eight 
and nine. Chapter seven will be dedicated to Debord's Comments, and will address its 
account of the modern spectacle whilst highlighting and discussing the important 
connection that the book makes between strategy and history. Chapter eight will then
build on this by relating these strategic themes to some of the notions of temporality
subjectivity set out in part one. Through doing so I'll indicate what would seem to b
more significant features of Debord's Hegelian Marxism. Having set out the importan
of contingency and strategy to this model, and thereby its departure from Hegel h
I'll then look in chapter nine at the degree to which the self-grounding aspects of Hegel's 
absolute might be perhaps be used to take these themes further. 
 
Strategy in the Existing Literature on Debord
 
 and 
e the 
ce 
imself, 
 
 
 We saw in the general introduction that Debord's biographers have often 
employed his interest in strategy as a means of characterising their subject, but here we 
ight n  
him as 
 to 
 
by showing the importance of deriving strategy from tactical operations, as opposed to 
 to be that political conflict 
 and less hierarchical (perhaps a reasonable response to those 
           
m ote that others have attempted rather more detail at times. Wark, for example,
has recently tried to “think about Debord in a slightly different light” by casting 
a “strategist”.5 Making reference to Gramsci's distinction between a 'war of position' 
(which he links to Leninist forms of organisation) and a 'war of manoeuvre' (linked
Luxemburgist ideas and syndicalism), he argues that the Kriegspiel “refutes” the former
dictating tactics “from above”.6 His implication would seem
thus becomes more fluid
                                      
5 Wark 2008, p.28 
6 Wark 2008, p.32 
173 
 argue 
r human activity is so continuously or 
d 
e joins 
 content of this 
ateria
 
 
pens 
sm, thus 
us 
 does indeed often echo the tone of some of Debord’s 
ity (e.g. “remember…that each of us lives only in the present, this 
               
who would question Debord's seemingly outdated focus on Napoleonic warfare).7 
These claims are rendered particularly interesting by Wark’s suggestion that the 
Kriegspiel is “really a diagram of the strategic possibilities of spectacular time”,8 
although this remark is unfortunately left largely undeveloped.  
 Jappe presents Debord's interest in strategy as nostalgia for a pre-spectacular 
past (“this interest,” Jappe writes, “could be interpreted as a desire to remain moored to 
a world still essentially intelligible...and to a high degree predictable”).9 I would
against this: strategy is an attempt to think and act with chance and uncertainty, not 
against it (as Clausewitz himself puts it, “no othe
universally bound up with chance”).10  
 Kaufmann picks up on the sense of pathos and occasional touches of sublimity 
attributed to the experience of time in Debord's later works; issues that are often linke
to Debord's allegedly more melancholic perspective in his later years, and which I'll 
connect to part one's discussion of temporality in chapter eight. As a result, h
Jappe in viewing Debord's interest in strategy in terms of nostalgia. Admirably, he 
attempts to connect the various aspects of Debord's work together; but rather than 
establish those connections through the theoretical and philosophical
m l – as I noted earlier, he will have no truck with “the myth of Debord the 
'theoretician'”11 – he reads Debord’s comments on time in terms of poetic melancholia. 
Debord was concerned with “war and loss”, he claims, because “they are two faces of
the same hunger for the irrevocable, for experiences that are lost forever”.12 One could 
perhaps argue that Situationist temporality thus suffers an inversion of sorts, as the
actualisation of negativity becomes the tragic acceptance of a time that simply hap
to us. Debord's Hegelian Marxism would then echo the theodicy of pantragedi
resulting in stoic contemplation. 
 In this regard Kaufmann’s view is close to that of Stone-Richards,13 who has 
claimed that Debord’s work can be seen to express a form of noble, aristocratic 
stoicism. In this regard he makes links to thinkers such as the Roman Emperor Marc
Aurelius, whose Meditations
remarks on temporal
                                  
; see also Prigent 2009b 
10 
11 
12 
13  
7 See Jappe 1999, p.114
8 Wark 2008, p.28 
9 Jappe 1999, p.114 
Clausewitz 1993, p.96 
Kaufmann 2006, p.204 
Kaufmann 2006, p.209 
 Stone-Richards 2001 
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orks 
fleeting moment of time”;14 “The art of living…must stand ready and firm to mee
whatever besets it, even when unforeseen”).15 I would however argue that Hegel’s 
objections to stoicism are pertinent here. Hegel points out in the Phenomenology – by 
way of oblique reference to Marcus Aurelius – that the sto
“indifferent” as to whether it is “on the throne or in chains”.16 Stone-Richar
are persuasive, particularly in connection to the withdrawal from public lif
said to characterise Debord’s later years, but despite the homologies Stoicism’s 
emphasis on enduring and accepting the present moment seems to jar with Debord and 
the S.I.’s concern with proactively changing it.  
 Bracken offers a few remarks that come close to addressing Debord’s 
Hegelianism. He describes Debord's ideas about time and history by way of analog
Vico,17 and even states at one point that “for Debord [the] apprehension of time wa
coloured with the Hegelian preoccupation with the self-conscious creation of history 
with acts of negation”.18 Yet like Wark he leaves these promising assertions 
undeveloped, and he ultimately seems to view Debord's interest in strateg
Machiavellian (in the crude sense of the term) manoeuvring: as a means of achieving 
ends on “the battlefield of everyday life”.19  
 To an extent this is undeniable: Debord's correspondence is replete with 
comments on strategems, ruses and speculations as to the intentions of others, and it can
at times present an ultimately saddening picture of someone seemingly compelled to 
view others in terms of conflicting, antagonistic interests. Yet on a theoretical level there
remains far more to be said here. The temporal dimensions of Debord's notion of 
subjectivity entail the constant obligation to make choices on the basis of limited 
knowledge, entailing that the construction and negotiation of life becomes an 
existential, strategic project. Hence Debord's fondness for works such as Baldesar 
Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier and Gracián's The Art of Worldly Wisdom: w
that describes the 'artistry' of dealing with the world.20 Art, in other words, when 
realised as life, could be seen to take on a strategic dimension: one can live well or 
                                                 
14   Aurelius 1997, p.20 
15   Aurelius 1997, p.65 
16   Hegel 1977, p.121 
7 
ugh the circumference of time,” Gracián writes, “before arriving at the centre of 
ián 2000, p.24). His observation that “we have nothing that is ours except time, 
ithout a roof can enjoy”(Gracián 2000, p.100) is used as the epigraph to Chapter 
ty of the Spectacle, and Debord also refers to Gracián in the Comments as “great 
l time” (Debord 2002, p.85).  
17 Bracken 1997, p.94 
18 Bracken 1997, p.105 
19 Bracken 1997, p.21
20 “You must pass thro
opportunity” (Grac
which even those w
Seven of The Socie
authority on historica
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g. 
our'). He thus argues for the 
portance of negativity, and sets out to “excavate” a politically relevant negative 
through an immanent critique of contemporary theory, arguing that this should serve as 
“the condition for re-articulating a thinking of agency”.23 Noys thus serves to bring us 
back to the theme of negativity discussed in the first part of this thesis.   
 As the negativity that Noys argues for is 'strategic' and linked to oppositional 
agency (a term that he adopts in favour of 'subjectivity'), his arguments clearly pertain to 
the suggestions that I'll advance here. Debord and the S.I. in fact number amongst the 
authors that he uses in order to make his case: the S.I.'s “strategic thinking”, he writes, 
can offer a “means for thinking interventions into real abstractions”.24 And, although 
Noys' desire to “take the negative further through a traversal of Debord and the S.I.”25 
would seem to require separating Debord's interest in strategy from its Hegelian and 
existential framework – Noys wants to avoid both dialectical negativity and Sartrean 
nothingness26 – the politicised negativity that he calls for is, nonetheless, strikingly 
close to Debord's own. For example: Noys reads Debord and the S.I.'s interest in time 
through Bergson rather than Hegel (a connection to Bergson is also suggested by 
Jappe),27 and views it as constituting a pure, negative flow. Against this, he argues that 
“negativity can never be pure, but must always be thought of as a relation of rupture, 
mixed in with and continually contesting positivity”.28 I would argue that this is 
                                                
poorly, and Debord was under no doubt that his own had been anything less than 
exemplary.21 Perhaps of more interest however is the degree to which these ideas might 
inform notions of political praxis, and in order to introduce this I'll make reference to 
Ben Noys' own recent comments on Debord and the S.I.  
 In The Persistence of the Negative (2010)22 Noys argues that much 
contemporary political philosophy and theory is marked by what he calls 
'affirmationism': a tendency to assert creativity, desire, productive potential and the 
importance of novelty as forces opposed to capitalism. For Noys, this trend constitutes a 
problem, in that it has led to theoretical models that mirror capital's own dynamics (e.
philosophical accounts of displacement, nomadism and flows, and theoretical 
discussions of the creative potential of 'immaterial lab
im
 
21 See for example Debord 2004b, p.6; 2006, p.1658. 
22   See also Bunyard 2011c 
23 Noys 2010a, p.13 
24 Noys 2010a, p.100 
25 Noys 2010a, p.98 
26   Noys 2010a, p.17 
27 Jappe 1999, p.137 
28 Noys 2010 a, p.100 
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precise  
owever also be noted that Noys’ antipathy to modes of thought that echo the dynamics 
 to follow Postone’s contention that the self-founding, 
ovement of the Hegelian absolute corresponds to that of capital. 
e, 
ly what Debord's Hegelian, negative and dialectical time provides. It should
h
of capital would perhaps lead him
circular m
 Nonetheless, it is this self-founding movement that I'll pursue in chapters eight 
and nine. This third part of the thesis will thus return to the claims advanced in part on
as regards the sense in which negativity might persist within the Hegelian absolute, and 
might thereby render it a form of continual self-determinate process. Following Debord 
and the S.I.'s own indications that communism should be seen as just such a process, 
part three will consider whether the forms of praxis and collectivity that they called for 
could be re-considered by way of these connections.  
 
177 
Chapter Seven: The Integrated Spectacle 
 
 
The Integrated Spectacle  
 
 My primary focus here will rest on the 'integrated spectacle' described in 
Debord's Comments on the Society of the Spectacle of 1988. I'll show that the latter 
book is rather less defeatist than some have claimed, and I'll illustrate this by discussing
some of the peculiarities of the mode of presentation that Debord adopts there. Through
doing so I'll also emphasise his identification of historical and strategic thought, and 
suggest that this can be used as a key towards interpreting some of the Comments' more
opaque assertions. This will serve to highlight some of the themes that will be address
in chapters eight and nine, but I'll also show that Debord's views tend towards 
replicating the subjectivism ascribed to the theory of spectacle in chapter six.  
 The Comments contends that the spectacle continued to develop and evolve aft
1967's The Society of the Spectacle. According to Debord, this evolution had given rise 
to certain “practical consequences”
 
 
I'll 
 
ed 
er 
 
s “an active force”; Debord will analyse its 
lines o ts 
r 
nced, 
. Debord 
 
 
t; 
faible] part; today, no part. The spectacle is mixed into all reality, and irradiates it.5  
                                                
1 which are presented, almost from the outset, by
way of military metaphors. The spectacle i
“ f advance”; it is an “invasion” with which some “collaborate”2 (Bracken poin
out that Debord's view of modern society may be inflected by the occupied France of 
his childhood).3 This is said to have resulted in the 'integrated' spectacle: a new form 
that combines the diffuse and concentrated spectacles that I discussed in chapter four. 
Their apparent political opposition during the cold war had resolved itself into a highe
form, based upon the subsumption of the concentrated spectacle by its more adva
diffuse counterpart.4 The integrated form thus blends the unification of state and 
economy, police power and surveillance with diffuse commodity consumption
however also qualifies his use of the word 'integrated' with the following remarks: 
  
For the final sense of the integrated spectacle is that it has integrated itself into reality even as it spoke
[of] it, and that it was reconstructing as it spoke. So this reality now no longer stands in front of it as
something alien. When the spectacle was concentrated, the greater part of surrounding society escaped i
when diffuse, a small [
 
1 Debord 1998, p.3-4; 2006, p.1595 
2 Debord 1998, p.4; 2006, p.1595, emphasis in the original 
hat Comments was written just prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, and also 
unt of the end of history. The latter was first presented in a lecture at 
mments was written between February and April 1988.   
 2006, p.1598 
3 Bracken 1997, p.5-6 
4 It’s worth noting here t
before Fukuyama's notorious acco
the University of Chicago in 1989; Co
5 Debord 1998, p.9, translation altered;
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 The 
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 This would seem to put Debord very close to Baudrillard. Yet in order to 
differentiate the two accounts we can return to the points raised in chapter four, where I 
made reference to this mention of 'surrounding reality'. I pointed out that this statement 
might seem to contradict The Society of the Spectacle's opening declaration that th
entirety of life had collapsed into representation, but I also argued that this need not be 
the case. The spectacle is a particular formation within the totality of historical pra
and it channels lived reality through its paradigms and models, thereby reducing lived 
practice to 'representation'. Thus whilst the spectacle of 1967 is a “map which exactly 
covers its territory”6 (a metaphor that Baudrillard also employed),7 peripheral areas 
external to that 'territory' can still remain 'outside' (i.e. areas of life that fall outside the 
spectacle's paradigms). With the integrated spectacle, howev
8b e just as “polluted”  as everything else. Yet despite this, Debord keeps his 
distance from Baudrillard: for just as the concentrated and diffuse forms are ultimately
located within historical reality, so too is the integrated spectacle. As Debord put it in 
1972: the spectacle is “a period swept along by the movement of historical time”,9 and
as we've also seen, history in Debord's view exists (however implicitly) so long as 
human consciousness exists within time.  
 This however is not to deny that the integrated spectacle poses problems for 
Debord's conception of 'historical consciousness'. This new form of spectacle is said to 
be characterised by five primary features: “incessant technological renewal; integration 
of state and economy; generalised secrecy; unanswerable lies; an eternal present.”10
first two correspond to the rationalisation and autonomy of the spectacular economy 
described in 1967, albeit taken to a higher level: 'technological renewal' furthers 
spectacular domination through the refinement of modes of 'cybernetic' control and 
increased specialisation, whilst the 'integration of state and economy' aids the 
construction and enforcement of a mode of life tailored to commodity production 
consumption. The three further features of the integrated spectacle are effects of this 
new level of spectacular domination and stem, on my reading, from the spectacle's 
denial of history.  
                                                 
6 Debord 1995, p.23, translation altered; 2006, p.774 
8 1598 
 2006, p.1599 
7 Baudrillard 1994, p.1 
Debord 1998, p.10; 2006, p.
9 S.I. 2003, p.22; Debord 2006, p.1100 
10 Debord 1998, p.11-12;
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ce 
n 
tacle, to pursue, guard and falsify information. The fifth feature, that of 
n 'eter
e means by which one might independently verify or respond to stated 
acts' is exacerbated by the degree to which its presentations of the past and the future 
come
 he 
tegrated spectacle pertain to the subjective loss of history, which for Debord means 
ions that follow I'll attempt to illustrate the importance of 
s linkage of the strategic and the historical, and I'll begin to do so by looking at 
s worth noting the manner in which that book is often interpreted.  
 The Comments has often been described as exemplifying the melancholic 
ebord's later years: Hussey writes that by 1988 – the 
y
15 Merrifield notes the Comments' “dark undertow”,16 and 
 For Debord, “people who lack all historical sense can readily be manipulated”.11 
The suppression and management of history thus aids the propagation of “unverifiable 
stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely explanations and untenable reasoning”;12 hen
the profusion of the integrated spectacle's third feature, 'unanswerable lies'. The fourth, 
'generalised secrecy', is similarly linked to that deprivation of 'historical sense': it 
pertains to the spectacle's capacity to manage knowledge, but also to the generalisatio
of the need, brought about by the tangle of conflictual interests that compose the 
integrated spec
a nal present', is more obviously connected to the spectacle's end of history: for its 
denigration of th
'f
 to be determined by the exigencies of the present.13   
The point that I want to stress here is that the primary characteristics of t
in
the loss of independent, critical thought. History's suppression, in other words, entails 
the removal of a common basis and reference point, and thus pitches spectators into a 
groundless hyperreality. Yet as history cannot be abolished or ended, but only managed, 
it may return; and that means that the following, enigmatic claim becomes particularly 
significant: “To the list of the triumphs of power,” Debord writes, we should “add one 
result that has proved negative: a state, in the management of which is lastingly installed 
a great deficit of historical knowledge, can no longer be led strategically.”14 Those who 
manage the spectacle are thus tasked with managing an entity that is antithetical to 
historical direction. In the sect
Debord'
the peculiar mode of presentation that Debord adopts in the Comments. First however 
it'
perspective said to characterise D
ear in which the book appeared – “there was clearly a sense of defeat in Debord's 
thought and demeanour”;
                                                 
11 Debord 1998, p.25, translation altered; 2006, p.1607 
Debord 1998, p.16; 2006, p.1602 
“When the spectacle stops talking about s
12 
13 omething for three days, it is as if it did not exist” (Debord 
604). 
slation altered; 2006, p.1605 
1998, p.20; 2006, p.1
14 Debord 1998, p.20, tran
15 Hussey 2002, p.353 
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Crary describes it as “deeply pessimistic”;17 “as pessimistic”, according to Plant, “as the 
age in which it arises”.18 Yet as can perhaps already be seen from the discussion a
the book is less defeatist than these statements would indicate. In a letter that make
reference to his preparatory research for the Comments, Debord jokes that “the work o
revolutionary critique is assuredly not to lead people to believe that the revolution h
become impossible!”,19 and as Jappe also points out,20 Debord's later remarks on
Comments in Cette Mauvaise Réputation show any notion of total resignation to be 
quite false.21  
 This is particularly evident in the book's epigraph, which is taken from Sun Tz
The Art of War: 
 
However desperate the situation and circumstances, do not despair.  When there is 
everything to fear, be unafraid. When surrounded by dangers, fear none of them. When 
without resources, depend on resourcefulness. When surprised, take the enemy itself by 
surprise.22   
 
 Sun Tzu's dialectical emphasis on the reversal of opposites stems from the Taoist 
principles that inform The Art of War,23 and the Comments itself can be seen to follow 
his advice that one should attempt to turn strength into weakness and vice versa
must “use the enemy to defeat the enemy”,24 according to Sun Tzu. Given the nature of 
the spectacle that statement is perhaps significant in relation to Sun Tzu’s attendant 
emphasis on the need for inscrutability: “Be extremely subtle,” he counsels; thereby 
25“you can be the director of the enemy's fate”.  I'll suggest in the following section that 
the form of writing adopted in the Comments can be seen to pertain to these 
recommendations.26 
 
'I Must Take Care not to Give Too Much Information to Just Anybody' 
 
                                                                                                                                               
16 
17 
18 92, p.153. Plant however adds that “the picture [the book] paints is by no means closed and 
19 
20 
21 
22 
rd with Hegelian dialectics clearly appealed to Debord, who 
n The Art of War and “the dialectical thought of Machiavelli 
24 
e and more literary interpretation of these aspects of Debord’s work.  
Merrifield 2005, p.123 
Crary in McDonough 2004, p.462 
Plant 19
hopeless.”  
 Debord 1986c 
Jappe 1999, p.146n 
Debord 2001a, p.31 
Debord 1998, p.vii; 2006, p.1593 
23 The affinity that these principles affo
noted and praised the links betwee
and...Clausewitz” (Debord 2008, p.204). 
Sun Tzu 1988, p.64 
25 Sun Tzu 1988, p.104 
26 See Rabant 1997 for an alternativ
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s own discourse.27 The 
ociety of the Spectacle, for instance, makes extensive use of détournement and thus 
 for where The Society of the Spectacle had described the negation of 
ithin 
the group's 
emise adow 
ant to this was Debord's apparently presumptuous (but surprisingly 
lite 
 We're thus brought to the way in which Debord's work attempts to unify its form 
and content, and this, I would suggest, is his primary response to the problem of 
articulating a critique of the spectacle within the spectacle'
S
actualises its critique through its enunciation; many similar examples can be found 
throughout Debord's work.28 However, this technique was rendered rather more 
complicated in the Comments as a result of its account of the spectacle's 'integration' 
into society:
spectacular society, the Comments responds to the emergence of the spectacle w
that negation.  
 We saw in the afterword to part two that the latter issue informed the S.I.'s 
dissolution. In his 'Theses on the S.I. and its Times', in which he reflects on 
d , Debord remarks that “When subversion invades society and spreads its sh
in the spectacle, present-day spectacular forces also emerge within our party”.29 By 
1988, having experienced the assassination of a friend and having become invested in 
the violent intrigue of Italian politics, Debord had reached the conclusion that “the 
highest ambition of the integrated spectacle is ... that secret agents become 
revolutionaries, and revolutionaries become secret agents”.30 Thus in order to truly 
express the spectacle's immanent negation he was obliged to highlight the spectacle at 
work within the latter, albeit without denigrating its negative characteristics.  
 Attend
prescient)31 concern that his work could be studied and used by those “who devote 
themselves to maintaining the spectacular system of domination”.32 Thus despite the 
scale of the book's print run he wrote that he expected it to welcomed by an e
readership of “fifty or sixty people,”33 half of whom strive to maintain the spectacle 
                                                 
27 As Debord himself acknowledged, “to analyse the spectacle means talking its language to some 
de n 
mé 06, 
p.768)  
c works are similarly composed of détourné elements; Comments on 
 the media's “jumbled pile of nonsense” in “an 
.3; 2006, p.1540); Debord would later remark that his self-
y, Panegyric, had sought to show through its “subjective extravagance”, the 
t society” (Debord 2008, p.228). 
.31; 2006, p.1106 
 p.1599 
32 
33 
gree – to the degree, in fact, that we are obliged to engage the methodology [pass sur la terrai
thodologique] of the society to which the spectacle gives expression.”(Debord 1995, p.15; 20
28 To pick a few: Debord's cinemati
the Assassination of Gérard Lebovici refuses to treat
orderly fashion” (Debord 2001b, p
eulogising autobiograph
“non-value of curren
29 Debord 2003a, p
30 Debord 1998, p.11; 2006,
31 See Eyal Weizman's work on the Israeli Defence Force's use of Debord, Deleuze and other such 
writers as means of re-conceiving urban combat (Weizman 2006).   
Debord 1998, p.1; 2006, p.1593 
Debord 1998, p.1; 2006, p.1593 
182 
whils e “must take 
care n ed by 
n ev
ere, 
 may 
d 
 
his 'puzzle' is often noted in the literature on Debord, it 
main
e 
 
 
 
 
's 
aken 
                                                
t the other half attempt quite the opposite. As a result, he explained, h
ot to give too much information to just anybody”.34 This statement is follow
en more peculiar passage, which I'll quote in full:  a
 
Our unfortunate times thus compel me, once again, to write in a new way. Some elements will be 
intentionally omitted; and the plan will have to remain rather unclear. One will be able to encounter there, 
like the very hallmark of the era, certain lures. As long as certain pages are interpolated here and th
the overall meaning may appear; just as secret clauses have very often been added to what treatises
openly stipulate; just as some chemical agents only reveal their hidden properties when they are combine
with others. However in this brief work there will be only too many things which are, alas, easy to 
understand.35 
  
 The book is thus presented as a kind of puzzle (perhaps an appropriate 
unification of form and content in its own right: when commenting on his explanatory
diagrams to the Kriegspiel, Debord remarked that “the figures looked like a truly 
daunting puzzle awaiting solution, just like the times in which we live”).36  
 However, whilst t
re s unsolved. Plant, for example, observes that “there is a great deal more to the 
Comments than sits on the page”,37 but holds that “it is evidently up to the twenty-fiv
or thirty revolutionary readers to put the text together for themselves”.38 “The secret
clauses must be made to manifest themselves somehow,” writes Brown; but what,” he
asks, “is the missing ingredient?”39 Kaufmann goes so far as to claim that in order to 
negotiate a society in thrall to a multiplicity of secret services Debord became “a kind of
ironic Hercule Poirot”,40 but gives little indication as to quite what the great detective
has hidden.  
 I would suggest that one can find a clue in Debord's indication that the book
'lures' might lie in its plan or structure, and that the 'hallmark of the era' might be an 
'encounter' with them:41 a 'hallmark' that would then reflect the reader's own 
susceptibility to such deceit. This can be qualified by the following statement, t
from a letter of 1989 to a reader of the Comments: 
 
One can call 'lure' anything that misleads rapid reading or computers. In any case, there isn't 
 
34 Debord 1998, p.1; 2006, p.1593 
nslation altered; 2006, p.1594 
38 
39 
, p.264   
er, comme la signature même de l’époque, quelques leurres” (Debord 2006, 
ecoys, like the 
98, p.2) renders Debord's indefinite 'one will be able to' as an 
nd loses the sense in which those 'decoys' may lie in the book's plan or structure.  
35 Debord 1998, p.2, tra
36 Becker-Ho and Debord 2007, p.9 
37 Plant 1992, p.152-3 
Plant 1992, p.153 
Brown 1991 
40 Kaufmann 2006
41 “On pourra y rencontr
p.1594). Imrie's translation of the second sentence ('readers will encounter certain d
very hallmark of the era', Debord 19
inevitable 'will', a
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ggest another 
un standing dialectical, 
st
s 
e 
 spectacle's eradication of history; and 
econdly, that the skills required to thread one's way through the book would seem to 
d to traverse the integrated spectacle itself. We thus perhaps have 
e beginnings of a response to Agamben's proposal that Debord's works can be read as 
anua
wn 
t. 
reate a 
rld 
lso 
                                                
a single inexact or deceptive piece of information [in my book]. I su
hypothesis to you: what if, in this book – for a reader capable of der
rategic thought (Machiavelli or Clausewitz) – there are in fact no lures? What if the only 
lure is the very evocation of the possibility of there being lures?42   
 
 A very similar point is made in Cette Mauvaise Reputation,43 and again in a 
letter to a Spanish translator of the Comments.44 What is perhaps most important here i
the relation between the 'dialectical, strategic thought' that Debord requires of his 
readers and the lack of strategic capability that he attributed to the integrated spectacle 
itself (as noted above), for this has two implications: firstly, that a failure to decipher th
Comments exemplifies the symptom's of the
s
connect to those neede
th
'm ls' of resistance.  
 My claim, in other words, is that the Comments tries to use the spectacle's o
nature against it. The book's critique presents itself as containing 'lures' and hidden 
meanings, thus evoking the confused and illusory nature of the spectacle. It thereby 
expresses the spectacle's integration into its own opposition, and through doing so it 
guards its own content with the same gesture that mirrors the true nature of its objec
This interpretation may seem forced, but it can be substantiated by some of the remarks 
that Debord makes elsewhere. In several letters he states that his aim was to c
book “intended to paralyse a computer”45 (elsewhere he writes that computers “cannot 
understand dialectics”;46 the rigid opposition of binary language is presumably not 
suited to the identity of opposites), or indeed any superficial reading: to create a book 
that was “deliberately confused”,47 and which thus expresses the true nature of a wo
in which “surveillance spies on itself, and plots against itself”,48 by “evok[ing 
its]…disorder” through a “disordered style”49 (it’s perhaps also relevant to remember 
Debord’s interest in Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1938) which, as noted earlier, he 
had read in the early 1950’s; Huizinga not only links play to war and strategy, but a
 
43 
44 slate 'lures', originally a term used by hunters 
45 
uestion, deliberately confused” (Debord 1989). 
42 Debord 2008, p.78 
“Perhaps [the suggestion of lures] is a lure? Perhaps the only one?” (Debord 1993, p.33). 
“I do not believe,” Debord writes, “that one must tran
and that evokes a lost trail, by the brutal trampa [trap] (there is no false information, which might 
make the reader 'fall into error', in my book)” (Debord 2008, p.93).  
 Debord 1990 
46 Debord 2001a, p.102 
47 “I will summarize the chapter in q
48 Debord 1998, p.84; 2006, p.1643 
49 Debord 1992a 
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 to make here, not least 
wever 
 
id 
 
to poetry, which he in turn connects to riddles and puzzles).50 
 There are any number of objections that one might want
because this runs entirely counter to any notion of popular appeal or intelligibility 
(although Debord was never one to make concessions to his audience).51 Yet ho
problematic it may be, it is perhaps of broader interest than its status as a hermeneutic
peculiarity: for if the means of interpreting the book are also those of negotiating the 
spectacle, then we perhaps have an illustration of the sense in which Debord really d
believe his peculiarly Hegelian association of history and strategy to afford some kind
of critical purchase on modern capitalism.  
 
History and Agency 
 
 I'll outline the ways in which the above might allow us to read the Comme
a moment, but first I'll make a few further remarks on the purported effects of the 
integrated spectacle's denial of history, and thereby on the reasons why Debord may 
have been so concerned with the need for strategic thought. The first point to make her
is that the passivity of spectatorship was viewed as detrimental to critical dialogue, and 
thereby to independent thought. Because there is now
nts in 
e 
 “no room for any reply”52 to 
pectacular discourse, spectacular society suffers a “dissolution of logic”.53 This is due 
ommunication celebrated and furthered by the spectacle is “essentially unilateral”54 or 
s
in part to its technical mediation: Debord contended in 1967 that the instant 
c
one-way, i.e. part of a cybernetic system of control; in the Comments this is augmented 
by a distinct antipathy to computers, which foster “unreserved acceptance of what has 
been programmed according to the wishes of someone else”.55 Society's absence of 
logic, “that is to say loss of the ability to perceive what is significant and what 
is...irrelevant”, turns theorists and philosophers into ideologues: such individuals – and 
Debord would seem to be referring to the figures associated with postmodernism here, 
insofar as these problems are rooted in the loss of universal history – have proven 
                                                 
50 “Only he who can speak the art-language [of poetic riddles] wins the title of poet. This art-lang
differs from ordinary speech in that it employs special terms, images, figures, etc., which not 
uage 
everybody will understand” (Huizinga 1955, p.133). 
ssim for comments on this tendency. See also the opening lines 
essions to the public in this film...” (Debord 2003a, pp.134-43; 
53 1998, p.27; 2006, p.1609 
 the original 
9 
51 See Kaufmann 2006, pp.232-8 and pa
of In Girum: “I will make no conc
2006, p.1334) 
52 Debord 1998, p.29; 2006, p.1610 
Debord 
54 Debord 1995, p.19, translation altered; 2006, p.772, emphasis in
55 Debord 1998, pp.28-9; 2006, p.160
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thought. Consequently, although the spectacle's expansion and the 
h “no 
 as having announced 
n 
ken, 
 
themselves committed to overcoming “the entire operational field of the dialectical 
logic of conflicts”, and thus “logic...at the level of strategy”.56  
 In other words, the loss of history results in the denigration of critical thought 
and agency, insofar as it undermines the solid basis for opposition and critique 
constituted by historical knowledge. Thus the loss of history also involves that of the 
capacity for strategic 
increasing redundancy of its economic basis engenders antipathy, boredom and the 
demands of the 'new proletariat', it also entails that the individuals concerned are less 
and less able to act on this disaffection. The result is a set of circumstances in whic
one really believes the spectacle”57 (Debord quotes Le Monde
“That modern society is a society of the spectacle now goes without saying”),58 but i
which any alternative seems increasingly impossible.59  
 Debord's contentions are thus characteristically dialectical: the growth of 
spectacular society has, as predicted in 1967, furthered disaffection; by the same to
the very conditions that prompt that disaffection have exacerbated the subjective effects 
of spectacular domination, rendering political change all the more difficult. Yet as the
loss of history denigrates the capacity for strategic thought, it also renders the direction 
of spectacular society an increasingly difficult task.  
 
Strategy and Tactics in Debord's Comments on the Society of the Spectacle 
 
 This brings us to the final sections of the Comments, which are almost as cryptic
as the book's opening passages. Debord begins here by quoting Clausewitz's classical 
definition of strategy and tactics, according to which “tactics teaches the use of armed 
forces in the engagement; strategy, the u
 
se of engagements for the object of the war”.60 
 
'integration' will engender revelations on the part of its rulers as to the advantages 
ew, integrated features. Musketry, Debord explains, 
ations, even though military 
Following a long discussion of the “changes in the art of war”61 brought about by new 
weaponry in the Napoleonic era, Debord indicates that the spectacle's development and
offered to them by the spectacle's n
quickly proved to be more effective in skirmish form
                                                 
Debord 1998, pp.30-1; 2006, p.1611 
Debord 1998, p.60; 2006, p.1629 
Debord 1998, p.5; 2006, p.1596 
See Marx Fisher's recent Capitalist Realism (2009) for relevant contemporary commentary on this 
issue. 
Clausewitz 1993, p.146; Debord 1998, p.85; 2006, p.1644  
Debord 1998, p.85; 2006, p.1644 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
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es they have overcome, and of what 
 claim 
bject of 
st subject to 
the very terrain of this 
reat i ws 
 
lity 
to dictate the actions of his enemies.66   
 Significantly, Debord's comments on Napoleon's skills in this regard would seem 
z, who claims in On War that “Bonaparte could ruthlessly cut 
thought continued to insist on its use in massed volleys from fixed lines; until, that is, 
the exigencies of warfare necessitated the acceptance of the relative inefficiency of such 
formations. Likewise, the establishment of spectacular domination has “radically a
the art of government” to such an extent that “those who serve the interests of 
domination” will be obliged to “see what obstacl
they are capable.”62  
 This might seem to contradict the emphasis that I've placed on Debord's
that the spectacle can no longer be led strategically. However, on my reading, Debord's 
point here is that whilst it might foster a degree of tactical awareness amongst its 
managers, it does not give rise to strategic thought. 
 These closing claims are preceded by a long discussion of the importance of 
conspiracy,  surveillance and manipulation within the integrated spectacle. Countries 
and companies alike now spy on one another, extracting information and presenting 
falsehoods: “thousands of plots in favour of the established order tangle and clash 
almost everywhere, as the overlap of secret networks and secret issues or attitudes 
grows ever more dense”.63 Political opposition, meanwhile – the nominal su
surveillance and restricted information – has largely disappeared, or is at lea
manipulation. Surveillance and intervention now “operate on 
th n order to combat it in advance.”64 This is alluded to again when Debord dra
attention to Napoleon's “strategy ... of using victories in advance”: his victories were 
used “as if acquired on credit”, Debord tells us, insofar as he was able to “understand 
manoeuvres ... from the start as consequences of a victory which while not yet attained 
could certainly be at the first onslaught”.65 Debord would thus seem to be indicating a
link between the spectacle's manipulation of its own opposition and Napoleon's abi
to derive from Clausewit
                                                 
62 Debord 1998, p.88; 2006, p.1646 
64 
65 
66 
oleon adopted a far more fluid approach to combat. The Grande Armée was able to live 
ge manoeuvres could be used as an 
 
le, but 
63 Debord 1998, pp.82-3; 2006, p.1642 
Debord 1998, p.84, emphasis in the original; 2006, p.1643 
Debord 1998, p.86, emphasis in the original; 2006, p.1644 
Rejecting fixed, geometric formations in favour of skirmish lines, smaller divisions and mobile 
artillery, Nap
off the lands that it conquered, and its flexibility entailed that lar
element of battlefield strategy rather than as its prelude. For example, Napoleon's Manoeuvre De 
Derrière involved crossing the enemy army's supply lines, and thereby forcing a situation in which it
was forced to either run away or fight whilst weakened and demoralised. The enemy's total 
annihilation was not only pursued through decisive action that dictated the nature of the batt
also through economic and political means. 
187 
seldom doubted 
l, 
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he 
 
n 'in advance', its 'strategy' is 
ictated purely by the momentum of its own tactical victories. One might note that this 
tum has been described by military historians as both the strength and the 
eakness of Napoleon's approach: according to Handel, its danger is that “instead of 
ecom
ll-
                                                
through all his enemies’ strategic plans in search of battle, because he 
the battle's outcome”.67 Because strategy is influenced by events on the tactical leve
tactical superiority can sabotage the enemy's strategy; and as Clausewitz stresses, 
Napoleon's success stemmed from allowing tactical events to shape his own unfolding 
strategy and to confound that of his opponents.  
 The implication is that the spectacle's 'integration' into society involves a simil
ability to 'ruthlessly cut through' an enemy's strategy, as it eradicates historical 
knowledge and thus strategy. Hence Debord's connection of Napoleonic “changes in t
art of war”68 to spectacular “changes in the art of government.”69 Yet as we've seen, he 
also maintains that history's eradication has resulted in a lack of coherent organisation
and continuity, and that this undermines the spectacle's own strategic operation. Thus 
although the spectacle is able to organise its own oppositio
d
same momen
w
b ing the driving force in war, strategy becomes a mere by-product or 
afterthought”70 (notably, Lukács makes similar points in History and Class 
Consciousness as regards the limits of bourgeois thought).71  
 For Debord, “precisely what defines these spectacular times” is that “an a
powerful economy” has become “mad”72 and now ploughs on towards self-destructive 
situations. Whilst discussing ecological issues,73 he remarks that it “has now come to 
declare open war against humans; not only against their possibilities for life, but against 
their chances of survival”;74 even “science,” which Debord claimed in 1972 to be “in 
thrall to the mode of production,” cannot “imagine a real overthrow of the present 
 
67 Clausewitz 1993, p.462 
68 Debord 1998, p.85; 2006, p.1644 
71 
s 
72 e original; 2006, p.1616 
n entire essay to pollution and ecological damage ('La Planète Malade'), and 
 the subject can be found throughout his late work. In the 1971 text he writes that 
 or death'” is “no longer the lyrical expression of the consciousness that 
fic thought of our century” (Debord 2006, p.1069).   
red; 2006, p.1616 
69 Debord 1998, p.87; 2006, p.1645 
70 Handel 2006, p.354  
“...capitalism is the first system of production able to achieve a total economic penetration of society, 
and this implies that in theory the bourgeoisie should be able to [attain]...an (imputed) class 
consciousness of the whole system of production. On the other hand, the position held by the capitalist 
class [entails]...that it will be unable to control its own system of production even in theory” (Lukác
1971, p.62). 
Debord 1998, p.39, emphasis in th
73 In 1971 Debord devoted a
further remarks on
the slogan “'Revolution
revolts, it is the last word of the scienti
74 Debord 1998, p.39, translation alte
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 a 
scheme of things”, and is thus “quite unable to think strategically”.75 
 We might also note that Clausewitz's comments on Napoleon's approach to 
strategy are made during a discussion of the art of defending against enemy invasion. 
Referencing Napoleon's Russian débâcle of 1812,76 Clausewitz stresses that the furthe
an attack progresses the weaker it becomes. It would seem that for Debord the 
spectacle's absence of strategic guidance entails that it too will advance beyond what 
Clausewitz refers to as its 'culminating point', i.e. the point beyond which an atta
decreasing momentum is outweighed by its resistance.77 Again, this may seem like
rather forced reading, but it might be noted that the S.I. made almost precisely the same 
point in 1969: in a short paragraph entitled 'The Culminating Point of the Spectacle's 
Offensive', they cast the events of the preceding May as inaugurating a movement that 
would confirm “the dialectical thought of Clausewitz”.78  
 
Good Taste 
 
 This perhaps serves to highlight the sense in which Debord, in these later years, 
still held to a dialectical model of emergent consciousness and revolt (Merrifield's 
suggestion that one can identify an Althusserian “epistemological break”79 in Debor
thought is thus quite wrong). He still maintains that the increasing abundance o
spectacular commodities is inversely proportional to their ability to satisfy,
d's 
f 
tered, and once force has been defeated?”81 The problem however lies in the 
anne
                                                
80 and he also 
seems to hold that the spectacle's development into the integrated stage has caused its 
veneer to wear increasingly thin: “the same question,” he wrote in 1992, “is about to be 
posed again everywhere: how can the poor be made to work once their illusions have 
been shat
m r in which this opposition was to arise. Because these weakening illusions were 
coupled to an alleged increase in the quasi-existential poverty described above, 
 
75 S.I. 2003, p.22; Debord 2006, p.1100 
de Armée advanced into Russia. Alexander's forces retreated, and employed a 
licy as they did so. When the exhausted and starving French finally reached Moscow 
e Tsar 
77 , p.639 
79 
80 r example Debord 2008, p.233. 
 
76 In 1812 the Gran
scorched earth po
Napoleon was able to claim the city. However, as three quarters of it had been burned, and as th
would not come to terms, Napoleon had no choice but to abandon Moscow and retreat back to Poland. 
During the course of this retreat he was forced to fight again at Beresina. When the returning army 
finally entered Poland its original force of 420,000 had been cut down to 10,000 (Handel 2006, p.194; 
see also Fuller 1970, pp.117-8).   
Clausewitz 1993
78 S.I. 1997, p.618 
Merrifield 2005, p.99 
See fo
81 Debord 1995, p.10; 2006, p.1794
189 
al; 
of the unhappy consciousness' links to 
pectatorship: here, food is viewed in the same terms as the hopeless pursuit of 
e discovers and forms his own tastes”82 – and in a related text from the 
ame p dern 
om 
it 
e 
imply concludes that “it is only necessary 
 know how to love”.84 It would thus seem that the response to Agamben's comment 
bout reading Debord's books as manuals is ultimately rather banal: the confusion of the 
tegrated spectacle can be superseded simply by discovering what, who and how one 
ves.85  
To “consider everything from the standpoint of oneself, taken as the centre of the 
orld”86 (the approach promoted by Debord in his autobiographical Panegyric, and 
us in his own personal history) is to adopt a somewhat solipsistic approach to the 
                                              
Debord's later writings bring the problematic aspects of his earlier work to the fore.  
 This can be illustrated by making reference to his views on the 'adulteration' of 
food, as set out in his 1985 essay Abat-Faim (literally: 'hunger-abater'). Once, Debord 
tells us, an abat-faim was a dish served to one's dinner guests prior to the main me
today, the totality of the food consumed by modern society is no more than a mere 
'hunger abater'. We thus have a subsequent image 
s
'augmented survival' described in 1967. In this essay Debord links the absence of 
history to the absence of taste – “each person no longer has an individual history in and 
through which h
s eriod he writes that “taste and knowledge have both disappeared”83 from mo
society. Yet following the pattern described above, he seems to hold that their 
deprivation will engender their return; and as before, this is a movement that would 
emerge from the effectively classless ennui of spectacular consumption, and not fr
the oppositional relations and antagonistic experiences of capital itself. However, what 
we have here is a sense in which this revolutionary demand is not driven by an abstract 
desire for 'more', or indeed by a desire for self-determination, but rather by the pursu
of individual 'taste'. In fact, in a letter of 1991 in which he dismisses “the immens
efforts that have been made by the 'practical men' of our era to manage to not 
understand what is most important”, Debord s
to
a
in
lo
 
w
th
   
 Debord 1985 
 Debord 1986a 
 Debord 2008, p.284. Rabant (1997, p.181), by way of his argument about Debord’s status as a 
‘guardian’ of an archive of a ‘true’ common language, implies a link between this statement – which is 
taken from Debord’s Panegyric – and the unfinished 121st line of Plato’s Critias: “So [Zeus] gathered 
all the gods in his most honourable residence, even that that stands at the world’s centre and overlooks 
all that has part in the world’s becoming, and when he had gathered them there, he said…” (Plato 
1961, p.1224). 
 This claim can be traced all the way back to 1958: “Each person,” wrote the S.I. in the first issue of 
Internationale Situationniste, “must seek what he loves, what attracts him” (S.I. 2006, p.49; 1997, 
p.11) 
59 
82
83
84
85
86 Debord 2004, p.7; 2006, p.16
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return o s of 
trategic engagement but also its defining content. The analysis of capital cannot 
n over to an account of its subjective effects. This is not only 
ental to economic analysis, as noted in chapter six, but perhaps even antithetical 
 us 
efore be 
 
 
e that this need 
                                                
f history, and entails that individual subjectivity becomes not only the basi
s
therefore help but be give
detrim
to it. For example, in November 1985 (and thus after that summer’s Live Aid event) 
Debord makes the following, rather disturbing comment: 
 
 [T]he planet produces enough cereal that no one should suffer hunger, but what troubles this idyll is that 
the 'rich countries' abusively consume half the world's cereals in feeding their cattle. But when one has 
known the disastrous taste of butchered meat which was thus fattened on cereal, can one speak of 'rich 
countries'? It's not to make us live like Sybarites that part of the planet is dying of famine; it's to make
live in the mud.87  
 
 Although in keeping with the concerns of the 'new proletariat', this passage 
perhaps shows what little relation the latter bears to the actual mechanics of capital. 
Debord's own comments on the links between strategy and subjectivity can ther
seen to imply the same problems as his theory of spectacle. In fact, given that the 
analysis and traversal of a historical context becomes undermined by an individualistic
focus, one could perhaps venture that if the spectacle can be said to possess the tactical
to the detriment of the strategic, then perhaps Debord's own account can be seen to 
privilege the strategic (i.e. subjective history) over the tactical (i.e. the study and 
engagement of capital). However, I'll suggest in chapters eight and nin
not be the necessary outcome of these ideas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 Debord 1985; 2006, p.1585 
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Chapter Eight: Strategy and Subjectivity 
 
 
History and Autonomy 
 
 The claims set out he r eight will attempt to synthesise some of
positions advanced in the first and second parts of the thesis, with reference to the lin
between history and strategy discussed in chapter seven. Whilst drawing on some of the 
ideas presented in part one, I'll try to set out the primary attributes of Debord's Hegelian 
Marxism. I should stress that the claims made here at the end of the thesis are more 
tentative than those presented in its earlier sections, and should be seen primarily as 
indications towards the possibilities that the reading presented here might hold for 
future work. It might also be noted that Debord gives us very little to draw on when it 
comes to investigating these aspects of his oeuvre, and as such my attempts at 
reconstruction will inevitably give way to speculation at times. Consequently, chapters 
eight and nine and the conclusions drawn from them could be seen as supplements to 
the thesis' primary intended contribution, i.e. its attempt to read and critique Debord's 
work through the philosophical dimensions of its intellectual history. However, as I will 
remain close to textual evidence throughout, I think it possible to suggest that the m
re in chapte  the 
ks 
odel 
 We've seen that Debord's concern with history and agency is marked by an 
phasis on autonomy and self-determination, and by the rejection of all forms of 
's work should be located within the 
mmunism, 
de
presented here may not be too dissimilar from Debord's actual views. 
 I'll begin by revising some of my earlier comments on the degree to which 
Debord's account implies an immanent form of political agency that avoids hierarchy 
and representation. From this I'll move towards noting the similarities between the unity 
of means and ends implied by the S.I.'s comments on organisation and historical 
process, before discussing the degree to which this echoes the circular self-
determination of the Hegelian absolute. I'll then work through some of the more literary 
and poetic elements of Debord's various comments on time and history, before 
presenting a theoretical model that may serve to explain them.   
em
separated power. In this respect his own and the S.I.
ultra-left tradition, and indeed it often is placed alongside libertarian co
council communism and anarchism. This of course sets Debord apart from Lukács, 
spite the debts owed to the latter; for where Lukács' claim that “the proletariat has 
192 
 
ld make explicit that 
, 
e. 
t 
proper 
the 
ery “opposite of himself, and of all that he had argued for in History and Class 
                                              
been entrusted by history with the task of transforming society consciously”1 bears 
obvious relation to the material that I've emphasised throughout this thesis, it also 
differs from Debord in that Lukács locates the full expression of that historical 
consciousness within the Party. This for Debord is tantamount to “directing the 
proletariat from without”.2 This is not to suggest that Debord and the S.I. were 
unequivocally opposed to the idea of a historical vanguard. Their early status as an 
artistic avant-garde was inflected with the desire to stand at the forefront of history 
(“Are we an avant-garde?” asked Vaneigem in 1963; “If so, to be avant-garde means to
move in step with reality”),3 and their concern with expressing an historical negative or 
tendency certainly chimes with the contention that the Party shou
which is implicit within the class as a whole. The difference is simply that the identity
consciousness and direction of that mass should not be localised in a hierarchically 
elevated and thus representational (qua the alienation and abdication of social power) 
form. Hence, as we also saw in the general introduction, the S.I. claimed that they “did 
not 'put our ideas into everybody's heads'”, but rather “gave voice to ideas that were 
necessarily already present in these proletarian heads”4 (this however bears relation to 
some of Marx and Engels' claims in the Manifesto, which Lukács, despite his distance 
from the S.I.’s views, no doubt also drew upon).5   
 Yet for Debord, what Lukács described as the virtues of the Bolshevik Party (i.
its function as a form of practical mediation between theory and practice) were in fac
everything that it “was not.”6 Despite the merits of his theoretical work, Lukács was 
said to be an “ideologist” in the service of the “power that was most vulgarly external to 
the proletarian movement”: for Lukács, according to Debord, gave the impression that 
he'd “found himself, his entire personality, within this power as if within his own 
self”,7 even though the terror inflicted by that power and the self-repudiations that it 
would later demand from him revealed that what he'd in fact identified with was 
v
   
Luká
 Debor
 S.I. 2003, p.9 translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1089, emphasis in the original. 
5 The communists are “the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every 
country, that section which pushes forward all others,” and have “the advantage of clearly 
understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate results of the proletarian movement” 
, p.814, emphasis in the original 
p.81-2, translation altered; 2006, p.814, emphasis in the original 
1 cs 1971, p.71, emphasis in the original 
2 d 1995, p.68; 2006, p.805, emphasis in the original 
3 S.I. 2006, p.159; 1997, p.334  
4
(Engels and Marx 1985, p.95). 
6 Debord 1995, p.80; 2006
7 Debord 1995, 
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Consciousness”8 (comments that might usefully be put in relation to Feuerbach's view
on religion: “Man” for Feuerbach, as we saw earlier, first sees his [own] nature as if out
of himself, before he finds it in himself”).9 In fact, and whilst Debord's 'new' proletariat 
is problematic as regards its bearing on the analysis of capital, its implications as 
regards direct councilist organisation are perhaps more consistent than Lukács' own 
views on the Party's embodiment of historical self-consciousness: for if subjec
unity is in essence an agency that is at the same time a self-determining process
it arises from a common attribute of those that compose it, then Debord's emphasis on 
direct, collective self-determination perhaps makes more sense – in theoretical terms, at
least – than Lukács' insistence on the Party as a controlling hub. 
 Two points can be drawn from these distinctions. Firstly, 'authentic' historic
agency would seem to entail finding and identifying oneself within a collective power 
that is not separate from one's own individuality, but which is rather an expression of 
the particular identities that compose it. Secondly, the manner in which the productio
and dissemination of theory is cast as an historically specific intervention receives a 
further qualification: for if theory is the expression of a shared circumstance, or r
consciousness of what is required to change that circumstance, then it would seem
the real measure of a theory's validity lies in the degree to which it affects practical 
change, and is adopted by those to whom it purports to give voice. This last point not 
only invites distinction from Leninism (What Is to Be Done?10 provides an obviou
point of reference here), but it also raises a set of difficulties that I'll treat towards the 
end of the thesis. Here however we can sum up these opening remarks by simply stating
that what Debord seems to imply here is a collective force that arises immanently from 
its members; a point that bears direct relation to the themes of organic unity and 
alienation discussed in part two. In the following section I'll show that the operat
this form of agency would also seem to recall aspects of the Hegelian Concept.  
Circularity and Un  
an
    
 
 As we saw earlier, the Lukács of 1967 – concerned by the interest that History 
d Class Consciousness had garnered amongst “French Existentialism and its 
                                             
Debord 1995, p.81-2, translation altered; 2006, p.814, emphasis in the original 
Feuerbach 1989, p.13 
8 
9 
10 Lenin 1988 
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ence”11 – held that “labour, the mediator of the metabolic interaction 
n 
 in 
t 
tions for self-determinate action, and I indicated above 
esented 
t 
16 (for “history”, as 
e saw earlier, “has no goal [n'a pas d'objet] aside from whatever effects it works upon 
 this is linked to the sense in which the S.I. advocated the 
e form and content of political organisation: for example, when 
intellectual ambi
between society and nature,” was “missing” from that book:12 the subjective alienatio
of consciousness had been blurred with the necessary alienation of its objectification
action, and as a result his attempt to present the proletariat as “the identical subject-
object of history” could be viewed as an “attempt to out-Hegel Hegel”.13 We also saw 
that Debord avoids this problem, and that he emphasises the necessity of self-
objectification in activity: “As Hegel showed,” he writes, “time is a necessary 
alienation, being the medium in which the subject realises himself whilst losing himself, 
becomes other in order to become truly himself.”14 The supersession of alienation and 
separation in Debord's account does not entail overcoming 'otherness' and externality 
altogether, but rather involves an identity in difference between the subject and its 
objective actions and their results. What then arises is a sense in which subject-objec
unity emerges as a set of condi
that this could be taken to imply an ethical dimension15 (insofar as this agency is to 
extend beyond capitalism, basing it solely upon economic determinations would seem 
to be unsatisfactory); or, if ethics seems too dogmatic a term, it could be read as 
implying a connection to notions of general will, as both the latter and the ethical 
pertain to the legitimation of a set of social relations. Yet these conditions are pr
not only as the grounds of action, but also as their goal: hence the sense in which tha
which lies beyond the spectacle is not a discrete social form, but an open history. 
Communism, qua the self-determination and interrelation of the individuals involved, 
thus becomes an historical process rather than an economic formula
w
itself”).17 I would argue that
unification of th
discussing workers' councils, the S.I. stated that “the means of their victory are already 
                                                 
11 Lukács 1971, p.xvi 
12 Lukács 1971, p.xvii 
13 Lukács 1971, p.xxiii 
14 Debord 1995, pp.115-6; 2006, p.835 
15   This is necessarily schematic, but one could venture that if freedom means self-determination, qua th
absence of the external determination of ali social power – and if the organisational m f 
e 
enated eans o
attaining freedom are an end in themselves, insofar as means and ends are one – then this would seem 
to imply an ethics, as pursuing one's own freedom would entail perpetuating that of others.  
the history of [the Paris Commune] ...from a divinely omniscient 
 objectively doomed to failure, and had no 
 [dépassement; alternatively: sublation]. It must not be forgotten that for those 
already there” (S.I. 2006, p.401, translation altered; Debord 
17 
16   “Theoreticians who examine 
viewpoint... can easily demonstrate that the Commune was
possible supersession
who really lived it, the supersession was 
2006, emphasis in the original). 
Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.792 
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r I 
d be taken 
I 
rd's description of the Hegelian Idea as 'undialectical' stems 
om th he 
 
s 
s to temporality that can be found in Debord's later work, I'll show that his 
nt 
their victory”.18 
 I think it possible to connect this unity of means and ends, and of process and 
goal, to the self-movement of the Hegelian absolute. When discussing this earlie
referred to Debord's remarks on the “non-inverted legacy” of the “undialectical part of 
the Hegelian attempt to create a circular system”,19 and suggest that this coul
to imply that there is, potentially, a dialectical and inverted version of such circularity. 
also suggested that Debo
fr e self-contained nature of the Hegelian absolute: like the flow of value in t
economy, the movement of the negative within the Hegelian system stands apart from 
those from whom it truly arises, and appears only as an object of static contemplation. A
genuinely 'dialectical' version thereof would, presumably, actualise that negative in 
lived practice, thereby 'inverting' and realising the unity of the absolute as free, self-
determinate historical agency. 
 This connection is however rendered difficult by the degree to which Debord'
account would seem to require the incorporation of chance and contingency intro this 
movement, as this jars with the free self-founding necessity of the Hegelian absolute. 
Yet before making that claim I'll first present some examples taken from Debord's work 
that may serve to strengthen my case. Drawing on the more poetic and literary 
reference
account can be seen to associate communion with time with sublimity; that this link 
with time involves decision and choice; and that identity with time, despite its appare
connection to an absolute, requires some form of strategic process. 
 
Strategy and the Sublime 
  
 Verso's 2004 edition of the latter includes a note by Debord on the difficu
translating the text. It is, he explains, a rather more complex work th
lties of 
an it may at first 
eem (a
inv  traps”;20 in addition, it 
ing”  modelled upon the Situationist dérive.22 This 
s  point that perhaps also substantiates my earlier remarks on the subtleties 
olved of the Comments): not only is it “crammed with
21exhibits a “continual shift of mean
                                                 
.I. 2006, p.362; 1997, p.641 
ebord 1
18 S
19 D 995, p.51, translation altered; 2006, p.795 
22 “
s, counting on their rarity, and also on diverse principles of the dérive, which modern art 
20 Debord 2008, p.218 
21 Debord 2004, pp.172-3; 2006, pp.1686-7 
If Comments was made to paralyse a computer, then Panegyric is made to partially escape good 
political mind
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hasis on moving in step 
 
 
e' 
(as discussed in chapter 
f 
ion 
    
shift of meaning can be seen in the themes treated by its chapters: for where the f
appropriately, deals with writing through the issue of strategy, the second chapter deals
with the passing of time through alcoholism.23 It is here that Debord makes the 
following, frequently quoted statement: “At first, like everyone, I appreciated the effect 
of mild drunkenness; then very soon I grew to like what lies beyond violent 
drunkenness, once that stage is past: a terrible and magnificent peace, the true taste of 
the passage of time.”24  
 This remark can be illuminated by way of reference to the eighth century 
Chinese poet Li Po, whom Debord references in Panegyric and indeed throughout the 
period under discussion here in part three. Li Po's work is much given to reflections on 
time, as the Taoist principles that characterise it entail an emp
with the world;25 and in keeping with other classical Chinese poets, he held alcohol to
offer greater spontaneity and a deeper unity with time.26 Yet whilst the romanticism of
Li Po's communion with time and the eternal can be appealing (legend has it that he 
died drunkenly falling from a boat whilst attempting to embrace the moon's reflection), 
what's important here is the degree to which Debord too presents affinity with time as 
something akin to the sublime; a point that accords with the negative, moving 'absolut
afforded by the 'passageways' of the constructed situation 
three).   
 Time and alcohol feature heavily in The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, which 
Debord also references throughout these later works. Khayyám presents the flow o
time as life, and links it to alcohol that is to be consumed and enjoyed. There's an 
existential current to the Rubáiyát, and indeed a degree of hedonism (from the 
Fitzgerald translation: “Ah, fill the Cup – what boots it to repeat/ How Time is slipping 
underneath our Feet”),27 but also a touch of fatalism: for example, in the Comments 
Debord quotes Khayyám as having described human agents as “puppets” of the 
“firmament”, destined to be put back into the “box of oblivion”.28  
 It's significant to note that those last lines are quoted in a small, separate sect
                                                                                                                                           
25   See Hinton in Li Po 1998, 2006, pp.xi-xxiv 
26  “Three cups and I've plumbed the great Way [the Tao],/ a jarful and I've merged with occurrence/ 
appearing of itself. Wine's view is lived:/ you can't preach [Taoist] doctrine to the sober” (Li Po 1998, 
 the Fitzgerald translation, although its 49  quatrain may be the one in question (Khayyám 
introduced into the deployment of texts” (Debord 2008, p.218). 
23   Debord 2004b, p.173; 2006, p.1687 
24 Debord 2004b, pp. 30-1; 2006, p.1669 
p.44). 
27   Khayyám 1993, p.51 
28 Debord 1998, p.85; 2006, p.1644; there is no direct correspondence between the lines that Debord 
quotes and th
1993, p.63). 
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nother from Baltasar Gracián, whose words can be traced to a section of The 
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of text, which is located immediately prior to the Comments' suggestion that the 
spectacle's managers will become aware of the possibilities afforded by the integrated 
spectacle's new terrain (as discussed in the previous chapter). The quotation is placed 
alongside a
A orldly Wisdom headed 'Live for the Moment'. This advises its readers to “Act 
when you may, for time and tide wait for no one”.29 Debord is of course as opaque as 
ever here, but the two quotations can perhaps be read as offering the choice between 
two different forms of temporality: acting in and with time (Gracián), or being acted o
by time (Khayyám); a choice made all the more important by the spectacle's dawning 
tactical (although not strategic) self-consciousness. We thus have a sense in which time 
is not only associated with sublimity, but also with strategy.  
 The existential dimensions of the latter theme can be found in the work of the
15th Century Spanish poet Jorge Manrique, which Debord translated into French in 
1980. In his notes to the translation Debord commends the emphasis on the flow 
that can be found in Manrique's work, and claims that the latter's “most beautiful less
... is that he must fight for ‘his true king’, which is that which one has made oneself”.30
Yet in order to 'fight' successfully one is obliged to know how to act at the right time, 
and to thus possess a degree of 'historical consciousness'. 
 As we've seen, this becomes an increasingly difficult task within the integrated 
spectacle. Yet given the nature of the latter, Debord's unpublished notes on Poker31 of 
1990 seem particularly apposite: he advises there that when others are presenting 
illusions and assuming all others to be doing the same, acting opportunely on the ba
of known facts confers an advantage. To play well, “one must know how to em
k of one's forces at the right moment.”32 Kairos is a classical Greek term r
to the opportune moment: the right time to act, but a time that cannot be measured.
Kairos is inherently qualitative, as opposed to the quantitative sequence of kronos
'clock-time', and not only does it transcend the latter, but it also impinges upon it and 
disrupts it with its demands for apposite action. This concept can be seen to pertain
directly to some of Debord's claims in In Girum: there, referencing both Sun Tzu and 
Clausewitz, he writes that “you have to act with what is at hand... the moment you see a 
 
án 2000, p.116  
as a means of supporting himself financially at some points in his 
 
29 Debord 1998, p.85; 2006, p.1644; Graci
30   Debord in Manrique 1996, p.73 
31   Debord claims to have played Poker 
life. 
32 Debord 2006, p.1790
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 with time is thus linked to contextual action, beauty, and is even 
 situations tended “towards the absolute, and [towards] its undoing”; both, 
ey claimed, were the “proclamation of the absolute and consciousness of the passage 
vely, 'consciousness of transitoriness']”.36 As I noted 
en, this use of the term 'absolute' was perhaps intended in a primarily aesthetic sense, 
s 
e 
                                                
favourable opportunity”,33 contending that “those who have chosen to strike with the 
time know that [the time that is] their weapon is also their master; and they can
complain. It is also the master of those without weapons, and a much harder master [to 
them].”34  
 It would seem that the self-determinate agency that Debord advocates relies on 
choice and decision: on knowing how and when to act both with and within one's own 
time. Yet time and choice are also linked to beauty. In 1955 Debord claimed that the 
only things that could rival the beauty of the Paris Metro map were Claude Lorrain's 
two paintings of harbours at dusk, which he had seen in the Louvre. They depict ships 
and people coming and going, and with the setting of the sun they also show the passage 
of time: “I am not, of course, talking about mere physical beauty [la beauté plastique]”
he wrote, for “the new beauty can only be a beauty of situation”, but rather “si
about the particularly moving presentation, in both cases, of a sum of possibilities”.35 
 Identity
accorded a degree of sublimity. Returning to the claims advanced in part one: when 
discussing the constructed situation we saw that for the S.I. both Lefebvre's 'moments' 
and their own
th
[conscience du passage; alternati
th
but given the correspondence between Debord's early views on the situation and hi
later indications of the subjectivity denied by the spectacle it is possible to use this 
'passage' through the 'absolute' as a means of pursuing his Hegelian Marxism. 
 The situation was to offer a degree of permanence and continuity to its 
communion with time (I argued earlier that where the Lefebvrian moment was an 
instance within time, the situation attempts to move with time). We also saw that 
Lefebvre claimed that creating moments entailed shaping 'structure' from 'conjuncture' ( 
i.e. establishing a specific type of moment from a shifting, changing context). Yet 
Debord, borrowing Lefebvre's terms, presented the situation as “an attempt at structur
of (in) conjunction”:37 as an attempt, in other words, to establish a state of self-directed 
change that involved the deliberate creation and traversal of chance, and thus, on my 
 
33 Debord 2003a, p.180; 2006, pp.1387-8 
34 Debord 2003a, p.174, translation altered; 2006, pp.1380-1 
rd 2006, p.208 35 S.I. 2006, p.11; Debo
36 S.I. 1997, p.119 
37   Debord 2009, p.337 
199 
ive 
d to 
 
 
 
y be characterised by a more strategic concern with attempting to supersede 
d 
reading, a degree of strategic agency. I also referred in chapter two to an unpublished 
note on chance, written by Debord in 1957, in which he writes that “In known 
conditions the role of chance is conservative”, although all “progress, all creation, is the 
organization of new conditions of chance”.38 Situationist practice would thus seem to be 
involved in the constant creation, negotiation and subsequent re-creation of success
fields of chance. This would then be both a historical and strategic project, characterised 
by constant, negative movement (qua its identity with time), and I think it possible to 
contend that these characteristics of the constructed situation would later be attribute
revolutionary and post-revolutionary subjectivity: for the Situationist revolution would
inaugurate a “collective” time, as Debord put it, “which is playful in character”,39 and in
which, for Vaneigem, “the game that everyone will play [will be] 'the moving order of
the future'”.40 Prior to the actualisation of such a future this movement would 
presumabl
the spectacle.  
 I'll now try to offer some speculations as to the mechanics that this model would 
seem to involve, and this will involve highlighting issues pertaining to bad infinity an
contingency. 
 
Bad Infinity and Contingency 
 
 Whilst Hegelian circularity entails permanent process, within Hegel's own 
account it can ultimately only give rise to further modulations of itself. Hegel is, after 
all, claiming to express the inner logic of being, and thus any changes that occur with
being do so within the parameters set by that logic. Debord of course makes no such 
claims: the subject-object unity that he describes is not that of the Idea, but rather far 
more human-scale. As such it is always contextual, and is obliged to recreate itsel
moves through time and through the contexts and situations with which it is face
where time and negativity move through the Hegelian circle as current through a circui
and are contained therein, Debord's own model of unity would seem to be obliged to 
continually reform itself around the more linear stream of time that passes through it. So
in 
f as it 
d. Thus 
t, 
 
although one could suggest that the links between praxis and the absolute render time in 
                                                 
40 S
38 Debord 2006, p.296 
39 Debord 1995, p.116 
.I. 2006, p.173; 1997, p.343 
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s Marxism perhaps invites future attempts to use his work as a vehicle 
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and our world in conformity with it (hence the importance of the state to Hegel's 
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Debord’s account equivalent to the “universal blood”41 of the Concept's negativity – the 
constant interplay of subject and object being analogous to its “life-pulse”42 – the 
process by which the ensemble moves through time must entail limitation, and thus bad 
infinity. It is however this persistence of the bad infinite that allows for the chance 
elements and strategic dimensions of the model, insofar as consciousness remains 
limited and subject to the unknown. In addition, insofar as the consciousness that would
arise form these contexts would be determined by them, it would also be contingent to 
some extent; it could thus not claim to be necessary in and of itself alone, but rather 
only necessary in relation to its own project and given circumstances. Consequently – 
and although this falls beyond the scope of this present study – there is thus a degree to 
which Debord'
towards a more politicised take on the links between Hegelian metaphysics and Sartrean 
ontology. 
 I’ll try to clarify these suggestions by way of the following. Hegel's views on 
contingency merit serious study in their own right, but they can perhaps be sketche
way of the following. For Hegel, if something is contingent it “has the ground of its 
being not within itself but elsewhere”.43 This means that it cannot, for Heg
genuinely free. True freedom in his view means necessity, and his position here is v
close to Spinoza's claim that “That thing is called free which exists from the necessit
its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone”.44 If something is free it must 
be the cause of itself, and thereby necessary; that which is contingent upon something 
else cannot therefore be free.45 For Hegel, everything ultimately has its basis within the 
Idea, although not everything that exists fully actualises and expresses this common 
nature. As it is the Idea alone that is truly, absolutely necessary, genuine human freedom 
can be found in recognising ourselves to be its expressions, and in shaping ourselves 
hilosophy; hence also his claim that the goal of Spirit is freedom). This can be 
strated by returning to the structure of the Hegelian system. The Logic allows pure
eing to unfold of its own immanent nature, by way of which process it reveals itself to 
 reason and ultimately nature. Nature, in The Philosophy of Nature, gives rise to life 
                                             
Hegel 1977, p.100 
Hegel 1969, p.37 
 Hegel 1991, p.218 
41 
42 
43  
 
tingency... ” (Hegel 1991, p.218). 
44   Spinoza 1996, p.2 
45 “When people speak of freedom of the will, they frequently understand by this simply freedom of
choice, i.e. will in the form of con
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In fact, 
in his 'Report on the Construction of Situations' of 1957,47 he writes that “the real 
exercise of freedom” is “consciousness of present necessity”48 (my italics). This is then 
ination of a divine Spirit, but rather self-determination in 
sit
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and ultimately Spirit, which then ascends in The Philosophy of Spirit to the point where
it takes up the immanent philosophical study of pure being. The physical, natural world
is thus part of a circle that is grasped by human consciousness, and which reveals itself 
and all that to which it gives rise to be both necessary and free. Nature, as follows given 
its location within this circuit, is the reason developed in the Logic whilst in a sta
otherness to itself. Consequently, nature exhibits unreason and contingency. Yet by th
same token, because nature is part of the movement of the whole, those contingencies
are themselves located within a grander necessity and constitute expressions of the 
freedom of that whole. My point then (following Houlgate, and as opposed to Beiser),
is that for Hegel contingency falls within necessity, as within its own logical conditions 
of existence.  
 With Debord however, freedom cannot be pure, self-referential necessity. 
not the pure self-determ
uation. Every formation and moment of subjectivity is thus finite, contingent on its 
decessor and on the factors that inform it. It thus involves bad infinity. 
This would seem to invite reference to Sartre once more, whose “circuit of 
fness” could be seen to echo some of these themes.49 Within that circuit I project 
self into the future, giving meaning to my present by defining it on that basis; but
en I reach myself in the future I have become different, and the totality that wou
se from my founding of my own being (i.e. from my future self founding my present 
f) is forever left 'de-totalised'. Like the unhappy consciousness, I continue to chase 
 own receding self. Furthermore, with Sartre there can be no sense in which freedom 
consciousness of present necessity', as one is always already free. It is in fact in order 
                                             
Beiser suggests that contingency may be a major problem vis a vis its location inside or outside the 
system: “If it is inside...[it] has only a subjective status, so that there is no explanation of real 
contingency”; if outside, “it then limits the absolute” (Beiser 2005, p.79; in contrast, see Houlgate 
2005 pp.112-5). 
The context of the following statement is a discussion of Zhdanovism, named after Andrei Zhdan
Soviet proponent of Socialist Realist art who argued artists should be “engineers of human souls” 
(Zhdanov 1977). Debord argues here that whilst a rejection of Socialist Realism in the East tended to 
pursue the greater creative freedom offered by Western artistic currents, this cannot be an adequat
response: rather, a negation of Zhdanovism was said to entail a negation of the Zhdanovist negatio
bourgeois art, i.e. the genuine supersession of art that would realise it as praxis. Freedom therefore 
was not to be confused with creative licence per se, but was rather to be linked with a conscio
awareness of the means towards actualising conditions made necessary by present exigencies (and 
ultimately of the requirements of actualising a condition of subject-object unity). 
S.I. 2006, p.36; Debord 2006, p.320 
“We shall use the expression Circuit of selfness for the relation of the for-itself with the possible 
which it is” (Sartre 2003, p.126). 
46 
47   ov, a 
e 
n of 
us 
48 
49 
202 
e impossible desire 
 and 
tity 
re 
 in 
 the 
ion 
to escape that freedom that the desire to found oneself arises, i.e. th
to become God. In Sartre's view, subject-object unity – or in his terminology, being in-
and-for-itself – would erase freedom altogether, instituting the end of consciousness
a flat, undifferentiated positivity.50 Yet with Debord the issue is more to do with identity 
with one's own objectified, externalised power (the nuances of which as regards 
alienation and collectivity were touched on at the end of part one), not identity with 
being per se,51 and Hegelian philosophy certainly involves a sense in which iden
does not entail the erasure of difference. Thus where Sartre posits an impossible desi
to become God, linking ethics to the renunciation of that desire – and where Hegel
effect purports to be God – Debord's own account has a more Feuerbachian take on
problem: subject-object unity becomes not a cosmic, metaphysical truth or the reduct
of the self to the status of an object, but rather a social condition that affords the 
                                                 
50 Sartre 2003 p.164 
51 This issue could be taken as a means of pursuing the question of whether Debord followed En
diamat in ascribing dialectics to the natural world, and not just to the human sphere. The problems of 
diamat are often traced to Engels, particularly his Anti-Dühring and Dialectics of Nature (Eng
1987), which validated Marxism as science by casting science itself as dialectics. From such a 
position one could claim the ascendancy of the Party to be as 'natural' and inevitab
stars in the sky (Stalin endorsed 'dialectical materialism' as “the world outlook of t
gels and 
els 
le as that of the 
 he Marxist-Leninist 
party e 
impo  
de 
at times 
y and 
ation on 
 
for helpful comments see Rees in Lukács 2000, p.21; see also Vogel 1996 for a useful overview of the 
problems). The initial claim that nature is not dialectical can then be read as contending that nature 
r 
. 
al 
ated by society; this then shapes our knowledge of nature (e.g. 
 category'. This then tempers Lukács' 1967 
rlier book had tried to 'out-Hegel Hegel'. He is not claiming that describing nature 
as a mistake, because to do so might imply a dialectics of nature: rather, he 
 stance on alienation makes such a dialectical understanding of nature all the more 
hereby denigrating Marxism's status as a “theory 
971, p.xvi).  
” (Stalin 1976)), and it is thus perhaps attractive to distance Debord from these positions. Th
rt of contingency, limitation and chance would seem to point to a rejection of a dialectics of
nature, but hints towards its acceptance van however be found in some of Debord's writings: for 
example, and somewhat peculiarly, in a letter of 1986 he describes the 19th century German physician 
Christian Hahnemann as “resembl[ing] a Hegelian dialectician by conceiving of homeopathy” 
(Debord 1986b). Furthermore, it might also be noted that some of the claims that Lukács makes when 
arguing for a dialectics of nature in his 'Tailism and the Dialectic' (written in the mid 1920's, lost, 
discovered in the 90's and published in 2000 as A Defence of History and Class Consciousness) do 
bear marked relation to Debord's apparent views on the limitations of consciousness (e.g. compare 
Lukács 2000 pp.102-3 with the opening pages of Panegyric). It might also be noted here as an asi
that Lukács' views on nature are famously confusing. History and Class Consciousness seems 
to deny that dialectics can be ascribed to nature, arguing that it should be restricted to societ
culture (Lukács 1971 p.24n); the book also objects to Engels' view that scientific experiment
the natural world might serve as a model for understanding society. Yet elsewhere in the same book
Lukács indicates that both nature and society are dialectical, albeit whilst noting that nature, though 
dialectical, is devoid of the active human consciousness that characterises society (Lukács 1971 p.207; 
cannot be understood in terms of the dialectics of society. This explains his objection to Engels: 
scientific experiment, in which an observer merely 'watches' the operation of nature, is unsuitable fo
understanding the active process of human history, and leads towards contemplation and determinism
In 'Tailism and the Dialectic' Lukács goes some way towards clarifying these positions, but they 
remain very unclear. His major point seems to be that reality should be considered as a historic
process; that our knowledge is medi
Lukács 2000, pp.102-3). Hence, nature is a 'social
complaint that his ea
as a social category w
holds that his book's
difficult, because it views nature in terms of society, t
of nature” (Lukács 1
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tant 
But if it seems a 
ontradiction to contend that Debord's account is modelled on the Hegelian absolute and 
et falls short of true infinity, one could look at Arthur, who ascribes the same features 
to capital itself (remembering here that for Debord the capitalist spectacle is a distorted 
mirror of its producers).53 For Arthur, capital's movement through the phases of 
commodity – money – commodity can be viewed in terms of identity in difference: 
“The truly infinite character of capital”, he writes, “is that it returns to itself in its 
circuit”.54 However, Arthur also points out that there is “no realisation of absolute 
wealth no matter how much capital is accumulated”,55 as this movement continually 
produces a succession of finite amounts. Furthermore, for Arthur, capital must always 
remain contingent upon material reality, despite its attempts to subsume the latter.56 It is 
thus marked by the bad infinite, despite its circularity and self-grounding, self-
perpetuating process. He then contrasts this with one of Marx's comments in the 
Grundrisse on post-revolutionary society, in which Marx claims that humanity does not 
strive “to remain something [it] has become, but is in the absolute movement of 
becoming”;57 and “what,” Arthur asks, “is this, if not true infinity?”58  
 The question of whether Marx's own philosophical anthropology really can 
support a notion of true infinity falls outside of our current concerns, but for the reasons 
given above I'd argue that Debord's cannot. As the actions undertaken by the subject 
must be contingent upon elements external to that subject, the latter cannot be possessed 
of the complete, self-enclosed necessity of the Hegelian absolute. Nonetheless, there are 
still elements of the 'good' infinite perpetual process: for what one finds here is a 
peculiarly existential, and indeed quite literal gloss on the Trotskyist notion of 
'permanent revolution' (this is in fact a point made by the S.I. themselves: the “new 
revolutionary movement”, they remarked in 1961, was to involve “the passage from the 
                                                
supersession of a collectivity's alienated powers and capacities.52   
 The degree to which this involves bad infinity and contingency (i.e. the cons
re-creation of that condition of unity) cannot however be avoided. 
c
y
 
52 This could in fact be seen to be close to what Sartre actually advocates. Anderson's explanation of this 
point puts Sartre close to the position that I'm attributing to Debord: “by choosing my freedom and 
justifying my own existence [as opposed of running from it in the hopeless desire to become in-and-
for-itself] ... I become, Sartre says (in a weak sense), God as causa sui, for I will myself to be the 
absolute cause and foundation of the meaning of my being as well as the cause of the world's 
meaning” (Anderson 1993, p.61). 
53 See for example Debord 1995, p.16; 2006, p.769 
54 Arthur 2004, p.148 
55 Arthur 2004,  p.146 
56 Arthur 2004, p.107 
57 Marx 1973, p.488; referenced in Arthur 2004, p.149 
58 Arthur 2004, p.149 
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volution”).  In what follows I'll attempt to develop quite what that theory might 
                    
 limited permanent revolution to a theory of generalised permane
59re
entail, and indeed what it might mean for the theory of spectacle.  
 
 
                             
59 S.I. 2006, p.86; 1997, p.203 
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Chapter Nine: Freedom and Praxis 
 
 
Tactics, Strategy and the Theory of Spectacle 
 
 In this final chapter I'll try to make good on my earlier suggestion that the notion 
of praxis that could be drawn from Debord's work might be of greater interest than the
theory of spectacle. In chapter eight I developed some of part one's claims as to the 
sense in which Debord's account can be seen to cast the Hegelian absolute as the 
grounds, rather than as the goal – or indeed th
 
e arrest – of historical agency; here in 
ight 
attempts are located. Such associations 
ay see t out in 
chapter nine I'll try to take this further, by way of recourse to the self-grounding and 
self-legitimating movement of the Hegelian Idea. Through doing so I hope to show that 
Debord's claim that Situationist subjectivity entails “going with the flow of time [miser 
sur la fuite du temps; literally, 'to gamble on the escape of time']”,1 when taken with his 
interest in strategy, affords a means of addressing the statement with which I began the 
thesis' general introduction: “Man – that 'negative being who is to the extent that he 
abolishes being' – is one [identique] with time”.2 I'll try to show that the themes 
outlined above may afford a means of taking that statement in conjunction with Marx 
and Engels’ famous contention that “communism” is “the real movement that abolishes 
[aufhebt] the present state of things”3 (a line that The Society of the Spectacle links, 
notably, to the movement of a self-conscious history, and to the dissolution of “all 
separation”).4  
 According to Clausewitz's definition, which I noted in chapter seven and which 
Debord adopts in the Comments, tactics is the use of engagements to win a battle; 
strategy is the use of battles to win a war. I also suggested in chapter seven that it m
be possible to relate this to the model of agency advanced here: one could link 'tactics' 
to the thought and practice required to negotiate a given context, and 'strategy' to the 
ongoing historical project within which such 
m m a little facile, but they can be useful in terms of relating the material se
part one of the thesis to the criticisms advanced in part two. 
 Towards the end of chapter seven I remarked that if the Comments can indeed be 
read as implying that the spectacle's managers will gain a tactical advantage to the 
                                                 
1 S.I. 2006, p.42; Debord 2006, p.327 
2 Debord 1995, p.92; 2006, p.820 
3 Marx 2000, p.187 
, p.866 4 Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.792; Cf. 2006
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n its own terms, it would seem that if the task is to remain in 
tep with one's own time, and to re-create the conditions of a self-determinate history, 
the 'strategic' process risk bringing the entire 
nterprise to a halt (hence my earlier claims that this model provides an impetus 
e tension between the ideas that found Debord's theory and his own 
laims  
 war of 
ments 
 
seem to 
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s 
an 
n 
                                                
d nt of strategic awareness, then perhaps Debord's own emphasis on individual
subjectivity privileges the strategic over the tactical: an emphasis on personal history
and 'taste' takes precedence, at least initially, over an engagement with the mechanics
capital. Yet as I've also suggested, such individualism need not be the necessary result 
this model. If one takes it o
s
then any denigration of the 'tactical' part of 
e
towards the critique of political economy).  
 Admittedly, one may well find this emphasis on military metaphor distasteful (In 
Girum's use of the charge of the light brigade as an image for historical revolt is 
particularly disquieting), but it serves to reinforce the sense in which the theory of 
spectacle's inadequacies oblige the formulation of new theories and analyses. It thus 
also underscores th
c as to its enduring validity. As a result, it provides a more involved framework
into which we can set Debord's claims that “Theories are only made to die in the
time”, and that they “have to be replaced because they are constantly being rendered 
obsolete”:5 for theories, on the interpretation suggested here, would be cast as ele
within a contextual, tactical 'battle', located within a larger strategic and historical 'war'.
This also gives rise to the following. If theory is above all an attempt at a practical 
intervention, then theoretical truth becomes practical truth. This in turn would 
mean that historical agency becomes the ultimate arbiter of theoretical validity. A w
host of difficult issues regarding truth and falsity immediately arise from this, and I'll 
touch on some of them below, but the main point here is simply this: for Debord, it 
would seem, historical agency becomes an ongoing process within which the theory of 
spectacle must be merely one moment amongst many others; a moment that thus invite
its own supersession.  
 In this regard that my earlier claim that the ideas that found the theory of 
spectacle may be of greater import than the theory itself can perhaps be viewed as 
stronger than the simple assertion that one element of this corpus is more intriguing th
another: for it would seem that these notions of praxis are in fact the real core of this 
material, and that the theory of spectacle – somewhat ironically, given its emphasis o
appearance – is just a particular manifestation of something more important. 
 
50-1; 2006, p.1354 5 Debord 2003a, pp.1
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 Once again, however, the problem here is that Debord gives us very little to 
work with. As could be seen in the previous chapter, one is obliged to speculate and 
reconstruct these ideas by drawing links between extant statements; in consequence, 
s f the latter, by virtue of their scarcity, will also be forced to carry more weight 
than may seem advisable.  
 
Spectacle and Foundational Philosophy 
 
 My aim is to develop the model that I outlined in the previous chapter by way
recourse to the 'self-movement' of the H
 of 
egelian absolute, and I'll begin by indicating the 
otential relevance of doing so. This point that can be made by referring to William 
which Maker uses the self-founding 
ovement of Hegelian logic to respond to some of the apparent problems posed by 
mo
 be 
 
e 
ed 
anent, 
 
 
ness, 
stages, but in doing so it also provides its own foundation from its own movement. 
deconstruction are thus said to merely echo the scepticism that the 
                
p
Maker's Philosophy Without Foundations, in 
m
'post dernism'.  
 The “latest fashion in philosophy,” claims Maker, writing in 1994, “is to
against foundations”,6 and to thus undermine philosophy's pretensions towards 
providing a stable basis for truth. Maker however contends that Hegel, despite being a
prime target for such attacks, actually took this very critique to its extreme. Th
Phenomenology, on Maker's reading, shows that consciousness cannot provide a basis 
for truth at all. Hegel himself presents the Phenomenology as the entrance into his 
system, and for Maker the identity of subject and object reached at the book's 
conclusion eradicates the distinction between knower and known, thus precluding 
conscious awareness as a starting point for the Logic; the latter is thus shorn of the ne
to deal with the conscious awareness of beings, and can thereby take up the imm
self-determinate study of being itself in its purity (a point that chimes with Sartre's view 
that to attain the status of in-and-for-itself would entail the demise of consciousness). 
The unfolding of the Hegelian system then reveals the logic inherent within being, and 
does so purely immanently by way of thought thinking itself. Upon returning to its
starting point at its conclusion it founds its own assertions whilst providing a stable,
self-sufficient claim to truth. The Phenomenology thus negates conscious aware
undermining all claims to stable foundations via the self-undermining of its successive 
Postmodernism and 
                                 
6 Maker 1994, p.2 
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Phenomenology answers, and from the conclusion of the latter an internal
truth is said to arise, offering not only a curative to postmodern relativism but also, 
according to Maker, a means towards reconstituting the legitimacy of modernity itself
 Maker is no Marxist, but the fact that he presents the 'anti-foundational' trends 
within philosophy as apologia for contemporary society8 is relevant to the concerns
introduced in chapter seven. For if postmodernism is akin to modern society, and if the
movement of Hegelian logic can chart a path out of its apparen
views on the self-determination of reason may pertain to Debord's views on the need fo
a self-determining historical agency that could build a way out of the loss of history
engendered by the modern spectacle.  
 
Freedom and Presuppositionless Thought 
 
 In order to make that case I'll need to say a little more about these aspects of 
Hegel's work, and we can begin by returning to his association of freedom and 
necessity. For Hegel, “If I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which
am not... [but] I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself.”
 I 
late to 
 a 
n or 
o 
, 
 
              
9 
Freedom is thus self-determination, and ultimately self-causation, as genuine 
independence entails the absence of external contingency. This can be seen to re
Hegel himself. He equated his philosophical project to the Christian obligation to come 
to know God,10 holding that a genuine knowledge of the absolute entailed not its 
description and representation, but rather identity with it (one must find oneself in God, 
etc.); and this is important here, because if the true nature of the absolute relies on
philosophical spokesman, then it cannot be strictly necessary. To be genuinely 
necessary, it must express itself. Hegel's philosophy cannot therefore be a descriptio
representation of the absolute, and nor can the latter's exposition rest on the contingent 
whim of an individual. Rather, there must be something within the absolute that leads t
its articulation within a body of philosophy, and this brings us back to the circular 
motive force of the Concept: for the completion of its movement is a return to self
made after a process of generating and then subsuming otherness. If a body of 
philosophy can lay claim to embody that return to self, then that philosophy can claim
                                   
7 Maker 1994, p.14 
8 Maker 1994, p.12 
9 Hegel 2004, p.17 
10 Hegel 2004, p.14 
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constitution. If freedom is self-determination, we can only attain it by determining 
mining; and that means that in order to be free, we must make 
nely free creatures: not by making ourselves into something other 
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to be not a representation, but rather a direct expression of the absolute.  
 The salient point here is simply this: the full expression of the absolute cannot b
predicated on anything other than itself. If it was contingent on something other than 
itself, then 'God', in effect, would be limited, unnecessary, and finite. This is why H
is so preoccupied with circles: for if the truth exp
genuinely absolute and necessary, then it must reveal the necessity of its own starting 
point. The starting point must be sublated by the conclusion.  
 Hegel's purportedly 'presuppositionless' approach to the study of reason allows 
him to make this claim, and this can be introduced by returning to Kojève's 'end of 
history'. I noted earlier that for Kojève Hegel “reconcile[d] himself” through writing the
Phenomenology” with all that is and has been, by declaring that there will never more
be anything new on earth”;11 I also noted that in the first few pages of the 
Phenomenology's preface Hegel states that “it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth
time and a period of transition to a new era”12 (the same point is made in the Logic, 
where Hegel writes of “the new spirit that has arisen in the sciences no less than in the 
world of actuality”).13 History was not about to come to an eschatological end: rather, 
what Hegel has in mind is far closer to a process of fruition. The world was said to be
pregnant with something new: namely – and I follow Houlgate's persuasive reading here
– a growing awareness of the nature and necessity of freedom. 
 Houlgate, like Maker, also works on Hegel's 'presuppositionless' appro
he offers the following explanations here.14 If freedom is
freedom cannot be granted: we cannot be truly free if we have been made to be 
an external force. Likewise, we cannot simply be free by dint of our own natural 
constitution, as if so our freedom would be contingent upon whatever had shaped that
ourselves to be self-deter
ourselves into genui
han ourselves (as if so what we became would be contingent on what we were), but 
her by making ourselves explicitly into what we already were implicitly (“The 
ence of Spirit,” Hegel claims, “is freedom”, and its history is a process in which it 
ake[s] itself actually that which it is potentially”).15 If our true nature necessarily 
                                             
Kojève 1980, p.168  
Hegel 1977, p.6 
Hegel 1969, p.26 
Houlgate 2005, p.17 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 Hegel 2004, p.17 
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arises from such a process, then in rendering our true nature explicit we must also reveal 
the necessity of that process itself. If the process is the self-movement of the absolu
then in effect, in comprehending that process we come to know ourselves as the self-
consciousness of God. Hence the sense in which Hegel views his philosophy as a 
clarification of the 'truths' accessed by religion. 
 Returning to the issue of freedom: the culmination of this drive towards libe
must entail an understanding of the true nature of reason: for if we do not know the 
nature of thought, Houlgate argues, we cannot be certain that our thinking is not subject 
to error. Errors would mean that our judgements are contingent on factors outside 
control, entailing that we would be un-free. For Houlgate, Kant's critical philosophy
thus a key aspect of the 'birth-time' described in the Phenomenology's preface,16 as it 
sought to derive truth from reason's own self-legislating operation: Kant, according to 
Hegel, had “set [reason] free from all authority.”17 However, if one is to discover the
true nature of reason, then one is obliged to use reason in order to make that discovery; 
and if one is not already in possession of the true nature of reason at the very outse
this project, then one has no way of knowing whether its result is in fact 'true' at all. F
Hegel, this amounts to “the mistaken project of wanting to have cognition before we 
have any cognition, or of not wanting to go into the water before we have lea
to swim”.18 Instead, for Hegel, Kant should have adhered further to his own e
on the self-legislating operation of reason, and allowed it to validate its own 
determinations through its own immanent operation.19   
 Hegel's approach in the Logic is an attempt to ensure that “the forms of 
thinking...are the object and the activity of the object itself.”20 This requires all 
presuppositions – assumptions as to what reason might be, and given determinations
                                                 
16 Houlgate 2006b, pp.12-6 
17 Hegel 1991, p.107 
18 Hegel 1991, p.82 
19 Houlgate (2006b, pp.17-8) draws attention to the following. Kant assumes that divine and human 
thought are distinct: human thought is said to be “discursive” (Kant 1996, p.121), and thus distinct 
from the “intellectual intuition” (Kant 1996, p.103) of a (hypothetical) divine intuition able to acc
objects in themselves, without the mediation of the categories. Houlgate's point is that this is an 
assumption (however reasonable it may seem): any such view should properly be derived from the 
operation of reason alone. If it is instead derived from 'given' experience, then our knowledge of pu
reason must be contingent on what we find, and thus cannot be entirely self-sufficient and nec
ess 
re 
essary. 
Houlgate also draws attention to Kant's claim that “our ability to judge” is “equivalent to our ability to 
think” (Kant 1996, p.132). Kant identifies twelve basic types of judgement, and then deduces the 
ts 
self found, and he can give no reason as to why we have the number and functions of 
 (Kant 1996, p.187; referenced in Houlgate 2006b, p.19). Kant also adopts much 
ble of categories. 
categories that make those judgements possible; his categories are thus predicated on the judgemen
that he him
judgement that we do
of Aristotle's own ta
20 Hegel 1991, p.82 
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s to in The Encyclopaedia Logic as “a consummate 
he 
ught: rather, what unfolds is the inherent logic of 
eing per se. Hence the sense in which this is an ontology as well as an epistemology, 
re) into the natural world. And, 
s this movement returns to its own origin at its conclusion, revealing being to be a 
that might affect its operation – to be disregarded and bracketed out. This is not to d
that the actual motivation of conducting this operation stems from a whole host of 
historical developments (the modern desire for freedom, as expressed in the American 
and French revo
language, etc.),21 yet at the outset of the Logic all are to be put to one side. Thi
however renders it difficult to find a starting point. We must begin somewhere, but to
begin somewhere is to begin with something specific; and if Hegel is to study the way i
which thought mediates itself and produces its own determinations, then he cannot sta
with a determinate concept, as if he did so everything that follows would then be 
founded upon – and thus contingent upon – that initial determination. His study of 
reason cannot therefore begin with an assumption as to what reason or thought ac
are. Likewise, he can have no assumptions as to what – if anything – will arise from t
starting point, and this, notably, means that there can be no such thing as an a priori 
'dialectical method' (reason may prove itself to be dialectical, but we cannot know this 
in advance, and nor can its movement be directed in accordance with an assumed 
dialectical pattern, e.g. the hackneyed 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' schema). He must 
therefore being with what he refer
scepticism”: his 'science' is to be “preceded by universal doubt, i.e. by total 
presuppositionlessness”, entailing “the resolve of the will to think purely.”22  
 The Logic thus begins with the purest, most abstract starting point possible: t
simple fact that thought is. Its first category is thus “Being, pure being, without any 
further determination”23 (this is similar to Descartes' own sceptical method, albeit 
stripped of the ego).24 Thought then begins to move of its own accord, through 
rendering explicit that which is implicit in each formation. Because the 'being' with 
which the Logic begins is devoid of any determinations whatsoever, it's illegitimate to 
claim that this is solely the being of tho
b
and hence also its expansion (in The Philosophy of Natu
a
process that determines itself towards its own full expression and self-consciousness, 
being, for Hegel – i.e. all existence – is revealed to be a self-determinate subject 
                                                 
21 See Houlgate 2006b for useful comments on the relation between presuppositionless thought an
language. 
d 
22 Hegel 1991, p.124 
3 
23 Hegel 1969, p.82 
24 Descartes 1968, p.10
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he immanent self-realisation described above, then we may arrive at a 
m 
(alluding to Spinoza in the Phenomenology's preface, Hegel writes that “the living
Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth
in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-other
with itself”).25  
 One can see why Postone, Arthur and others might be intrigued by the 
possibility of emphasising the Hegelian aspects of Capital, and of thereby using the 
self-movement of the absolute as a way of thinking about the operation of capital.
have here the identity of ends and means, a tendency towards subsumption, and self
perpetuating movement. However, as I indicated in the conclusion to part two, it ma
also be attractive to relate these themes to a model of praxis. Hegel's presuppositionle
thought is rendered anti-dogmatic by virtue of its 'consummate sceptic
recognises no authority other than itself; furthermore, if it could be connected to the 
notions of subjectivity and situation described earlier, then it might also be amenabl
the 'strategic' task of addressing emergent contexts and problems (we might note here, 
with reference to Hegel's claim that Kant tried to learn how to swim without getting 
wet, that for Clausewitz teaching strategic theory in the absence of praxis is akin to 
learning to swim on dry land).26  
 This can be facilitated by returning to the themes of universality and 
particularity considered in part two. As we saw, Hegel's philosophy claims not to 
impose a universal structure on the particular elements that it articulates, but rather 
derives such universality from them. If that sense of organic unity can be viewed in 
relation to the operation of collective praxis, and if the agency of the latter can be 
connected to t
model able to sustain and develop Debord and the S.I.'s claims as to the unity of for
and content within political agency. Rather than thought thinking itself, we would then 
have historical agency directing itself. 
 
The Problem Posed by Presuppositionless Thought 
 
 There is however a very obvious problem here: how can one go about applying 
thi d to 
the n 
    
s 'presuppositionless' approach to the given, contingent data of material reality, an
 equally given orientation of a political project? The difficulty is in fact greater tha
it might seem. Those within the Marxist tradition may not be overly troubled by a 
                                             
Hegel 1977, p.10, emphasis in the original 
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oulgate indicates that Hegel can only be criticised on his own terns, Maker goes so far 
orld in any way. I've claimed, 
llowing Houlgate, that Hegelian logic is both epistemology and ontology. Yet for 
aker, nd 
                                                
philosophical prohibition of engaging with the material and the political, but the 
presuppositionless challenge is worth taking seriously: for its very lack of 
presuppositions invalidates any attempt to incorporate it into a different model by 
automatically invalidating anything other than itself. For Houlgate, “any criticism 
levelled at Hegel from a position other than that of radically presuppositionless though
will necessarily stem from a thinking that is less self-critical and so more dogmatic tha
presuppositionless thought itself”, because “any such thinking by definition will 
uncritically presuppose some principle or other.”27 This is significant in relation
Marx's critique of Hegel, as any attack made upon the determinations derived from 
presuppositionless thought will involve more presuppositions, and will thus be more 
contingent and less necessary than presuppositionless thought itself.  
 This does not mean that Hegel is above criticism, and nor does it mean that he
must be absolutely correct (he himself admits that given more time he would have 
revised 
th s of these arguments, then the only criticism that can be levelled at Hegel is that
he is not presuppositionless enough, i.e. that the transitions in the Logic do not follow
each other immanently, but rather reflect Hegel’s own external intervention.29 In fa
Houlgate's reading suggests that after Hegel all philosophy ought properly to be 
Hegelian philosophy: where Kant hoped to leave to his “descendants nothing more that 
the task of arranging everything in the didactic manner...without their being able to 
increase the content”,30 Houlgate's Hegel only leaves his own descendants the task of 
refining the Logic's determinations, so as to ensure that its transitions are genuinely 
immanent.31  
 Maker presents a similar challenge, but in a rather different manner. Wher
H
as to argue that genuine reason cannot engage with the w
fo
M  the Phenomenology does not show that consciousness and its object are one a
 
27 Houlgate 2006b, p.37 
28 Hegel 1969, p.42 
e certainly seem to be the case. Magee (2001) points out the influence of alchemy, 
d hermeticism on Hegel's work; if the correspondences with such bodies of 
ed from the nature of thought itself, then Hegel's books really can be viewed as 
unyard 2009 for a review of Magee's book). 
hasis in the original 
y 
egel endeavours to carry out in his Logic” (Houlgate 2006b, p.39, emphasis in 
29 This would of cours
mysticism, magic an
thought are deriv
grimoires (see B
30 Kant 1996, p.13, emp
31 “Strange though it may seem to say, most, if not all, post-Hegelian philosophy is thus in fact logicall
pre-Hegelian in that it has still to carry out the radical self-criticism demanded of any modern 
philosophy and that H
the original). 
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the same – thus providing a “ladder”32 to the Hegelian system's onto-logic for all tho
unwilling to give up the presupposed distinction between the ideal and the material – 
but rather shows consciousness to cancel itself out as a solid ground for philosophical 
truth: for if the identity of knower and known is complete, then neither term makes any
sense, as the distinction that defines them is lost (a point also made by Carlson,3
one that seems to jar with Hegel's concern with identity in difference). For Maker, the 
Logic cannot therefore be an ontology at all: for if it described a form of reason that was
also inscribed in a world of objects, it would remain within the “perspective of 
consciousness”,34 i.e. engaged in establishing truth through the relation of subject to
object. In marked contrast to many of Hegel's own statements – and in a manner tha
requires some gymnastics when dealing with The Philosophy of Nature35 – Maker thus 
holds that Hegel's philosophy “is most definitely not an idealist metaphysics”,36 but
rather a normative, regulative body of categories and laws derived from pu
a  
 Hegel's presuppositionless approach, for Maker, thus generates an entirely pure 
measure of truth, but one that cannot incorporate any reference to that which it is to 
measure. It cannot in consequence contain any prescriptions as to how it might be 
applied to specific circumstances (as if so it would be tainted by the given). This me
that any attempt to 'use' its determinations must fall outside it.37 Maker thus claims
“for Hegel, unlike Marx, there can be no strictly philosophical theory of praxis”,38 a
philosophy is to be a purely self-contained system of pure reason alone. In this respect, 
Maker's reading perhaps exemplifies what Debord would perhaps view as the proble
of this entire approach: namely, the contention that truth might be found in the 
seemingly static, self-referential dimension of a thought separated from action. 
 
A Possible Response to the Presuppositionless Claim 
 
 This can be explained as follows. For Hegel, “Reason is the Sovereign of the 
                                                 
32 Hegel 1977, p.14 
33 Carlson 2007, p.10 
34 Maker 1998 
 Maker 1998 
hat can be actually established by modes of cognition which assume 
givenness and which take account of given in their actual employment fall outside of the system” 
). 
35
36 Maker 1994, p.121 
37 “In strict terms, questions of w
(Maker 1994, p.39
38 Maker 1994, p.44 
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c  reason is the truth of the world because in effect it ultimately is the world (Hegel 
himself states that “Reason is the substance of the Universe”).40 According to Maker, on 
the other hand, reason is a detached sovereign: it constitutes an absolute truth towards 
which the world is to aspire, and against which it can be measured. Maker thu
highlights the assumption (perhaps, if it's not too trite: the presupposition) upon which
this approach rests, because he takes it to an extreme: namely, the contention that truth
and freedom are linked to a necessity that stands over and above the contingencies of 
lived reality, and that genuine, Hegelian reason is an eternal absolute, and thus not 
contingent upon the economic and cultural determinants of its era. In other words, 
Maker's account brings to light the sense in which Hegelian presuppositionless thoug
from what might be posited as Debord's perspective, could be viewed as separate
thought: a thought that operates in abstraction from real historical praxis.  
 That in itself does little to rebut Houlgate's claim that all non-Hegelian 
philosophy can be viewed as being more contingent, and thus less valid than Heg
philosophy itself. Yet as noted, the entire enterprise of presuppositionless thought can be 
seen to rest on the contention that freedom equates to necessity; and as we've alrea
seen, with Debord freedom is linked to a consciousness of present necessity, i.e. an 
ability to negotiate chance and contingency. Truth and necessity are linked to self-
determination with Debord, but always in terms of the need to address a particular 
circumstance. Consequently, the truth that affords historical freedom cannot reside in an
unchanging, separate system: such a system might rather be viewed in terms of the 
Feuerbachian alienation of practical power into a heaven of pure thought, t
c plated as an unchanging, static order. Whilst this does not refute Houlgate's 
demand directly, it does posit an alternative claim: the assertion that truth can only 
derive from the pure, immanent necessity of presuppositionless thought could thus be 
countered by the opposing contention that truth is in fact connected to a more practical, 
in the previous chapte
short of Hegelian true infinity – means that one can, perhaps, adapt some of these 
tions of self-determinate process to it. 
esuppositionless Praxis 
                                                 
Hegel 2004, p.9 39 
40 Hegel 2004, p.9 
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 In order to illustrate the ways in which that might be possible we can look at 
some of Lefebvre's own related objections to Hegelian philosophy. In his Dialecti
Materialism of 1940, which Debord would certainly have read – and whilst noting that 
Hegel “claims not to admit any presupposition at all” – Lefebvre writes that 
“Hegelianism, being a system, involves one essential presupposition”: namely, that a 
philosopher might “grasp the entire content of human experience”.41 This claim is in 
fact inaccurate (Hegel does not claim omniscience, and nor does he aim to detail every 
contingent aspect of reality), but the idea that informs it is relevant. Lefebvre continues:
“If this content [of the absolute] is, as Hegel says it is, infinitely rich”, th
attained only through the joint efforts of many thinking individuals, in a progressive 
expansion of consciousness.”42 Admittedly, this notion of 'expansion' evokes the 
perpetually receding goal of the 'total man', but it is pertinent; partly because Debord 
shares a degree of bad infinite progression with Lefebvre,43 but also because the latter's 
remarks bring him close to the position that I've attributed to Debord. If, as with 
Lefebvre, the infinite 'content' of the Idea is linked to an infinite historical process, the
the absolute in effect becomes that process, and not a discrete point reached at its 
conclusion. This view recalls the reading of the absolute that I presented in chapte
by way of reference to Hyppolite. As we saw, for Hyppolite history does not end at the
attainment of absolute knowing, and Spirit does not retreat into pure self-referentiality: 
rather, what emerges is a perpetual movement of self-conscious self-determination (as 
indicated earlier, on this view the Concept's continual self-separation can only become 
present to itself in consciousness if that consciousness is itself temporal).  
 Furthermore, Lefebvre also contends that the unfolding determinations of that 
process “dissolves” the “static determinations attributed by Hegel to the Idea, [and] to 
knowledge, to religion and to the state”.44 This would seem to be especially true with
Debord, given the importance of chance and contingency to that process. The collectiv
                                                 
41 Lefebvre 1969, p.48 
42 Lefebvre 1969, p.48 
43 In his 'Conscious Changes in Everyday Life', a paper delivered in 1961 (via a tape recorded in a 
briefcase) to Lefebvre's research group on everyday life, Debord made the following claims: “if we 
regard everyday life as the frontier between the dominated and undominated sectors of life [a 
re consciously controlled and those that are 
ance and uncertainty, it would be necessary to replace the present 
re's 
44 
distinction made by Lefebvre between areas of life that a
not], and thus as the terrain of ch
ghetto with a constantly moving frontier; to work ceaselessly towards the organisation of new 
chances” (S.I. 2006, p.95; Debord 2006, p.578). This constantly moving frontier is close to Lefebv
receding goal, but I would propose that each instance of that process, insofar as it is a Situationist 
engagement with chance, is itself a moment of that goal.  
Lefebvre 1969, p.104 
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 in this regard, 
and can be seen to pertain to the issue of representation and separated power. If in order 
to function strategically such collective agency is obliged to reformulate itself in 
accordance with the exigencies with which it is faced, and if it is set against separation 
and marked by a unity of form and content in that respect (Debord's proletariat 
“demands a universal critique of separation”, obliging it to “assume a form adequate to 
[that] task in its action”),45 then the forms that it adopts in response to these exigencies 
would seem to be required to arise from the movement and interrelation of the particular 
individuals involved. Thus in contrast to the themes of alienated universality discussed 
in part two we might then have a more organic, dynamic social totality.  
 My suggestion then is that if, as Debord states, the agency discussed here “has 
no goal [n'a pas d'objet] aside from whatever effects it works upon itself”,46 then 
Hegel's account of a thought that thinks itself could perhaps be linked to a historical 
agency that shapes itself and its world. In place of a lack of presuppositions we might 
instead have a lack of fixed structure, dogma and representation;47 and rather than the 
immanent self-determination of pure reason, we would have an emergent, immanent 
political will. My earlier contention that Debord would seem to cast the absolute as the 
grounds rather than the goal of action could then be qualified with the following. 
 With Hegel, the famed restlessness of the negative is a process of change that 
takes place within a relatively static, eternal structure (i.e. that of being). With Debord 
on the other hand, subject-object unity moves by way of its identity with the negativity 
of time, thus changing its world and itself in the process. The absolute thus becomes a 
'passageway', to use the S.I.'s own terms, rather than a state of being, and requires 
strategic engagement with the contexts and situations that it works upon. Thus where 
with Hegel the immanent, self-determinate movement of reason takes place according 
to its own sovereign necessity, and accepts no determinations other than those that it 
generates from itself, with Debord we would seem to have a political movement that 
shapes itself, and which accepts no external authority, nor the establishment of fixed 
dogma and hierarchy within itself. Hence my earlier contention that the reading 
advanced in this thesis might be able to re-cast Debord's work as a basis from which one 
                                                
dimension of this historical subjectivity become particularly important
 
45 Debord 1995, p.85, translation altered; 2006, p.816 
47  
46 Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.792 
Debord stated as early as 1957 that “eternity is the grossest idea a person can conceive of in 
connection with his acts” (S.I. 2006, p.41; Debord 2006, p.326), and for the S.I. no revolutionary 
organisation could last beyond its period of relevance: following the events of May 1968 Debord 
commented that “from now on we are sure of a satisfactory consummation of our activities: the S.I. 
will be superseded” (S.I. 2006, p.325; Debord 2006, p.963). 
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could pursue an almo   st anarchistic approach to Hegelian Marxism.48
                                                 
48  This would be in marked contrast to contemporary trends in anarchist thought, as the recent move 
towards 'post-anarchism' (named after post-Marxism, and characterised by the adoption of postmodern
philosophies) is also a move away from philosophers like Hegel. As the editorial to a recent post-
 
anarchist journal puts it: “I believe that we are living through a post-anarchist moment. ...one of the 
many great things about post-@ is that it means we can be done, finally, with Hegel” (Call 2010, p.9). 
ents on Badiou and post-anarchism.   See Noys 2008 for useful comm
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Conclusion to Part Three 
 
 
A Theory of Praxis and a Theory of Spectacle 
 
 I introduced the possible relevance of Hegel's presuppositionless thought at th
outset of chapter nine by way of reference to the Comments' description of modern 
society, and in connection to the problems that the spectacle's loss of history poses for 
political agency. Whilst making reference to Maker's contention that thes
e 
e aspects of 
egel's work might offer a means of charting a way out of postmodern relativism, I 
uggested that linking these ideas to Debord's views on historical, strategic agency 
ight also offer a way out of the integrated spectacle. I would not pretend that Debord 
ould necessarily have framed these ideas in the same way, or indeed approached them 
y the route that I've taken, but I would suggest that what I've outlined here is perhaps 
lose to what he may have had in mind when indicating that “history” might “return to 
s” after its spectacular “eclipse”.1 As I pointed out at the beginning of this thesis, 
istory for Debord is not a catalogue of past events, but rather something to be 
onsciously made. Thus, with reference to the points indicated above, one could 
ontend that what we've arrived at is a model of political agency geared towards 
reating its own history; and whilst Debord's own recommendations in this regard 
voured the pursuit of individual 'taste', the ideas that I've sketched here in part three 
re more oriented to collective praxis, and imply detailed engagement with the 'terrain' 
at this agency is required to cross. It would, in other words, seem to be obliged to 
enerate theoretical analyses of the contexts and situations with which it is faced. Whilst 
ebord and the S.I.'s desire to move beyond Marx's 19th century account corresponds to 
is need, the abstract subjectivism that resulted from their rejection of economic 
eterminism and structuralism does not. Hence my suggestion that the ideas that 
nderlie the theory of spectacle would seem to point beyond it.  
Yet as is no doubt apparent, we've moved in these last sections from an attempt 
 use Hegel as a means of illuminating Debord towards noting the possibilities that 
ebord might offer as regards an approach to Hegel. To an extent, this has been present 
roughout the thesis: as I admitted in the preface, Debord does not state explicitly that 
e is taking the Hegelian absolute as the template for praxis; I myself have drawn this 
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1 Debord 1998, p.73; 2006, p.1636 
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inference from the many statem
be accused of overstating my c n order to set out a broader 
rgument as regards the possibilities that this material might hold for further work, and I 
ould suggest that the problems that I've identified within the theory of spectacle render 
issible: for it seems far more productive (and indeed in keeping with 
e material itself) to pursue what might be taken from Debord's work rather than to 
imply
ents that would seem to imply it. I could in consequence 
ase. However, I've done so i
a
w
this approach perm
th
s  study it as a static object. With that in mind the conclusion to the thesis will now 
outline some of these implications, particularly vis a vis the degree to which Debord's 
account could serve as a means of considering collective political will.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Validity and Will 
 
 I think it can be suggested that the claims set out in chapters eight and nine poin
towards something akin to a notion of general will. Rousseau himself maintains that the 
general will “cannot be represented”,1 and the ex-Situationist T.J. Clark one 
commented, albeit without further qualification, that “the Debord-Rousseau comparison 
is inescapable”.2 I would suggest that the most interesting aspect of this link is the 
connection between the self-legitimating operation of a Rousseauian general will and 
that of the model of agency described above (which I've suggested to be just as self-
validating as the Hegelian logic that serves as its template). In order to bring the th
as a whole to a conclusion I'll make a few further remarks on this subject before 
summarising some of the thesis' central claims.  
 The most obvious point of reference here is The Philosophy of Right. Ther
Hegel equates right to the conditions of freedo
t 
esis 
e 
m, and derives the latter by examining the 
ll 
end 
 
and 
ord, 
 
concept of a will that wills itself, and which thereby wills the conditions for its own fu
expression. As noted earlier, political freedom for Hegel cannot be found in the 
individual's submission to the dictates of a separate, universal law, but rather in each 
individual finding him or herself 'at home' within a system of laws and conditions that 
derive from the necessary, intrinsic nature of their own free will. Hegel does not pret
that everyone will recognise that state as embodying their own freedom, and he 
acknowledges that some may see it as an imposition upon their own individual 'caprice'.
He does however maintain that such individuals would be mistaken if they did so, 
this claim pertains to his departure from Rousseau. Like Hegel, and indeed like Deb
Rousseau (as Rose puts it) casts freedom as “communal social activity”.3 Yet for Hegel 
the Rousseauian will has no necessary tendency towards a specific formation (such as 
the rational state): it has only “the particular individual in their particular caprice” as its
“primary and substantive basis”.4 Rousseau's general will, for Hegel, does whatever it 
wants, and whatever it wants and does is right; its directions and formations are steered 
                                                 
1 Rousseau 2008, p.127 
2 Clark in Jappe 1999, p.viii 
3    Rose 2007, p.48 
4    Hegel 2005, p.xlvi 
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 its members. In contrast, Hegel attempts the immanent 
 state 
lways realise it), not from mere opinion or choice.”5  
 
.I.'s work is bound to act towards the perpetuation of its own conditions of existence, 
ian 
errors', as his account precludes 
al 
 
pen-ended self-determination an actual possibility: 
amely
f 
nd 
the S.I.'s post-revolutionary future of endless play (although certainly not an absent 
ght such an error be identified? 
 might one identify 
n 'authentic' as opposed to an 'inauthentic' political agency, and by what merit could it 
h that unity does not simply refer to an identity between thought 
er is not alienated 
only by the whims of
philosophical derivation of the necessary, logical content of will itself. This leads him to 
conclude that free will can only fully exist in specific circumstances, i.e. within a
derived from “what the will must will in order to be free (even thought it may not 
a
 As I suggested in chapter four, it may be possible to infer something similar 
from Debord's account. The historical agency that can be drawn from his own and the
S
and is thus in this sense also a 'will that wills itself'. Of course, from a strictly Hegel
perspective Debord could be seen to repeat Rousseau's '
fixed structures and formulations. Yet there is a sense – supported by the teleologic
dimensions of Debord and the S.I.'s work – in which the full expression of freedom lies
in the conditions that render free, o
n , the end of capital, the abolition of work, the re-appropriation of society's 
technical capacities, and (certainly in the S.I.'s earlier years) the realisation of art in the 
construction of situations. I'll return to this in a moment, as regards the possibility o
deriving an ethics from Debord and the S.I.'s work; first however I'll indicate the 
reasons why it might be important to do so.   
 If the agency modelled here is obliged to re-create the grounds of action as it 
negotiates its various contexts, and if this operation entails negotiating chance a
contingency – i.e. making choices and acting on the basis of limited knowledge – then 
surely there's a sense in which it may go awry. Whilst that may be less of a problem in 
one), it does matter within the present context, i.e. in terms of the actual practicalities of 
a political movement. For what becomes particularly important here is not so much the 
issue of choosing badly, but rather that of identifying whether this will might will 
something other than itself. For by what criteria mi
Addressing this may offer a response to the following question: how
a
be accorded the rather grand title of 'historical'? These are questions that bring us back 
to the issues attendant to subject-object unity that I raised in the conclusion to part one 
(i.e. the degree to whic
and action, but rather to a context in which objectified social pow
                                                 
5 Houlgate 2005, p.209 
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o ilar response to the question of validity as 
ecounts the following: 
ukács...told me that his Party was – with regard to him – in the right, even though he was, in his 
he Party, since the Party after all embodied the objective historical 
ation, whereas his own advanced position (based only on himself and the mere logic of thought) had 
ailed behind this objective situation.9  
e 
95 
consciousness in history and what it does in it. For example, [Marx's] Capital is obviously true and false: 
                                                
from its producers). 
T  a degree, Debord actually has a sim 
that of Rousseau. When discussing majoritarian democracy the latter makes the 
following, perhaps unsettling claim (for a relevant critique of which see Wolff):6  
 
When ... the opinion contrary to my own prevails, this proves only that I have made a mistake, and that 
what I believed to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had prevailed against the 
general will, I should have dome something other than what I had willed, and I should not have been 
free.7  
 
 This perhaps echoes Lukács' views on the Party to a degree.8 Adorno, in his 
lectures on negative dialectics, r
 
 L
thoughts and arguments, against t
situ
tr
 
 As we saw earlier, Debord objects to Lukács' views on the Party, and opts 
instead for a far less hierarchical rejection of all forms of representation. Yet allied to 
this is the sense in which validity lies in the absence of representation and external 
determination, and this leads Debord to accord the revolutionary proletariat the sam
legitimating function that Lukács attributed to the Party.  
 This can be seen in an important letter from 1971, in which Debord discusses the 
possibility that his theory might be wrong. Highlighting the sense in which its 
legitimacy would be validated retrospectively and by the movement of history (a point 
that would seem to be greatly informed by his reading of Clausewitz),10 Debord writes: 
If the concept of spectacle is radically false (because it can indeed be relatively 'false' –  and thus 'true' for 
historical thought – in that it is only 'the maximum of possible consciousness' at this moment in society, 
which one will explain much better after one has left it behind or when one will be more advanced in the 
endeavour to leave it), then I have said a thousand other things in my book that are just (of which 9
come from comrades from the past), but they all contain something erroneous, because I have not 
understood or reassembled them on the basis of this concept.11  
 He then continues, in a passage to which I referred earlier: 
 
But if the concept of spectacle is an error, fuck! The whole book collapses. However, I do not know a 
better one on the subject that occupies us, which is a detail that leads us to the fundamental question of 
 
7 
 Lukács 1971, p.237  
compare Debord 2004b, pp.3-5; 2006, p.1657 with Clausewitz 1993, p.192 and passim. 
, p.456 
6 Wolff 1998, pp.50-7 
7 Rousseau 2004, p.12
8 For an example of Lukács' rejection of Rousseau see
9 Adorno 1965 
10 For example, 
11 Debord 2004a
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 political project that achieves a degree of 'recognition'? For 
xamp nal 
 
ism 
essentially, it is true, because the proletariat recognised it, although quite badly (and thus also let its error
pass), etc.12   
 
 Debord seems to indicate that the real measure of truth lies in the degree t
which it is 'recognised' and acted upon by the 'proletariat'. Yet doesn't this provide a 
justification for any
e le, is it not the case that the German proletariat of the 1930's 'recognised' Natio
Socialism in some sense? The Nazis gained power by expressing the dissatisfactions of 
the day, in however distorted a form. How then could one claim that the adoption of
Marx's Capital was an act of recognition, whereas the acceptance of National Social
was an act of misrecognition?  
 
The Validation of Theory 
 
 The second of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach includes the following claim: “The 
question [as to] whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory”, but rather a “practical question”; for “Man must prove the truth — 
i.e. the reality and power...of his thinking in practice.”13 A static, reflective identity 
between thought and world is thus replaced by an emphasis on establishing the
identity through action, or rather through the actualisation of thought in praxis. This no
doubt informs Debord's position, but it doesn't resolve the problem: for if thought 
becomes 'true' when realised in action, then presumably any thought pushed throu
into reality would be just as 'true' as any other. It can however be qualified by way of 
reference to Marx's famous letter to Ruge of September 1843 (to which Debord all
in The Society of the Spectacle),
ir 
 
gh 
udes 
rinaire way” (“Here is the truth, kneel down before it!”).15 Here Marx 
principles”, as through doing so it becomes possible to “show the world what it is really 
fighting for”.16 In other words, the task of the critic is to identify immanent historical 
 direction in society. Phrasing this in a Hegelian vein, Marx writes that 
“Reason has always existed, but not always in a reasonable form”;  in other words, the 
    
14 in which Marx warns against confronting the world 
in a “doct
advocates “develop[ing] new principles for the world out of the world’s own 
tendencies and
17
                                             
Debord 12 2004a, p.457 
14 
15 
17 
13 Marx 2000, p.171 
Debord 1995, p.92; 2006, p.820; see 2006 pp.868-9 
Marx 1843 
16 Marx 1843 
Marx 1843 
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ficacy,19 although this is qualified by the sense in which such theory cannot 
ffer en e' 
developing tendencies;21 these tendencies, and indeed history per se are shaped and 
 
as 
rea r if 
the
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su  
av
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course and direction of historical movement exists implicitly within social reality, but 
needs to be rendered explicit so that it can be identified and understood. Through 
identifying such tendencies, Marx explains, the critic would “develop the true reality as 
[existing reality's] obligation and its final goal.”18 'True' reality is thus the immanent 
negation of present reality.  
 If this second statement on truth is used to qualify the first, truth can then be 
seen as a practical process in which the theory that identifies that negation is actua
in the attempt to realise such change. This, I would suggest, bears direct relation to
Debord and the S.I.'s own views. Theoretical truth, in their work, seems to lie in its 
practical ef
o tirely arbitrary formulations, but must rather identify and articulate the 'bad sid
of history at work within the present.20 So, truth lies in history; history is marked by 
cr rstood in Debord's broad sense of the term
all those with a desire to advance the present moment). Hence Debord and the S.I.'s 
diness to claim that they expressed a set of concerns immanent to their times: fo
ory is to clarify and articulate such a movement,22 it cannot be imposed upon it from 
thout (a position that perhaps echoes, in suitably 'inverted' form, Houlgate's 
ntention that anything other than presuppositionless thought must be less valid than 
ch thought itself: here immanent historical praxis alone can claim validity). Yet if the
oidance of separation stands as a criteria for legitimacy, then we may have the 
ginnings of a response to the problems indicated above: for whilst one could contend 
t one might just as easily 'give voice' to a popular fascist movement, the latter, 
ofar as it fosters separation and hierarchy, would be less valid than a movement that 
 not.  
The implication would then be that truth lies not only in praxis, but rather in a 
                                            
eated by the revolutionary proletariat (unde
 
Marx 1843 
e.g. “The truth of a concept is...revealed...by the coherence of its use in theory and in practical life” 
(S.I. 2006, p.239; 1997, p.494).  
Following the events of May 1968 Debord claimed that he and the S.I. “had prophesied nothing. We 
had simply pointed out what was already present... The merit of the Situationists was simply to have
recognised and pointed out the new focuses of revolt in modern society” (S.I. 2006, p.290; 1997, 
p.572). 
See S.I. 2003, p.123; Debord 2006, p.1158 for remarks on predicting the evolution of such tendencies
doing so is said to become easier at insurrectionary moments, which for Debord concentrate divers
processes into a nexus of possibility. 
It is in turn clarified and tested by it: “Historical struggles...correct and improve all theory of this 
kind” (S.I. 2003, p.30; Debord 2006, p.1105). 
18 
19 
20 
 
21 ; 
e 
22 
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form of praxis that aims at the supersession of separation.23 As I've indicated, this 
fact follows from the very concept of spectacle itself, insofar as the latter's falsity
from the separation that it fosters. Thus whilst a body of theory may be 'recognised' a
acted upon, perhaps even achieving practical success, it only merits the term 'historical' 
if it forms part of a drive towards the actualisation or further expression of the 
conditions of freedom, i.e. the supersession of hierarchy, separation and of the alienation
of social power. Marx's talk of 'developing new principles for the world from the 
world's own principles' could then be taken to pertain not to the identification and 
furthering of any arbitrary tendency, but rather those that accord with a drive towards 
freedom.  
 As I've indicated several times in the thesis I would suggest that this could b
seen to imply a form of ethics,24 in that it pertains to the legitimation of social relations
                                                 
23 See for example Debord 1995, p.48; 2006, p.793 
24 Given the importance of Spinoza's own ethics t  Negri's account, and following M.Beatrice Fazi's 
persuasive claim that The Ethics deserves its name in that it presents a theory of constitutive relations, 
this point provides an opportunity to make note of the similarities and d nctions between his work 
and that of Debord; something that I simply do not have room to treat in the thesis proper. It is 
o
isti
howe
more
 
ed 
laim that 
sumption'. 
 
ion 
ith 
ly 
y opaque 
lds that 
time serves as the measure of labour value, insofar as socially average labour time reduces particular 
labours to the common, general substance of abstract labour; for Negri, the only way in which 
value 
al 
n broad terms as a 'power to act', and being less associated 
rxism in theorising forms of immaterial labour are thus taken not as a sign of a 
the degree to which social production, or 'life' – now viewed in terms 
bstance' – is ready to slough off its old capitalist skin. The similarities to 
 the problems: Negri collapses 
ciety into a kind of monism, rendering capital largely indeterminate (See Noys 2010 
d is 
ism is 
at substance “must be 
ver important: partly because of  Debord's interest in Italian politics in the 1970's and 1980's (for 
 on this see Kinkle 2010), but also because it offers the opportunity to set Debord's Hegelian 
paradigm against Negri's Spinozism (Macherey 1997 would provide a useful framework for such a 
discussion). The following remarks are intended only to orient my reading of Debord vis a vis Negri's
views on time, political opposition and the critique of capital. In Empire Hardt and Negri describ
The Society of the Spectacle as “perhaps the best articulation, in its own delirious way, of the 
contemporary consciousness of the triumph of capital” (Hardt and Negri 2000, p.427);  a c
was no doubt due to the echoes between Debord's spectacle and Negri's version of 'real sub
In Marx's original formulation, the formal subsumption of labour denotes the adoption of existing
forms of production as means of producing capital, whilst real subsumption refers to the reformulat
of these means in accordance with the demands of surplus-value extraction. Yet just as is the case w
Debord and the fetish, Negri's extension of Marx's concept jars with its original formulation: explicit
rejecting the labour theory of value (Negri 2009), Negri claims that within conditions of real 
subsumption there is no longer any 'outside' to capital. For example, in his quite astonishingl
'The Constitution of Time' (2003) Negri inserts an 'aporia' into Marx's value theory. Marx ho
complex forms of labour can stand as aggregations of more simple labour is by reference to the reality 
of that complex labour, i.e. to its concrete difference; thus something 'external' to the measure of 
is used to explain what should properly be fundamentally 'internal' to it. Within real subsumption this 
'aporia' is resolved: because there is no longer any 'outside', labour and life blur (echoes of Debord 
once again). This is connected to Negri's adoption and development of the concept of 'immateri
labour'. Labour comes to be considered i
with discrete commodities and forms of labour it becomes increasingly 'measureless'. The difficulties 
met by classical Ma
theoretical failing, but rather of 
of a primary, Spinozist 'su
Debord's theory are of course particularly evident here, but so too are
the entirety of so
pp.106-25; see also Aufheben 2006). Negri's interest in time as the ground of oppositional politics is 
also similar to that of Debord, but Negri's Spinozist positivism affirms rather than negates, an
oriented towards 'being' rather than 'becoming' (See Negri 2004); arguably, it loses the adaptive and 
strategic dimensions of the latter that can be found in Debord. One might also wonder if Spinoz
best suited to the linkage of time to political opposition: Spinoza states th
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imed at a common good. I must however be careful here, as Debord and the S.I. 
e as a means towards considering 
 
er to the 
 As 
 
s' 
he 
notably, Bakunin makes a similar point: 
Man”, he writes, “is truly free only among equally free men”;29 one might also add 
 recognised similar issues is itself open to 
ebate).30 
ion 
lf-
a
consistently described morality in terms of ideology, and frequently denounced 
individuals who'd warranted their disfavour as 'moralists'.25 Nonetheless, one could 
contend that these aspects of Debord's work might serv
the problem of establishing a politics on an existential basis (one might also add that 
Debord, albeit as early as 1952, once stated that a “science of situations” would need to
“incorporate...morality” amongst its other elements).26 De Beauvoir's own answ
problem set by Sartre's philosophy was to contend that “freedom wills itself genuinely 
only by willing itself as an indefinite movement through the movement of others”.27
I noted in chapter eight, Debord can perhaps be seen to have adopted something rather
similar. For example, when discussing the organisation of the S.I. and the forms of 
social relations that the group were working towards, he referenced Marx and Engel
call in the Manifesto for “an association, in which the free development of each is t
condition for the free development of all”28 (
“
that the degree to which Marx himself
d
 Debord's comments on the acknowledgement of theory do often involve a not
of recognition. Yet as there is no a priori human essence involved, the commonality to 
which this pertains must presumably stem from the sense in which all such human 
subjects are, or at least should be, 'one with time': all are potentially free, se
determining creatures. If the creation of conditions in which that self-determination 
might flourish are also those in which the alienation of collective power is abolished, 
then each has common cause in instituting conditions amenable to this state of affairs. 
                                                                                                                                               
conceived without any relation to time, but [rather] under a certain species of eternity” (Spinoza 1996, 
p.60), and presents its manifestation as political will as an expression of God's (timeless) nature 
(Spinoza 2004, p.292). Following Noys, I'd thus suggest that the positivity of Negri's account can be 
taken to undermine the critical, oppositional and strategic dimensions of political agency; the more 
negative and Hegelian framework of Debord's own views on temporality might lend itself to a 
resolution of some of these problems.  
25 “Stirner”, according to the S.I., was “not wrong” in saying that “moralists sleep in the bed of religion” 
(S.I. 1997, p.553). 
27 
er 
d hence needs ethical mediation. This universal…must be actualised 
is 
. 
26 Debord 2003a, p.4; 2006, p.63 
De Beauvoir 1976, p.90 
28 S.I. 2003, p.83; Debord 2006, p.1135; Engels and Marx 1985, p.105 
29 Bakunin 1866 
30 Arthur writes the following: “Marx only dimly perceived that class interest as a universal stands ov
against the members an
theoretically and practically for effective action against capital. But what sort of universal is this? It 
not to be conceptualised abstractly, that is to say as transcending difference, but concretely, as 
including difference…” (Arthur 2004, p.238, emphasis in the original)
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e revo
itherin le time of 
ique 
level of the 'sphere of circulation', and within its 
beral framework of “Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham”.33 Rather, the ideas 
to what would seem to be akin to a notion 
f general will, give added impetus to the critique and supersession of capital. This 
This position could perhaps be developed via comments such as the following: 
 
Th lutionary project of a classless society, of a generalised historical life, is also the project of a 
w g away of the social measurement of time in favour of a playful model of the irreversib
individuals and groups, a model in which independent [but] federated times are simultaneously present. It 
is the programme of the total realisation, within the medium [milieu] of time, of the communism that 
abolishes 'anything that exists independently of individuals'31.32 
 
 This is of course not to replace a critique of capital with ethics. As we saw in 
part two, Marx does not offer a merely moral critique of capitalism: he shows that the 
inequality that it engenders cannot be remedied by a more equitable means of 
distribution, but is rather intrinsic to capital itself; thus, to offer a merely moral crit
is in some sense to remain on the 
li
outlined here, if taken with their connections 
o
accords with my earlier attempt to cast the theory of spectacle and its failings as a 
moment within a broader historical agency.  
 
A Theory that Points Beyond Itself 
 
 Having discussed the validation of theory within Debord's account we might 
now ask how his own theory might itself be validated by these criteria. Firstly, insofar 
as they sought to identify trends and tensions within their present era, he and the S.I. 
were undoubtedly successful, and perhaps even prescient to a degree: they 
unquestionably saw May 1968 as a validation of their claims, and Debord's comments 
 
d 
ave 
nt-
on the integrated spectacle's fusion of its diffuse and concentrated predecessors came 
one year prior to the fall of the Berlin wall.34 Yet as regards its ability to be used in any
practical sense the theory falls short.35 Debord was certainly right to try to move beyon
Marx's 19th century account, but the manner in which he and the S.I. attempted this g
rise to the problems detailed in part two. As we saw in part one, the romantic and ava
                                                 
31 Cf. Marx 2000, p.196: “The reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for 
rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals”. 
32 Debord 1995, pp.116-7, translation altered; 2006, p.836, emphasis in the original 
33 Marx 1976, p.280 
34 See Debord's preface to the third French edition of The Society of the Spectacle (1992) for furthe
remarks on this topic. 
35 On an admittedly anecdotal level: I was 
Reclaim the Streets movement that Debo
r 
once told by someone involved in the Situationist-inspired 
rd and the S.I.'s work made for great slogans, but were of 
little further use. For comments on this movement see Meaden 2009. 
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re 
garde aspirations of the S.I. were not an ornament to an otherwise traditional ultra-le
critique, but rather indications of the real scale and militancy of their ambitions; yet as 
argued, the subjectivism that founds that romanticism undermines the theory's efficacy.  
 Thus perhaps even on its own terms this is a theory that invites is own 
supersession: for if one draws out the ideas that inform and underlie it, one can measure
it against what would seem to be its own criteria for validity and find it wanting in some
respects. Yet these same ideas also imply its further development and advancement. If 
one does adopt such a perspective it is perhaps possible to find a whole set of ideas he
that may be worth developing and advancing in their own right; ideas that are very 
different from the visual cultural and media studies approaches to which Debord's 
account is most often subjected.  
 
Précis of the Thesis' Primary Arguments  
 
 I began by setting out the importance of time and history to Debord's wo
showed that attending to these themes can serve to illuminate his theory of spectacle
point that I then illustrated by way of reference to some of the existing readings
work which tend to take his visual terminology in a reductively literal manner. In 
contrast, I argued that the spectacle is the culmination of a line of historical 
development towards the separation of social power from those that constitute it; yet in 
the same respect, it is also a point at which the conscious unity between that power and
its producers might be achieved. Thus whilst the concept of spectacle is mod
(Kojèveian reading of) Hegel's end of history, it is also presented as a potential en
pre-history. 
 I also argued that this pertained to some of the peculiarities of what would seem 
to be Debord's Hegelian Marxism. For Debord, the conscious awareness of historical 
praxis that was to emerge from the spectac
rk, and 
: a 
 of his 
 
elled on a 
d of 
le was given its first formulation by Hegel, 
ular 
of his 
ed 
al of 
but in a manner that reflected the limitations imposed by his own historical context; 
what Hegel took to be an 'end' is in fact a beginning, as the self-determinate circ
identity of thought and practice, subject and object that Hegel places at the apex 
system is in fact the grounds of self-determinate historical action (albeit conceptualis
in ideal, cosmological terms). Marx's inversion of Hegel is thus understood not as the 
transposition of ideal categories onto economic phenomena, but rather as the revers
perspective involved in replacing Hegel's retrospective, contemplative stance with 
230 
m. Yet 
ontending that there are 'no un-free acts', Debord's Hegelianism entails that 
al fre
 
. 
h a negativity that remains detached and separated from its observers. In 
e looked at the sense in which the S.I.'s early avant-garde concerns built 
n the Surrealists own desires to release that negativity, and to realise it in lived praxis 
 
future-oriented, pro-active agency.  
 This Hegelianism is however also inflected by existential ideas. There is no 
intrinsic, a priori identity to the human subject: rather, the latter is 'one with time', and 
this entails that there is no necessary telos to history other than a desire for freedo
rather than c
re edom lies in the conditions of self-determinate activity, i.e. in the subject-object 
unity that Hegel mistook for history's end. Yet because the subject is finite and located
in time, any such moment of unity must aim at another, so as to perpetuate that freedom
Historical agency thus becomes an agency that aims at itself, and which is obliged to 
negotiate the present in order to do so. This is therefore also a strategic agency: a point 
that can be qualified by noting the importance of the finitude and contextuality implied 
by Debord's concerns with time.   
 These claims were introduced in part one by way of a discussion of Debord and 
the S.I.'s early years, in which I used the theme of tragedy to unite the material in 
question. In chapter one we looked at some of the salient aspects of French 
Hegelianism, particular as regards its association with time, consciousness and 
negativity, and I argued by way of reference to Bataille that the Hegelian system's 
'closure' could be seen to be a 'tragic spectacle': for it afforded a safe, neutered 
communion wit
chapter two w
o
through the unity of life and art; in chapter three we then saw that those concerns bore 
direct relation to the S.I.'s interest in the everyday, and also to the import of 
existentialism. However when looking at the latter I suggested that the continual 
rejection of the dialectic's resolution could be seen to be just as tragic as its 
instantiation, and by way of a discussion of Debord's relation to Lefebvre I argued that
his account based the 'openness' of his own dialectic on a form of circular closure, i.e. 
the subject-object unity discussed above.  
 Part two, which focussed on the years surrounding The Society of the Spectacle, 
then took up the theory of spectacle itself in some detail, reading it through the 
connections that it and Marx's account share with Hegel's antipathy to forms of 
universality that stand abstractly opposed to the particular entities that they unite. In 
chapter four I presented a more detailed reading of the spectacle, arguing that it could 
not be reductively equated to the commodity fetish; in chapter five I discussed the 
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, 
atter uses Marxist concepts whilst undermining their bases; this results in 
ifficu
s 
d in 
ion. 
 spectacle. Through doing so I also reinforced my 
arlier claim that the theory of spectacle could be located as a specific, historically 
ontextual moment within a broader notion of strategic, self-determinate agency.  
 
onclusion
commodity fetish itself, and in chapter six I demonstrated Debord's departure from the 
latter. These differences were shown to be closely connected to Debord's shift away 
from the labour theory of value, which I argued presented problems for Debord's work
insofar as the l
d lties as regards identifying quite what capital is, and thus how it might be 
addressed.  
 Having thereby argued that the theory of spectacle jars with the strategic aspect
of the ideas that inform it I then set out in part three to reconstruct Debord's notion of 
historical agency, particularly vis a vis his later emphasis on strategy. In chapter seven 
we looked at Debord's Comments, and I showed how that text could be interprete
the light of the themes of time, history and subjectivity set out in part one. Chapter eight 
then offered some speculations on the connections between Debord's interest in strategy 
and his Hegelian Marxism, in which I returned to my earlier contention that it can be 
seen to link a focus on the Hegelian absolute to an existential notion of self-constitut
This was then developed in chapter nine, where I suggested that linking this to the 
'presuppositionless' aspects of Hegel's philosophy might offer a response to the apparent 
problems posed by the integrated
e
c
 
C  
Towards the end of part two we looked at the work of Moishe Postone and Chris 
rthur, whose 'systematic' dialectic departs from the 'historicist' dialectic favoured by 
ebord and the S.I. As I indicated there, their departure from a historicist approach is 
erhaps informed in part by the deeply problematic history of Hegelian Marxism, and 
y its association with Stalinism and Party orthodoxy. I hope however to have shown 
at Debord's work can be seen to indicate a rather different, non-dogmatic and anti-
ierarchical version of 'historicist' Hegelian Marxism; one far closer in spirit to 
narchist, libertarian communist and councilist approaches. I've claimed that it implies a 
rm of collective agency that involves the contextual development of theory, and the 
upersession of any static structure; particularly, and perhaps most importantly, those 
ithin its own forms of organisation. Debord's critique of representation, when related 
to such agency, implies the rejection of all hierarchy and centralisation. I've thus argued 
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that it perhaps implies a theory o  broader in focus than the 
machinations of an avant-garde elite, and perhaps, albeit more tentatively, an approach 
ould be to go beyond the scope of 
is present work, but I hope to have shown that they are perhaps deserving of further 
refere  but 
hat 
 
at lea
releva t those ideas in detail, having presented a critique of the theory 
ich 
they m e developed, I hope to have substantiated my opening contentions in this 
 serves to 
which perhaps point beyond it.  
 
 
 
 
f collective political will,
to existential ethics. To develop those claims further w
th
investigation. 
 In this respect I'll close by returning to my opening remarks, where I made 
nce to Debord's claim that “the S.I. is like radioactivity: one speaks little of it,
one detects traces of it almost everywhere, and it lasts a long time.”36 I suggested t
the theory of spectacle might be amongst the least 'noxious' aspects of this material, or
st advanced in its process of decay. Yet the ideas that inform it may have a longer 
half-life, and may be of greater resource as regards this material's contemporary 
nce. Having set ou
of spectacle and having also made some provisional indications as to the ways in wh
ight b
respect. We might then close with the following statement: addressing the theory of 
spectacle through its basis in Debord's concerns with time and history not only
clarify the meaning of the theory, but also highlights the themes from which it arises and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Debord 1979b 
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